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The Taiwan Voter
The Taiwan Voter examines the critical role that ethnic and national iden-
tities play in politics, illustrated by the case of Taiwan. That country’s 
elections often raise international tensions, and they have sometimes led 
to military demonstrations by China, as in the 1995– 96 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. Yet no scholarly books have examined the ways in which Taiwan’s 
voters make their electoral choices in such a dangerous environment. 
Critiquing the conventional interpretation of politics as an ideological 
battle between liberals and conservatives, The Taiwan Voter demonstrates 
that in Taiwan the party system and the voters’ response to it are instead 
shaped by one powerful determinant of national identity— the China 
factor. The book also takes up Taiwan’s voter turnout, “pocketbook vot-
ing,” and the effects of the new electoral system adopted in 2004.
Taiwan’s electoral politics draws international scholarly interest be-
cause of the prominence of ethnic and national identification in its 
politics. Of course, identities matter almost everywhere. In most coun-
tries, though, the many tangled strands of competing identities pres-
ent a daunting challenge for scholarly analysis. Taiwan, by contrast, is a 
country where the cleavages are both powerful and limited in number, 
so that the logic of the interrelationships among issues, partisanship, and 
identity are particularly clear. In this book, Christopher H. Achen and 
T. Y. Wang bring together experts on Taiwan to investigate the ways in 
which social identities, policy views, and partisan preferences intersect 
and influence each other. These novel findings have wide applicability 
to other countries, and thus they will be of interest to a broad range of 
social scientists interested in identity politics.
Christopher H. Achen is Professor of Politics and Roger Williams 
Straus Professor of Social Sciences at Princeton University.
T. Y. Wang is Professor of Politics and Government at Illinois State 
University.
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This book began at a conference in Taipei, Taiwan, on March 24, 2013. The 
Election Study Center of National Chengchi University hosted all the au-
thors for an intense discussion of how a book about the Taiwan voter might 
be written. (A few contributors were “virtual attendees” via an Internet link.) 
Preliminary versions of chapters were presented and thoroughly discussed. 
After additional reviews and revisions, this book was accepted for publica-
tion by the University of Michigan Press.
The Election Study Center has provided extensive administrative and 
financial support to this project from the beginning. The book would have 
been impossible without the research excellence and professional colleague-
ship of the members of the Center. Their warm hospitality to each editor on 
multiple occasions has been a highlight of our professional lives.
A great many people and institutions also helped make The Taiwan Voter 
possible. T. Y. Wang’s research sabbatical was funded by the Chiang Ching- 
kuo Foundation and Taiwan’s National Science Council (now called the 
Ministry of Science and Technology). He also received a Summer Faculty 
Fellowship from Illinois State University to support this project. A grant 
to Wang from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy paid for editing and 
other expenses of preparing the book for publication review. The Open Ac-
cess edition was funded by the Top University Project of National Chengchi 
University, made possible by a grant from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education. 
Princeton University’s Politics Department and Illinois State University’s 
Department of Politics and Government also helped with logistical support 
and research funding.
Larry Bartels, during his time as director of Princeton’s Center for the 
Study of Democratic Politics, hosted a small conference that helped build a 
foundation for this book. Michele Epstein and Helene Wood provided the 
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administrative support to make the conference successful. We thank all three 
of them.
Achen remembers with respect and gratitude his former colleague Tang 
Tsou of the University of Chicago Political Science Department, now de-
ceased, who arranged a first visit to Taiwan. The trip was paid for by Taiwan’s 
Government Information Office, which was then directed by Dr. Shao Yu- 
ming. That eye- opening initial encounter with the people of the island led to 
the professional relationships that have made possible Achen’s participation 
in this project.
The anonymous reviewers for the University of Michigan Press gave us 
two rounds of thoughtful comments and criticism. The book is much bet-
ter for their efforts. Gail Schmitt and Carissa L. Tudor provided editing 
assistance, and we are in their debt as well. We also thank our editors at the 
University of Michigan Press, Melody Herr and Mary Francis, supported by 
Danielle Coty, for their enthusiasm about our project and for their encour-
agement and guidance through the publication process. We have also very 
much appreciated the unwavering support of the series editor, Mic Laver.
To analyze Taiwan voters’ political attitudes and electoral behavior, the 
contributors to this volume have utilized multiple waves of survey data, ag-
gregate electoral data, and information gathered through focus group in-
terviews, all collected on the island during the past two decades. Most of 
the data used in this book are taken from Taiwan’s Election and Democra-
tization Study (TEDS). This long- running series of representative national 
samples of Taiwan voters is the gold standard for academic election studies 
in Asia. The coordinator of the multiyear TEDS project is Chi Huang of 
the Election Study Center and the Political Science Department at National 
Chengchi University, Taipei, and the data are managed and distributed by 
the Election Study Center. More information is available on the TEDS web-
site (http://www.tedsnet.org).
Other data sources for the book include the Taiwan National Security 
Survey (TNSS), sponsored by the Program in Asian Security Studies under 
the directorship of Emerson Niou of Duke University, and also a number 
of individual surveys conducted by the faculty of the Election Study Cen-
ter, many of whom are contributors to this volume. Focus group interviews 
conducted by the faculty and staff of the Election Study Center also appear 
in subsequent chapters. Su- feng Cheng is the principal investigator for those 
projects.
The Taiwan Voter would have been impossible without all these data, 
and we very much appreciate the assistance that all these individuals have 
provided us.
Preface  ix
We also owe thanks to a great many students and colleagues for advice 
and encouragement along the way. Achen is particularly grateful to the other 
members of the “Gang of Four dinner group,” Da- chi Liao, Pei- shan Lee, 
and Vincent Wang, for their support and inspiration. Wang extends his grat-
itude to Ali Riaz for his encouragement and friendship through the years.
We are grateful to all those who have helped us. However, our interpreta-
tions of the TEDS, the TNSS, and other data are our own. Each author in 
this volume takes sole responsibility for the remaining errors and misjudg-
ments in what he or she has written.
Most important, the editors thank our wives, Tena Achen and Christine 
Lee, for their patience with our overseas absences and their tolerance of our 
frequent lengthy work days while we finished editing this book. Our grati-





Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang
Taiwan’s recent history is a remarkable saga. During the two decades from 
1970 to 1990, Taiwan underwent dramatic economic change, as its gross do-
mestic product grew at an average rate of 9 percent per year.1 The economic 
success rapidly propelled Taiwan into the ranks of the newly industrialized 
countries. Democratization arrived in the late 1980s, too, with robust elec-
toral competition between the two principal parties. The long- ruling, for-
merly authoritarian party was beaten at the polls in 2000 and handed over 
power peacefully, only to return in 2008 in an equally peaceful transition 
when its opponents lost. A third peaceful transition between parties took 
place in 2016. An impoverished Asian one- party authoritarian state had be-
come in a few decades a prosperous, vibrant democracy.
The Taiwan success story has generated considerable scholarly interest. 
The initial studies focused on economic growth— the “Taiwan miracle” 
(e.g., Chan 1988; Clark 1987, 1989; Wang 2000). In the ensuing decades, 
scholarly research shifted its focus to Taiwan’s political miracle, first the de-
mocratization and then the establishment of stable party competition (for 
example, the chapters collected in Tien 1996). As time has passed, however, 
Taiwan’s domestic political economy has become a more typical example 
of the stresses, debates, and achievements of a rich democracy. Economic 
growth and employment, energy policy, the environment, public works, and 
many other familiar topics are frequent subjects of debate in Taiwan. How-
ever, those concerns are not unique to the island.
Taiwan’s uniqueness lies elsewhere— in its relationship with China. No 
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other topic or relationship plays so central a role in Taiwan’s politics. It 
structures foreign policy; it structures the political party system; it structures 
much of how ordinary citizens orient themselves to politics. The fundamen-
tal role of “the China factor” will be explicitly or implicitly discussed in 
many chapters of this book.
In The Taiwan Voter, we focus on ordinary citizens’ political preferences, 
attitudes, and choices since the onset of democratization. To study the causes 
of voting, we take up the conventional “big three”— party identification, is-
sue orientation, and candidate evaluation— since there is a general consen-
sus in political science literature that they exert influential effects on voting 
(Jacoby 2010). But to those three, we add a fourth— identity. In particular, 
we look closely at national identity, since it looms so large in Taiwan voting.
Though our concerns are primarily with citizens rather than with elites 
and institutions, we take note of institutional features of Taiwan democracy 
that shape the choices presented to its citizens. One chapter is specifically 
devoted to the recent change in the electoral rules that seems to have put 
Taiwan on its way to a classic two- party system.2
In this volume, we are reporting on one country, but our focus extends 
well beyond it. The study of Taiwan politics leads rapidly to interesting, 
sometimes difficult, theoretical puzzles. Why have citizen identities, usually 
taken as relatively fixed features of people’s political lives, evolved so rapidly 
in Taiwan, while simultaneously one particular identity cleavage centered on 
“the China factor” has become increasingly consolidated as the most impor-
tant political division in the country’s politics? In the presence of this cleav-
age, how do Taiwan citizens3 make their electoral decisions? We intend to go 
beyond the usual country study to ask questions like these. Implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, this book suggests comparisons with other countries 
that share one or another of these unusual features of Taiwan’s politics, such 
as Japan, Canada, Ireland, and Israel. More generally, our findings have im-
plications for every country in which national identities have large effects in 
electoral politics. Thus, we attempt to contribute not only to making sense 
of Taiwan, but more broadly to the theoretical understanding of democratic 
elections in general.
Using single- country studies to generate theoretical understanding has a 
long tradition in political science, and in electoral research in particular. The 
Columbia studies under Paul Lazarsfeld demonstrated the powerful role of 
group memberships and loyalties in American electoral decisions (Lazars-
feld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). 
Angus Campbell and his Michigan colleagues’ seminal work, The American 
Voter, showed how partisan identity shaped not only the vote but also the 
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very way that citizens perceive the political world and form their political 
opinions (Campbell et al. 1960). David Butler and Donald Stokes’s Political 
Change in Britain (1974) traced class conflict in politics, the parental trans-
mission of partisanship, and the importance of local context in determining 
vote choices. A great many other articles and books, far too numerous to list 
here, have been devoted to such topics as voter turnout, economic voting, 
electoral institutions, and strategic voting in particular democratic systems 
around the world. No one would say of these contributions that they taught 
us only about the country in which they were carried out.
This point is particularly relevant in East and Southeast Asia, where 
electoral studies are few and our understanding is thin. It seems to us 
critically important to build a knowledge base for each democracy of the 
region. At present, no one could write a competent comparative volume 
called The Asian Voter: when the foundation stones are missing, no struc-
ture can be erected.
The problem of too little Asian country knowledge is also visible in some 
recent important contributions to comparative electoral behavior. For ex-
ample, Thomassen (2005) compares what is known about electoral behavior 
across the European democracies. Evans and De Graaf (2013) study how 
class voting varies across Europe and the Anglo- Saxon countries. Carlin, 
Singer, and Zechmeister (2015) use the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project data at Vanderbilt University, among other sources, to show how 
partisanship, ideology, and economic factors have different force in dif-
ferent countries across Latin America. We are impressed by the depth of 
scholarship amassed by the many contributors to these edited volumes. But 
we are equally impressed by how often Taiwan fails to fit the conceptual 
frameworks they put forward. Of course, none of these three books deals 
with Asia; their agenda lies elsewhere. But even when Taiwan is explicitly 
included in the set of countries studied, as in Dalton and Anderson’s (2011) 
comparative investigation of how the institutional and party- system features 
of each country create a context that shapes how citizens think and act in 
electoral politics, the fit is odd. Too often, Taiwan is assimilated conceptually 
to countries with a European- derived culture that it does not share. We go 
deeper into this topic in chapter 9 and in the concluding chapter 12. For the 
present, it suffices to say that we make no apologies for focusing on Taiwan. 
Getting each country right is a prerequisite to reliable comparisons, both 
within continents and regions and across them.
Thus we intend this volume to join the ranks of similar books on political 
behavior, such as The Japanese Voter (Flanagan et al. 1991) and The Irish Voter 
(Marsh et al. 2008). Like them, this book studies one country, but it does 
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so as part of an international effort to understand electoral behavior in a 
variety of democratic systems. While we draw primarily on Taiwan’s politics 
as observed in the multiyear nationwide surveys of the Taiwan’s Election and 
Democratization Study (TEDS) and the Taiwan National Security Survey, 
we aim to speak to those interested in elections everywhere.
The Relationship to China
Taiwan at its closest point is only a little more than 100 miles from the 
Chinese mainland. Like any small polity next door to a powerful coun-
try, Taiwan necessarily pays careful, even obsessive attention to its neighbor. 
Indeed, Taiwan’s politics revolves around the relationship with China. For 
Taiwan’s citizens, the relationship to the mainland is multifaceted. China 
represents simultaneously a cultural heritage, a security threat, and an eco-
nomic opportunity.
Cultural Heritage
Taiwan’s cultural inheritance from the Chinese mainland is undeniable. 
Although its first settlers seem to have come from what is now the Phil-
ippines and Indonesia, Taiwan’s modern history can be traced to the mid- 
seventeenth century, when residents from the coastal areas of China mi-
grated to the island to escape from the war and devastation on the mainland. 
In that same period, the Portuguese arrived on the island, which they called 
“Formosa” (“beautiful”). The Dutch and Spanish also founded settlements. 
In the Tainan area, the oldest inhabited part of Taiwan, a temple still stands, 
dedicated to two gods with unmistakable white features. By 1684, however, 
China’s Qing dynasty had driven out the Europeans and established a local 
government on the island. The Qing maintained at least a nominal admin-
istrative relationship with the island for the subsequent two- plus centuries. 
Like many dynasties before it, the Qing dynasty eventually collapsed under 
the weight of corruption and administrative failure. During the collapse, 
and in the wake of the First Sino- Japanese War, Taiwan’s sovereignty was 
ceded to Japan in 1895, beginning another colonial experience, this one 
lasting half a century.
Although the initial stage of Japanese rule was marked by the island 
residents’ armed resistance, insurrection was soon quelled by the colonial 
authority’s adroit combination of repression, co- optation, and assimilation. 
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In some respects, the Japanese treated Taiwan as their own province, and 
they began its modernization. Certainly Taiwan was treated better than most 
other countries conquered by Japan just before and during World War II. 
During the colonial period, some Taiwan people adopted Japanese names 
and became naturalized Japanese citizens.4 Many young people were drafted 
and served in the Japanese military during the war.
At the end of the war, Japan unconditionally surrendered to the Allied 
forces. Taiwan’s sovereignty was returned to China, then led by the Nation-
alist (Kuomintang or KMT) government under Chiang Kai- shek. Chiang 
and two million of his mainland followers retreated to the island in 1949 
after being defeated by the Communist troops on the Chinese mainland. 
To maintain their claim that they remained the sole legitimate rulers of the 
mainland, KMT leaders preached “recovering the Chinese mainland” as the 
sacred national mission. The eventual unification of Taiwan and China was 
taken as a given.
The Chiang regime also took a series of measures to “re- Sinicize” local 
residents in order to foster a Chinese identity. A China- centered curricu-
lum was established in schools. Maps of the nation showed all of China, 
including the mainland, Taiwan, and all areas claimed by China, such as Ti-
bet. Schoolchildren were taught in Mandarin, and their use of local dialects 
was punished. Ethnic television and radio programs were restricted as well. 
These measures, combined with the shared culture and languages stemming 
from the ancestral homeland, led many Taiwan citizens to view China as the 
principal source of their racial and cultural heritage. In some cases, they saw 
Taiwan and China as a political unity as well. In one or another sense, they 
identified as “Chinese” (Wang and Liu 2004). This ensemble of affective and 
historical ties continues for many Taiwan people to the present day, though 
increasingly in attenuated form.
Security Threat
The Chiang regime generally encountered a warm welcome from island resi-
dents after the KMT forces first arrived on Taiwan in 1945. But the initial 
enthusiasm of many local residents for returning to the ancestral “mother-
land” was substantially dampened when they saw the mainland troops sent 
to take control of the island. Impoverished and poorly educated, many of the 
soldiers were seen as beggars and thieves, less disciplined and capable than 
the Japanese they replaced. Nationalist officials in turn viewed the islanders 
with suspicion due to the half century of Japanese colonial rule. By 1947, 
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the animosity between the KMT government and local residents culminated 
in the bloody crackdown against Taiwanese elites by Chiang’s troops, a tragic 
event known as the “2– 28 Incident” (Kerr 1965; Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991). 
This outbreak of hostility solidified the perception, especially in the older 
generation, of the KMT government as simply a new foreign regime and 
occupying force, this time from China rather than from Portugal or Japan.
While the Chiang regime actively advanced its claim to be the legitimate 
ruler of China, Beijing’s leaders made the same claim, and they attempted 
to forcibly unify Taiwan with the Chinese mainland. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, several major battles were fought over Kinmen (also known as 
Quemoy) and Matsu, two small islands near the mainland but occupied by 
Taiwan. Although the 1970s saw a shift of Beijing’s strategy away from a 
reliance on the “military liberation” of Taiwan to a wave of “peaceful initia-
tives,” Chinese leaders have refused to renounce the use of force to resolve 
cross- Strait disputes. To force Taipei into acceptance of its unification for-
mula, known as “one country, two systems,” Beijing has isolated Taiwan 
internationally and has backed its claim to the island with the threat of 
military action.
As China increasingly won the diplomatic battle on the world stage, Tai-
wan went through a series of political changes toward democratization since 
the late 1980s. These included lifting martial law, legalizing political par-
ties, ending restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech, and the 
popular election of the president. The pace of democratic reform quickened 
after the pro- independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed 
in 1986 and became the island’s first major opposition party. An atmosphere 
of political tolerance emerged on the island as opinions different from the 
“one China” principle were permitted. Blaming President Lee Teng- hui for 
condoning a Taiwan independence movement on the island, Chinese lead-
ers launched several missiles into the seas around Taiwan in an attempt to 
influence, first, the 1995 Legislative Yuan election, and then Taiwan’s 1996 
presidential election. The misguided effort backfired, with most Taiwan ob-
servers estimating that Lee’s successful reelection effort was aided by the 
Chinese saber- rattling (Garver 1997; Cooper 1998, chap. 4).
During the 2000 presidential election campaign, Beijing leaders em-
ployed the tactic of a “paper missile,” a White Paper on cross- Strait relations 
that promised military intervention if Taiwan moved toward independence. 
This attempt to disrupt the momentum of the pro- independence candidate, 
Chen Shui- bian of the DPP, probably backfired again. Contrary to China’s 
expectations, these threats provided Chen with a late boost and a narrow 
margin of victory. Chen’s election was a milestone in Taiwan’s political de-
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velopment, and it illumined the sharp contrast with the mainland’s politi-
cal system, as political power was peacefully transferred from one political 
party to the other on the island for the first time and indeed on any terri-
tory where ethnic Chinese rule. While Beijing has subsequently moderated 
its unsophisticated and ineffective attempts at intimidating Taiwan voters 
(Tung 2005), especially after the China- friendly Ma Ying- jeou of the KMT 
was elected president in 2008, it has continued to aim more than a thousand 
short- and medium- range missiles at the island. As many in the older gen-
eration saw the authoritarian KMT as an illegitimate Chinese occupation 
force, younger generations now often see China under Communist Party 
rule as an authoritarian and less developed country with an aggressive mili-
tary posture. In consequence, much of the Taiwan population views China 
as a threat to their economic prosperity and democratic way of life.
Economic Opportunity
Perhaps surprisingly, cross- Strait economic exchanges have flourished dur-
ing the past two and a half decades despite tense political and sometime 
military relations between Beijing and Taipei. Since the ban on contacts 
between Taiwan and China was lifted by the Taipei government in 1987, 
economic exchanges between two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased 
dramatically. Cross- Strait trade rose from $3.9 billion in 1989 to $31.2 bil-
lion in 2000, and further to $102.3 billion in 2007, despite the restrictive 
policies imposed by Taiwan’s pro- independence Chen administration from 
2000 to 2008. Taiwan investment in the Chinese mainland also increased, 
from $421 million in 1991– 92, to $2.6 billion in 2000, and to about $10 
billion in 2007.5 Along with these investments, many Taiwanese investors 
have now relocated to the Chinese mainland.
The trade and investment flow seems unlikely to be slowed by politi-
cal intervention in the near future. Reversing its predecessor, the Taipei 
administration under Ma relaxed trade restrictions. Since 2008, the Tai-
pei government has reached more than a dozen accords with Beijing and 
has also signed the landmark trade deal known as the Economic Coopera-
tion Framework Agreement (ECFA).6 Nor is trade liberalization likely to 
be substantially slowed now that the opposition has again taken power in 
2016. The pro- independence DPP has always had concerns about Taiwan’s 
increasing economic integration with the Chinese mainland, worrying that 
expanding cross- Strait exchanges would increase the island’s dependence on 
China and endanger its national security. Yet the DPP leadership increas-
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ingly recognizes the importance of the Chinese market to Taiwan’s economic 
growth and prosperity, as demonstrated by the party’s ambivalent campaign 
platform on cross- Strait relations during the 2012 and 2016 presidential 
elections and by the frequent visits to the Chinese mainland by key DPP 
politicians.7 Even for the most anti- China politicians and citizens on Tai-
wan, the trade and investment opportunities across the Strait in the world’s 
most populous country are too lucrative to ignore. Well- armed, sworn en-
emies can still do business.
Taiwan thus has a complex and ambivalent relationship with China 
that is characterized by cultural affinity, security menace, and opportuni-
ties for economic prosperity. Precisely because cross- Strait ties are close but 
unsettled, they have formed the basis of the key political cleavage on the 
island that has effects on every aspect of Taiwan’s politics. In particular, this 
multifaceted relationship forces island citizens to decide whether they are 
Chinese, Taiwanese, or both. It also forces them to take a stand on Taiwan’s 
future relations with China— the issue of “unification vs. independence”— 
also known as the tongdu issue. In turn, both these decisions are deeply 
implicated in voters’ partisan identifications.
The Central Political Cleavage in Taiwan
Taiwan is an immigrant society within the Chinese diaspora. The shared lan-
guage, culture, and ancestral homeland help shape the identities of Taiwan 
citizens. For a small number, the Chinese identity may preclude any national 
identification with Taiwan: they follow the KMT’s traditional one- country 
view of China, of which Taiwan is a province. For these citizens, “I’m Chi-
nese” means a great deal, including adherence to the position that there is 
only one China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that Chinese citizens are 
subject to the authority of the legitimate rulers of China (who are in Taipei). 
This view is essentially consistent with Beijing’s official position, the sole dis-
agreement being over the location of the legitimate all- China government.
At the other extreme, a Taiwan citizen may say, “I’m Chinese,” mean-
ing no more than an Irish- American does when she says proudly on St. 
Patrick’s Day, “I’m Irish,” even though her ancestors have been in North 
America for nearly 200 years and her sole national loyalty is to the United 
States. She would think it bizarre if Ireland claimed sovereignty over her. In 
short, among different citizens of immigrant lands like Taiwan or the United 
States, identification with the country of ancestral origin ranges from deep 
to superficial, and in some cases may be equivalent to outright rejection. 
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Indeed, the Allied war on the Axis powers in Europe during World War II 
was led by a German American, Dwight Eisenhower. 
Identities may be central to personality, but even the deepest remain poten-
tially malleable. Unexpected events or changes in an ancestral country’s behavior 
can transform the complex of emotion and historical memory that constitutes 
national identity. The transformation can go in either direction, as Taiwan’s his-
tory illustrates. A pan- Taiwanese identity first emerged after the Qing govern-
ment ceded the island’s sovereignty to Japan (Ching 2001). This development 
was soon impeded by the Japanese colonial authority’s comprehensive assimila-
tion policies (Brown 2004; Chu and Lin 2003). Then, after Taiwan’s “glorious 
return” to Chinese rule might have provided an opportunity for the consolida-
tion of a Chinese identity, instead the 2– 28 Incident created a deep divide, par-
ticularly between the resident Minnan and the newly arrived mainlanders, often 
creating parallel differences in national and political identity.8
As chapter 3 explains, the Minnan/mainlander divide became increas-
ingly blurry with the progression of time. Through politicians’ conscious 
efforts, social contacts among various ethnic groups, interethnic marriages, 
and the spread of education, understanding, and respect among the vari-
ous ethnic groups have been improved and ethnic conflict reduced. As a 
new generation of islanders has matured into adulthood, many have become 
relatively indifferent to the historical memories that had divided their com-
munities in the past.
Simultaneously, many Taiwan citizens have been increasingly frustrated 
by the international isolation imposed by the Chinese government. Bei-
jing’s international application of its “one China principle” has significantly 
compressed the island country’s international space. Chinese leaders persis-
tently maintain that the Republic of China, the official name of Taiwan, has 
lost its legitimacy and that Taipei has no legal right to establish diplomatic 
relations with foreign governments or to participate in any international 
organizations with statehood as a membership requirement. The grow-
ing importance of China in international affairs has led many countries to 
break relations with Taipei as a prior condition for establishing official ties 
with Beijing. The number of nations having official relations with Taiwan 
dropped significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout the subsequent 
two decades, only about 30 countries, most of them small, diplomatically 
recognized Taiwan, and Taipei had membership in just a handful of interna-
tional governmental organizations.
Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation coincided with a period of rapid 
economic growth and democratization on the island, leaving many in Tai-
wan with the sense that their lack of standing in the world community was 
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discordant with their economic and political achievements. China was seen 
not only as a hypothetical military threat but also as a chronic irritant— an 
alien economic and political force opposed to their interests and self- respect. 
The Chinese missile tests during 1995– 96 and military threats in 2000, both 
intended to intimidate Taiwan, raised the issue forcefully: Surely, Taiwan 
people said, no self- respecting country would treat its own citizens that way. 
Increasingly, the island’s citizens began to question the Chinese aspect of 
their identities. Were they still Chinese, or had they now become just Tai-
wan people?
Taiwanese identity rose in parallel with sympathy for Taiwan indepen-
dence. The two attitudes reinforced each other, with powerful implications 
for Taiwan’s politics. The previously unquestionable “sacred mission” of uni-
fying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland during the island’s authoritarian 
era was now reconsidered in the minds of many island citizens. An increas-
ing number of the island residents began to view Taiwan as a separate and 
independent political entity, not part of China (Wang and Liu 2004). The 
way was prepared for the pro- independence DPP to become what it had 
never been previously, a serious contender for political power. The precise 
causal relationships are not easily sorted out, but the association was clear 
and powerful: as Taiwan people increasingly abandoned their identity as 
Chinese, they became ever more likely to support the opposition DPP and 
the cause of Taiwan independence (Liu and Ho 1999). All these forces, com-
bined with a more moderate DPP campaign platform and a split in the 
KMT, paved the way for Chen’s victory in the 2000 presidential election 
(Rigger 2001, chaps. 8 and 9).
During the subsequent eight years, the pro- independence DPP govern-
ment, like the Chiang regime before it, selectively endorsed some aspects of 
Taiwan’s historical memories. To reinforce the idea that the island is a politi-
cal entity separate from China, the “greater China nationalism” promoted 
by the KMT authoritarian regime came under severe attack during Chen’s 
administration (Greene 2008). Chen’s de- Sinicization measures, along with 
Beijing’s tactics of diplomatic isolation, have had substantial effects on citi-
zens’ identity. By the time President Ma took office in 2008, more than 
half of the island residents were Taiwanese identifiers and very few of them 
subscribed to the Chinese identity alone. In total, 90 percent of the island 
residents considered themselves either purely Taiwanese or holders of a dual 
identity— regarding themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. In the view 
of some observers, the combination of Chinese threat and active govern-
mental attempts to reinforce Taiwan consciousness has made inevitable “the 
ongoing consolidation of the Taiwanese nation” (Schubert 2008, 111).
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The Taiwanese/Chinese divide has now gone beyond individuals’ attach-
ment to ethnic groups and has become embedded in different political com-
munities at the national level. The contestation between the two identities 
is now more than the debate over Taiwan’s sovereignty and has become the 
key political cleavage of the society, commonly known as the issue of “uni-
fication vs. independence.” While this political cleavage involves the debate 
over Taiwan’s ultimate sovereignty, it also structures opinions about how to 
interact with a rising China in the meantime. In all these ways, preferences 
about the island’s relationship with the Chinese mainland have been and 
continue to be the most important issue of the society, while all other cleav-
ages are distinctly secondary. Consequently, Taiwan can be characterized as 
a single- issue society, since the main cleavage affects almost all aspects of the 
island citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors. Most notably, it is reflected 
in the voters’ partisan identifications.
Indeed, Taiwan’s political landscape has undergone significant change af-
ter the formation of the DPP in 1986. During the ensuing process of rapid 
democratization, the previous authoritarian system dominated by the KMT 
was transformed with the emergence of multiple minor political parties 
as spin- offs from the KMT. After Chen Shui- bian of the DPP was elected 
president in 2000, Taiwan’s multiparty system increasingly moved into two 
distinctly separate and relatively equal political camps— the Pan- Blue Alli-
ance and the Pan- Green Alliance, with the KMT and the DPP being the two 
leading parties in each, respectively. The Pan- Blue Alliance consists of the 
KMT, the People First Party (PFP), the New Party (NP) and the Nonpar-
tisan Solidarity Union (NPSU), while the Pan- Green Alliance includes the 
currently ruling DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Even though 
none of the political parties advocates the island’s immediate unification 
with China, Taiwan voters perceive the two political alliances as representing 
opposite positions on the issue of unification/independence. The Pan- Blue 
Alliance is perceived as adopting policies that move in a direction toward 
Taiwan’s eventual unification with China, whereas the Pan- Green Alliance is 
seen as making plans that would lead to the island’s ultimate independence. 
Thus, chapter 4 shows that citizens who hold a strong Taiwanese identity 
tend to espouse the island’s de jure independence and provide electoral sup-
port for the Pan- Green Alliance, while those who continue to recognize the 
Chinese heritage as a part of their identity are more likely to back the Pan- 
Blue candidates.
As Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) “freezing hypothesis” famously 
claimed half a century ago, party systems become stabilized when they 
reflect preexisting cleavage structures in the society. Because Taiwan 
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citizens’ partisan identifications notably reflect the most important po-
litical cleavage in the society, the island’s political landscape has been 
increasingly molded into two distinctly separate alliances that are led by 
two major political parties. As chapter 10 explains, the 2005 electoral 
reform that abandoned the single non- transferable vote (SNTV) elec-
toral rules in favor of the mixed- member majoritarian system (MMM) 
has further consolidated Taiwan’s two- party system.
While the endogeneity of the key political cleavage and its effects on 
Taiwan citizens’ political life form a crucial part of our story, we will also 
pay attention to the ways in which candidates’ personal traits affect electoral 
behavior. Chapter 8 shows that the importance of candidates’ traits dimin-
ished as Taiwan democratized. Because political power was monopolized by 
the KMT during the authoritarian era, most nominees for elected positions 
shared the same party label and candidates’ traits were voters’ means of dif-
ferentiation. As the issue of unification/independence became prominent in 
a democratic Taiwan, partisan identification increasingly had major effects 
on the island citizens’ electoral decisions.
In sum, the central issue that dominates Taiwan politics is the debate 
over the island’s sovereignty and its long- term relationship with China. In-
dividuals’ stands on the unification/independence issue are closely related to 
their national identities and deeply reflected in their partisan identification. 
The cleavage is so deep that it has profound impacts on every aspect of the 
island citizens’ political life. All issues, including such minor policy ques-
tions as absentee voting or the adoption of an English translation system, 
can become entangled in the main cleavage and be examined through a 
partisan lens.9
Political Cleavage and Politics: Taiwan as a Test Case
Some countries are so consequential in the world that they have legions 
of outside observers. The United States, China, Britain, France, Germany, 
Japan, and Russia take up space in the sophisticated media of every country. 
Political life in most small countries, however, is of interest only to their own 
citizens. Taiwan is a small country, and its domestic politics typically makes 
international news only as entertainment— when fistfights break out in the 
parliament, known as the Legislative Yuan. Apart from specialists in East 
Asian politics, no one outside Taiwan cares very much. Why should readers 
with an interest in comparative electoral behavior want to read about Taiwan 
in particular?
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In our judgment, there are two good reasons to pay special attention to 
Taiwan. First, Taiwan is one of the best places to investigate the multifaceted 
effects of cleavage on politics. With cleavages defined as divisions that sepa-
rate members of communities into groups (Rae and Taylor 1970), empiri-
cal research has variously linked political cleavages to conflict and partisan 
differences (Bonilla et al. 2011; Dahrendorf 1959; Dunning and Harrison 
2010; Tilley, Evans and Mitchell 2008). Yet, cleavages are not all bad, as Lip-
set (1963, 78– 79) argued half a century ago, because “[a] stable democracy 
requires relatively moderate tension among its contending political forces.” 
However, if key differences in a society are allowed to accumulate and re-
inforce each other, cleavages may deepen, conflicts may grow intense, and 
extreme polarization may be manifested in voting and partisan divisions.
It is often argued that cross- cutting cleavages can mollify the intensity of 
conflict and reduce polarization. The overlapping cleavages make it difficult 
to build a coalition as few people are solely associated with any given cleav-
age. Conversely, this implies that conflict and political polarization are gen-
erally the most extreme when there is just one major cleavage in the society 
(Simmel 1908; Rae and Taylor 1970; Zuckerman 1975).
As we have noted, the current central axis of politics in Taiwan is the 
issue of unification vs. independence. Citizen’s opinions on that issue are 
closely tied to their identity— Do they think of themselves as Chinese, as 
Taiwanese, or as both? Ethnic identity also plays a role: mainlanders are 
unlikely to define themselves as purely Taiwan citizens, while a majority 
of Minnan do so, and thus they have different positions on the unifica-
tion/independence issue. Ethnic identity, national identity, and preferences 
over how to deal with a rising China are all interrelated and reinforce each 
other in Taiwan. Political parties on the island necessarily must define them-
selves in a way that makes sense in this context. They all have distinct and 
well- differentiated positions on the unification/independence axis, with 
two small parties (the NP and the TSU, respectively) holding down the 
extremes. This dominant issue structures party ideology and electoral strate-
gies, while citizen’s party identifications and vote choices map closely onto 
those issue positions.
The nexus of causal relationships for Taiwan citizens is thus theoreti-
cally complicated but empirically simple: ethnic identification, national 
identification, party identification, and political opinions connect closely to 
each other and reinforce each other. Each of them connects to vote choice. 
This set of relationship is relatively tight in Taiwan. To our knowledge, 
only Israel has a similarly close linkage among ethnic origins (Ashkenazic 
vs. Sephardic), concepts of the state (Israeli vs. Jewish), the central political 
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dimension (relationship with the Palestinians), and party choice (Shamir 
and Arian 1999). Where relationships are strongest, causal patterns are most 
easily discerned. One can study Taiwan for the same reason Charles Darwin 
gathered scientific information on the Galapagos Islands: that is where the 
evidence is clearest.
The second reason for studying Taiwan is its strategic importance. Tai-
wan is a flashpoint in East Asia, one of the most likely places to set off a 
general Asian war. Domestic politics in China and Taiwan have perhaps 
been the central drivers of cross- Strait tensions. In Taiwan, the cross- Strait 
relationship is the key cleavage that profoundly shapes the interest structure 
of its electorate. If voting is a means for individuals to make collective deci-
sions, it is crucial to know what Taiwan citizens are asking for and how these 
demands are manifested in their partisan support and vote choices. Thus, 
understanding Taiwan voters is important not only in its own right as a key 
mechanism of a young democratic polity but also for its impact at the col-
lective level in preserving peace in East Asia. Until the last decade or so, even 
China did not pay close attention. The resulting misjudgments helped cause 
the missile crisis in 1996, with costly consequences for the mainland (Garver 
1997; Cooper 1998, chap. 4).
In this volume, we make no pretense of sorting out the full set of causal 
relationships among the various kinds of identity and the resulting vote 
choices. Those relations necessarily differ among individuals: some will 
come to their partisanship because of their ethnicity, some because of their 
national identity, and some because of their policy views. Others will in-
herit a partisanship and let that determine their other identities, while 
still others will exhibit more complex patterns. We leave to others the full 
specification of all those causal paths— an important topic, but one that 
we must set aside.
Our perspective is rather that the key political cleavage is so powerful 
that it renders other differences among Taiwan voters secondary or unim-
portant. When any one component is inconsistent with another, there will 
be cognitive or psychological pressure to bring them into line. Therefore, 
the island citizens’ portfolio of identities, their political opinions, and their 
vote choices are also “co- integrated” in the sense that time series analysts use 
the term.10 That pressure may be strong or weak, it may be heeded quickly 
or slowly, it may be set aside, or it may be resisted. In any cross- section, 
some individuals may ignore their contradictory views or deliberately hold 
inconsistent views, and some may hold them for a lifetime. But for most 
individuals in a political system like Taiwan’s, where one central, vivid issue 
dominates political life, where that issue is closely tied to important ethnic 
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and national identities, and where the parties’ stances reflect that issue, most 
individuals will show substantial consistency. We will not find many DPP 
supporters who have a Chinese identity and support Taiwan’s unification 
with China, nor many mainlanders favoring immediate independence.
Demonstrating the power of a political cleavage manifested in many 
forms is a central feature of this book. Indeed, Taiwan is a perfect case for 
analyzing the effects of political cleavages and personal identities on politics. 
Many small countries are out of the international fray, and it matters little 
how their politics and policies evolve. Not Taiwan. Political identities are 
important in every political system, but often in such variegated or muted 
form that their effects are difficult to detect. Not in Taiwan. And institutions 
matter in every country, but changes in them are so rare and glacial that no 
one can be sure how much difference they make. Not in Taiwan. Succeeding 
chapters will demonstrate not just how interesting Taiwan politics is in its 
own right but how much Taiwan can teach us about how politics works in 
the many countries around the world where ethnic divisions and contested 
national identities are central to electoral politics.
Plan of the Book
This volume has 12 chapters. To make the volume accessible to both scholars 
and general audiences, contributors have intentionally avoided complicated 
statistical analysis. Not until the final chapter do we build a comprehensive 
statistical model based on the factors that previous chapters have identified.
After this introduction, the book proceeds to a chapter by Chia- hung 
Tsai, designed to introduce Taiwan electoral politics to those who may have 
little prior experience with the topic. It explores who Taiwan voters are and 
how they have voted in presidential elections since the rapid democratiza-
tion began about two decades ago. Tsai finds that Taiwan’s young democracy 
has increasingly consolidated into a competitive two- party system formed 
by the Pan- Blue and the Pan- Green Alliances, which are dominated by the 
KMT and the DPP, respectively. While the Pan- Blue Alliance has generally 
enjoyed the electoral advantage during most lower- level elections, the two 
parties have split the six presidential elections since democratization. The 
Pan- Green Alliance is increasingly competitive at all levels.
Tsai notes that a regional divide in Taiwan is clearly recognizable, val-
idating the general view that the island consists of “a Blue North and a 
Green South” (the Pan- Blue Alliance dominates northern Taiwan and the 
Pan- Green Alliance dominates southern Taiwan.11) Due to the policies im-
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plemented by the KMT government during the authoritarian era, Taiwan 
voters who are mainlanders, well educated, more affluent, government em-
ployees, or in their 30s and 40s are more likely to support Pan- Blue candi-
dates. The island citizens who belong to the Minnan ethnic group and who 
are less educated, less well- off, working in labor and agricultural sectors, or 
in their 20s tend to identify with the Pan- Green Alliance.
After this first chapter explores who Taiwan voters are, successive chapters 
take up the “big three”— party identification, issue orientation, and candi-
date evaluation— and how they affect the island citizens’ political attitudes 
and behaviors. To these three, we add a fourth— identity, particularly national 
identity. As previously noted, the preference about Taiwan’s future relationship 
with China presents a deep dividing line between the island’s citizens. Pre-
cisely because the unification/independence issue is the key political cleavage, 
it closely intertwines with the island citizens’ national identities, their partisan 
attachments, their issue preferences, and their views of the candidates.
In that spirit, in chapter 3 T. Y. Wang examines the development of po-
litical identity in Taiwan. The author shows that the “China factor” has been 
the essential component of the changing boundaries in group membership 
that shapes Taiwan voters’ identities. Immediately after the KMT’s retreat to 
the island, the ethnic divide between local citizens and mainlanders became 
salient. After democratization and other social changes, the ethnic cleavage 
was replaced by the contestation between Chinese and Taiwanese identities. 
As the majority of citizens now hold a Taiwanese identity and few are Chi-
nese identifiers, the boundary of the Chinese/Taiwanese divide has gradually 
lost its political significance in domestic politics but has moved to a differ-
ent level. Due to Beijing’s forceful claim on Taiwan’s sovereignty, the term 
“Taiwan” is no longer a purely geographic designation. Being “Taiwanese” 
increasingly implies an identity with Taiwan as an independent state. The 
shadows of both the ethnic cleavage and the Taiwanese/Chinese divide con-
tinue to be cast on the island citizens’ partisan identifications.
Following the discussion of identity change on the island, in chapter 
4 Ching- hsin Yu takes up the second of the “big four”— partisanship. He 
explores the trajectory of Taiwan voters’ attachments to parties and how 
they are intertwined with their positions along the axis of unification/inde-
pendence. The author traces the development of the island citizens’ partisan 
identification and concludes that nonpartisan voters during the authoritar-
ian era were not “independent” in its true sense. As the KMT monopolized 
political power and banned the formation of political parties, those who did 
not identify with the KMT were treated as “nonpartisan independents” lest 
they form a cohesive political force. Many of these citizens later became the 
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loyal supporters of the newly established opposition DPP. Along with their 
junior partners, the KMT and the DPP later formed the Pan- Blue Alliance 
and the Pan- Green Alliance. Because each of the two political alliances has 
a distinctive position on the issue of Taiwan’s future relations with China, 
which is the most important political cleavage on the island, Taiwan voters 
have developed a clear partisan attachment in the competitive two- party 
system. That said, a considerable number of citizens are nonpartisan and 
they behave differently according to their educational levels. Yu finds that 
highly educated independents are less interested in politics and less likely to 
vote but they are also more autonomous and politically moderate than their 
less educated counterparts.
The next three chapters turn attention to the third leg of the “big four”— 
citizens’ issue orientation. Conventionally, political issues have been seen 
as crucial to the functioning of democracy. Political parties are expected to 
present policy options to electorates, allowing citizens to select those candi-
dates who correspond most closely to their own ideological positions. The 
congruence of issue positions and ideology between citizens and political 
parties has thus become an important topic in electoral studies (e.g., Ad-
ams, Ezrow and Somer- Topcu 2011; Lachat 2011; Thomassen and Schmitt 
1997; but, for a critique of this framework, see Achen and Bartels 2016).
Do issue preferences play a role in Taiwan citizens’ voting calculus? If so, 
what are the important issues? How do they relate to the key political cleav-
age on the island? Chapter 5 by Shing- yuan Sheng and Hsiao- chuan Liao 
demonstrates the impact of the central political cleavage on Taiwan politics. 
Examining the evolution of four key political debates on the island, the au-
thors show that reform vs. stability has become an issue of the past. The sec-
ond issue, wealth distribution, fails to differentiate political parties because 
the partisan elites of various political affiliations have converged on the same 
ideological position and have attempted to outbid each other in order to win 
electoral support. Third, while environmental protection has the potential 
of becoming an important political issue after the disaster at the Fukushima 
nuclear plan in Japan, it is still an issue in the process of development in 
Taiwan. The most important political issue on the island, then, is and will 
continue to be Taiwan’s future relationship with China, which is closely tied 
to the island citizens’ identity as Chinese or Taiwanese.
The salience of Taiwan’s relationship with China does not mean that such 
issues as the economy are unimportant. Empirical studies on the American 
presidency have long concluded that the state of the economy is an impor-
tant contributing factor to electoral decisions. An abundance of literature 
has demonstrated the linkage between the electoral success of an incumbent 
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government and its economic performance.12 The logic is simple. When eco-
nomic conditions are good, voters are likely to reward the incumbent with 
their vote. When the economy is bad, voters tend to switch their support to 
the challenger. Jimmy Carter’s devastating defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980 
and George H. W. Bush’s loss to Bill Clinton in 1992 are testimony to the 
conventional wisdom that “economics is the fate of politicians” (Norpoth 
1985, 167).
Following this reward- punishment model, in chapter 6 Chia- hung Tsai 
explores the role of the economy in Taiwan citizens’ voting calculus. The au-
thor finds mixed evidence for economic voting in the island country’s presi-
dential elections. While prospective economic evaluations are found to be an 
important determinant of Taiwan voters’ electoral choices, the weight of the 
economy is overshadowed by, again, citizens’ partisan affiliations. This find-
ing shows that responses to the economy affect Taiwan voters’ electoral cal-
culus, but primarily through the colors of partisan lenses, which are closely 
aligned with their positions on the key political cleavage in the society.
Chapter 7 by Alexander Tan and Karl Ho examines the complex dy-
namics of cross- Straits relations, in particular the burgeoning economic ex-
changes with China after Ma Ying- jeou of the KMT was elected president 
in 2008. The authors find that island residents exhibit an ambivalent view 
of Taiwan’s close and intensive interactions with the Chinese mainland since 
2008. Following partisan lines, some of them feel that such ties are beneficial 
to the island’s economy, while others express concerns about the security 
implications. In the aggregate, Taiwan voters recognize that isolation from 
China is not viable or even possible, yet getting too close to China also 
troubles them. This explains why the public changed its mind about the 
engagement policies of the Ma administration, initially favoring it after the 
DPP’s isolationist policies during 2000– 2008, but then coming to distrust 
close ties as they seemed to bring few benefits to most ordinary citizens. 
Thus, cross- Strait relations, or more broadly speaking “the China factor,” 
affect not only how Taiwan voters see the future but also how they view the 
current administration.
Following these discussions of the impact of national identities, parti-
san attachments, and issue orientations on Taiwan voters’ electoral decision, 
chapter 8 by Hung- chung Wang and Lu- huei Chen examines the last com-
ponent of the “big four”— citizens’ evaluation of candidates. Assessment of 
candidates for public office attracts considerable attention in each campaign 
season. Scholars and pundits analyze and dissect candidates’ backgrounds 
and characters, and discuss how these personal traits affect voters’ evaluation 
of candidates and their voting decisions. Citizens’ evaluation of candidates 
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is important because, it is argued, seeking for and digesting political in-
formation is costly. The assessment of candidates offers the public a useful 
shortcut as it seems to provide a clue as to how they will perform their duties 
once elected. In particular, given that the president occupies the principal 
position in the government, presidential traits and characters have impor-
tant symbolic meaning, which set public standards for all political behaviors 
(Greene 2001; Kinder 1986; McCurley and Mondak 1995).
Following this line of research, Wang and Chen find that in Taiwan’s 
presidential elections, KMT candidates tend to be viewed as more capable 
of dealing with cross- Strait relationships and economic development, while 
DPP nominees are associated with the issue of eliminating corruption and 
initiating political reforms. Perhaps surprisingly, the perception of candi-
dates’ personal traits has little effect on the island citizens’ voting behavior. 
Taiwan voters’ electoral decisions are largely determined by their partisan 
identifications, which, again, are closely in line with citizens’ positions on 
the axis of unification/independence and their national identities. Thus, 
candidate issue ownership is applicable to Taiwan’s parties, but voters’ evalu-
ation of candidates’ personal characteristics and perceived competence are 
conditioned largely by their partisan affiliations.
In the context of Taiwan’s electoral politics, it should occasion no wonder 
that Western notions of political “left” and “right” have little relevance in 
Taiwan, as Yi- ching Hsiao, Su- feng Cheng, and Christopher Achen explain 
in chapter 9. The left- right scale is irrelevant because the main cleavage in 
Taiwan is not the degree of government control of the economy, as previous 
chapters emphasize. Nor are “left” and “right” used to describe other aspects 
of political debates in Taiwan. Political elites make essentially no use of those 
words in Taiwan, and ordinary citizens are mystified by references to them. 
The confusions are exacerbated by particular connotations of “left” and 
“right” in both Mandarin and the Taiwanese dialect, as the authors explain.
While the “big four” are the most significant factors in voters’ electoral 
calculus, they do not operate in a political vacuum. Institutional structures 
set a broad framework for the actions of both political parties and individu-
als. They set an approximate upper limit to the number of parties, configure 
the choice menu on the ballot, structure voters’ electoral calculus, and pro-
vide incentives or disincentives for citizens to show up at the ballot boxes 
on election days (e.g., Cox 1997; 1999; Engstrom 2012). Thus chapter 10 
by Chi Huang examines the effects of recent electoral system change on 
Taiwan’s party system. As with the experience of Japan, which also adopted 
the mixed- member system a decade earlier, Taiwan has witnessed a dramatic 
change in its party system in the postreform era. The fast convergence to-
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ward two- party competition on the island is due in part to the interactions 
between the powerful presidency and political elites’ ambition of synchro-
nizing presidential and legislative elections. Because the issue of unification 
vs. independence is the single most important political cleavage on the is-
land, as discussed in the previous chapters, it has played a hidden yet signifi-
cant role in shaping the postreform party structure toward a “Pan- Blue vs. 
Pan- Green” system.
Chapter 11 by Chung- li Wu and Tzu- Ping Liu examines Taiwan citizens’ 
political participation. Similar to the trend in many Western democracies, 
the path of turnout rates in the island country’s presidential and legislative 
elections has gone downward since the early 1990s. Three particular factors 
affect individuals’ turnout and other forms of political participation— age, 
party identification, and political knowledge. In general, older people, indi-
viduals identified with main political parties, and those equipped with more 
political knowledge tend to have a higher level of political participation. 
Because this more engaged group generally has higher socioeconomic status, 
these findings further confirm the conventional wisdom that citizens in the 
upper and middle classes tend to be more interested and involved in public 
affairs than individuals in the lower class. The chapter shows that the gap has 
widened in Taiwan in recent years.
Each of these chapters identifies one or more important aspects of Tai-
wan politics. The final chapter by Christopher Achen and T. Y. Wang brings 
together all of them to examine vote choice on the island. We have built a 
comprehensive statistical model based on the factors that previous chapters 
have identified and discuss their implications. The central finding is that one 
key dimension organizes Taiwan citizens’ vote choices— the China factor. 
Should Taiwan accommodate itself to China’s ever more powerful presence 
in Asia, or should it forcefully assert its status as a separate country and resist 
integration with the mainland? The answer to that question largely deter-
mines what Taiwan people think about related policy issues, which party 
they adhere to, and how they vote.
Thus, in contrast to left- right economic disputes, which dominate poli-
tics in many Western countries, politics in Taiwan is fundamentally about 
nationalism and the future of Taiwan’s national identity. In that respect, 
Taiwan is one of many countries around the world in which similar issues 
shape domestic politics. In recent years, the world has seen a succession of 
crises and threats to peace in which national identity was the central issue— 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Ukraine, to list just three examples in which local 
wars have broken out and the major Western powers have taken an interest 
in restoring the peace. Taiwan, too, is an international hotspot with a poten-
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tial for setting off a major international conflict. Thus far, democracy and 
peace have prevailed on the island. Hence, Taiwan has much to teach us, and 
we offer this book as a contribution to the international dialog about how 
differing conceptions of national identity can be managed peacefully.
Notes
 1. National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan) at http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/
pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp (accessed March 15, 2015).
 2. As in Japan, factional politics are prevalent in Taiwan. The island country’s two 
major political parties have employed patron- client relationships for power distribu-
tion and voter mobilization. For a discussion of Taiwan’s factional politics, see Batto 
and Huang (2016).
 3. We use “Taiwan citizen” to mean any citizen of Taiwan because the term “Tai-
wanese” has various political connotations for different people. To some, “Taiwan-
ese” refer to citizens living in the territory effectively governed by the Taiwan govern-
ment, while to others the term means an ethnic designation opposed to “mainlander.” 
Because the majority of support for the Pan- Green Alliance led by the Democratic 
Progressive Party comes from those who self- identify as “Taiwanese,” a “Taiwanese” or 
a “Taiwanese citizen” thus may have a narrower and potentially partisan meaning in 
English.
 4. One well- known example is former Taiwan president Lee Teng- hui, who freely 
admitted that he had become a Japanese citizen with a Japanese name during the 
colonial period. Throughout his life, his Japanese language skills were better than his 
Mandarin.
 5. Retrieved from Liang- An Jing- ji Tong- ji Yue- bao (Monthly Report on Cross- 
Straits Economy) published by the Mainland Affairs Council, the Republic of China, 
at http://www.mac.gov.tw (accessed March 15, 2015).
 6. For a complete list of cross- Strait agreements, see the Mainland Affairs Council 
website, the Republic of China, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67145&CtNo
de=5710&mp=1.
 7. Greater Tainan mayor William Lai’s visit to Shanghai is one of the most recent 
high- profile visits by DPP politician (Tsao and Chung 2014).
 8. There are four major ethnic groups in Taiwan: Minnan, Hakka, mainlander, and 
aborigine. Minnan refers to island residents whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan from 
the Chinese mainland several hundred years ago. They are the largest ethnic group 
at 77% of the island’s 23 million people. About 10% of Taiwan’s total population is 
Hakka, descendants of immigrants who came to the island at roughly the same time 
as the Minnan from areas in central China. Both Minnan and Hakka are generally 
grouped together as “Taiwanese” even though they have different customs and habits 
and speak different dialects. Approximately 12% of the total population are mainland-
ers, those who arrived from the mainland in the late 1940s after the Chinese civil war, 
and their descendants. Aborigines, the original settlers, constitute less than 2% of the 
total population in Taiwan.
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 9. Taiwan has no system of absentee voting (“postal voting”). One of the main 
explanations often advanced is that China- based Taiwanese businesspeople and their 
family members rely on good relations with China and thus are potential KMT sup-
porters. Hence, absentee voting is expected to increase the KMT’s votes, and the DPP 
opposes it. Similarly, the Ma administration declared more than five years ago that Tai-
wan would start using the pinyin system for English translation, which is the phonetic 
system used in almost every part of the world, including the UN. Because the pinyin 
system was developed and adopted in the Chinese mainland, however, its usage was 
resisted by many DPP politicians (Economist 2014).
 10. Some of the original applications were to currency exchange rates. Political 
scientists have studied arms races using the same ideas. In both instances, the com-
plex causal details are much less important than showing that the system constantly 
attempts, in the midst of continual disturbances, to reach toward an equilibrium, even 
if it never attains it.
 11. For a discussion of Taiwan’s “Blue North and Green South” phenomenon, see 
Chou 2012.
 12. For a concise review of the literature on economic voting, see Lewis- Beck and 
Stegmaier 2007.
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Chapter 2
Who Is the Taiwan Voter?
Chia- hung Tsai
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of recent Taiwan elec-
tions for readers who may not be familiar with them. The growing impor-
tance of the north- south divide in Taiwan’s politics is emphasized. The chap-
ter also explores how the supporters of the two party camps differ from each 
other. In particular, standard variables that are important for differentiating 
party supporters in many other countries, such as income and occupation, 
turn out to have only modest effects in Taiwan. Instead, ethnicity plays the 
most crucial role in shaping the voting and partisan identities of Taiwan 
citizens, just as the theoretical framework of this book suggests.
Recent Taiwan Presidential Elections
Chapter 1 has given a brief overview of Taiwan’s history that highlights the 
island country’s political development. In particular, it argued that the pivot 
of Taiwan politics is the citizens’ political identities, which are both related 
to their ethnicity and manifested in their partisan affiliation with the Pan- 
Blue Alliance or the Pan- Green Alliance— the two major political camps 
that have formed since the late 1990s. Presuming that background, the pres-
ent chapter begins with an exploration of Taiwan’s general voting patterns 
as seen in election returns tabulated by the Central Election Commission. 
The scope of the analysis comprises the five presidential elections since 1996 
when the island’s president was first popularly elected, a time span of nearly 
two decades.1 Since then, four more presidential elections have been held, 
with two peaceful transfers of power in 2000 and in 2008.
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The rapid democratization on the island culminated in the 1996 presi-
dential election, in which Taiwan voters exercised their political right to 
popularly elect their national leader for the first time. In the 1996 presiden-
tial election, two candidates— Lin Yang- kang and Chen Lu- an— were mem-
bers of the KMT who only broke away from the party after they failed to 
secure its nomination. Chen ran as an independent and Lin was supported 
by the New Party— a KMT split- off strongly advocating Taiwan’s unifica-
tion with the Chinese mainland. Similarly, in the 2000 presidential election, 
James Soong left the KMT and ran as an independent against Lien Chan, 
the KMT nominee, and Chen Shui- bian, the DPP- affiliated candidate. Al-
though Soong and Lien together polled nearly 60 percent of the votes, Chen 
won the election with merely 39.3 percent under the first- past- the- post vot-
ing system. After the election, Soong organized the People First Party and 
has since served as its chair.
Recognizing that a divided KMT would only benefit the opponents, 
Soong joined Lien as his running mate in the 2004 presidential election. 
However, a successful DPP campaign and an apparent assassination attempt 
on Chen’s life 24 hours before the polls opened gave Chen the victory.2 
Then, in both the 2008 and 2012 elections, it was the KMT- affiliated Ma 
Ying- jeou who scored the victory. While the 2008 presidential election was 
a classic two- party race between the KMT and the DPP, the 2012 election 
was a three- party race with the PFP- affiliated Soong unsuccessfully attempt-
ing a comeback.
Thus, while there are multiple political parties on the island, even the 
smallest are either allies of the DPP or are KMT splinter groups. Hence the 
political landscape can generally be characterized by two political alliances— 
the “Pan- Blue” and the “Pan- Green”— led by the KMT and the DPP, re-
spectively. The current chapter uses those terms for all the elections in the 
democratic era, even though the terms themselves did not appear until 
2000. To simplify the analysis, vote shares of candidates in the five presiden-
tial elections are aggregated into those two blocs.
The Consolidation of Two- Party System
Figure 2.1 shows the electoral support enjoyed by the two party groups dur-
ing the five presidential elections Taiwan has conducted since democratiza-
tion, 1996– 2012. A dominant electoral force in the mid- 1990s, the Pan- 
Blue Alliance shrank rapidly during the subsequent decade, only to recover 
somewhat in the two most recent presidential contests. In recent years, the 
28  Taiwan Voter
partisan divide on the island has been approximately 50– 55 percent for the 
Pan- Blue Alliance and 40– 45 percent for the Pan- Green Alliance, with the 
smaller parties of decreasing importance. It appears that Taiwan’s political 
landscape has consolidated as a genuine two- party system dominated by the 
KMT and the DPP.
Many democracies in the world show strong regional differences in their 
voting patterns. Well- known historical examples include the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth- century “Solid South” in the United States (Archer 
and Taylor 1981; Tindall 1972), the traditional loyalty to the Labour Party 
in northern England and Scotland, the east vs. west divide in Korean and 
Ukrainian politics, and the strong support for the Liberal Party in Quebec, 
Canada, in the immediate postwar period. Taiwan also has a sharp regional 
division. Since 2000, the island country’s electoral politics has increasingly 
displayed a strong north- south divide. In part due to the fact that the na-
tional government in Taipei has poured budget money into northern Tai-
Fig. 2.1. Vote shares of the Pan- Blue and Pan- Green camps in the presidential 
elections, 1996– 2012. Data: Election Study Center.
Fig. 2.2. Pan- Blue’s vote shares in the presidential elections, 1996– 2012. Data: 
Election Study Center.
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wan, the disparity between the north and the rest of the country in de-
velopment and living standard has grown. As cross- Strait relations become 
increasingly vital to Taiwan’s economic development in the 2000s, voters in 
northern Taiwan, where high- tech industries, banking businesses, and the 
service industry gather, are more supportive of the KMT and its policies 
than those living in southern Taiwan.
The five choropleth maps in figure 2.2 set out the vote shares garnered 
by Pan- Blue presidential candidates during the five presidential elections. 
They show the emergence of the north- south divide. In the 1996 presiden-
tial election, running as the incumbent and the first native son to be Taiwan’s 
national leader, the KMT’s nominee, Lee Teng- hui, was widely popular. The 
Pan- Blue Alliance won at least 70 percent of the votes in every city and 
county on the island, in both urban and rural areas. In particular, voters in 
much of north- central Taiwan, including Taoyuan County, Hsinchu City 
and County, Miaoli County, and eastern Taiwan, were highly supportive of 
the three Pan- Blue candidates and in particular of Lee. The regional divide 
was not much in evidence.
As noted above, the 2000 presidential election was a three- way race 
among Chen Shui- bian, the DPP nominee; James Soong, the party switcher 
from the KMT to independent; and Lien Chan, the KMT nominee. Using 
the Jhuoshuei River as the traditional demarcation line between northern 
and southern Taiwan, figure 2.2 again shows that the regional disparity in 
electoral support for the two political alliances began to emerge in this elec-
tion. The two Pan- Blue candidates received a combined vote share of 60 per-
cent to 70 percent in many parts of northern Taiwan, especially in Taoyuan 
County and in Hsinchu City and County. The Pan- Green candidate Chen 
ran better in southern Taiwan but had little support in cities and counties in 
the north. Overall, Chen had less than 40 percent of the national vote. Had 
the Pan- Blue Alliance not been divided and thus split its electoral support, 
Chen would not have been able to win the 2000 presidential election.
The regional disparity in electoral support became even clearer in the 
2004 election, as figure 2.2 shows. Pan- Blue candidates continued to garner 
large electoral support in northern Taiwan but were not able to receive more 
than 40 percent of votes in cities in the south, including Yunlin County, 
Chiayi City and County, Tainan City and County, Kaohisung City and 
County, and Pingtung County. Cities and counties in the central part of 
Taiwan, including Taichung City and Nantou County, Taichung County 
and Chunhwa County, became battleground areas as the Pan- Blue candi-
dates barely secured a majority of votes.
The regional divide between a “Blue North” and a “Green South” ap-
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peared to become consolidated in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. 
In 2008, the Pan- Blue nominee, Ma Ying- jeou, won a landslide victory with 
a 58.5 percent to 41.5 percent victory. As figure 2 shows, however, while 
Ma was able to garner 60 percent to 70 percent of the vote in much of 
northern and eastern Taiwan, the electoral support for him was considerably 
weaker in southern cities and counties. Although Ma won his reelection bid 
in 2012, the regional disparity in electoral support continued. The Pan- Blue 
candidate continued to draw 60– 70 percent of the vote in much of northern 
and eastern Taiwan, while southern Taiwan remained the stronghold of the 
Pan- Green Alliance.
Regional disparities in party support are due partly to purely regional 
factors. But northern and southern Taiwan also differ in ethnic composition, 
income, and occupations, which together account for some of the regional 
disparity. The remainder of the chapter takes up those forces accounting for 
the partisan divide.
Demographic Characteristics and Electoral Behavior
As we have seen, the Pan- Blue Alliance has enjoyed a 5– 10 percentage point 
electoral advantage at the national level since 2000. This section will exam-
ine where that support comes from.
As chapter 1 pointed out, there are three major ethnic groups on the 
island— Minnan, Hakka, and the mainlanders. While they were all immi-
grants from the Chinese mainland, the Minnan and Hakka are the island 
residents whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan several hundred years ago. 
Mainlanders were originally largely composed of the followers of Chiang 
Kai- shek when the KMT government retreated to the island in 1949. Main-
landers now are primarily their descendants. Each ethnic group thus carries 
a distinct memory of Taiwan’s modern history that may affect their partisan 
support. The ethnicity of Taiwan voters is closely related to their voting be-
havior (Wang 1998; Lin 1989; You 1996).
Figure 2.3 shows that mainlanders have been highly supportive of the 
Pan- Blue Alliance. Nearly 90 percent of mainlanders voted for its candi-
dates in every election since 1996. By contrast, support for Pan- Blue can-
didates from the Minnan group has declined significantly since 1996 when 
the KMT nominee, Lee Teng- hui, received more than 80 percent of the 
votes from his fellow Minnan voters. In subsequent elections, the Minnan 
voters’ electoral support for Pan- Blue candidates has fluctuated between 40 
percent and 55 percent. Although the KMT- affiliated Ma won the election 
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in 2012 with the majority support of the Minnan citizens, the gap between 
the mainlander and the Minnan voters for the Pan- Blue Alliance remains as 
large as 40 percentage points.
Last, the Hakka are more centrist. The majority of the Hakka group 
generally have provided their electoral support to Pan- Blue candidates. 
However, from 2000 to 2004, President Chen Shui- bian appointed many 
Hakka politicians as cabinet ministers in his first term. The ministry- level 
government agency, the Council for Hakka Affairs, and Hakka TV were also 
established in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Perhaps in consequence, Hakka 
voters swung to the DPP in 2004. However, the majority returned to the 
KMT in subsequent elections.
The evidence thus shows that the Pan- Blue Alliance generally has been 
able to garner majority support from the two minority ethnic groups on 
the island, the Hakka and the mainlanders, and that mainlanders are its 
Fig. 2.3. Percentages of three ethnic groups voting for the Pan- Blue. Data: See 
Appendix 2.A3.
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most loyal supporters.3 The majority group, the Minnan, leans to the Pan- 
Green. The Pan- Green alliance receives its electoral support primarily 
from the Minnan group, with very little backing from the mainlanders. 
Thus the ethnic cleavage between the mainlanders and the Minnan group 
is significant. Although mainlanders make up only about 12 percent of the 
island’s population, their loyal support for the Pan- Blue Alliance and their 
high turnout rate, together with typically substantial Hakka backing for 
the KMT, suggest that the ethnic cleavage will continue to play an impor-
tant role in Taiwan’s politics.
In many countries, the parties are substantially based on income classes 
because that is a central cleavage in the political system. As we have already 
suggested in this book and as chapter 9 argues in detail, conventional left- 
right economic divisions do not describe Taiwan politics well. However, in-
come might still matter to some degree. One of the legacies of the KMT’s 
authoritarian rule has been Taiwan’s successful economic development in 
the 1970s. The land reform and the Ten Major Construction Projects, for 
instance, helped bring rapid economic growth. While most Taiwan citizens 
have benefited from these economic policies, it has been argued that the 
well- off and the middle class have benefited most, and thus have generally 
been the most loyal supporters of the KMT (Winckler 1992). Figure 2.4 
confirms this observation to some degree. Citizens of higher income ap-
peared to support the Pan- Blue candidates more than those of lower income 
by roughly 10 percentage points in the last three presidential elections.
In addition, the figure shows a significant decline of support for the Pan- 
Blue Alliance by low- income citizens, from about 90 percent in the 1996 
election to roughly 40 percent in 2004, and then stabilizing at about 55 
percent. The changing partisan support by less affluent voters may appear 
exaggerated due to the “Lee Teng- hui Complex,” referring to citizens’ emo-
tional attachment to the island country’s first popularly elected president in 
1996 (Hsu 1998, 2004). His broad popularity was not likely to be repeated 
when the KMT returned to mainlander candidates. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that in recent years, for whatever reasons, less affluent Taiwan voters tend to 
be less supportive of the Pan- Blue Alliance than their well- off countrymen. 
Yet as the graph shows, the impact of income is much smaller than that of 
ethnicity. Taiwan politics is simply not primarily about class conflict.
Another measure of class, closely associated with income, is respondents’ 
education. Figure 2.5 shows that Taiwan voters with college or graduate 
school education tend to be more supportive of the Pan- Blue Alliance, while 
citizens with a lower level of education tend to back Pan- Green candidates. 
Note that the largest supporting gap among voters with different education 
34  Taiwan Voter
levels appeared in 2004, while partisan support for the Pan- Blue Alliance 
nearly converged among educational groups in 2012. Again, the effects are 
very small compared to those of ethnicity, nearly disappearing in the most 
recent election.
Figure 2.6 gives social class one last chance. It displays vote shares for 
Pan- Blue candidates according to respondents’ occupation. The differences 
in partisan support among different occupational groups appear to be rather 
consistent during the past five presidential elections. Specifically, Taiwan 
voters employed in the public sector, such as the military, governmental 
employees, and public school teachers, are highly supportive of the Pan- 
Blue Alliance, by roughly between 60 percent to 75 percent. This is followed 
by those in the private sector, with a Pan- Blue support rate between 50 to 
60 percent. Citizens who earn their living by farming, fishing, and forestry 
Fig. 2.4. Percentages of three income groups voting for the Pan- Blue. Note: 
The survey for the 2000 presidential election lacks the question on household 
income. See appendix 2.A1 for the categorization of income groups. Data: See 
appendix 2.A3.
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are least likely to support Pan- Blue candidates. The difference in support 
for the Pan- Blue Alliance between government employees and citizens in 
the agricultural sector are as high as 25 percentage points in the 2008 and 
2012 elections. Since state employees are devoted supporters of the KMT, 
the Pan- Green Alliance relies on backing from voters in the agricultural and 
labor sectors. Thus there is clearly an occupational difference here, but it is 
tied in part to traditional mainlander dominance of government and to the 
reliance on fishing and farming in southern Taiwan, where the population is 
disproportionately Minnan. This raises the question of whether the effect of 
occupation is causal or merely correlational. Chapter 12 sorts out whether 
occupation itself has an impact on vote choice, or whether occupational 
differences simply proxy for other electoral forces, especially ethnicity and 
national identity.
Figure 2.7 raises the question of whether Taiwan politics is undergoing 
generational change. It shows the vote shares for Pan- Blue candidates based 
Fig. 2.5. Percentages of three education groups voting for the Pan- Blue. Data: See 
appendix 2.A3.
36  Taiwan Voter
on respondents’ age. In general, the average vote and the over- time trends 
of all age groups are strikingly similar. Voters in their 30s and 40s tend to be 
a bit more supportive of the KMT and its political partners in recent years. 
However, it is noteworthy that the younger generation in its 20s became 
the age group least supportive of the Pan- Blue Alliance in 2012. While it 
remains to be seen whether this represents a trend, it may be indicative of 
a discontented younger generation that leaders of both the Pan- Blue and 
Pan- Green alliances need to cultivate. In any case, the differences are quite 
small and inconsistent in comparison with other factors examined in this 
chapter, and the evidence best fits the notion that Taiwan’s electoral cleav-
ages are relatively stable and generally reproducing themselves in younger 
generations thus far.
Lastly, one can ask how the ethnic cleavages seen in this chapter mani-
fest themselves in partisanship. Party preferences are crucial: they structure 
not only presidential choices but also votes for lower- level offices. They 
Fig. 2.6. Percentages of five occupation groups voting for the Pan- Blue. Data: See 
appendix 2.A3.
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also determine how voters see the political world. Thus it is important 
to ask how different ethnic groups have evolved in their partisan attach-
ments. For that purpose, annual data are available, not just information 
from presidential years.
Figure 2.8 show how KMT partisan loyalties of the three main ethnic 
groups have evolved since 1992. Remarkably, KMT identification is nearly 
constant among all three groups over a period of 30 years. And the differ-
ences among them are very large, amounting to more than 30 percentage 
points. It is clear that ethnicity is a key determinant of KMT partisanship.
Figure 2.9 gives the same information for DPP partisans. Prior to 2000, 
many citizens disguised their anti- KMT leanings by calling themselves “in-
dependents.” But since Chen Shui- bian’s first presidential race, DPP par-
tisanship, too, has been very stable within each ethnic group. Apart from 
some disenchantment in the later years of the Chen presidency, the DPP has 
held the same share of partisans it attracted in its first successful presidential 
Fig. 2.7. Percentages of five age groups voting for the KMT. Data: See appendix 
2.A3.
Fig. 2.8. Partisan identification with the Pan- Blue Alliance by ethnic groups, 1992– 
2012. Data source: Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese (Election Study Center, 
NCCU).
Fig. 2.9. Partisan identification with the Pan- Green Alliance by ethnic groups, 
1992– 2012. Data source: Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese (Election Study 
Center, NCCU).
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race. And, again, the differences between Minnan and mainlanders are very 
large, amounting to nearly 25 percentage points in recent years.
Thus in general, the evidence seems to suggest that Taiwan voters who are 
in their 30s and 40s, with higher level of education, who are relatively well- off, 
or are working in the public sector tend to be the most supportive of the Pan- 
Blue Alliance. Candidates of the Pan- Green Alliance are more appealing to 
citizens who are in their 20s, have low income, or are employed in the agricul-
tural or labor sectors. None of these factors has effects nearly as large as ethnic-
ity, which has by far the biggest impact on vote choices and on partisanship. 
However, as it will be shown in chapter 3, with Taiwan’s democracy becoming 
increasingly consolidated the ethnic cleavage among its citizens has gradually 
been transformed and cloaked in their partisan attachments.
Conclusion
Drawing on survey data about Taiwan voters’ electoral choices since 1996, 
this chapter has provided a general characterization of Taiwan voters. It has 
shown that the partisan preferences of citizens on the island are focused on the 
Pan- Blue and the Pan- Green alliances. As Taiwan’s democracy has increasingly 
consolidated into a competitive two- party system, each alliance has become 
dominated by a single party, the KMT and the DPP, respectively.
The Pan- Blue Alliance has enjoyed a 5– 10 percentage point electoral ad-
vantage during the past three presidential elections. This electoral gap is not 
constant across the island. For a variety of economic and historical reasons, 
Taiwan’s political landscape is divided, with the Pan- Blue Alliance dominat-
ing the northern part of the island and the Pan- Green Alliance receiving 
strong support in the south.
The chapter has also shown that the two electoral alliances are based 
on different parts of the voting population. At the risk of oversimplifica-
tion, one may say that citizens who are mainlanders, well- educated, more 
affluent, government employees, or in their 30s and 40s are more likely to 
provide electoral support for Pan- Blue candidates. On the other hand, vot-
ers who are less educated, less well- off, working in labor and agricultural 
sectors, or in their 20s tend to identify with the Pan- Green Alliance. But all 
these differences are dwarfed by the impact of ethnicity, which has very large 
impacts on both vote choices and on partisan identity.
This description of the support base of each party group raises a host of 
questions. Why are people in each of these sectors drawn disproportionately 
to one party rather than another? Are the differences primarily ideological, 
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while demographic differences are merely incidental? Or do identity differ-
ences shape both opinions and partisan loyalties? Or does everything re-
duce to the economy and pocketbook voting? And why has popular support 
come to be focused on just two parties? Subsequent chapters take up these 
questions.
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Appendix 2.A1
Wording and coding of demographic variables
Age. In what year were you born? 20– 29 years old=1, 30– 39 years old=2, 40– 
49 years old=3, 50– 59 years old=4, 60 years old and above=5.
Education. What is the highest degree that you finished? Elementary school 
and below=1, high school=2, college/graduate school=3.
Occupation. What is your current occupation and position?
Income. What is your household’s total income? See appendix 2.A2 for clas-
sification.
Ethnicity. What is your father’s ethnicity? Minnan=1, Hakka=2, mainland-
er=3.
Region. Where do you live? Taipei City, Taipei County and Keelung City, 
Taoyuan County, Miaoli County, Hsinchu City, Hsinchu County Taic-
hung City, Taichung County, Chunghwa County, Nantou City Tainan 
City, Tainan County, Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung County, Pingtung 
County, Penghu County, Ilan County, Hwalien County and Taitung 
County.
Appendix 2.A2
Classification of Three Income Groups
According to the yearly family income data published by the Directorate- 
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, the monthly family income 
of the 20th percentile and 80th percentile is calculated. Based on these two 
numbers, respondent’s income is categorized as low, middle, and high. For 
example, the 80th percentile of monthly family income was NTD 131,798 
and the 20th percentile was NTD 24,680. Respondents who answered “no 
income,” “below NTD 15,000,” and “between NTD 15,000 and 30,000” 
fall into the low income group. Respondents who answered “between NTD 
100,000 and NTD 200,000” and “more than 200,000” belong to the high 
income group. Respondents whose income is higher than NTD 30,000 but 
lower than NTD 100,000 are defined as the middle income group.
In 1998 and 2000, respondents were asked their personal income instead 
of their household income. Because it is difficult to translate between these 
two measures, we dropped those years from the tabulation.
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Appendix 2.A3
List of Datasets
An Interdisciplinary Studies of Voting Behavior in the Presidential 
Election in 2000 (ESC 1996). Principal investigator: Yih- yen 
Chen.
An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior in the 1996 Presiden-
tial Election (ESC 2000). Principal investigator: John F. S. Hsieh.
Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2002– 2004 (III): The 
Presidential Election, 2004 (TEDS2004P). Principal investigator: 
Shiow- duan Hwang.
Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2008 (TEDS2008P). 
Principal investigator: Ching- hsin Yu.
Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2009– 2012 (III): The 
Survey of the Presidential and Legislative Elections, 2012 (TEDS 
2012). Principal investigator: Yun- han Chu.
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Notes
 1. Prior to 1996, Taiwan’s president was indirectly elected by its now defunct 
National Assembly.
 2. The reality of the assassination attempt is disputed between the parties.
 3. Aboriginals also give the KMT majority support, so that the KMT is in many 
respects a coalition of minorities, while the DPP largely represents the majority sub-
ethnic group. Many other countries have a similar party- bloc structure, including the 
United States, in which the Republicans get heavy support from the white majority 
while the Democrats are disproportionately a coalition of racial, ethnic, and religious 
minorities.
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The Development of the Taiwan Voters’ Identity
T. Y. Wang
The ubiquitous effect of identity in contemporary politics has been widely 
recognized in the scholarship of the social sciences. Political instability 
within societies or bitter conflicts between nations has frequently been at-
tributed to differences in identity politics (Horowitz 2000; Isaacs 1975), and 
Taiwan is no exception to this pattern. Indeed, the issue of identity has im-
portant implications not only for the island country’s domestic politics but 
also for its relationship with China; hence, Taiwan’s identity politics may 
affect peace and stability in East Asia.
Taiwan voters’ identities have undergone substantial changes since the 
Nationalist (Kuomintang) government led by Chiang Kai- shek retreated 
to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, the “China factor” has played an essential 
part in the formation and change of the island citizens’ identities. The re- 
Sinicization efforts by the authoritarian KMT government, the infusion of 
two million of Chiang’s followers, the rapid democratization in the ensuing 
decades, and the continuing rivalry between China and Taiwan have trans-
formed the island residents’ identity in form and in substance. This chapter 
aims to trace the trajectory of Taiwan voters’ identity change. With the no-
tion of “boundary” framed in the theoretical frameworks of primordialism 
and constructionism, this study employs quantitative survey data collected 
over two decades and qualitative information gathered by focus- group in-
terviews and in- depth interviews.1 It argues that the substance of identity 
is relational because it involves the distinction between what it is and what 
it is not. The comparison and reference to other groups thus establish the 
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boundary, and hence the identity. As the boundary changes, identity evolves 
as a result. The political environment and the policies adopted by political 
elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait since World War II provide the 
impetus to the formation and the change of Taiwan voters’ identities. Spe-
cifically, the initial boundary along the ethnic line between Taiwan’s local 
residents, known as “Taiwanese,” and “mainlanders” during the authoritar-
ian era, changed to the contestation between “Taiwanese consciousness” and 
“Chinese consciousness” as the island country entered the period of democ-
ratization. With China’s forceful claim over the island, the Beijing govern-
ment’s hostility became one of the main driving forces in the growth of a 
distinct national identity. The boundary of identity politics on the island has 
thus shifted from the ethnic divide to the characterization of Taiwan as an 
independent state.
Boundary Change: The Development of Identity
Identity can be understood as a psychological attachment to a social/politi-
cal category. The substance of identity is relational because it involves the 
distinction between what it is and what it is not (Abdelal et al. 2009; Barnett 
1999). The comparisons and reference to other identities therefore sets up 
“boundaries” between groups of individuals that facilitate the formulation 
of the “we- group” and the “they- group.” In this sense, the development of 
identity is dependent on individuals’ interactions with others as well as the 
time and the place that the interaction occurs. As interactions and the con-
text differ, the boundary changes and the content of identity may vary as a 
result. Even though a certain identity may bear the same label, its substance 
may be different as boundaries shift. Research on identity thus needs to 
examine the impetus to identity formation and change. Primordialism and 
constructionism,2 the two most commonly invoked identity perspectives, 
provide the theoretical underpinning of the analysis.
In the discussion of the development of identity, proponents of pri-
mordialism maintain that identities are deeply rooted in primordial attach-
ments, which, as Charles Cooley and Edward Shils conceptualized, are “not 
merely to the other family member as a person, but as a possessor of certain 
especially ‘significant relations’ qualities” (Shils 1957, 142). These qualities 
stem from “the givens . . . of social existence” that involve “immediate conti-
guity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems 
from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social 
Changing Boundaries  47
practices” (Geertz 1994, 31). These primordial bonds, which are based on 
blood, speech, and custom, define human relations and establish boundaries 
among groups of people. These boundaries then have the power of generat-
ing psychological attachments to groups. Proponents of primordialism thus 
maintain that identities are deep- rooted in blood, culture, and language. 
Although the effects of such primordial ties may vary from individual to 
individual, their impacts are long lasting. As Geertz (1994) indicated, “for 
virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments 
seem to flow more from a sense of natural— some would say spiritual— 
affinity than from social interaction” (31). As a result, identities rooted in 
blood, culture, and languages are assumed to be given and immutable.
The constructionist perspective refutes the primordialist view that identi-
ties are inherited and underivable (Gellner 2008; Laitin 1998). Construc-
tionists maintain that identities can be fostered or intentionally constructed 
and that when social interactions change, identity can alter as a result. In this 
conception, boundaries can be artificially established. First, societies have 
various socialization mechanisms, such as education and family. Through 
these media, individuals are exposed to the customs and conventions of 
various groups, cultures, and norms of the society as well as to the histori-
cal memories of the nation. Feelings of distinctiveness from other groups 
of people are formed, and psychological attachments to these entities are 
created. Furthermore, most nations maintain an interpretative version of 
history that frequently emphasizes the oppression and exploitation of the 
people. To form a hostile “they- group” and unified “we- group,” political 
elites frequently employ state institutions to exploit such unequal and ex-
ploitative historical memories. With the objective of mobilizing their fellow 
citizens, this collective group consciousness becomes an essential part of the 
public identity. Sometimes, in an attempt to change an existing identity or 
create a new identity, the state intentionally recognizes one or a few groups 
and ignores others. This is frequently done by subsidizing or celebrating the 
chosen groups’ languages, cultures, or historical memories through educa-
tion, propaganda, and other political means. As Gellner (2008, 54) suc-
cinctly points out in his discussion of national identity, “nationalism uses 
the pre- existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures, or cultural 
wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms 
them radically. Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite 
fictitious pristine purities restored.” As a result, the celebrated group identity 
becomes the dominant one in the society, and a public identity is likely to 
be constructed through the engineering of the state. From the construction-
ist perspective, identities are more than the function of race and ethnicity, 
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and they are not unchangeable and underivable. Because boundaries can be 
intentionally manipulated through policies and socialization media, identity 
can be constructed through deliberate efforts.
The China Factor and Taiwan’s Changing Political Environment
The Boundary of Ethnicity
As noted in chapter 1, Taiwan’s modern history has been closely linked to 
political development on the Chinese mainland. After the Qing dynasty 
established administrative control of the island in the seventeenth century, 
thousands of residents in coastal provinces migrated to Taiwan seeking a 
better life in the subsequent decade. Taiwan’s sovereignty was later ceded to 
Japan by China’s last imperial dynasty in 1895. Unlike the Chinese main-
land, which was plagued by wars and chaos in the ensuing half century, 
Taiwan advanced to become a more modern society during the same period 
under the assimilation policy of the Japanese colonial authority. Although 
many Taiwan residents received a Japanese education, they still longed 
for their Chinese ancestral roots. The population was overjoyed when the 
island’s sovereignty was returned to the Chinese government, which was 
controlled by the KMT at the end of World War II. The local residents’ 
enthusiasm for returning to the “motherland” soon evaporated because the 
ruling authority dispatched to Taiwan in 1945 was corrupt and its policies 
discriminated against the local residents. As a result, many Taiwanese elites 
were filled with nostalgia for Japanese colonial rule, which was remembered 
as being efficient and honest. KMT officials in turn viewed the islanders 
with suspicion since they were under the influence of the Japanese Empire 
while the KMT government was fighting Japanese invaders on the main-
land. The animosity between the KMT government and local residents, 
particularly the Minnan group, finally culminated in a bloody crackdown 
on the Taiwanese elites by KMT troops, a tragic event known as the 2– 28 
Incident of 1947. This outbreak of hostility solidified the local perception 
of the KMT government as simply a new foreign regime and occupying 
force (Lai, Myers, and Wou 1991).
The ethnic division on the island deepened further after the KMT gov-
ernment retreated to Taiwan after its humiliating military defeat on the 
mainland. Along with the government came two million of its followers, 
who were known as mainlanders. Insisting that the Republic of China 
(ROC) had the legitimate and sovereign claim over China, including both 
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Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, Taipei’s ruling elites imposed harsh au-
thoritarian rule. As it was stated in chapter 1, a series of prejudicial measures 
were implemented to “re- Sinicize” local residents to accept the view that 
Taiwan was part of a greater China and to foster their Chinese identity. By 
recognizing and celebrating China- centered historical memories, activities 
that might arouse local identities and promote Taiwan independence were 
censored and suppressed. Meanwhile, local residents’ freedom of expression 
and association was substantially curtailed under martial law. Through inter-
pretations of the constitution by the Grand Justice Court, clauses relevant to 
presidential term limits and regular parliamentary elections were suspended. 
Using all of China as the “imagined community,”3 local residents’ participa-
tion in legislative politics was restricted because Taiwan was deemed only 
one of the 36 provinces of the nation, and their representation in the parlia-
ment was treated as such (Wang 2008). The net effect of these authoritarian 
measures was that a small group of mainland elites effectively monopolized 
political power on the island, especially at the national level. The perception 
that mainlanders were the oppressor and local Taiwanese were the oppressed 
underlined the ethnic cleavage on the island. This ethnic divide thus became 
the first boundary among the island’s residents in Taiwan’s modern history. 
Many mainlanders believed that the only way to survive in this unfriendly 
environment was to support the KMT government. This rational calcula-
tion and their emotional affinity to the Chinese mainland strengthened the 
mainlanders’ espousal of Chinese consciousness, which also turned into a 
partisan identification with the KMT.
Although the boundary between Taiwanese, particularly the Minnan 
group, and mainlanders continued to exist during the subsequent several 
decades, the ethnic division as a major social cleavage increasingly lost its 
political importance. First, constant social contacts among various ethnic 
groups in schools, workplaces, and other social settings help to narrow 
the differences between them. Most islanders’ ability to speak the official 
language— Mandarin— and the ability to converse in local dialects by some 
mainlanders also enhanced mutual understanding among ethnic groups on 
the island. Interethnic marriages over the past several decades have blurred 
ethnic lines and produced a new generation that has been more accepting 
of different ideas from all ethnic groups. Most important, the rapid democ-
ratization on the island in the 1980s also contributed to weakening the sig-
nificance of the ethnic divide. With the lifting of martial law, freedom of 
expression and association became constitutional rights protected by law. 
After Lee Teng- hui became the first native- born president in 1988, and later 
with the passage of constitutional amendments in the mid- 1990s that stipu-
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late popular elections of the presidency and a new parliament, mainlanders 
could no longer monopolize political power. Meanwhile, local politicians 
began to advocate such slogans as “collectivity of common fate” (sheng- ming- 
gong- tong- ti), “the rising new nation” (xin- xing- min- zu), and “the new Tai-
wanese” (xin- Taiwanren) in an attempt to ease the ethnic tension between 
Taiwanese and mainlanders and garner electoral support. As local residents’ 
sense of relative deprivation in the power distribution dissipated, along with 
politicians’ conscious efforts to allay ethnic tension, the antagonistic feeling 
between the mainlander and other ethnic groups gradually attenuated.
Empirical research employing interpretative approaches and quantitative 
analyses supports this conclusion (Chang 2006; Cheng 2009; Pao 2009; 
Wang 2008). Table 3.1 presents survey responses from the Minnan and 
Hakka groups on their views of Taiwan’s ethnic relations. It shows that by 
2006 about 40 percent of Minnan and Hakka respondents or their close rel-
atives had intergroup marriages with mainlanders, and 67 percent of them 
felt they got along with mainlanders as equally well as with those of their 
own ethnic groups. About 69 percent believed that they had the same social 
status as mainlanders. As the boundary between local residents and main-
landers has become increasingly blurry, ethnic identity has lost its power of 
differentiation. That said, this does not mean that there is no political dif-
ference among Taiwan’s major ethnic groups. As chapter 2 has shown, the 
TABlE 3.1. Minnan and Hakka on Ethnic Tension




Who do you get along with? (N = 1082) %
Minnan and Hakka 24.1
Mainlander 2.7
Both about the same 67.0
No response 6.2
Do you feel those mainlanders you know have higher social status than you? (N 
= 934) %
Better 14.2
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ethnic cleavage among Taiwan citizens has gradually been transformed and 
cloaked in their partisan attachments. That is, the mainlanders as a group 
consistently have a disproportional partisan attachment to the Pan- Blue po-
litical alliance, whereas members of the Minnan group present the opposite 
pattern in their party identification with the Pan- Green camp. Alternatively, 
a new boundary between Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese conscious-
ness has increasingly become prominent on the island.
The Boundary of Chinese/Taiwanese Consciousness
The contestation between Chinese consciousness (zhong- guo- yi- shi) and 
Taiwanese consciousness (Taiwan- yi- shi) concerns the interpretation of the 
relationship between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.4 In the conception 
of Chinese consciousness, “China” is a term that encompasses both cultural 
and political significance. To be Chinese implies belonging not only to a 
particular ethnic and cultural group but also to the political identity of the 
Chinese state known as zhong- guo, in which Taiwanese culture is a part of 
Chinese culture and the Taiwanese people are a part of the Chinese popula-
tion. Since the island of Taiwan is an integral part of China, the eventual 
unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland is regarded as both natural 
and inevitable. Those who espouse Taiwanese consciousness, by contrast, 
challenge the idea that Taiwan is a part of China. They argue that the one- 
hundred- year separation of Taiwan from the Chinese mainland has created 
a Taiwanese culture distinct from that of the Chinese mainland. The ideas 
that Taiwan and China are one nation and that all Chinese must be ruled 
by a single government within the same state are thus rejected. Some even 
assert that “Taiwanese are not Chinese” and have opposed the assertion that 
Taiwan is a part of China in any sense (Shih 1992, quoted in Huang 1993, 
49). While advocates of Chinese consciousness behold a China- centered in-
terpretation of the island’s relations with the Chinese mainland, proponents 
of Taiwanese consciousness take a Taiwan- centered view of the relationship.
As indicated earlier, during its authoritarian rule of the island, one of the 
major tasks of the KMT government was to foster Chinese consciousness 
and its accompanying Chinese identity so that local residents would accept 
the view that China was their motherland. Throughout the several decades 
after 1949, the leaders of the KMT upheld the principle of “one China,” 
of which Taiwan was considered to be a part. Even after Lee Teng- hui be-
came president, he was careful not to challenge the One China principle for 
fear of offending the party’s old guard. Presiding over the newly established 
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National Unification Council, Lee promulgated the National Unification 
Guidelines in March 1991, symbolizing the commitment of his adminis-
tration to Taiwan’s eventual unification with the Chinese mainland. The 
rapid democratization that was set in motion in the late 1980s nevertheless 
later made the advocacy of Taiwan independence into a constitutional right 
protected by law. The previous China- centered school curriculum was also 
revised and shifted to a new emphasis on the island’s history and culture 
(Wang 2001). In particular, local politicians’ advocacy of such slogans as 
“the new Taiwanese” had the effect of fostering a new identity on the island. 
By the mid- 1990s, Taiwanese consciousness has become the strongest alter-
native to Chinese consciousness.
The rivalry between the two perspectives rose to its zenith during the 
eight- year presidency of Chen Shui- bian, of the DPP, from 2000 to 2008. 
Chen has strong pro- independence credentials, and his affiliated DPP is 
the only major political party on the island that advocates the island’s de 
jure independence. To raise the local population’s Taiwanese consciousness 
and identity, the Taipei government under Chen’s leadership launched a 
series of de- Sinicization initiatives on the island. As a result, Chinese con-
sciousness and its related Chinese identity were under severe attack dur-
ing Chen’s presidency. Like the Chiang regime, the Chen administration 
selectively recognized a portion of Taiwan’s historical memories, in par-
ticular those related to the 2– 28 Incident. Other measures were adopted 
to promote an image that Taiwan is a separate political entity from China, 
including adding the phrase “Issued in Taiwan” to the island country’s 
green passport cover and dropping the national emblem of the ROC as 
the official logo of Taiwan’s overseas missions. With the revision of history 
textbooks, education has been used to change the collective memories of 
the Taiwan’s citizens (Wang 2001; Wang and Chang 2005). The Chen 
administration’s efforts to strengthen Taiwanese identity reached a climax 
when the Rectification Movement (zheng- ming- yung- dong) was launched 
in 2007 by replacing “China” in the names of all relevant government and 
state- run agencies with “Taiwan.”5 It also renamed the Chiang Kai- shek 
Memorial Hall and proposed a referendum for UN membership that was 
held during the 2008 presidential elections (Enav 2007; Mo and Shih 
2007). All of these measures aimed to celebrate Taiwanese consciousness 
for its own sake and as a way of rejecting Chinese consciousness. As the 
contestation between the two perspectives became increasingly prominent 
on the island, the divide was manifested in the changing patterns of the 
island residents’ self- identification as a Taiwanese or a Chinese.
During the period between 1992 and 2012, surveys conducted by the 
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Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, in Taiwan, asked re-
spondents the following question:
In our society, some people consider themselves Taiwanese, and oth-
ers view themselves as Chinese, while still others see themselves as 
both Taiwanese and Chinese. What is your view on this matter?
Figure 3.1 shows that the island citizens’ identity has undergone signifi-
cant change over the course of past two decades, signifying the vicissitudes of 
Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese consciousness. Indeed, as figure 3.1.a 
demonstrates, the overall ratio of Taiwanese identifiers has increased sub-
stantially since 1992, from about 20 percent to 40 percent in 2000, and has 
continued rising. When President Ma Ying- jeou of the KMT was inaugu-
rated in 2008, more than half of the island’s citizens considered themselves 
Taiwanese. Four years later, the percentage of Taiwanese identifiers increased 
to 56 percent, an increase of more than 45 percent from two decades ago. 
During the same period, the proportion of Chinese identifiers on the island 
Fig. 3.1. Identity change by ethnicity, 1992– 2012. Data source: Core Political 
Attitudes among Taiwanese (Election Study Center, NCCU).
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declined significantly, from close to 30 percent in 1992 to about 4 percent 
in 2012, a decline of about 25 percent. Interestingly, the percentage of dual 
identifiers on the island— those who see themselves as both Chinese and 
Taiwanese— has been quite steady, hovering around 45 percent since 2001, 
even though it also witnessed a slight decline by 2012.
The pattern of identity change appears to occur across ethnic lines for 
the three largest ethnic groups on the island. Figures 3.1.b and 3.1.c show 
that the changing patterns of both Minnan and Hakka groups resemble the 
overall trend in Taiwan, as increasing proportions of the two groups consider 
themselves Taiwanese while the number of Chinese identifiers has dropped 
significantly, to less than 5 percent by 2012. Currently, a substantial propor-
tion of Minnan and Hakka, about 35 percent and 45 percent, respectively, 
hold dual identity, considering themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese. 
For the mainlanders, the ratio of Chinese identifiers also witnessed a sig-
nificant decline during the same period, from about 50 percent in 1992 
to around 10 percent in 2012, as figure 3.1.d shows. Like the Minnan and 
Hakka groups, the number of Taiwanese identifiers among mainlanders has 
increased during the same period, but substantially less so by comparison. 
Since 2004, more than 60 percent of them accepted that they are Chinese 
as well as Taiwanese.
Figure 3.2 also presents the distribution of identity change for the five 
political generations in Taiwan.6 As with the overall trend, there was a steady 
increase of respondents holding Taiwanese identity and a continual decline 
of Chinese identifiers for each of the five generations. By 2012, more than 
half of all age groups were Taiwanese identifiers, while the proportions of 
Chinese identifiers fell to about 5 percent, except for respondents of the 
first generation, who were at least 81 years old and increasingly dying off. 
What is worth noting is that more than 60 percent of the fifth generation 
are holders of Taiwanese identity while very few of them are Chinese identi-
fiers. That 40 percent to 50 percent of the third and the fourth generations 
are holders of dual identity probably is because these respondents received 
the China- centered education during their formative years under the KMT 
authoritarian rule.
What are the island citizens’ views on the meaning of being Chinese/Tai-
wanese? An examination of the qualitative data from focus- group interviews 
conducted since 2000 shows that Taiwan voters tend to take a primordial 
view of being “Taiwanese.” A recurrent statement made by all interviewees 
is that “I was born here, I grew up here, and therefore I am a Taiwanese,” 
even though they do not reject their Chinese cultural origin. In response to 
questions on the definitions of Chinese and Taiwanese, a third- generation 
Fig. 3.2. Chinese/Taiwanese identity by generations, 1992– 2012. Data source: Core 
Political Attitudes among Taiwanese (Election Study Center, NCCU).
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interviewee stated in 2000 that “Taiwanese are those who live in Taiwan. We 
have the same customs . . . and we are ‘made in Taiwan’” (2000SB05). For 
the fourth- and fifth- generation interviewees, the answer is more straightfor-
ward: “Chinese are those who were born in China and Taiwanese are those 
who were born in Taiwan” (2011TSQI06) and “those who were born in 
Taiwan are Taiwanese” (2011TSQI07).
Such a primordial conceptualization of Taiwanese identity appears to 
cross the ethnic line. Some mainlanders recognized that their immediate 
ancestors or even themselves were born on the Chinese mainland, but the 
very fact that they had been living in Taiwan for half a century led them 
to espouse Taiwanese identity. A first- generation mainlander contended in 
2002 that “Taiwanese are those who live in Taiwan. Even though I came 
from the mainland, I am a Taiwanese as I have lived here for half a century” 
(2002– 31). Another mainlander stated that “I am a Taiwanese. I was born 
here and grew up here. I drink Taiwan’s water and eat Taiwan’s rice. There is 
no mistake that I am a Taiwanese” (2011CUSQD06).
This primordial conceptualization also crosses the generational line, and 
in fact the tendency becomes stronger as interviewees get younger in age. 
For the fifth- generation respondents, to define who they are by birthplace is 
the most natural and straightforward approach. For instance, a 2011 fifth- 
generation interviewee defined “Taiwanese” in a blunt manner: “those who 
were born in Taiwan are Taiwanese” (2011TSQI07).
While there appears to be a consensus about the meaning of Taiwanese, 
respondents of different ethnic groups and generations have defined “Chi-
nese” in two different but noncontradictory ways. Some conceptualize the 
term in a primordial sense, treating the association of culture and ethnicity 
as the defining characteristic of being Chinese. Since residents in Taiwan and 
on the Chinese mainland share many cultural and ethnic traits, “Taiwanese” 
is considered a subgroup of “Chinese,” and thus logically “Taiwanese” is 
“Chinese,” broadly defined. Others define the term with a political meaning 
by equating “Chinese” with “the citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)” and “China” with “the Chinese state” or “the PRC regime.” In this 
conceptualization, they maintain that since Taiwanese are not citizens of the 
PRC, they are not “Chinese.” Thus, in the mind of Taiwan voters, the term 
“Chinese” may have separate cultural and political connotations. Along with 
the quantitative survey data presented earlier, it appears that the vast major-
ity of the island’s citizens have employed the term of “Chinese” with a po-
litical meaning. This may explain why few of them are Chinese identifiers: 
they do not consider themselves citizens of the PRC. If they have emotional 
affinity with the country of China (zhong- guo), many respondents adopted 
Fig. 3.3. Identity and partisan support, 1992– 2012. Data source: Core Political 
Attitudes among Taiwanese (Election Study Center, NCCU).
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dual identity, of which its Chinese element has a cultural meaning. In other 
words, when the term “Chinese” (zhong- guo- ren) is applied to Taiwan voters, 
it has less of the political designation that is traditionally associated with a 
Chinese polity and more of the cultural and ethnic connotations that should 
be more appropriately understood as “ethnic Chinese” (hua- ren).
Thus, the contestation between Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese 
consciousness has increasingly tilted toward the former as more and more 
citizens on the island become Taiwanese identifiers. Such a trend applies to 
all three major ethnic groups in Taiwan, including mainlanders, who tradi-
tionally espouse Chinese consciousness. While many mainlanders continue 
to view the word “China” as a term representing a culture, a nation, and a 
state and are holders of a dual identity, the majority of them have become 
indigenized to the point of accepting a part of their identity as being Tai-
wanese. However, like the ethnic divide on the island, Chinese/Taiwanese 
consciousness has also been cloaked by partisanship. Figure 3.3 shows that 
the island citizens holding Taiwanese identity tend to be supporters of the 
Pan- Green Alliance, led by the DPP, whereas those with Chinese identity 
and dual identity are more likely to develop a partisan attachment to the 
Pan- Blue Alliance, led by the KMT. Indeed, as subsequent chapters show, 
the KMT tends to be perceived by Taiwan voters as a party holding Chinese 
consciousness with a pro- unification stand, and the DPP as a party holding 
Taiwanese consciousness with a pro- independence position. Meanwhile, as 
the divide of Chinese/Taiwanese consciousness is increasingly cloaked by 
partisanship within a domestic context, the public discourse on the cleavage 
continues on the island but has shifted to a new boundary.7
The Boundary of National Identity
In addition to its domestic element, the rivalry between Chinese conscious-
ness and Taiwanese consciousness also has an external dimension due to 
Beijing’s forceful claim of the island. After being defeated by Communist 
troops in 1949, the KMT government, led by Chiang Kai- shek, retreated 
to Taiwan to continue what was perceived as the sacred mission of “recover-
ing the mainland” from the Chinese Communists. By the late 1960s, the 
Chiang family’s ambitious goal of national unification by the ROC, head-
quartered in Taipei, had become increasingly unlikely. The passage of UN 
Resolution 2758 in 1971, which recognized the Beijing government as “the 
only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations,” symbolized the 
decisive victory of the PRC in the cross- Strait competition for international 
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legitimacy. Since then, Beijing leaders have steadfastly applied their version 
of the One China principle in the international community: that “there is 
only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government 
of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China” 
(TAO 2000). Refusing to recognize the legitimate existence of the ROC on 
Taiwan, Chinese leaders maintain that the island has no legal right to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with foreign countries or to participate in any in-
ternational organizations requiring statehood as a condition of membership. 
Over the years, the increasing importance of China in international affairs 
has led many countries to break diplomatic relations with Taipei as a neces-
sary condition for establishing formal ties with the Beijing government. The 
number of states recognizing the ROC dropped significantly in the 1970s 
and 1980s. To participate in international organizations, most of which are 
nongovernmental in nature, the Taipei government frequently had to com-
promise on its name, flag, and national anthem in order to meet Beijing’s 
demands (Lee and Wang 2003; Wang, Lee, and Yu 2011). As of 2013, only 
twenty- three countries officially recognized the Republic of China, and Tai-
pei was in just a handful of international governmental organizations. Bei-
jing’s tactic of diplomatic isolation is humiliating to Taiwanese citizens and 
seriously hurts their dignity because they believe that Taiwan is more quali-
fied to enjoy the legitimacy as a state than such UN members as Nauru and 
the Marshall Islands.
Indeed, Taiwan witnessed significant economic growth and political 
development even as its international space was being squeezed by Bei-
jing’s tactic of diplomatic isolation. The island’s manufacturing sector went 
through rapid expansion, with the country’s GDP growing at about 9 per-
cent per year during the two decades starting in 1970.8 As one of the largest 
trading nations in the world and ranking among the top holders of foreign 
exchange reserves, Taiwan was considered one of the newly industrialized 
countries. In addition to its economic achievements, Taiwan also witnessed 
rapid democratization in the 1990s. With political power being peacefully 
transferred between political parties through regular elections since 2000, 
Taiwan has become a genuine democracy. The island country’s lack of in-
ternational standing simply does not match its political achievement and 
status as a world- class economy, and Taiwanese citizens blame Beijing for the 
country’s lack of international legitimacy (Wang 2006).
Meanwhile, Beijing has also employed the tactic of military coercion. Re-
fusing to renounce the use of military force to resolve the cross- Strait dispute, 
Chinese leaders have deployed more than 1,000 short- range ballistic missiles 
along China’s coast area, targeting them at Taiwan. In order to weaken the 
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island’s defensive capability, Beijing has deliberately prevented any country 
from selling weapons to Taiwan. When Chinese leaders launched the eight- 
month- long missile test and military exercises in 1995– 96 and issued saber- 
rattling threats in 2000, China became a genuine menace to the island citi-
zens’ democratic way of life and economic prosperity (Garver 1997; Wang 
2001). Thus, Beijing’s tactics of diplomatic isolation and military coercion 
have invited Taiwanese citizens’ resentment. As a hostile “they- group” bear-
ing the name “China” has formed in the mind of the island’s citizens, the 
boundary of Chinese/Taiwanese consciousness that was largely confined to 
domestic politics has increasingly shifted to the level between a “Chinese 
state” and a “Taiwanese state.”
Figure 3.4. shows that a large proportion of Taiwanese citizens have con-
sistently sensed an “unfriendly” Chinese government since 1996. The feeling 
of Beijing’s antagonism toward the Taipei government reached its zenith 
during the period 2000– 2008, when President Chen was in office, as 60 per-
cent to 70 percent of Taiwan voters perceived the animosity from across the 
Taiwan Strait. Data in table 3.2 demonstrate that there is a strong associa-
tion between the island citizens’ feeling of Beijing’s enmity and their holding 
of Taiwanese identity. Qualitative data from focus- group interviews provide 
an interpretative understanding of this relation. In addition to the primor-
dial ties mentioned in the last section, many focus- group respondents also 
justified their holding of Taiwanese identity by their frustration at Beijing’s 
“suppression” (da- ya) of Taiwan in the international community. One of the 
respondents commented that “I was born here. . . . China continues bully-
Fig. 3.4. Taiwan voters’ views on Beijing’s friendliness toward the Taipei 
government, 1996– 2012. Data source: Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese. 
(Election Study Center, NCCU).
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ing and suppressing us, which makes me feel that Taiwan is not like a coun-
try. When I travel abroad, I feel no country likes us [to be treated unfairly 
by Beijing]. . . . I am a Taiwanese. . . . I was born here. . . . I never feel that 
I am Chinese. . . . I am totally different from them” (2010S401). Some of 
them cited Taiwanese athletes’ inability to carry the island country’s national 
flag and to sing the national anthem in international sport competitions as 
examples of Beijing’s “bullying practices” (ya- ba). As another respondent 
complained, “Because Chinese doesn’t allow us to carry our national flag in 
international baseball games or Olympic competitions, .  .  . I feel they are 
always harassing us. . . . I feel they are bullying us. . . . [Interviewer: Do you 
think you are both Chinese and Taiwanese?] . . . No, I am just a Taiwanese!” 
(2010N403).
The resulting humiliation and resentment prevented Taiwan citizens 
from identifying with a hostile “China.” At the same time, the loss of inter-
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national legitimacy by the ROC has made the sense of belonging to “Tai-
wan” as a state the only distinction between them and citizens of China. The 
island residents’ bitter feelings of Beijing’s diplomatic “bullying” has thus 
hardened their identity with an independent Taiwan that is separate from 
China. As one respondent commented, “I feel I am a Taiwanese. . . . Because 
I was born here and grew up here . . . I feel that we really should tell people 
that [we are Taiwanese]. If we do not speak out, we would disappear . . . then 
when we go abroad, foreigners will not respect you and you will feel that you 
don’t have a country any more” (2010N302). Another stated that “I will 
always emphasize that I am a Taiwanese when I go abroad” (2011TSQF04). 
Quantitative survey data in table 3.3 confirm that this sentiment is wide-
spread, as about 80 percent of Taiwanese identifiers and 50 percent of dual 
identifiers now view Taiwan as an independent state. As the boundary be-
tween Taiwanese and Chinese gradually loses its power of differentiation 
within a domestic context, the external dimension of the boundary becomes 
increasingly prominent. The public discourse on the Chinese/Taiwanese dis-
tinction has shifted to the level of national identity.
Independence or Unification?
With a Taiwan- centered political identity becoming the overriding view on 
the island, one might conclude that Taiwan voters would lose their emo-
tional attachment to China and support the island’s de jure independence 
at all costs. Figure 3.5 presents the island residents’ positions on the issue 
of independence versus unification. A quick glance at figure 3.5.a seems to 
confirm the above conclusion; that is, the overall support for a cross- Strait 
unification has declined precipitously. The declining support for unifica-
tion is clearly visible across all generations, as figure 3.5.b shows, and there 
is little sign of it rebounding any time soon. While support for indepen-
dence has been increasing since 2000, figures 3.5.a and 3.5.c indicate that its 
overall support has stabilized to about 20 percent between 2003 and 2012, 
although the fifth generation tends to be more supportive of independence. 
After the eight- year rule by the DPP, the only major political party on the 
island that has called for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan, support 
for de jure independence has only increased slightly by comparison. It is 
important to note that, throughout the last two decades, 35 percent to 45 
percent of respondents have remained undecided regarding their preferences 
over Taiwan’s long- term status. Such a tendency is stronger for younger gen-
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erations, as figure 3.5.d shows, since 40 percent of the fourth and fifth gen-
erations have taken a wait- and- see position since 2008.
Previous analyses have shown that preferences for the island’s future rela-
tions with China are conditioned by perceived costs (Hsieh and Niou 2005; 
Niou 2004; Wang 2005; Wu 1993). The majority of the respondents ex-
pressed a preference for independence if there would be no war with China, 
but they were not willing to if Beijing would respond violently. They rejected 
unification if there were great disparity between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait but were divided on the issue of unification if the social, economic, 
and political conditions of the two systems were relatively compatible. In 
particular, those respondents who took a wait- and- see position appear to be 
more sensitive to future circumstances than others (Wang 2009). Support-
ers of independence or unification are more likely to continue to back their 
respective positions even if the preferred positions are associated with high 
costs. The “undetermined” islanders, however, tend to switch their positions 
from one preference to the other when favorable conditions are present and 
Fig. 3.5. Independence/unification by generations, 1994– 2012. Data source: Core 
Political Attitudes among Taiwanese. (Election Study Center, NCCU).
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thus serve as swing voters. Given their sizeable number, their decisions in 
either direction could form a majority that will determine Taipei’s course 
of action regarding its future relations with Beijing. Overall, these findings 
show that Taiwan voters are pragmatic and risk averse on cross- Strait rela-
tions and that they are not willing to sacrifice their hard- won democratic 
way of life and economic prosperity for such radical political changes as 
declaring de jure independence or unification. Despite the rising Taiwanese 
identity on the island, Taiwan’s future relations with China remain undeter-
mined because the island citizens are pragmatic and risk averse.
Conclusions
As with many countries in the world, the formation and change of citizens’ 
identities have played a major role in Taiwan’s contemporary politics. To 
examine the trajectory of Taiwan voters’ identity change, this study employs 
the notion of “boundary” framed in the theoretical frameworks of primor-
dialism and constructionism. By analyzing quantitative survey data and 
qualitative information gathered through focus- group interviews over the 
course of two decades, it shows that the “China factor” has been the essential 
component of the changing boundaries that shape Taiwan voters’ identities. 
Immediately after the KMT’s retreat to the island, the identity boundary 
was set at the ethnic divide between local citizens and mainlanders because a 
small group of mainland elites monopolized political power. With the rapid 
democratization since the late 1980s, along with other social changes on the 
island, the ethnic divide has been replaced by the contestation of Chinese/
Taiwanese consciousness manifested in the island citizens’ holding of Tai-
wanese, Chinese, or dual identities. Because the majority of Taiwan voters 
have now adopted Taiwanese identity and few are holders of Chinese iden-
tity, the boundary of Chinese/Taiwanese consciousness has gradually lost its 
political significance within the domestic context. That said, the shadows of 
both ethnic cleavage and the Taiwanese/Chinese divide continue to be cast 
over Taiwan’s politics because it is cloaked in the island citizens’ partisan 
attachment. Meanwhile, due to Beijing’s tactic of imposing diplomatic iso-
lation on Taipei in the international community, a new boundary is increas-
ingly apparent on the island. The term “Taiwan” is no longer a geographic 
designation, and “Taiwanese” now assumes the new meaning of an identity 
with Taiwan as an independent state.
These findings have both theoretical and policy implications. Theoreti-
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cally, this study vindicates the constructionist argument that identity can be 
intentionally or unintentionally fostered through socialization media such as 
family and education. Both the KMT authoritarian regime ruled by the Chi-
ang family and later the pro- independence DPP government led by Chen 
adopted a series of Sinicization and de- Sinicization measures, respectively, 
to promote the “desired” identities. However, the validity of construction-
ism does not reject the primordialist claim that identities are deep- rooted 
in blood, culture, and language and are assumed to be given and hard to 
change. The fact that a substantial proportion of mainlanders continue to 
hold Chinese identity, along with the justifications employed by members 
of the Minnan and Hakka groups for their holding of Taiwanese identity, 
demonstrates the power of primordial bonds in shaping individuals’ identi-
ties. The empirical findings presented above suggest that both primordialism 
and constructionism are useful in understanding the development and the 
formation of identities.
This chapter also shows that identity is a relational concept that defines 
an individual psychological attachment. Because identity delineates what 
is and what is not, it sets boundaries and forms a “they- group” and a “we- 
group.” When the boundaries change, the substance of the identity may be 
altered even though it may bear the same label. While the public discourse 
on Chinese/Taiwanese identity continues, the substance of Taiwan’s identity 
politics has increasingly shifted to the relationship between a unified Taiwan 
and a hostile China. A new boundary of national identity has thus emerged 
on the island.
The empirical findings have important policy implications for cross- Strait 
relations. One of the major reasons for many island residents to switch their 
identities was Beijing’s diplomatic isolation of Taiwan and military coercion 
of the island country. While successful in making Taiwan a pariah state in 
the international community, the Chinese leaders’ forceful measures only 
invited resentment from Taiwan voters and hardened their identity with Tai-
wan as an independent state. The tendency also applies to mainlanders who 
have been strong holders of Chinese identity and supporters of cross- Strait 
unification. Since there is a strong association between holding Taiwanese 
identity and recognition of the island’s independent and separate status from 
China, Beijing’s forceful claim is counterproductive to its cause of unifica-
tion. Given that the rising Taiwanese identity has yet to be translated into 
pursuit of the island’s de jure independence, some creative thinking needs to 
take place by Beijing’s new leadership in order to attract the active support of 
Taiwan voters so that cross- Strait disputes can be resolved peacefully.
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Appendix 3.A1. 
List of Data Sources
Survey Data:
1. Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese. Election Study Center, 
National Chengchi University.
2. Lu- huei Chen. 2006. The Origin and Political Effect of Taiwanese 
Identity. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.
3. Sufeng Cheng. 2011. Taiwan Identity: Formation Typology and 
Its Political Consequences (II). National Science Council Research 
Plan, NSC 99– 2410- H- 004– 113.
4. Sufeng Cheng. 2013. A Study of Presidential Popularity and Its 
Political Effects (II). National Science Council Research Plan, 
NSC100– 2410- H004– 086- MY2.
Focus Group Interviews:
1. I- chou Liu. 2000. A Study in Major Political Identification Con-
cepts of Taiwan Public (I). National Science Council Research Plan, 
NSC89– 2414- H- 004– 022- SSS.
2. I- chou Liu. 2002. A Study in Major Political Identification Concepts 
of Taiwan Public (II). National Science Council Research Plan, 
NSC 89– 2414- H- 004– 049.
3. Su- feng Cheng. 2010. Taiwan Identity: Formation Typology and Its 
Political Consequences (I). National Science Council Research Plan, 
NSC99– 2410- H- 004– 113.
4. Su- feng Cheng. 2011. Taiwan Identity: Formation Typology and 
Its Political Consequences (II). National Science Council Research 
Plan, NSC99– 2410- H- 004– 113.
5. Sufeng Cheng. 2013. A Study of Presidential Popularity and Its Polit-
ical Effects (II). National Science Council Research Plan, NSC100- 
2410- H004- 086- MY2.
Notes
 1. A list of data sources is presented in the Appendix. The author would like to 
thank Professors Lu- huei Chen, Sufeng Cheng, I- chou Liu and the Election Study 
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Center, National Chengchi University in Taipei, for making the data available. All 
errors are my own.
 2. Some scholars distinguish three theoretical approaches for identity research: 
primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism. Both constructivism and instru-
mentalism agree that identity is malleable by social linkages and not biological giv-
ens. Their difference lies in how these linkages are created. Thus, the instrumentalist 
approach is essentially “a variant of constructivism” (Dawisha 2002, 6).
 3. For the meaning of “imagined communities,” see Anderson 1991.
 4. Group consciousness connotes identification with a group as well as an aware-
ness of the relative position of the group in a society. Some scholars describe the rise of 
Taiwanese identity and its related awareness as the emergence of Taiwanese national-
ism (e.g., Wu 2004). Because nationalism generally refers to a belief aiming to achieve 
and maintain national independence, it is frequently used for the analysis of colonial 
movements and ethnic conflicts that yearn to break free from domination (e.g., Fox 
2004; Varshney 2003). As will be discussed below, this is not the case for Taiwan 
since the rise of Taiwan- centered awareness does not imply that the island’s citizens 
are actively pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence and permanent separation from 
China. The island citizens’ positions on the issues of independence and unification are 
more pragmatic and risk averse (see Hsieh and Niou 2005; Niou 2004; Wang 2005; 
and Wu 1993, 1996). Some Taiwanese scholars have thus preferred to use the term 
“consciousness” (e.g., Wang 2001; also see Rigger 2006). This study follows that rea-
soning.
 5. For instance, the Chen administration renamed the state- run China Petroleum 
Corporation as CPC Corp, Taiwan. Other renamed agencies included the island 
country’s shipbuilding corporation and its central bank (Bishop and Dickie 2007).
 6. All respondents in the surveys are divided into five political generational groups 
based on the following four birth years as cutoff points: 1931, 1953, 1968, and 1982. 
The classification is based on the premise that respondents of each generation would 
be 18 years old when one of four significant political events occurred: (1) the retreat 
of the KMT government to Taiwan in 1949, (2) Taipei’s withdrawal from the UN 
in 1971, (3) the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986, and (4) 
the peaceful transfer of political power in 2000. Such a classification is based on the 
conceptualization that a political generation is a group of people who share common 
experiences and historical memories due to the fact that they are born in a same time 
period and live through the same social and economic environment (Mannheim 1952; 
Neumann 1965). For justifications on the significance of the four political events, see 
Chang and Wang (2005).
 7. A private polling organization recently released a report that 60 percent of 
Taiwan citizens possess Chinese identity (China Times, March 5, 2013). The report 
generated some controversy on the island. It also invited concerns from foreign gov-
ernments. Diplomats from the American Institute in Taiwan and Interchange Asso-
ciation, Japan, the “unofficial” representative offices of the United States and Japan, 
respectively, visited National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center to discuss 
the findings.
 8. National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan) at http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/
pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp (accessed March 15, 2015).
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Chapter 4
Parties, Partisans, and  
Independents in Taiwan
Ching- hsin Yu
Taiwan is a new democracy in which elections have played a significant role 
in citizen political participation in the past decades. Mainstream electoral 
studies have paid much attention to voters’ decision- making processes in 
elections. Factors that influence voters’ electoral choices, such as partisan-
ship, economic evaluation, candidate qualifications, and policy preferences, 
are often included in the discussions of voter behavior. Among those factors, 
citizen partisanship, or party identification, is often cited by scholars as the 
most consistent and influential one in Taiwan. However, the concept has 
met with confusing definitions and implications. On the one hand, Taiwan’s 
political history has shaped a distinct developmental pathway of citizen par-
tisanship. As Taiwan was undergoing a significant democratic transition in 
the mid- 1980s, the party system evolved from a one- party hegemonic system 
to a two- party system, then to a multiparty system in the 1990s, followed 
by the formation of two major camps, the Pan- Blue and the Pan- Green, in 
the 2000s. Citizen partisanship also changed dramatically. On the other 
hand, as more research was devoted to the exploration of the behavior of 
partisan voters, political independents were of less concern. In addition to 
the differences between partisans and independents, there are various types 
of political independents, whose attitudes and behaviors are different from 
each other, so study of citizen partisanship in Taiwan calls for examination 
of these different kinds of independents.
This chapter intends to explore the evolution and distribution of citizen 
partisanship in Taiwan with a special interest in political independents. Af-
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ter a brief literature review, it will examine the historical origins of citizen 
partisanship and the evolution of the party system in Taiwan. It will then 
compare attributes and attitudes of different types of partisans and indepen-
dents, such as political interest, preferences on the issues of unification and 
independence, support for democracy, voting, and vote choice. In conclu-
sion, a reconsideration of the development of citizen partisanship and its 
impact in Taiwan is discussed.
Studies of Partisans and Independents
A system of voter identification was developed from the group theory since 
Campbell and his associates published their classical works on American 
voters (Campbell, Gruin, and Miller 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). It main-
tains that citizens tend to psychologically identify and behaviorally support a 
political group, or party, based on their personal experiences and preferences. 
The link to a given party will further shape citizens’ political attitudes and 
issue positions. Party identification is not only a psychological attachment to 
a political party but also a cue for a citizen’s political actions. Because citizens 
have different experiences with a political party their identification may have 
varying strength as a result. Some citizens may develop a strong party iden-
tification, others may have a weak attachment to a political party, and still 
others may possess a neutral feeling toward any groups. Therefore, American 
voters are typically categorized in one of five categories: Strong Democrat, 
Weak Democrat, Independent, Weak Republican, and Strong Republican; 
or in seven categories with the addition of Independent Democrat and In-
dependent Republican (Weisberg 1993, 684).1
Regardless of its popularity, the concept of party identification has 
nevertheless suffered from the problems of dimensionality and transitivity 
(Converse 1966; Petrocik 1974; Weisberg 1980; Niemi, Wright, and Powell 
1987; Bartle and Bellucci 2009). Generally speaking, the discussion of at-
titudes and behaviors of citizens with strong partisanship are less controver-
sial. How to assess independents or citizens with weak partisanship raises a 
crucial issue so that they will not be treated as a residual category.
Political independents are generally characterized as having positive at-
tributes like prudent judgment and adequate political involvement (Bryce 
1929). However, the normative virtues of the political independents have 
been critically challenged by empirical studies (Campbell et al. 1960, 143). 
While the debate over what constitutes adequate qualifications of a nonpar-
tisan voter will continue for a long period of time, the increasing popularity 
Parties, Partisans, and Independents in Taiwan  73
of survey data has enabled scholarly research to reexamine the nature of 
political independents (Burnham 1970; Dennis 1988; Keith et al. 1992; 
Magleby, Nelson, and Westlye 2011).
Studies of voters’ party identification in Taiwan, beginning in the early 
1970s, have primarily followed the research on American voters. As partisan 
attachment is widely recognized as one of the most influential factors affect-
ing a voter’s political decisions (Chen 1986, 1994; Chu 1996; Liu 1996, 
1997), empirical studies have found that independents in Taiwan are largely 
female, less educated Minnans and Hakkas (in contrast to the mainland-
ers) with low socioeconomic status. They have less political interest and pay 
little attention to political affairs. More recent studies show that the num-
ber of independents had increased over time and the political attitudes and 
voting behaviors of less- educated independents differ from those of highly 
educated independents (Yeh 1994; Chu 2004; Wang 2010). The empirical 
evidence confirms the “revisionist” image of the political independent as 
characterized by the authors of The American Voter. It also demonstrates that 
a clear differentiation between pure independents and partisan leaners in 
Taiwan is sometimes difficult (Wang and Yu 2011).
Precisely because nonpartisan voters have varying degree of political at-
tributes, their existence has crucial implications to a functioning party system 
and the health of democracy. Indeed, political independents frequently play a 
pivotal role in deciding the final outcome of a close election. They also func-
tion as a vital balance in an otherwise polarized society. This is especially im-
portant for a nascent democracy like Taiwan, where the party system has not 
yet stabilized. As the current research analyzes Taiwan voters’ partisan identi-
fication, it will pay particular attention to political independents in Taiwan.
Partisanship before 1986
The development of citizen partisanship had a unique history in Taiwan in 
its early periods. The tragic incident that occurred on February 28, 1947 
(the 2– 28 Incident), created a deep antagonism between the incoming 
mainlanders and the Minnan. The latter learned from the incident that poli-
tics could be dangerous, and as a consequence, political apathy began to take 
root in their society. When the Kuomintang government moved to Taiwan, 
an authoritarian regime was quickly and firmly established. Constitution-
ally, the Temporary Provisions were implemented to establish martial law, to 
provide the president with tremendous discretionary power, and to prohibit 
the emergence of political opposition. No new political parties were allowed 
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to be established under martial law. Any dissident opinions targeted at the 
government were also subject to repression. Intense political socialization 
aimed at enhancing citizen loyalty to the government, which was in reality 
loyalty to the ruling KMT, was widespread in the school curricula (Wilson 
1970). With the assistance of state- controlled mass media, only selective in-
formation beneficial to the KMT regime was permitted to circulate. Equally 
important, the introduction of a political commissar further ensured the 
KMT’s unchallenged status in regard to the military. A party- state run by 
the KMT, like that of many communist countries, became firmly established 
on the island. Under the authoritarian party- state structure, the KMT was 
therefore the only significant political party.2 Citizens in Taiwan were either 
KMT members or not. No other political parties were able to compete for 
popular support against the KMT, so the situation was similar to that of the 
one- party hegemonic system as described by Sartori (1976).
Furthermore, under the name of Fa- tong (the sole legitimate government 
representing China), the KMT regime maintained an extensive political struc-
ture as it had done on the Chinese mainland. As “one China” was taken as 
given and Taiwan was regarded as one of China’s 36 provinces, the political 
connection between the island and the Chinese mainland was emphasized by 
a Mainlander dominated regime. The political representation of Minnans and 
Hakkas was intentionally suppressed. As a result, a political division rooted in 
ethnicity emerged on the island (Wang 1993; Wachman 1994).
Despite the ethnic division, support of the KMT came from two sources. 
As indicated in chapter 3, the first group of supporters were the mainlanders 
who fled to Taiwan with the KMT government in the late 1940s. Because 
they followed the party leaders in the Sino- Japanese War and the Chinese 
Civil War, mainlanders have become the core supporters of the KMT (Wu 
1995; Shyu, 1997). The second group of supporters has been the Minnan 
and Hakka through political indoctrination by the regime. After the disas-
trous defeat on the Chinese mainland, it was crucial for the KMT regime to 
establish strong local support in Taiwan. Unlike mainlanders who shared a 
similar history with the KMT leaders, Minnans and Hakkas were connected 
to the party by a mix of political, economic, and ideological incentives. Po-
litically, a Minnan or Hakka with KMT membership had a better chance of 
being promoted in the government. Party membership was a proxy criterion 
for national loyalty and carried political expedience for the Minnan and 
Hakka who intended to have a career in the government. Economically, 
maintaining a close tie with the KMT would benefit businesses. By forego-
ing some prerogative interests, the regime effectively exchanged economic 
benefits for the political support of the Minnan and Hakka.
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One noteworthy way the KMT regime built grassroots support was 
through the implementation of local elections. Since the early 1950s, local 
elections had been the KMT’s main locus for recruiting local elites, distrib-
uting economic prerogatives, and marketing the regime’s image of a “free 
and democratic China” in opposition to totalitarian Communist China. Of 
course, the outcomes of elections were managed by the KMT regime. None-
theless, it is also reasonable to argue that local elections gave the Minnan 
and Hakka experience with party politics and the electoral process. Under 
the façade of a free and democratic China, the authoritarian KMT regime 
did provide a certain degree of pluralism in society. Non- KMT independent 
candidates found some room for political participation in elections. In spite 
of being outnumbered by the KMT candidates, the non- KMT candidates 
won seats in various local elections. The appearance and activities of these 
non- KMT candidates were typical symbols of electoral competition under 
the one- party hegemonic system. Indeed, there were some non- KMT can-
didates who consistently won elections in certain regions. The non- KMT 
elected politicians provided alternative choices for the Taiwan electorate, in 
particular, those Minnan and Hakka who had no partisan affiliation.
The non- KMT forces continued to grow during Taiwan’s rapid eco-
nomic and sociopolitical transition. The KMT regime found it more and 
more difficult to curb the expansion of the non- KMT forces in elections. 
Worse still for the KMT regime, diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, such 
as losing its seat at the United Nations and the termination of formal rela-
tions with Japan and the United States, had facilitated further expansion 
of the electoral arena. The non- KMT candidates found more room for 
collective action in elections. For example, the group Dang- wai (mean-
ing “outside the KMT”), which appeared in the early 1970s, unified the 
non- KMT candidates during elections. Members of Dang- wai were able 
to share common platforms and manifestos without being penalized by 
electoral regulations. Although Dang- wai members did not formally orga-
nize as a political party, they worked together in elections as if they were 
members of one. The Minnan/Hakka electorate was able to make a choice 
between the KMT candidates and the Dang- wai candidates in elections. 
Of course, although they competed against KMT candidates in elections, 
not all of the non- KMT candidates maintained similar political stances. 
Nor were all of the non- KMT candidates anti- KMT. Therefore, it would 
be premature to suggest that a quasi two- party system had taken shape in 
Taiwan. Nonetheless, the non- KMT forces did grow in one election after 
another. It was not until the Democratic Progressive Party was formally es-
tablished in 1986 (although it was still illegal at that time) that a new party 
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system with two meaningful political parties emerged in Taiwan (Cheng 
1989; Lu 1992; Hsieh 2005).
The evolution of the party system before 1986 resulted in a peculiar pat-
tern of citizen- party connectivity in Taiwan. First, a clear and stable partisan-
ship between the mainlanders and the KMT had emerged in the early period 
when the KMT government moved to Taiwan. The mainlanders maintained 
a strong affiliation with the KMT due to their close dependence on the 
KMT in all respects. As the KMT regime made every effort to consolidate 
its control over the island, material enticements and purposive incentives 
provided by the KMT were used to facilitate its popularity among the Min-
nan and Hakka. For example, the KMT regime adopted several liberaliza-
tion measures in the early 1970s, such as recruiting Minnan and Hakka 
elites into the party and gradually opening some electoral posts for public 
contestation, had effectively expanded its connection with the Minnan and 
Hakka. Together with the mainlanders, the more extensive connections be-
tween the KMT and Minnan and Hakka thus helped the KMT to maintain 
a consistent advantage in elections. However, except for those mainlanders 
and KMT- friendly Minnan and Hakka, a majority of the citizens in Taiwan 
were not registered KMT members.3
Second, the historical legacy had a significant effect on the development 
of citizen partisanship in Taiwan. Due to the unique sociopolitical develop-
ment in the 1950s and 1960s, the label of “political party” acquired negative 
implications for some Taiwanese. The incident of February 28, 1947, the 
discriminatory political structure in place since the early 1950s, and the 
white- terror mentality prevented the Minnan and Hakka from embracing 
political affairs. Even though they had participated in local elections, their 
connection to the ruling KMT was weak. If they supported a KMT candi-
date in elections, it did not mean that they identified with the KMT. In fact, 
voters generally placed candidates above the party. It was the candidates, 
not the voters, who were directly connected to the KMT. Strong popular 
support for KMT candidates did not equate to strong support for the KMT. 
The candidate’s personal image and connections generally were more im-
portant than the party label in elections (Chen 1986). Since the image of 
political parties was not that welcome, maintaining their stance as nonpar-
tisan could be a good choice for many Minnan and Hakka voters. Also due 
to the fact that the non- KMT candidates were not allowed to engage in any 
organized campaign activities under martial law, the Taiwan electorate sup-
porting non- KMT candidates was unable to form a normal partisanship, 
which KMT supporters could do.
Third, the Dang- wai represented a partially united front of non- KMT 
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candidates in elections. At the beginning, the name of Dang- wai was merely 
an expedient way of differentiating non- KMT candidates from their KMT 
opponents. However, the term gradually acquired special political and orga-
nizational meanings. As the political system increasingly liberalized, mem-
bers of the Dang- wai regularly engaged in island- wide electoral campaigns. 
Since martial law banned the formation of political parties, Dang- wai mem-
bers used various names in different elections as common symbols to distin-
guish themselves. Consequently, the emergence of the Dang- wai provided 
Taiwan voters with a unique form of two- party competition.
The election of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly is a typical example that 
illustrates the development of political independents. The elections were 
implemented in 1951 and ended in 1994. Only two minor political par-
ties, the Chinese Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, which had 
been established in China during the Second World War, were allowed to 
present their candidates under party labels. However, as shown in table 4.1, 
the two minor parties were too weak to win a meaningful number of seats 
in the elections. Compared with those two parties, independent candidates 
performed much better. Even though the winning number varied from elec-
tions to elections due to a lack of organized campaigns, they managed to 
win from 15 percent to 27 percent of the electoral vote. They were thus a 
significant non- KMT force. The majority of Dang- wai independents unified 
under the DPP after 1986, which fared well in the elections of 1989 and 
1994, garnering about 21 percent and 29 percent of the popular vote. The 
establishment of the DPP also suggested that there was a split among politi-
cal independents. Those independents who did not join the DPP continued 
to run for election under a nonpartisan label. Popular support for non- DPP 
independents did not disappear, although it declined significantly.
The growth of political independents in local elections implies the ex-
istence of political space for non- KMT forces. The election results of the 
Provincial Assembly provide a larger picture in which the KMT was strongly 
TABlE 4.1. Election Results: Taiwan Provincial Assembly (percentage of vote)
Year 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1968 1972 1977 1981 1985 1989 1994
KMT 78.18 84.21 80.30 79.45 82.43 84.51 79.45 72.73 76.62 76.62 70.13 60.08
DPP 20.78 29.11
New Party 2.53
Other parties 1.82 1.52 1.35 1.30
Independent 20.00 15.79 18.18 20.55 16.22 15.49 20.55 27.27 23.38 22.08 9.09 7.59
Sources: Data are from the ROC Central Election Commission, the Taiwan Provincial Election Commis-
sion, and the Election Studies and Survey Data Archive of the Election Study Center of National Chengchi 
University.
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dominant, although at the same time the number of political independents 
in Taiwan’s political landscape was not insignificant. Unfortunately, other 
than these macro electoral results, there are little empirical data showing 
individual voters’ partisanship. Micro studies of individuals’ vote choices 
were not feasible until the mid- 1980s, when academics began to introduce 
the concept of party identification and its relevance to Taiwan.
In a strict sense, there were only KMT partisans and it was difficult to 
identify the non- KMT supporters in elections. Although the non- KMT 
candidates often called themselves independents, their supporters were not 
exactly the same as “independent voters” according to definitions of party 
identification. They were voters who supported non- KMT candidates, re-
gardless of how persistent their support would be. True partisan support did 
not develop until the establishment of the DPP in 1986, when the partisan-
ship of Taiwan voters began to take on a different form than in previous 
decades. In particular, those who were non- KMT supporters before 1986 
would not only support the individual candidates as they had before but also 
began to adjust to the new party label. Thus, it is difficult to provide a de-
tailed portrait of non- KMT supporters because the fact that they were non- 
KMT supporters does not necessarily make them independents. Since there 
was a ban on the formation of political parties, supporters of non- KMT 
candidates (independent candidates) generally characterized themselves as 
independents (voters supporting independent candidates) even though they 
in fact were non- KMT supporters. Consequently, the concept of “indepen-
dent” that is often cited as a counterpart of party identifiers carries a differ-
ent connotation.
Equally important, the evolving party system consistently shaped citi-
zens’ partisanship differently than in the previous decades. In particular, 
Taiwan experienced a new political landscape after the KMT’s disastrous 
defeat in the 2000 presidential election as some members left the party and 
organized the People First Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Along 
with the New Party, a KMT split- off of 1994, they form a part of Taiwan’s 
multiparty system. The island citizens’ partisanship has become diversified 
as a result, which can be characterized as multipartisan including identi-
fication with the KMT, DPP, NP, PFP, and TSU.4 Yet in addition to the 
increase in political parties, a significant characteristic of the party system 
after 2000 was the formation of the Pan- Blue and Pan- Green coalitions. The 
Pan- Blue includes the KMT, the NP, and the PFP, while the Pan- Green in-
cludes the DPP and the TSU. The key departure point of the Pan- Blue and 
Pan- Green mainly rests on their different stances with regard to cross- Strait 
policy. These alliances also have strong impacts on citizens’ vote choice in 
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elections. Hence, citizen’s partisanship can be also understood in terms of 
their allegiance to the Pan- Blue Alliance or the Pan- Green Alliance, which 
presents a bipartisan structure.
Partisans and Independents since the 1990s
Thanks to the rapid advancement of electoral studies since the 1990s, more 
sophisticated findings about citizens’ partisanship have appeared in Taiwan’s 
academic community. This section will examine the attitudes and behav-
iors of partisans and independents in recent decades. Instead of using voter 
identification with an individual political party, it will use voter identifica-
tion with the two major political camps mentioned above. Hence, following 
the prescriptions provided by The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), 
there will be seven categories of partisan: Strong Pan- Blue, Weak Pan- Blue, 
Leaning Pan- Blue, (pure) Independent, Leaning Pan- Green, Weak Pan- 
Green, and Strong Pan- Green. In order to provide a more concise meaning 
of “Independent,” this chapter also uses education as a criterion to divide 
the Independents into three categories: low- educated, middle- educated, and 
high- educated. Consequently, there will be comparisons among party iden-
tifiers and political independents in terms of political interests, cross- Strait 
relations, support for democracy, voting, and vote choices. These variables 
are selected for comparison because they have been frequently identified as 
important aspects of the study of Taiwan voters. Through the application 
of these variables with cumulative survey data collected over the past two 
decades, it is expected that the analyses will contribute to the study of par-
tisanship and the impacts of political independents in Taiwan. Descriptions 
and measurements of these variables can be found in appendix 4.A1.
General Distribution
The empirical findings regarding citizen partisanship shown in table 4.2 
demonstrate certain consistencies and changes during the past two decades. 
In the early 1990s, when citizens started to experience contested elections 
between the KMT and the DPP, a majority of the voters identified them-
selves as nonpartisan. The number of independents was as high as 34 percent 
in 1992. Next in predominance were the Weak Pan- Blue and Strong Pan- 
Blue identifiers. As for the newly established DPP, its identifiers numbered 
far less than those of the Pan- Blue Alliance. This suggests that the KMT 
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continued to enjoy a clear electoral advantage, as it had before. The number 
of independents declined in the legislative election of 1995 as only 22.5 
percent of the electorate considered themselves as independents. Both the 
KMT and the DPP had more identifiers. In particular, around 32 percent 
of the electorate labeled themselves as Weak Pan- Blue. The presidential elec-
tion of 1996 showed a similar pattern as in 1995 as the percentage of those 
identifying with the KMT and with the DPP rose. Only slightly less than 
one- quarter of the electorate identified themselves as nonpartisan. In partic-
ular, the KMT had enjoyed a strong surge of identifiers such that the com-
bination of strong Pan- Blue, Weak Pan- Blue, and Leaning Pan- Blue com-
prised more than 50 percent of the electorate. The number of independents 
rose again in the elections for legislators in 1998. It seems that the surge of 
independents resulted from the decline of KMT identifiers. Meanwhile, the 
number of identifiers with the DPP, either Strong Pan- Green or the Weak 
Pan- Green, had increased slowly but steadily.
The independents reached their peak in the presidential election of 2000 
and the legislative election of 2001. One key reason for the increase of in-
dependents had to do with the dramatic change in the party system at that 
time. On the one hand, the KMT suffered from an internal split before 
the presidential election, which led to a disastrous defeat in the presidential 
election and the DPP became the ruling party, 14 years after its establish-
ment. On the other hand, new political parties, such as the PFP and the 
TSU, emerged in the 2001 legislative election. The unprecedented face of 
a multiparty system appeared in Taiwan. As political parties exhibited vary-
ing degree of quality, many citizens became reluctant to identify themselves 
as leaning toward a particular party. Thus, being an independent was the 
optimal choice for many voters. After 2001, the number of independents 
became somewhat variable in different elections, ranging from slightly more 
than one- third in the 2008 to about one- quarter in 2012.
One noticeable development was the gradual increase of partisan lean-
ers since 2001. The percentages of both the Leaning Pan- Blue and Leaning 
Pan- Green categories, with some minor ups and downs, showed an increas-
ing trend through 2012. The increase in partisan leaners resulted mainly 
from the emergence of coalitional electoral competition at that time; for 
example, members in the Pan- Blue camp (the KMT, the NP, and the PFP) 
cooperated in the presidential elections in order to defeat the Pan- Green 
candidates. However, in the legislative elections, each party in the Pan- Blue 
camp nominated its own candidates and competed against each other. The 
coexistence of cooperation and competition in these elections encouraged 
voters to swing their partisanship between pure independents and leaners.
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Last, the percentages of strong party identifiers have been stable over the 
past two decades. The percentage of Strong Pan- Blue identifiers decreased 
when the KMT lost the presidential election in 2000, and the number con-
tinued to decline in 2001 and 2004 but then showed a slight surge from 
2008 to 2012. As for the Pan- Green, winning the presidential election in 
2000 did bring growth in the percentage of strong identifiers. The trend 
did not continue but maintained an average of between 4 percent and 6.5 
percent from 2001 to 2012.
Political Interest
The general trend of partisan distribution for the past decades, as shown in 
table 4.2, is rather stable. However, unlike the partisans who have a clear 
political orientation, it would be imprudent to regard the political indepen-
dent as a unified subset of the electorate. Many studies have provided a more 
detailed examination of the political independent, and, among the variables, 
educational level seems to be the most cited demographic criterion that 
differentiates subtypes of political independents. These studies argue that 
TABlE 4.2 General Distribution of Partisanship
 1992 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004.03 2004.12 2008.01 2008.03 2012
Strong Pan- 
Blue
15 13.4 15.3 10.4 8 4.5 5.2 5.1 8.6 7.1 7.9
Weak Pan- 
Blue
18.4 31.8 31.6 21.5 13.7 9 11.6 13.4 14.3 15.9 17
Leaning Pan- 
Blue
7.2 2.3 4.2 8.1 5.4 12.7 13 14.4 13.8 13.3 15.1
Independent 34 22.5 22.1 28.2 35.4 35.9 32.7 27.6 34.6 30.7 26.5
Leaning Pan- 
Green
3.2 1.2 1.9 5.5 4.4 13 11.5 13.5 10.5 11.8 11.2
Weak Pan- 
Green
6.9 12.2 11.2 13.6 15.9 13.1 13.6 13.7 8.7 11.1 11.3
Strong Pan- 
Green
3.2 3.2 3.7 7.2 8 5.7 5.8 5.9 4 5.2 6.5
NR 12.1 13.5 10 5.5 9.2 6.1 6.7 6.4 5.4 4.9 4.5
Sources: Data for 1996– 2000 are from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, and data for 
2001– 12 are from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study Project (see List of Data Sources in appendix 
4.A2).
Notes: 1: Numbers in the table are percentages of respondents in each election survey. 2: The elections in 1992, 
1995, 1998, 2001, 2004.12 (December), 2008.01 (January), and 2012 are legislative elections. The elections in 
1996, 2000, 2004.03 (March), 2008.03 (March), and 2012 are presidential elections. In 2012, the election for 
president and legislators were held at the same time.
82  Taiwan Voter
differences in other demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, and 
career, do not reveal clear and consistent implications about the attitudes 
and behavior of the political independent, and the educational differences 
have continuously drawn researchers’ attention in studies of the political 
independent. Therefore, this paper will also investigate the educational dif-
ferences among political independents in Taiwan.
As indicated in figure 4.1, political independents in Taiwan have shown 
different patterns during the past two decades. In the early 1990s, trends in 
the percentages of political independents with low- level and middle- level 
educations were similar until early 2000s. Both categories also accounted 
for the majority of political independents at that time. Moreover, the per-
centage of moderately educated political independents has been the highest, 
while the numbers of least- educated political independents have decreased. 
By contrast, the highly educated political independent did not account for 
a very high percentage. Notably, the number of highly educated political 
independents increased after 2000 and exceeded that of the least- educated 
political independent. The different developments among the least, moder-
ately, and highly educated political independents should enable researchers 
to get a more precise understanding about political attitudes and behavior.
The concept of political interest has been considered a driving force of 
political participation since the publication of The People’s Choice (Lazars-
feld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). Those voters with a greater interest in 
politics would concurrently have more political information and would be 
more attentive to political activities than those less interested. The literature 
also suggests a close relationship between political interest and partisanship. 
Identifying with a political party would provide voters convenient and reli-
able cues for elections. Moreover, a political party continues to convey polit-
ical messages to voters all the time. It is anticipated that citizens with a close 
relationship to a political party would have more political interest than those 
citizens who do not maintain such a party affiliation. The results in table 
Fig. 4.1. Educational distribution among independents. Data Sources and Notes: 
Same as table 4.2.
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4.3 partially confirm these findings. The general pattern indicates, first, that 
independents have been the most uninterested in politics during the past 
two decades. Except for the presidential election in 2000 and the legislative 
election in 2004, independents were more likely to say that they do not have 
an interest in politics. Second, partisan voters, regardless of their strength of 
identification, did not have clear associations with political interest. Partisan 
leaners in the Pan- Blue camp were generally less interested in politics, yet 
even the stronger partisans in the Pan- Green camp showed an unanticipated 
low interest in politics. The overall trend suggests a moderate relationship 
between political interest and partisanship. Even though independents have 
shown a relative lack of interest in politics, the relationship between parti-
sanship and political interest is not consistent.
Nonetheless, the relationship between independents and political inter-
est has rather consistently and systematically followed educational differ-
ences. Figure 4.2 shows a different distribution of political interest among 
the three types of Independents. The least- educated independent has the 
lowest political interest compared to the other types of Independent. The 
percentage of lack of political interest in the least- educated independent ex-
ceeds 80 percent. By contrast, the highly educated independent consistently 
maintains a certain degree of political interest. The political interest of the 
moderately educated independent, as expected, lies in between. The graph 
clearly suggests that the least- educated independents have the least interest 
in politics.
TABlE 4.3 Distribution of Political Interest among Partisans
 1992 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004.03 2004.12 2008.01 2008.03 2012
Strong Pan- 
Blue
31.4 38.1 25.4 42.1 13.5 42.4 38.9 10.8 53.3 38.9 34.5
Weak Pan- 
Blue
34.6 35.3 24.9 35.9 7.7 42.9 34.8 14. 56.5 39.5 34.1
Leaning Pan- 
Blue
34.9 38.2 29.8 48.4 13.1 46.4 37.4 10.1 63.3 37.7 34.6
Independent 46.7 50.8 40.7 58.8 22.3 66.3 54.2 23.7 72.5 52.3 48.5
Leaning Pan- 
Green
21.3 5.9 26.9 34.9 12 58 38.2 15.2 58.9 37.2 43.5
Weak Pan- 
Green
33 40 22.6 40.3 13.9 50.4 42.3 13.7 49.5 41.5 40.7
Strong Pan- 
Green
28.6 25.5 10 36.9 1.1 52.7 43.3 19.4 69.4 53.6 45.1 
Source and Note: Same as table 4.2.
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On Cross- Strait Relations
As mentioned above, the point of disagreement between the Pan- Blue and 
the Pan- Green camps has been their different positions on the issue of uni-
fication with China versus Taiwan independence. The choice is not an easy 
one for the majority of Taiwan citizens to make, and the preference of main-
taining the status quo has become the more preferred alternative during the 
past decades. On average, up to 55 percent of Taiwan voters have chosen 
neither unification nor independence. This significant number has also im-
plied that support for maintaining the status quo comes from all types of 
partisan citizen, and particularly from the independents. As indicated in 
table 4.4, the partisan difference of the two political camps is significant 
only between the strong party identifiers and the rest of the categories. Both 
Fig. 4.2. lack of political interest among independents with different educational 
levels. Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
TABlE 4.4 Distribution of Support for Maintaining the Status Quo
 1992 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004.03 2004.12 2008.01 2008.03 2012
Strong Pan- 
Blue
55 46 35.2 41.6 37.9 28.3 48.9 44.6 62.3 52.2 64.1
Weak Pan- Blue 60.9 52.5 51.1 44.4 46.6 54.6 60.4 68 67.4 67 66.9
Leaning Pan- 
Blue
68.6 62.9 57.6 56.1 53.1 50.2 65 56.9 73.7 71.3 69.9
Independent 51.2 48.5 51.3 54.3 51.2 55 57 58.6 55.9 64.4 66
Leaning Pan- 
Green
56.2 41.2 63 37.9 55.8 52.7 45 54.1 46.2 50.2 50.2
Weak Pan- 
Green
48.6 41.8 42.7 48.2 54.3 51.3 41.3 44.2 43.1 42.5 42.7
Strong Pan- 
Green
32.7 29.8 28.3 30.7 48.4 29.6 20 29.7 31.4 23.2 35.6 
Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
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the Strong Pan- Blue identifiers and Strong Pan- Green identifiers (and rela-
tively, the Weak Pan- Green identifiers) have lower support for maintaining 
the status quo. The Weak Pan- Blue, Leaning Pan- Blue, Independent, and 
Leaning Pan- Green, by contrast, are strong supporters of the status quo. In 
particular, Leaning Pan- Blue identifiers are the most likely to choose main-
taining the status quo than all other types of partisans. While independents 
also choose maintaining the status quo, they do not present significant dif-
ferences from party leaners.
If we take a closer look at independents’ preferences on maintaining the 
status quo, figure 3 shows that there are noticeable differences among the 
three types. On the one hand, the highly educated independents have been 
very supportive of maintaining the status quo. The upward trend also sug-
gests that the highly educated independents have become core supporters 
for maintaining the status quo. On the other hand, the least- educated inde-
pendents have been less likely to support maintenance of the status quo. Yet 
the trend after early 2008 did show a strong increase up to 2012. As for the 
moderately educated Independents, their preference for maintaining the sta-
tus quo resembles that of highly educated independents. Also, the attitudes 
of the moderately educated independents are also more stable than the other 
two types of independents.
Support for Democracy
As a member of the Third Wave democracies, Taiwan has made an admira-
bly smooth and peaceful political transition over the past decades. However, 
those achievements in democratic transition did not automatically bring 
about good governance in Taiwan. Like many other Third Wave democra-
Fig. 4.3. Support among independents with different educational levels for 
maintaining the status quo. Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
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cies, the challenges of political transition may not have been associated with 
the establishment of democratic institutions but, rather, with the new socio-
economic issues occurring at the same time. In the past ten years, citizens 
in Taiwan have encountered sluggish economic development, repeated po-
litical corruption, and worsening social inequality. Consequently, the poor 
economic performance and ineffective governance could have disillusioned 
citizens about democracy and reminded them of the “good old days” in the 
authoritarian era (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007).
Fortunately, whether citizens lost their confidence in democracy under 
poorly performing governments is not clear. Table 4.5 shows that regard-
less of partisan differences, the majority of citizens have maintained rather 
strong support for democracy. Relatively speaking, citizens with stronger 
party identification are also more supportive of democracy. Pan- Green camp 
identifiers are more supportive of democracy than are Pan- Blue identifiers. 
The Strong Pan- Green identifiers, in particular, have been the most stable 
believers in democracy compared with other partisans. As for independents, 
their belief in democracy is not significantly different from the Leaning Pan- 
Blue identifiers but is slightly lower than for Leaning Pan- Green identifiers. 
Independents who are not supportive of democracy present a different pic-
ture when the level of education is taken into consideration. As figure 4.4 
shows, support for democracy by independents displays a surge as well as 
a decline over the past decade. Independents’ support for democracy in-
creased significantly from 2000 to 2004, then dropped sharply from 2004 
to 2012. Figure 4.4 further indicates that the highly educated independents 
have been slightly more supportive of democracy than both the moderately 
and least- educated independents. Yet the three types of independent have 
moved closer to each other in 2008 and 2012.
TABlE 4.5 Distribution of Support for Democracy
 2000 2001 2004.03 2004.12 2008.01 2008.03 2012
Strong Pan- Blue 51.8 81.7 72.9 88.3 54.7 44.5 59
Weak Pan- Blue 48.4 89.1 83.9 85.2 53.6 46.3 57.9
Leaning Pan- 
Blue
54.2 84.6 74.1 88.7 53.1 49.2 47
Independent 52 82.5 82.7 87.7 56.5 43.1 47.1
Leaning Pan- 
Green
53.3 89.7 89.3 93.6 54.5 48.8 60.6
Weak Pan- Green 61.2 92 93.1 91.4 61.2 59.4 63.7
Strong Pan- 
Green
70.2 90.9 89 94 81.6 75.8 73.9 
Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
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Voting
One of the bedrock arguments made about party identification is the party’s 
strong impact on citizen’s voting. Citizens with stronger party identification 
are supposed to have stronger intentions of supporting the party with which 
they identify in elections. Partisan voters are therefore more likely to vote 
the way parties request. Table 4.6 presents the trends in not voting among 
different partisan voters. It shows, first, that stronger party identifiers are 
far more likely than others to cast their ballots in elections. Except for the 
Strong Pan- Green voters who had a higher percentage of not voting in 1996, 
200412 and 200801, the number of those not voting in both the Strong 
Pan- Blue and Strong Pan- Green camps has been less than 10 percent. Table 
4.6 also shows that weak party identifiers are less likely to vote than strong 
party identifiers. Both the Leaning Pan- Blue and Leaning Pan- Green identi-
fiers are also less likely to vote than the weak party identifiers. Fourth, except 
for some elections, political independents tend to be the most unlikely to 
vote in elections. The general pattern of not voting and partisanship seems 
to reasonably confirm the conventional wisdom that partisanship does mat-
ter to a citizen’s intention to vote or not.
Figure 4.5 provides additional information about different types of po-
litical independents and their intention to vote. In the early 1990s, there 
was no clear difference among the highly, moderately, and least- educated 
political independent in voting. Noticeably, this pattern changed in 1998, 
when highly educated political independents refrained from voting, as did 
the moderately educated political independent, though with a moderate 
change. This new pattern continued until early 2008. Also noticeably, the 
least- educated political independents were by no means absent from voting. 
They were more likely to vote than their more educated counterparts.
Fig. 4.4. Support for democracy among independents with different educational 
levels. Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
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Vote Choice
Based on the perspectives of party identification, citizens with a certain par-
tisanship would be expected to be more likely to support a given party in 
an election. In Taiwan, citizen partisanship is effectively associated with vote 
choice in elections. As indicated in table 4.7, different types of Pan- Blue 
identifiers revealed consistent support for their party candidate. Moreover, 
the strength of identification was also in agreement with the assumption 
of transitivity, in which stronger identifiers tend to vote for their partisan 
candidate more than weaker identifiers do. As for independents, in the 1996 
election the Pan- Blue presidential candidate, Lee Teng- hui, dramatically 
outperformed his competitor, Peng Ming- min. More than 41 percent of 
Independents voted for Lee, while only 4 percent voted for Peng. This sharp 
difference also accounts for Lee’s strong victory.
As discussed above, the KMT suffered a serious internal split during the 
presidential election in 2000. This internal split also led to a split among 
the Pan- Blue identifiers. Only 37.8 percent of Strong Pan- Blue identifiers 
and 34.8 percent of Weak Pan- Blue identifiers voted for their partisan can-
didate. The number was even smaller for those Leaning Pan- Blue identifi-
ers. Independents were in favor of the Pan- Green candidate in 2000, which 
contributed to the electoral success of the DPP presidential candidate, Chen 
Shui- bian. As for the Pan- Green identifiers, they did not vote for the Pan- 
Blue candidate. Unlike the Pan- Blue identifier, the partisan boundary for 
the Pan- Green identifier was more consistent and predictable.
The presidential elections in 2004, 2008, and 2012 were typical Pan- 
TABlE 4.6. Distribution of Not Voting
 1992 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004.03 2004.12 2008.01 2008.03 2012
Strong Pan- 
Blue
3.1 6.5 6.1 6.3 4.3 9.8 2.2 9.2 8.5 3.7 4.2
Weak Pan- Blue 14.3 13.6 5.4 11.2 5.6 14.8 4.2 17.1 20.9 5.6 5.1
Leaning Pan- 
Blue
22 8.8 10.2 14.1 9.2 20.3 7.6 28.7 30.6 9.8 14.8
Independent 13.1 14.7 13 17.7 8.6 20.4 15.3 30.2 36.4 19.3 20.2
Leaning Pan- 
Green
14.6 5.6 7.4 28.4 7.5 22.5 10.5 29.8 25.4 16.4 12.2
Weak Pan- 
Green
9.5 11.6 6.3 12.7 8 14.8 4 15.7 18.5 9.4 11.2
Strong Pan- 
Green
4.2 4.3 11.5 8.1 2.1 7 0 10.8 12 2 2.5 
Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
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Blue versus Pan- Green competitions, in which there were neither internal 
splits nor strong independent candidates. It is obvious that the impact of 
partisanship on elections became even stronger over time. Distribution of 
party identification in the three elections looked reasonable with no obvious 
deviations. Also, the strength of party identification was relatively consis-
tent. Interestingly, unlike the 1996 and 2000 elections, in which indepen-
dents one- sidedly favored either the Pan- Blue or the Pan- Green candidate, 
their vote choice seemed to be more divided. They had a higher tendency 
to support the Pan- Green candidate in 2004 but were more likely to back 
Pan- Blue candidates in the 2008 and 2012 elections. As the electoral com-
petition between the two political camps became intense, the influence of 
independents has also increased. Interestingly, sizeable numbers of Taiwan 
voters continue to self- identify as independents, as table 4.7 shows. This 
could be due to the historical memories of one- party authoritarian rule that 
makes island citizens reluctant to report partisanship. It could also be the 
unsatisfactory performance of political parties as a whole, which leads to an 
Fig. 4.5. Not Voting among Independents with Different Educational levels. Data 
Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2
TABlE 4.7 Percentage of Votes for Pan- Blue Presidential Candidate
 1996 2000 2004.03 2008.03 2012
Strong Pan- Blue 87.6 37.8 87.4 94.9 95.1
Weak Pan- Blue 75.1 34.8 87.9 91.6 91.3
Leaning Pan- Blue 56.9 22.4 76.3 85.3 79
Independent 41.6/4.0 11.1/30.0 19.3/34.4 39.3/16.0 35.6/20.7
Leaning Pan- Green 28 7.8 4.2 9.3 10.8
Weak Pan- Green 29.5 8.2 0.8 5.2 3.4
Strong Pan- Green 21.2 4.3 0 1.9 1.7
Data Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
Notes: (1) The two numbers for the Independent category represent the vote for the Pan- Blue 
candidate and the Pan- Green candidate, respectively. (2) Since the Pan- Blue and Pan- Green alliances 
were not formed until after 2000, vote shares of Pan- Blue candidates in 1996 and 2000 elections 
refer only to those of KMT candidates.
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unwillingness of identifying with any party. For whatever reasons, political 
independents in Taiwan deserve further analysis in future research.
Figure 4.6 shows that highly educated independents were less likely to 
vote for the Pan- Blue candidate in the presidential election of 1996. In con-
trast, least- educated independents were strongly supportive of the Pan- Blue 
candidate. The support for the Pan- Blue candidate in the 2000 election de-
clined concurrently among the three types of independents. The differences 
in vote choice among independents with different educational levels seen in 
1996 disappeared. In 2004, highly educated independents were more will-
ing to vote for the Pan- Blue candidate than their less educated counterparts. 
The election of 2008 was similar to that of 2000, with the three types of 
independents not showing much difference. Yet all the independents tended 
to show considerable support for the Pan- Blue candidate. The highly edu-
cated independents turned their backs on the Pan- Blue candidate in 2012. 
Both the moderately educated and least- educated independents had higher 
percentages of support for the Pan- Blue candidate. In addition to the chang-
ing patterns of vote choice among independents, figure 4.5 also reveals one 
significant feature: there is a correspondence between the elections that lead 
to power change and the convergence of vote choice among the three types 
of independents. The KMT’s loss of power in the 2000 elections was accom-
panied by unified, declining support of independents. A similar instance 
occurred in 2008, when the Independents almost unanimously supported 
the Pan- Blue candidate who won the election.
Concluding Remarks
The evolution of the party system in Taiwan has been closely tied to the 
development of democracy. The development of citizen partisanship has 
Fig. 4.6. Vote choice among independents with different educational levels. Data 
Sources and Notes: Same as table 4.2.
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taken a distinct route following the process of democratic opening. The 
long- standing KMT had monopolized the political marketplace early on, 
relegating citizen partisanship to nonpartisan status if they were not sup-
porters of the KMT. Nevertheless, those nonpartisan citizens participated 
in elections, supported certain non- KMT candidates, and paved the way for 
alternative partisanship later on. The establishment of the DPP represents a 
watershed development in citizen partisanship, having made possible com-
peting partisanship. Additionally, the development of a multiparty system 
and the formation of Pan- Blue and Pan- Green camps in the 2000s signifi-
cantly transformed citizen partisanship. There have been both changes and 
continuity in the party system, as in citizen partisanship. Individually, each 
political party has certain social bases, yet those bases are somewhat shared 
by allied parties. That means a citizen might change his or her support from 
election to election. The difference on the policy of cross- Strait relations has 
separated the Pan- Blue and Pan- Green as well as supporters of each camp. 
Citizens seem to be in the situation of a two- party system, which has a dis-
tinct partisan boundary that is unable to be crossed. Therefore, a citizen in 
Taiwan could be either a supporter of the KMT, NP, and PFP, or a supporter 
of the DPP and TSU.
The distinct historical development of the political situation in Taiwan 
has also given birth to a considerable number of political independents. 
Repressive measures by the KMT in the early period generated a hostile 
political atmosphere for many Taiwanese, so maintaining a politically in-
dependent status was a naturally safe and expedient choice, and the imple-
mentation of local elections provided these non- KMT citizens channels of 
participation without committing to any partisanship. The existence of the 
independent thus went hand in hand with the development of the party 
system. The independent would later turn into a strong power base for the 
first meaningful opposition party, the DPP. As Taiwan entered a period of 
rapid political transition in the late 1980s, Taiwan citizens began to expe-
rience true two- party partisanship. This new situation soon transformed 
again as new political parties continued to emerge in the early 1990s and 
2000s. Multipartisanship appeared following the establishment of the NP, 
the PFP, and the TSU. Nonetheless, the formation of multiple partisan-
ship does not imply the eclipse of the independent, a considerable number 
of whom still exist in the political marketplace. Also notably, the multi-
party system has been in fact more like two- party camps within which 
citizens are more likely to cast their ballots according to party coalition, 
especially in presidential elections.
Thus, citizen partisanship has been both continuous and changing. 
Strong partisan citizens are more consistently affiliated with a given party, 
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but that is not the case for weak partisans and party leaners. The latter is 
obvious in the Pan- Blue camp. In contrast, the Pan- Green camp has enjoyed 
a more stable partisan affiliation with citizens. As for the independents, they 
generally resemble the conventional picture depicted in The American Voter 
(Campbell et al. 1960). Given the significant number of independents vot-
ing, they are certainly not to be ignored in elections, but they do behave 
differently according to their different educational levels. Though highly 
educated independents are less interested in politics and less likely to vote 
in elections, they do maintain a rather supportive attitude toward democ-
racy and maintaining the status quo in cross- Strait relations. It is likely that 
these highly educated independents are comparably more autonomous and 
prudent than the least- educated independents, who are more likely to be 
mobilized in elections.
Modern democracy needs political parties. Even though the normative 
functions of the political party might change over times, the political party 
continues to be indispensable for democracy. More specifically, the forma-
tion and operation of the party system significantly affect the functioning 
of democracy. One of the core assumptions of party politics is a stable con-
nection between citizens and political parties; the majority of the citizens in 
society are able to voice their preferences through political parties. Yet if a 
considerable number of citizens do not maintain a regular connection with 
a political party, it is therefore implied that the political party does not mat-
ter much in society. Worse still, a lack of partisan connection also implies 
a lack of important media transmitting citizens’ political information. Citi-
zens would drift around the political world without an anchor (Wattenberg 
1986, 130). Given the evidence of a high degree of overlap in attributes 
between the pure independent and partisan leaners in Taiwan, a clear clas-
sification of leaners is important both theoretically and practically. If we 
treat leaners as extended partisan voters, then the number of independents is 
less significant. It also leads to the conclusion that a relative majority of the 
electorate is partisan and that political parties have penetrated the major part 
of society. The party system is then accordingly stable. On the other hand, 
if we treat leaners as equal to independents, then more than one- third of the 
electorate will be labeled as independents; thus there exists a strong segment 
of uncommitted nonpartisan voters in elections. The formation and essences 
of party competition would also be affected because more centrist party ap-
peals, rather than purely partisan- oriented ones, would become dominant in 
elections. Therefore, the changing partisan alliances of these independents, 
somewhat including the leaners, continue to play a crucial role in Taiwan’s 
electoral politics.
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APPENDIx 4.A1. Measurements of Key Variables
Variable Description and Measurements
Directions and 
strength of party 
identification
Before 2004, respondents were asked the following questions:
 i.   Do think of yourself as close to any particular party? When respon-
dents answer yes, then they are asked,
  (1a) Which party do you feel close to? and
  (1b)  Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very 
close?” (strong, weak).
 ii.   When respondents answer no to question (i), then respondents are 
asked, “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties 
than to the others?” If respondents answer yes, then they are asked (1a) 
again (leaners).
 iii.   When respondents answer “no” to question (ii), then respondents are 
regarded as independents.
After 2004, respondents were asked slightly different questions.
 i.   Among the main political parties in our country, including the KMT, 
DPP, PFP, NP, and TSU, do you think of yourself as leaning toward 
any particular party? (yes, then ask (iii) and (iv); no, then ask (ii)).
 ii.   Do you feel yourself leaning a little more to one of the political parties 
than the others? (yes, then ask (iii); no will be classified as indepen-
dent)
 iii.  Which party is that?
 iv.  Do you lean very strongly, somewhat, or just a little to this party?
Pan- Blue and Pan- 
Green identifiers
Citizens who identify with the KMT, the NP, and the PFP are classified as 
Pan- Blue identifiers; citizens who identify with the DPP and the TSU are 
classified as Pan- Green identifiers.
Political interest More generally, would you say that you are very, somewhat, not very, or 
not at all interested in politics? (not interested, very little/not much inter-
ested, somewhat interested, very interested)
Maintaining the 
status quo
Respondents are asked: “Concerning the relationship between Taiwan and 
mainland China, which of the following six positions do you agree with: 
(1) immediate unification; (2) immediate independence; (3) maintain 
the status quo, move toward unification in the future; (4) maintain the 
status quo, move toward independence in the future; (5) maintain the 
status quo and decide later; (6) maintain the status quo forever. (Items 1 
and 3 are classified as pro- unification; items 2 and 4 are classified as pro- 
independence; items 5 and 6 are classified as maintaining the status quo.)
Support for  
democracy 
Respondents are asked, “Some say that ‘Democracy might have some 
problems, but it is still the best political institution.’ Do you agree or 
disagree?” (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
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Appendix 4.A2.
List of Data Sources
Yih- Yen Chen. 1992. Electoral Behavior and Democratization in Taiwan: A Study 
of Legislative Election in 1992. National Science Council Research Plan, NSC 
82– 0301- H004– 034.
Yih- Yen Chen. 1995. Electoral Behavior and Democratization in Taiwan (iv): A Study 
of Legislative Election in 1995. National Science Council Research Plan, NSC 
84– 2414- H- 004– 053 B2.
Hsieh, John Fu- sheng. 1995. An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior in 
the 1996 Presidential Election. National Science Council Research Plan, NSC 
85– 2414- H- 004– 017 Q3.
I- chou Liu. 1998. Constituency Characteristics and Voters’ Behavior: An Integrative 
Study of Legislative Election in 1998. National Science Council Research Plan, 
NSC 88– 2414- H- 004– 017.
Yih- Yen Chen. 1999. Integrative Study of Voting Behavior in the 2000 Presidential 
Election. National Science Council Research Plan, NSC89– 2414- H- 004– 021- 
SSS.
Chi Huang. 2001. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2001 (TEDS 2001). 
National Science Council Research Plan, NSC 90– 2420- H- 194– 001.
Shiow- duan Huang. 2004. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 
2002– 2004(III): The Presidential Election, 2004 (TEDS 2004P). National Sci-
ence Council Research Plan, NSC 92– 2420- H- 031– 004.
I- chou Liu. 2004. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2002– 2004 (1/4): 
The Legislative Election, 2004 (TEDS 2004L). National Science Council Research 
Plan, NSC 93– 2420- H- 004– 005- SSS.
Yun- han Chu. 2008. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2005– 2008(III): 
The Legislative Election, 2008 (TEDS2008L). National Science Council Research 
Plan, NSC 96– 2420- H- 002– 025.
Ching- hsin Yu. 2008. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2008 (TEDS 
2008P: Presidential Election). National Science Council Research Plan, NSC 
96– 2420- H- 004– 017.
Yun- han Chu. 2012. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2009– 2012 
(III): The Survey of the Presidential and Legislative Elections, 2012(TEDS2012). 
National Science Council Research Plan, NSC 100– 2420- H- 002– 030.
Notes
 1. Mainstream wisdom concerning party identification in the tradition of the 
Michigan school and American National Election Studies have postulated the concept 
as a long- term psychological attachment to a given group (a specific political party). 
For a party identifier, party identification is a sense of group identity or belonging. Also 
by definition, party identification should be stable, not having frequent fluctuations. 
Therefore, data collection begins with a nonspecific statement asking the respondent: 
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“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, 
an Independent, or what?” The wording of this question also probes the respondent’s 
endurance of staying with a political party. Those respondents who answer with either 
“Republican” or “Democrat” are then asked, “Would you call yourself a strong Repub-
lican (or Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (or Democrat)?” This follow- up 
question allows the researcher to explore respondents’ intensity of party identification. 
So, the two questions produce four types of party identifier: Strong Republican Identi-
fier, Weak Republican Identifier, Weak Democrat Identifier, and Strong Democratic 
Identifier.
 2. Although minor political parties, such as the Chinese Youth Party and the Dem-
ocratic Socialist Party, came to Taiwan with the KMT government, they were merely 
window- dressing since the KMT monopolized all political resources (Tien 1989). 
Thus, both parties were too weak to challenge the KMT.
 3. The actual number of registered KMT members has been in dispute. Some esti-
mate that the party has more than 2.5 million members while others claim that it has 
had less than one million. The KMT has been reluctant to release its membership. The 
electoral defeat in the 2000 presidential election has led to a sharp decline in party 
membership. It is estimated that the KMT now has about 850,000 members (cited 
from Yu 2002).
 4. There were other minor parties during this period. Because they either did not 
participate in any elections or failed to generate significant political impacts, this 
research excludes them from the discussion.
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Chapter 5
Issues, Political Cleavages, and Party 
Competition in Taiwan
Shing- yuan Sheng and Hsiao- chuan (Mandy) Liao
Taiwan experienced rapid socioeconomic and political changes in the 1960s 
and 1970s and evolved from an authoritarian to a democratic political sys-
tem beginning in the mid- 1980s.1 Since the early 1980s, many issues have 
emerged in Taiwan’s political arena. Some of them quickly disappeared, some 
temporarily attracted the attention of Taiwan citizens but gradually declined 
in importance, and still others evolved into highly salient ones and have had 
deterministic impacts on party competition and, hence, party turnover. Un-
like most industrial democracies, in which issues of wealth distribution and 
materialism/postmaterialism (or fundamentalism/postmodernism) create 
the most important political cleavages (Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 
1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Moreno 1999), those issues have not evolved 
into prominent ones for party competition in Taiwan. Instead, during the 
1980s, as Taiwan transitioned to democracy, parties competed on the issue 
of reform versus antireform (stability). The partisan elites of the Democratic 
Progressive Party framed the reform issues and attracted the attention of 
Taiwan voters. As a result, the DPP gradually transformed itself into a strong 
opposition party with the support of about 30 percent of the electorate at 
the beginning of the 1990s. After political reforms and the resolution of un-
fair political practices, the party faced the challenge of searching for a new 
issue to appeal to a larger share of the electorate. So, it shifted the battlefield 
and framed the independence/unification issue in order to connect with the 
enduring social cleavages— ethnicity and Chinese/Taiwanese identity. Soon, 
the issue not only dominated the political discussions of the elites and the 
public but it also shaped party competition and affected elections.
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This chapter, which is based on observation of the period from 1996 to 
2012, endeavors to answer the following question: Why have some issues 
evolved to create important political cleavages that have shaped party com-
petition in Taiwan, whereas other issues have not? Four issues are discussed 
in this chapter: wealth distribution, environmental protection/economy, re-
form/stability, and independence/unification. We explore the answer to the 
research questions from the perspective of the elites and that of the public. 
From the viewpoint of the elites, we show how they frame and manipulate 
different issues in the political arena to attain their political goals. From the 
viewpoint of the public, we show how the voters’ positions on issues coin-
cide with manipulation by the partisan elites and how the voters perceive the 
importance of the issues.
Issues and Political Cleavages in Taiwan
The importance of issues in politics has long been recognized and empha-
sized by political scientists. Carmines and Stimson (1989, 3) describe it well 
in their classic book Issue Evolution: “To speak of politics is to speak of politi-
cal issues.” As they argue, there are many issues in a political system, but the 
majority of them lie dormant most of the time. Only a few issues occasion-
ally “rise from partisan obscurity and become so contentious, so partisan, 
and so long lasting that they come to define the party system in which they 
arise, to transform the grounds of debate which were their origin” (Carmines 
and Stimson 1986, 901). According to Carmines and Stimson, which issues 
become salient and which remain dormant depend on the actions of parti-
san elites and the responses of the mass electorate. First, elites instinctively 
know that some issues may benefit them, and they work to clarify those is-
sues and frame them in partisan terms. Second, the mass public must alter 
its cognitive perception of the parties with respect to new issues, care about 
the differences among parties, and even change its political attitude and vote 
choice according to its opinions about new issues. When a substantial part 
of the mass public starts to change its cognition, attitude, and behavior in 
this way, all parties in the political system are necessarily forced to take a 
position along the dimensions of the new issue. At this moment, the issue 
experiences an evolution and affects the agendas of parties, the discourses 
of the elites, and party identification and vote choice of the mass electorate. 
Carmines and Stimson illustrate an issue evolution in which the party elites 
grew increasingly polarized on civil rights in the 1960s and 1970s, leading 
the mass electorate to become similarly polarized on that issue.
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Furthermore, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that political cleavages 
reflect social cleavages, and social cleavages are determined dramatically by 
the historic conditions of national and socioeconomic development. Ac-
cordingly, specific national conditions lead to a variety of alliance patterns 
among leaders of various social groups. As a result, these cleavages define 
the potential social bases of political conflicts. Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis 
offers a reasonable explanation for the rise of the party systems and voter 
alignments in advanced democracies. In most advanced democracies, the 
wealth distribution issue based on class is the most common factor and per-
haps the most important political cleavage. However, approximately from 
the beginning of the 1970s, economic factors and traditional class- conflict 
models fail to explain contemporary political phenomena. Those who are 
materially better off protest the most, rather than those who are materi-
ally disadvantaged. Traditional political cleavage and theory of class con-
flict cannot explain this new political trend. Inglehart (1990, 1997) adds 
a new aspect— postmaterial or postmodern values based on noneconomic 
issues— to the formation of political cleavages. This new cleavage and the 
old wealth distribution cleavage are the most important issues in most ad-
vanced democracies (Moreno 1999).
Taiwan experienced rapid socioeconomic and political changes in 1960s 
and 1970s, and evolved from an authoritarian to a democratic political 
system beginning in the mid- 1980s. A great deal of evidence suggests that 
from the mid- 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, when Taiwan experi-
enced a transition to democracy, reform versus antireform (stability) was the 
most salient political issue (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Chu 1994; Shyu 1998; 
Wu 1993). As many new democracies in East Europe and Latin America, 
the democratic- authoritarian or reform- antireform is the most salient issue 
(Moreno 1999). Chu (1994) argued that the Taiwan public focused more on 
issues of political reform than on issues of economy and wealth distribution 
during this period because the Taiwan government’s economic policies had 
successfully resolved the problems of wealth accumulation and distribution 
during the decades that economic development heated up. Hsieh and Niou 
(1996a) examined the 1992 legislative election and found that the reform/
stability issue had the greatest impact on voters’ evaluations of parties, fol-
lowed by the wealth distribution and the independence/unification issues, 
with the environment/economy issue having the smallest impact. However, 
when Hsieh and Niou reviewed the 1993 local elections for county magis-
trates and city mayors, they found that the independence/unification issue 
and two valence issues— public work and anticorruption— had important 
impacts on voters’ evaluations of the parties. Other positional issues such as 
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wealth distribution, environment protection, and reform had limited im-
pacts (Hsieh and Niou 1996b). Because the debate on independence versus 
unification was increasingly contested in the 1990s, when political scien-
tists examined the 2001 legislative election, they found that independence/
unification was the most influential issue and had considerable impact on 
voters’ party evaluations and vote choice. The reform/stability issue had 
some impact and was the second most important political cleavage. The 
wealth distribution issue also had some impact and a significant effect on 
vote choice, but the environment/economy issue was still not influential in 
elections (Hsieh 2005; Sheng and Chen 2003).
Given the research results in previous literature, we may suspect that 
the impacts of different issues fluctuate in different elections. This chapter 
will systematically answer why and how some issues have created impor-
tant cleavages that have shaped party competition in Taiwan while other 
issues have not. As noted, four issues are examined in this chapter: reform/
stability, wealth distribution, environmental protection/economy, and in-
dependence/unification. We choose the four issues for two major reasons. 
First, the reform/stability issue and independence/unification issue have oc-
cupied Taiwan election platforms and have polarized Taiwan politics for a 
long time. The wealth distribution issue and the environmental protection/
economy issue marked the old and new left- right issues that shape endurable 
political cleavages in advanced democracies although Taiwan is not such a 
case (Hsiao, Cheng, and Achen, chapter 9 of this book; Norris 2004). As 
parties and politicians in Taiwan raised these issues in elections and in the 
legislature frequently and sometimes caught the public’s attention, these two 
issues did not form political cleavages.
The other reason for choosing these four issues is that they are position 
issues. A position issue is one on which the opinions among the elector-
ate may easily be divided, such as the extent to which we should empower 
the government. On the contrary, issues such as economic development or 
anticorruption are valence issues— these are issues that are uniformly liked 
or disliked by the electorate (Fiorina 1981). Position issues are more likely 
to develop political cleavages and shape party competition than valence is-
sues since parties can take opposing sides to mobilize the electorate (Stokes 
1963). Valence issues have less potential to form a long- term political cleav-
age because they do not differentiate parties effectively.
Thus, this chapter will dissect the four issues in Taiwan and demonstrate 
their evolution from the perspectives of both the partisan elites and of the 
public. We selected the observation period from 1996 to 2012. Data are 
from two major databases: data on the elections of 1996, 1998, and 2000, 
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which were collected by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi 
University, and data on the elections of 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2012, which 
were collected by the Taiwan Election and Democratization Study project. 
All of these data are from face- to- face interviews with individuals of the 
Taiwan public aged 20 and above and are based on probabilistic sampling.
In the following, we first focus on the partisan elites’ role in issue evolu-
tion and discuss how partisan elites frame and manipulate the four issues in 
order to attain their political goals. We also demonstrate how Taiwan citi-
zens perceive the elites’ signals and update their positions on issues. Then, we 
discuss mass perception of the importance of issues. Last, we conclude with 
the issue evolution of the four focal issues in Taiwan.
The Framing and Manipulation of the Issues by the Partisan Elites
In the process of issue evolution, the elites of the Dang- wai (the non- KMT 
forces and the forerunner of the DPP before 1986; see chapter 4) and DPP 
play an important role, not only because the Dang- wai and DPP elites are 
strategic politicians but also because they are from the opposition forces 
when Taiwan endured a transitional period from authoritarian to democ-
racy. They are ambitious to acquire governing power. Politicians of the op-
position or minority parties naturally turn to new issues to improve their 
political situation, whereas politicians of the majority parties naturally seek 
to maintain the salience of the current agenda (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 
12– 13). The Dang- wai and DPP elites strategically search for issues that 
benefit their group’s growth and strength. Furthermore, they frame and ma-
nipulate the issues to mobilize the mass public. From the beginning of the 
1980s, the Dang- wai and DPP elites have capitalized on four major issues: 
political reform, social welfare, environmental protection, and Taiwan in-
dependence. The issues of political reform and Taiwan independence have 
been relatively more effective than the other two in terms of issue evolution. 
In the early 1980s, the Dang- wai and DPP elites used political reform issues 
to challenge the established authoritarian Kuomintang government and at-
tract voters. After political reform was achieved, the DPP elites switched to 
the independence/unification issue and acted as an advocate of Taiwan inde-
pendence from the beginning of 1990s. The success of manipulating issues 
to mobilize the mass public extended the support base of the DPP in the 
1980s and 1990s and brought the DPP to the presidency in 2000 and 2004. 
However, once the DPP captured power, its room for manipulating issues 
became smaller for two reasons. First, once the DPP was in power, Taiwan 
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voters were no longer satisfied with only rhetoric during elections; instead, 
they wanted to see the actual implementation of the DPP’s campaign prom-
ises. Second, the DPP soon found that it was limited by fiscal difficulties; in 
particular, Taiwan has been in an economic downturn since 2000.
In the following, we will describe issue by issue how the elites have framed 
and manipulated them. We begin with the very first one that appeared in 
Taiwan politics— reform versus stability— and end with the most significant 
issue in Taiwan— independence versus unification.
The Reform/Stability Issue
Taiwan experienced rapid economic development from the beginning of the 
1960s through the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, Taiwan society experienced 
dramatic socioeconomic change and transitioned from an underdeveloped 
country to an industrialized society in the 1980s. Accompanying this trans-
formation, there emerged a new middle class with more education and 
sophisticated political skills. This new class and the politically suppressed 
Taiwanese, whose parents or grandparents had lived on the island before 
1948, strongly pushed the dominant KMT government to undertake politi-
cal reforms. However, the KMT government was reluctant to respond to the 
prodding. Utilizing a reform- oriented strategy, the Dang- wai gradually at-
tracted the electoral support of Taiwan citizens. Eventually they got enough 
support to organize a formal party, the DPP, in 1986. Indeed, the Dang- wai 
got just 13.0 percent of all votes in the 1980 legislative election; however, 
the share of votes for the DPP (established in 1986) increased to nearly 30 
percent by the end of the 1980s (see chapter 4 for details).
The reform/stability issue was the most salient one in the 1980s, during 
Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Some Taiwan citizens were worried about 
instability because of the rapid and radical political reform. They tended 
to identify with the KMT, whereas those taking political reform more seri-
ously tended to identify with the DPP (Sheng and Chen 2003). In a survey 
conducted in 1991 about the most significant problem in the country, 36.4 
percent of respondents mentioned political structure, 14.2 percent men-
tioned national status and national identity, while only 9.3 percent men-
tioned wealth distribution (Wu 1993, 6).
The opposition forces made great efforts to promote political reform and 
earned a reputation for being reformist. There was a considerable number 
of issues on the reform agenda from the mid- 1980s to the beginning of the 
1990s, including the lifting of martial law in 1987, termination of the Tem-
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porary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, and with the return to a regular 
constitutional structure in 1991, full- scale elections of national representa-
tives in 1992, a popular vote for the provincial governors and city mayors of 
Taipei City and Kaohsiung City in 1994, and direct elections for president 
in 1996. Even when the large and structural changes were achieved, the DPP 
continued its reformist role and turned its focus to social and economic 
reforms. These reforms include anticorruption, anticrime, constitutional re-
form, dealing with the KMT assets, and social welfare policies. In the pro-
cess, the DPP legislators sometimes allied with members of the New Party, a 
newly established small party that sometimes collaborated with KMT legis-
lators. The DPP might not be the owner of the particular reform issue as it 
was during the earlier period, but it was more active in this respect than the 
KMT (Sheng 2001).
A survey conducted by the Election Study Center in 1993 asked respon-
dents about their impressions of the two major parties. The results showed 
that 35.8 percent of respondents perceived the DPP as a radical party, and 
32.4 percent of respondents perceived it as a violent party. In contrast, 43.0 
percent of respondents perceived the KMT as a conservative party (Liu 
1994, 64). Even at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, after the 
DPP had won the presidency and began to govern the country, the mass 
public’s principal negative image of the DPP was still that it was violent and 
radical, whereas the principal positive image of the DPP was its contribu-
tion to democratic reform (Cheng 2004, 195– 98). From figure 5.1, we can 
see that Taiwan voters on average located the DPP at 3.9 on the reform/
stability issue dimension in 1996 and at 4.6 in 2001.2 However, because of 
the fierce party competition in the legislature and in the elections, the DPP 
returned to the reform- oriented position that it had held in the past. The 
DPP government directed two financial reforms and held referendums on 
national issues in 2004. The slogan of President Chen’s reelection in 2004 
was “Taiwan first, Reform first.” Not surprisingly, the public located the 
DPP at 3.9 in 2004. In contrast, the public perceived the KMT as taking 
stability more seriously and as being more conservative in regard to political 
reform. The public located the KMT at 6.9 in 1996 and did not shift much 
over the years, until 2008.
In mid- 2006, President Chen Shui- bian and his family members were 
accused of improper trading of shares, misuse of government funds, and 
corruption.3 In 2008, after leaving office, Chen Shui- bian was convicted 
of corruption and money- laundering, shocking the Taiwan public. When 
more evidence revealed that ex- president Chen had accepted money from 
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bankers during the second financial and banking reform, the public became 
even more disillusioned with both Chen Shui- bian and the DPP. In the 
2008 election, the KMT presidential candidate, Ma Ying- jeou, took the op-
portunity to promote reforms in administrative ethics and social justice. He 
promised to initiate legislation on the criminal liability of illicit wealth of 
public servants and to comprehensively examine constitutional reform.4 In 
contrast, as the governing party the DPP took social stability more seriously 
than when it was in opposition. The DPP candidate, Hsieh Chang- ting, 
stressed the importance of consensus on reform. The public’s perception of 
the two parties’ issue positions along the reform/stability spectrum reflects 
this situation. In 2008 the public perceived the DPP, which was rated at 4.7, 
as more centrist than in 2004, while the KMT, at 6.1, was seen as leaning 
more toward reform than it had been in 2004. Along with this development, 
both the KMT and DPP have taken a more centrist position since 2008. 
In such a case, there is less space for parties to manipulate this issue, which 
leaves the possibility of convergence of their issue position in the future.
Fig. 5.1. Respondents’ issue positions on reform/stability and their perceptions 
about the positions of the parties (1996– 2008). Source: Appendix 5.A2. Note: 
On the horizontal axis, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the 
presidential election; “l” indicates that surveys were taken after the legislative 
election.
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The Wealth Distribution Issue
Unlike most advanced democracies, in which issues of wealth distribution 
are salient for party competition, issues of wealth distribution are relatively 
not so important in party competition in Taiwan. The evolution of this issue 
in Taiwan has gone through different phases. Before the mid- 1980s, both 
the successful economic policy and the weak consciousness of the working 
class detracted from the attention given to wealth distribution issues (Chu 
1994, 3). At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, social 
welfare issues became more prominent due to fierce party competition and 
the increasing gap between the rich and the poor; however, such issues have 
become less polarizing, since most parties strive to offer social welfare bene-
fits and none of them want to be seen as opposing benefits. More important, 
the independence/unification issue has attracted most of the attention of 
the parties and the electorate. Last, after party turnover in the presidency in 
2000, the differences between the parties’ issue positions diminished while 
the DPP was in power and faced fiscal problems and the KMT stayed with 
a catch- all strategy on this issue. Later, we will discuss this issue according to 
its development over time and explain its ups and downs in Taiwan politics.
From the beginning of the 1980s, the parties and candidates empha-
sized wealth distribution issues more actively than before. This was con-
nected to ethnicity, the most significant social cleavage in Taiwan.5 When 
the KMT government was moved to Taiwan in 1949, many mainlanders 
who worked for the military, public sector, and education sector immi-
grated to Taiwan with the government; thus, a high proportion of public 
servants were mainlanders. So the KMT’s social welfare policies in the 
early era focused more on these groups in order to consolidate its ruling 
apparatus. In 1987, the newly founded DPP set up a department whose 
purpose was forming an alliance with social- movement organizations in 
order to confront the KMT government. Responding to political reforms 
and to the challenge to its conservative welfare policies, and hoping to 
obtain widespread supports from the Taiwan voters, the KMT started a 
small- scale welfare program in the 1980s.
Before the 1980s, small- scale welfare programs did not arouse much dis-
content because class consciousness was weak. Taiwan’s economy heavily re-
lied on exports and small- scale enterprises, which created many outsourcing 
industries. When the big outsourcing factories could not accommodate all 
the contracts, they would farm out their contracts to small subcontractors. 
In 1986, 63.3 percent of workers in manufacturing industries worked in a 
factory with fewer than 10 employees (Hsieh 1989, 17).6 Although these 
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small- scale enterprises supported the economic development of Taiwan, 
they hindered the formation of working- class consciousness and stimulated 
mobility between classes (Chang 1987; Gates 1979; Hsieh 1989). The struc-
ture of these small enterprises created more possibilities for Taiwan workers 
to start their own businesses,7 and from 1979 to 1987, 35 percent of Taiwan 
citizens chose to do so rather than be hired by others (Hsieh 1989, 12). Even 
among employees, 30 percent of them wanted to open their own business in 
the future (Stites 1985, 238). Moreover, the heads of the small enterprises, 
as well as society in general, also manipulated this desire for business own-
ership as a way to deal with unhappy workers (Hsieh 1989).8 Because the 
working class in Taiwan prefers starting their own businesses to confronting 
their bosses, it has been rather difficult to form strong class consciousness 
among workers.
The issue of wealth distribution stirred up more controversy after the 
1980s because the disparity between the rich and the poor grew as a result of 
the rapid economic development and social transformation. According to a 
survey on family income, the average income of the top 20 percent of richest 
families was as much as 4.1 times that of the bottom 20 percent of families 
in 1980. The ratio of the average income between the top 20 percent and the 
bottom 20 percent was 5.2 in 1992 (Directorate- General of Budget 2012). 
From the beginning of the 1990s, not only did the DPP promote wealth 
distribution legislation, it also actively searched for a new battleground in 
wealth distribution issues to attract voters. In the 1992 legislative election, 
one candidate campaigned on the promise of a pension for senior citizens 
and achieved a significant victory. Later in the 1993 elections for county 
magistrates and city mayors, many DPP candidates advocated pensions for 
the elderly (Wang 2003, 81– 82). When the DPP candidates were elected, 
they kept their promise and granted NT3000 dollars to senior citizens. Even 
though these payments did not last long in many counties because of fiscal 
difficulties, the DPP acquired a reputation for caring about the social welfare 
of the average Taiwan citizen. In the DPP’s 1999 survey on the question of 
a party’s capability to design a fair and reasonable social welfare system, 32.9 
percent of respondents considered the DPP qualified while 20.7 percent 
chose the KMT (Fell 2005, 39). It may be plausible that it was at that mo-
ment the DPP achieved ownership of the social welfare issue, especially that 
of care of the elderly.
However, the DPP’s ownership of that issue did not last long, since the 
KMT was also competing for it. Worried that the DPP might take all of 
the credit for advocacy of legislation on social welfare, the KMT not only 
started to propose a national health insurance program but also struggled 
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to propose its own version of policies on subsidies for seniors.9 Eventually, 
the KMT cooperated with the DPP to pass legislation providing benefits 
to elderly farmers. Also, in 1995, the KMT government implemented the 
National Health Insurance program. Although the DPP initially gained the 
support of the electorate in part from promoting social welfare, both the 
DPP and KMT found their niches in the wealth distribution issue in the 
mid- 1990s.
In other words, because of fierce electoral competition, a considerable 
number of social welfare issues became prominent in the Taiwan political 
arena. When a party or candidate advocates a policy that might benefit a 
specific group, political opponents may do likewise, or even advocate a more 
radical extension of the same policy aiming at the same target. Since most 
Taiwan parties and candidates attempted to take credit for welfare plans 
and avoid the blame for blocking such plans, the differences between the 
parties have gradually decreased (Chu 1994; Fell 2005; Sheng 2002; Sheng 
and Chen 2003). Furthermore, once the independence/unification issue ap-
peared in the Taiwan political arena, it diverted much of the attention of the 
parties and the electorate from other issues. As Norris (2004, 119) claimed, 
“In Taiwan the parties were identified mainly by nationalist issues, about 
relationships with mainland China, rather than by left- right ideology.”10 
Hence, the disparity of wealth distribution failed to form a strong political 
cleavage on the island.
Indeed, from 2000 to 2008, while the DPP was in power, the party be-
came more concerned about the government’s fiscal capacity and economic 
development and was not as active in promoting social welfare as it had been 
prior to that time. In September 2000, the newly elected DPP president, 
Chen Shui- bian, announced at a press conference, “Social welfare can be 
put off, but economic development can’t be” (United Daily News, September 
17, 2000, 1). Therefore, the differences on the social welfare issue between 
the parties became smaller. As figure 5.2 shows, in 2000 Taiwan voters on 
average rated the DPP’s position on the wealth- distribution issue dimension 
at 6.5, while the KMT on average was at 4.8 on the same issue dimension 
(questionnaire shown in a2 of appendix 5.A1). However, in 2004, after the 
DPP had been in power for four years, the rating was 6.0, compared to 5.6 
for the KMT. In 2012, the DPP was at 5.4, while the KMT was at 5.1 along 
the spectrum of wealth distribution; thus, the issue positions of the two ma-
jor parties in promoting wealth distribution had converged.
Figure 5.2 also demonstrates that the DPP became more centrist on 
wealth distribution in the perception of Taiwan public. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that many Taiwan voters felt that the DPP had become closer to 
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business interests and played money politics soon after it was elected (Liu 
2003). According to a survey conducted in 2002, two years after Chen Shui- 
bian became president, 42 percent of the respondents perceived that the 
DPP was too close to big business and to consortiums and spoke for the 
wealthy (United Daily News, July 29, 2002, 3).
The small differences between the issue positions of the two major par-
ties has constrained the DPP’s advantage on the wealth distribution issue. A 
political cleavage due to opposition positions in the wealth distribution issue 
has been difficult to develop. Take regulations on subsidies for senior citizens 
as an example. In 2002 the KMT, together with the People First Party, first 
proposed and passed a regulation to provide subsidies to the elderly except 
for those with retirement pensions. Instead of discussion on whether the 
subsidies were affordable for the government and were fair to other minority 
groups, legislators from different parties competed to propose their own ver-
sions of subsidies. Some proposed to broaden the qualifications, while others 
Fig. 5.2. Respondents’ issue positions on social welfare/tax raises and their 
perceptions about the parties’ positions (2000– 2012). Source: Appendix 5.A2. 
Note: On the horizontal axis, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the 
presidential election; “l” indicates that surveys were taken after the legislative 
election. In 2012 the presidential election and the legislative election were held 
at the same time.
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proposed to raise the amount of the allowance. Even though a less disputable 
revision of the legislation was made on June 2003, the parties continued to 
propose revisions to the qualifications and the amount of the allowance. In 
total, there were 30 legislative proposals from different parties and legisla-
tors in the Fifth Legislative Yuan (Sheng 2005a). From the perception of the 
public, all of the parties seemed to converge at a neutral place on the wealth 
distribution issue. Thus, it becomes more difficult for the electorate to dif-
ferentiate parties on the basis of the wealth distribution issue.
More important, in order to maintain its overwhelming dominance 
in Taiwan politics, the KMT has adopted a catch- all strategy, not a one- 
sided one. It will not give up the votes of laborers or farmers even though 
it may stand closer to public servants and capitalists due to its historical 
background. It may give wealth distribution issues less priority but will not 
oppose improving wealth distribution. On the contrary, the DPP, which 
was established through the strong support of disadvantaged and dissatis-
fied groups, focuses on social welfare programs to gain votes; however, the 
KMT’s strategy makes it difficult for the DPP to create confrontational situ-
ations effectively.
Overall, although the wealth distribution issue has been a point of con-
tention in elections for a long period of time, it did not emerge as a signifi-
cant political cleavage in the society. The disparity between the rich and the 
poor has widened in recent years, however, due to the economic downturn 
and money politics in Taiwan (Sheng 2013). According to a survey on fam-
ily income, the average income of the top 20 percent of richest families 
was as much as 6.2 times that of the bottom 20 percent of families in 2010 
(Directorate- General of Budget 2012). If we limit the observations to the 
top 5 percent of richest families and the bottom 5 percent of families, the 
ratio in income between them is even greater. It was 32.7 in 1998, 55.1 in 
2005, and 93.9 in 2012 (Ministry of Finance 2013). Because of the worsen-
ing imbalance in wealth distribution, social welfare issues have become more 
salient (as evidence will show in the next section), and the parties have used 
this issue as a means to gain the support of disadvantaged voters. Indeed, in 
the 2012 election, voters concerned more about social welfare were more 
likely to vote for the DPP (Sheng 2013). After the election, persisting dis-
putes on wealth distribution issues, such as minimum wage and maximum 
hours, labor pensions, and pensions of retired public servants, have made 
the rising gap in wealth a prominent issue in the Taiwan society. From the 
experience of advanced democracies, wealth distribution becomes a salient 
issue when there are a large- scale changes or economic depressions, or both 
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(Dalton 1996; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Will the rising gap in wealth in the 
Taiwan society polarize elites and voters and become an important political 
cleavage in the future? In our view, the issue of wealth distribution may not 
be able to single- handedly form a significant political cleavage due to the 
similar stands of political parties in Taiwan. However, if it aligns with the 
identity issue, the scenario may be different, a point that we will discuss in 
the conclusion.
The Environmental Protection/Economy Issue
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Taiwan public has started to notice the 
environmental deterioration resulting from rapid economic development. 
However, the ruling KMT emphasized development, in which economic 
growth was the top priority, at the expense of environmental protection 
(Tang and Tang 1997). Protesting the KMT’s promotion and endorsement 
of heavily polluting industries, several environmental protection groups were 
organized to confront the KMT government. The DPP played an important 
role in the protests. In 1986, Lukang residents were mobilized to oppose a 
DuPont investment that had been endorsed by the KMT government. This 
protest made DuPont withdraw its project of establishing chemical factories 
in Lukang. This incident prompted many antipollution protests in the fol-
lowing years. In 1991, when the KMT government decided to build a fourth 
nuclear power plant in Kongliao, many Kongliao villagers were mobilized 
to oppose this policy by demonstrations and sit- ins at the proposed nuclear 
power plant’s location. A violent clash with the police occurred, and a po-
liceman’s death brought the incident to nationwide attention. From then 
on, demonstrations accompanied the building project of the fourth nuclear 
power plant. The growing polarization of the proenvironment and pronu-
clear groups brought the former into closer alignment with the DPP (Ho 
2005a, 405– 7), which energized its base of support by mobilizing people 
who cared about environmental protection.
As shown in figure 5.3, when respondents were asked to locate the posi-
tion of the parties on the environmental protection/economy issue dimen-
sion (with higher scores indicating economic development and lower scores 
as environmental protection), the DPP was rated at 5.0 in 1998 while the 
KMT had a score of 7.3 (questionnaire shown in a3 of the appendix 5.A1). 
However, after the DPP became the ruling party, its desire to stimulate eco-
nomic recovery led it, like the KMT, to favor more developmentalist poli-
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cies. When it faced a trade- off between the environment and the economy, 
most of the time the DPP favored the latter over the former, frustrating 
many Taiwan voters who cared about environmental issues (Ho 2005b).
Take the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant as an example. 
After President Chen Shui- bian came in power in 2000, he issued an execu-
tive order to halt the construction of the plant in October. This decision 
brought about severe political battles and resulted in a serious political crisis 
between Chen, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan.11 Later, the 
Council of Grand Justices issued the Interpretation No. 520, which stated 
that the Executive Yuan’s actions had a “procedural flaw” for not reporting 
to the Legislative Yuan before making the decision to halt the construction. 
The value of stock market went down at least 2.5 percent as a result. In the 
end, the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan reached a compromise to 
restart the construction with a consensus that a “nuclear free homeland” was 
the objective in the long run. The political compromise appeased the oppo-
sition parties, but frustrated people who stood for environment protection 
and expected the DPP would have made a difference. Although a few DPP 
leaders continued their fight against the use of nuclear energy and proposed 
to hold a nationwide referendum on the fate of the fourth nuclear plant, 
Chen did not endorse their proposal and chose promoting economic devel-
opment rather than environmental protection as his top priority (Fell 2012, 
187– 88). The data in figure 5.3 demonstrate that the public has gradually 
changed its view of the DPP on environmental issues.
In contrast, the KMT was rather stable at around 7.2 on the issue spec-
trum of environmental protection/economy until 2008. In the 2008 presi-
dential campaign, Ma Ying- jeou promised to initiate land restoration and 
reductions in carbon emissions. His platform also included the imposition 
of an energy tax and establishment of green traffic networks and buildings. 
As for controversial public works, such as the highway between Su- ao and 
Hua- lien, he promised to respect the results of environmental reports. When 
Ma Ying- jeou repeated his promises for legislation and policy at the Na-
tional NGO Environmental Forum (Green Party Taiwan 2009), environ-
mental groups had great hope that he would fulfill them.12 The perception 
of the electorate with regard to the KMT’s position on environmental issues 
was at 6.8 in 2008, which reflected this expectation to some degree. Mean-
while, Hsieh Chang- ting, the DPP presidential candidate in 2008, held to 
the DPP’s traditional policy, which included ceasing the construction of the 
highway, and the party was perceived at 5.4 on the issue spectrum of envi-
ronmental protection/economy.
Although antinuclear protests continued to occur in Taiwan after the 
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fiasco of halting the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant, this is-
sue failed to catch the public’s attention as it did in 2000/2001. As both the 
KMT and the DPP are generally in favor of developmental policies, it was 
not until the Fukushima nuclear incident of 2011 that the safety of nuclear 
energy became politically significant again. The Fukushima incident, which 
occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011,13 turned the public’s attention to 
environmental protection. When the KMT government requested a budget 
increase in 2012 to fund the ongoing project of building the fourth nuclear 
plant, the public loudly and clearly voiced their serious concerns about the 
safety of nuclear energy. Several environmental groups instituted protests 
again. A TEDS survey conducted in 2013 showed that 60.1 percent of re-
spondents believed the government should halt constructing the plant, while 
only 27.3 percent supported the project (Sheng 2014). The DPP seized the 
opportunity to put forward the proposition of a nuclear- free homeland. The 
party’s elites also joined in the 309 NO NUKE Parade with environmental 
groups. To defuse the crisis, the KMT government announced in 2013 that 
a referendum on the fate of the power plant would be held later. Under the 
growing pressure, the KMT government finally announced in April 2014 
Fig. 5.3. Respondents’ issue positions on environmental protection/economy and 
their perceptions about the parties’ positions (1998– 2008). Source: Appendix 
5.A2. Note: On the horizontal axis, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted 
after the presidential election; “l” indicates that surveys were taken after the 
legislative election.
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that the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant would be moth-
balled for three years.14 It is worth noting that this move did not represent 
a KMT position shift because it keeps the option of restarting the construc-
tion in the future.
If the KMT continues to emphasize the economy while the DPP stands 
for environmental protection, this issue may provide a political environment 
in which to start discussions and debates. However, since the Taiwan public 
is much more concerned about economic prosperity than environmental 
protection (as evidence will show in the next section) and the ruling party 
cares more about economic growth, which is the case for both the KMT 
and the DPP, the environmental protection issue has difficulty in evolving 
to become a significant political cleavage (Sheng and Chen 2003). Further, 
as Inglehart (1990) noted, the new political cleavages of postmaterialism 
(such as environmental protection) do not necessarily attract votes because 
the supporters of those new issues are more active on issue agendas rather 
than being passively dominated by partisan elites. In other words, it is more 
difficult for partisan elites to manipulate the environmental protection is-
sue. Thus, even when the issue of environmental protection becomes more 
salient in the Taiwan political area, its influence on party competition and 
elections may still be less than that of existing political cleavages.
The Independence/Unification Issue
After the achievement of political reforms and the reorganization of unfair 
political structures, the DPP, with 30.0 percent support of the electorate at 
the beginning of the 1990s, faced the challenge of finding a new issue to 
continue its political life. Which issue was the DPP able to maneuver most 
effectively to attract Taiwan voters in the next stage? Two major issues gradu-
ally drew attention from the DPP elites at the beginning of the 1990s. One 
was the pursuit of Taiwan independence, and the other was the pursuit of a 
welfare state (as discussed above). When the issue of Taiwan independence 
was raised in the political arena, it was connected to Taiwan’s most impor-
tant social cleavages, those of ethnicity and Chinese/Taiwanese identity, so 
that it was easily perceived by voters and aroused the emotions of substantial 
portions of the Taiwan public.
Even though the DPP is pro- independence, its position on the inde-
pendence/unification spectrum has shifted at different times to attain its 
political goals. In 1991, when it was eager to claim a position for Taiwan 
independence, the DPP passed the Taiwan Independence Clause just two 
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months before the National Assembly election. The DPP headquarters is-
sued several full- page and article- style ads on why it advocated a sovereign 
and independent Republic of Taiwan (Fell 2005, 99). However, it received 
only 23.6 percent of the vote in the 1991 election, worse than its usual 
outcome. In the following legislative election in 1992, taking into account 
that Taiwan voters were not so comfortable with a radical stand on Taiwan 
independence, the DPP packaged Taiwan independence into a more diluted 
form and deemphasized the issue. The term “Republic of Taiwan” vanished 
from its ads and the more moderate “diluted Taiwan independence” replaced 
“pure Taiwan independence” (Fell 2005, 100).
In 1996, an independence- oriented DPP presidential candidate, Peng 
Ming- min, made “Want Independence, Oppose Unification, Love Peace” 
his campaign slogan. Again, this pledge moved the DPP to a more radical 
independence- seeking position. The public perceived the DPP as an extreme 
party in this regard and placed it at 2.0 on the independence/unification 
spectrum in 1996, whereas the public perceived the KMT at 6.1, and the av-
erage position of the public’s own view was at 5.2 (figure 5.4, questionnaire 
shown in a4 of appendix 5.A1). The DPP garnered only 23.1 percent of all 
votes in 1996. This serious defeat continued in the 1998 legislative election. 
While the public stood at 5.0 on the independence/unification spectrum, 
the DPP was perceived at 2.3, far from the public’s average position. The 
DPP received 29.6 percent of the vote, less than what an ambitious and 
energetic party would expect.
The continuous electoral defeats prompted the DPP to reconsider its po-
sition on the independence/unification issue. Before the 2000 presidential 
election, the DPP tried to take a centrist stance on the independence issue 
and to convince Taiwan voters that it had the ability to handle cross- Strait 
relations. First, the DPP passed the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, which 
returned to its original principle of Taiwan self- determination. The second 
step was Chen Shui- bian’s speech “The New Central Way,” which referred to 
a vague middle way on the independence/unification issue (Fell 2005, 106). 
In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui- bian was elected with 39.3 per-
cent of the vote. Another key factor that contributed to this victory was that 
two candidates— Lien Chan and James Soong— ran on the pro- unification 
side and split the vote.
Chen Shui- bian knew well that he would not be so lucky in the next 
election. To compete in a single plural electoral system with two parties, 
the median position might be a better position strategically. From then 
until the 2001 legislative election, Chen hewed to a centrist position on 
the independence/unification issue. The first move in this direction was his 
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inaugural speech, in which Chen declared the Four Noes plus One With-
out pledge,15 emphasizing that the new government would take a centrist 
position on the issue. Taiwan voters did receive this signal and thus revised 
their image of the DPP. As shown in figure 5.4, the Taiwan public on aver-
age located the DPP at 3.1 in this issue dimension. It was the first time 
that the Taiwan public placed the DPP at this moderate position on the 
independence/unification issue.
After Chen was in power, he still faced an opposition- controlled legisla-
ture. Although some legislators left the KMT and followed James Soong to 
a new party, the PFP, together the KMT and PFP still held more than half of 
the seats in the legislature. The situation for Chen’s government was worse 
since the KMT legislators were much more cohesive than usual because 
of the serious partisan conflict during the elections and a divided govern-
ment created after the elections (Hawang 2003; Sheng 2003, 2008). In the 
meantime, the PFP legislators cooperated with the KMT legislators on most 
substantial legislation because they shared the same supporting groups (Yu 
2005). On the other hand, the DPP faced a challenge from a newly founded 
party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, a party more extreme than the DPP on 
Fig. 5.4. Respondents’ issue positions on independence/unification and their 
perceptions about the positions of the parties (1996– 2012). Source: Appendix 
5.A2. Note: On the horizontal axis, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted 
after the presidential election; “l” indicates that surveys were taken after the 
legislative election.
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the independence/unification issue dimension. As a result, Chen’s govern-
ment faced a political dilemma.
In hoping to win a majority in the legislature to implement Chen’s cam-
paign promises, the DPP adopted two campaign strategies in the 2001 leg-
islative election. The first was to run a national campaign. Normally, candi-
dates running under a multimember district with a single nontransferable 
vote electoral system try to distinguish themselves from other candidates 
of the same party because they target the same bloc of party supporters. 
Thus, they have incentives to run independent and local campaigns; that is, 
to focus on serving constituents and bringing pork- barrel projects to their 
constituency, rather than concentrating on national issues (Sheng 2005b). 
However, in 2001 the DPP ran its campaign by promoting national cam-
paign ads, and it prohibited its candidates from running independent cam-
paigns. Expecting a coattail effect from the national star, Chen Shui- bian, 
the DDP candidates followed this policy.
The DPP’s second electoral strategy was to declare publicly that it in-
tended to be a government for all people; that is, the government would 
work for all Taiwan citizens, not only for DPP voters. Therefore, it took 
a centrist position on the independence/unification issue and did not em-
phasize either the independence/unification issue or the Taiwanese/Chinese 
identity issue (Fell 2005, 140– 41). Instead, the party emphasized other is-
sues, such as social welfare and the political corruption of the era of the old 
KMT government. In the 2001 legislative election, the only party empha-
sizing independence was the TSU. The TSU won 7.8 percent of the vote 
and 13 seats. The only party emphasizing unification was NP, which nearly 
disappeared, getting only 2.6 percent of the vote and one seat in 2001.
By pursuing these strategies, the DPP won 33.4 percent of the vote and 
38.7 percent of all seats in the legislature. Although the DPP increased its 
number of seats and became the largest party in the legislature, the 38.7 per-
cent of seats was still not enough to control the legislature. Even if it could 
get support from the TSU on most important legislative roll- call votes, the 
total fraction of seats in the Pan- Green bloc (44.5% of the total) still would 
be outvoted by the opposition coalition, the Pan- Blue bloc, formed by the 
KMT, PFP, and NP. After the DPP failed to win support from a majority of 
the voters, it faced a severe fight with the Pan- Blue bloc in the legislature. 
Consequently, the DPP government was able to accomplish little and could 
not implement its campaign promises.
Soon after the 2001 legislative election, the DPP found that the TSU had 
attracted voters who favored an extreme position on Taiwan independence. 
Several substantial moves showed the TSU’s aggressiveness and steadfast po-
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sition. For example, the TSU initiated a proposal to revise the President 
and Vice- President Election and Recall Law to limit the qualification of a 
presidential candidate: only those born in Taiwan would have the right to 
be a presidential candidate. Another obvious example was the firm position 
TSU legislators took, while the Plebiscite Law was under debate, in favor 
of having substantive issues such as Taiwan independence decided by plebi-
scite. Also, when creating Regulations for Managing the Relations between 
Citizens of the PRC and Taiwan, the TSU always stood for very strict re-
strictions on people from China. Compared to the TSU’s firm stand on the 
independence issue, the DPP appeared ambiguous and hesitant on the issue.
Fearing that they would lose the electoral support of pro- independence 
voters to the TSU, the DPP started to shift to a more pro- independence 
stance after the 2001 legislative election. Constrained by its ruling posi-
tion, the DPP did not declare for Taiwan de jure independence. Rather, it 
played a safe game; namely, to consolidate its original voter base by resorting 
to Taiwan self- determination and Taiwan nationalism. The 228 Hand- in- 
Hand Rally before the 2004 presidential election was designed to present 
the DPP as the party that loved Taiwan. Further, the DPP advocated Rectify 
the Name of Nation and Drafting the New Constitution in the later legisla-
tive elections. All of these actions contributed to the party’s position shift to 
an extreme pro- independence stance in 2004. The Taiwan public discerned 
this shift and placed the DPP at 2.2, almost the same as its position in 1996 
(figure 5.4).
The DPP continued its pro- independence strategy even as President 
Chen’s second presidential term was almost over. In the cover letter of ap-
plication for membership in the United Nations, Chen requested the admis-
sion of Taiwan (Office of the President, July 20, 2007), which was different 
from the earlier request, “Readmission of the Republic of China.” The DPP 
further proposed a referendum that requested the government to continue 
to apply for membership in the United Nations under the name of Taiwan. 
The DPP presidential candidate for the 2008 election, Hsieh Chang- ting, 
supported this referendum despite the opposition of the United States and 
China. The United States and China worried that the next step of the DPP 
would be an independence referendum. When Hsieh visited the United 
States during the election, he stated that an independence referendum 
would not be necessary since Taiwan was already substantially independent. 
He claimed that the “cross- Strait common market” policy of his KMT op-
ponent, Ma Ying- jeou, was a preliminary step to unification with China. As 
a result, the Taiwan public rated the DPP’s position at 2.2 and the KMT’s 
at 7.4 in 2008 (figure 5.4).
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The DPP lost the 2008 election. This defeat led the party to reconsider 
its claims on the issue of independence/unification. Hsieh had linked an 
open economic policy with Taiwan nationalism but failed to provide a 
better substitute policy for Taiwan’s economic recession. This strengthened 
the public’s impression about the DPP’s lack of ability to deal with both 
economic and cross- Strait issues. Over half of the Taiwan public (54.3%) 
thought that the KMT performed better on cross- Strait issues in 2008 
(Sheng 2013). Some moderate DPP elites, such as Tuan Yi- kang, claimed 
that the mass public was tired of the DPP’s dogmatic views on the issue of 
independence/unification. Furthermore, after 2001 the public in general 
placed themselves at 4.5– 4.6 along the spectrum of independence/unifica-
tion. According to Downsian median voter theorem, it is expected that 
parties will seek a more centrist position when most of the public stands 
at the middle. During the 2012 election, the DPP presidential candidate, 
Tsai Ing- wen, adopted a moderate strategy on the issue of independence/
unification. She claimed that she would unconditionally carry on the ex-
isting cross- Strait policies if she won the election. She also admitted the 
importance of an open economic policy and trade with China and com-
mitted herself to dealing pragmatically with the relationship with China. 
However, she denied the “1992 consensus”16 and made a vague assertion of 
“Taiwan consensus.” The mass public still perceived the DPP at 2.6 on the 
spectrum of independence/unification, even though this was the second 
closest placement to the center for the DPP since 1996.
In contrast, the Taiwan public perceives the KMT as a pro- unification 
party. This perception is based on the KMT’s long- standing political dec-
laration in support of eventual unification with China. In 1990, the KMT 
government set up the National Unification Council. In 1991, the council 
drafted “Guidelines for National Unification,” which called for a phased 
approach toward unification. However, Lee Teng- hui, the KMT’s president 
who held office from 1988 to 2000, maintained a vague position on the 
independence/unification issue. Early in 1991 and 1992, when the DPP 
passed the “Taiwan Independence Clause” and advocated a radical Republic 
of Taiwan pledge in elections, Lee was lenient toward the DPP. His blurred 
and ambivalent attitude on unification with China made the New KMT 
Alliance, a hard- line faction on the unification position, accuse Lee of being 
a supporter of gradual independence. Lee’s attitude toward independence/
unification contributed to the departure of the New KMT Alliance from the 
KMT and its formation of the NP in 1993.
During the campaign for the 1996 presidential election, when facing 
Lin Yan- kang and Chen Lu- an, two candidates who were strongly pro- 
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unification, Lee Teng- hui was still vague about his position on indepen-
dence/unification. A survey conducted by the Election Study Center in 1996 
asked respondents about Lee’s position on that issue. The results showed that 
23 percent of the respondents considered Lee as favoring unification, 22.1 
percent considered him as favoring independence, 23.0 percent thought he 
favored the status quo, and 31.9 percent were not aware of Lee’s position at 
all (Sheng 2002). This explained why Taiwan voters located the KMT at 6.1 
on the independence/unification dimension in 1996.
From 1996 to 2000, when Lee was still the KMT’s leader, Taiwan vot-
ers considered the KMT as a party inclined to the right of center on the in-
dependence/unification issue. This perception changed when Lee left the 
KMT and became the spiritual leader of the TSU. The KMT reserved the 
option of unification with China and strongly stood for an open economy 
with China. After 2000, Taiwan citizens located the KMT at around 7.0 
on the unification side of the dimension. In 2008 the KMT presidential 
candidate, Ma Ying- jeou, announced the No Unification, No Indepen-
dence, and No Use of Force pledge on the independence/unification issue. 
Also, in his inaugural speech, he promised to foster more direct exchanges 
in cross- Strait relations and draft a peace pact with China. After Ma took 
office, he encouraged friendlier and more peaceful relations with China, 
such as frequent Chiang- Chen talks,17 opening direct investment in 
China, and allowing Chinese tourists and students to visit Taiwan. He also 
advocated signing the Cross- Strait Financial Supervision and Cooperation 
Memorandum and the Cross- Strait Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement to strengthen economic relations across the straits. Although 
the No Unification pledge seemed to make him a little more centrist, his 
economic and cultural policies, which encouraged closer relations with 
China, contributed to his pro- unification position in the public’s percep-
tion. The public rated the KMT’s position at 7.4 along the independence/
unification spectrum.
Furthermore, the concurrence between the issue position of the 
KMT’s and DPP’s identifiers and the issue position that those identifiers 
perceive their party to have is noteworthy, as figure 5.5 demonstrates. 
The issue position of KMT identifiers and their perception of the KMT’s 
issue position correspond to each other. This situation is more apparent 
when we compare the issue position of DPP identifiers with their percep-
tion of the DPP’s issue position. The concurrence may not be coinciden-
tal. Brody and Page (1972) argue that a voter may be persuaded by a can-
didate’s position and thereby consider that position to be his own. The 
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public’s perception on issues will be “distorted” by “pre- existing partisan 
attitudes.” In order to maintain cognitive consonance, party identifiers 
will selectively absorb information and form their issue position close to 
their preferable partisan position (RePass 1971). Research on American 
voters has shown this possibility. For example, Page and Jones (1979), 
Markus and Converse (1979), and Markus (1982) specify their models 
with reciprocal causal relationships among party, issue, and candidate 
factors by a simultaneous- equation statistical method. The concurrence 
in figure 5.5 implies that partisan elites have influenced Taiwan citizens 
in shaping their issue position.
Specifically speaking, elites try very hard to attract Taiwan citizens to 
their side. They frame and develop the issues. They persuade and convince 
the Taiwan public that certain issues are important and that their position 
benefits the public the most. The ups and downs of the issue positions of 
party identifiers show that they recognize the shift of their party’s issue posi-
tion and that they will shift their issue position accordingly. The DPP identi-
fiers are more likely to be persuaded by the DPP elites, while the Pan- Blue 
identifiers are less likely to be persuaded by the DPP elites. And the KMT 
identifiers are more likely to be persuaded by the KMT elites, while the Pan- 
Green identifiers are less likely to be persuaded by the KMT elites. In other 
words, when voters pick up the signal of political elites’ rhetoric or action on 
the issues, or both, they are selectively persuaded. In such a case, we should 
be able to find that an individual’s party preference affects his issue position 
so that a concurrence between his position and his perception of his prefer-
able party’s issue position appears, as in figure 5.5.18
For example, the DPP identifiers perceived the DPP’s issue position as 
more centrist (3.2) on the issue spectrum in 2000, when Chen Shui- bian 
offered the New Central Way policy. At the same time, the DPP identifiers 
also moved to a more centrist position (4.3) in 2000. Another example oc-
curred in 2008. When the DPP strongly catalyzed the birth of the Admis-
sion of Taiwan to the United Nations referendum and Hsieh Chang- ting 
claimed that he would not propose an independence referendum because 
Taiwan was substantially independent, the DPP identifiers placed the DPP’s 
issue position at 2.0, the most pro- independence stance that they have ever 
considered for the DPP. Meanwhile, they rated themselves at 2.9, also the 
most pro- independence placement that they have ever had.
Another interesting phenomenon in figure 5.5 is the trend in the issue 
position of KMT and DPP identifiers. Compared to their perception of the 
parties, Taiwan voters tend to be more centrist than their preferred parties, 
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even though their positions generally fluctuate with those of their parties. 
This may imply that Taiwan citizens, although standing close to the posi-
tion of their preferred party, do not consider themselves as extreme as their 
parties on this issue. In other words, the issue position of party identifiers 
seems not to deviate from that of independent voters too much on average. 
Furthermore, not only their perceptions on parties’ issue positions but also 
their issue positions were prone to be centrist in 2012. Indeed, DPP identifi-
ers perceived themselves at 3.3 on the issue spectrum in 2012 (2.9 in 2008), 
while KMT identifiers placed themselves at 5.4 in 2012 (5.8 in 2008). Fell 
argues that the fluctuations of party position were determined by intraparty 
struggle in the two main parties after 2008 and suggests that the new genera-
tion of leaders have sought “more consensual politics” (2011, 93). Conver-
gence to a more centrist stance on the issue of independence/unification for 
both the DPP identifiers and KMT identifiers may be possible in the future 
unless political parties on the island become extreme.
Fig. 5.5. Party identifiers’ issue positions on independence/unification and their 
perceptions about the positions of the parties (1996– 2012). Source: Appendix 
5.A3. Notes: 1. IDKMT = KMT identifiers. IDDPP = DPP identifiers. Here the 
placements of the KMT and DPP are the average perception of KMT identifiers 
and DPP identifiers, respectively; that is, KMT=KMT as perceived by KMT 
identifiers; DPP=DPP as perceived by DPP identifiers. 2. On the horizontal axis, 
“P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the presidential election; “l” 
indicates that surveys were taken after the legislative election.
T
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The Most Important Problem Facing Taiwan
In this section, we discuss how the public perceives the most important 
problem the country is facing and whether the public’s perspective responds 
to the elites’ issue agenda. Survey data were collected after presidential and 
legislative elections from 1996 to 2012 (questionnaire wordings are in a5 of 
the appendix 5.A1). Since this is an open- ended question, there are diver-
gent responses. However, we managed to subdivide respondents’ answers 
into eight categories: economic prosperity, independence/unification/cross- 
Strait affairs, wealth distribution/social welfare, party/politician’s ability and 
corruption, social order and national security, political/social reform/stabil-
ity, environmental protection, and others. Table 5.1 shows the results.
Based on data from the table, we find that the Taiwan public was ex-
tremely concerned about economic prosperity, especially in 2001 and 2008, 
when Taiwan’s economy was in a downturn. Also, the public was concerned 
about social order and national security, especially in 1996 and 2004, when 
tensions with China occurred in the Taiwan Strait. Sometimes, the public 
takes the party or politician’s characteristics (e.g., ability, integrity, and cor-
ruption) more seriously. However, economic prosperity, social order, and 
national security, as well as the party’s and politician’s ability or corruption, 
TABlE 5.1. The Most Important Problem Facing Taiwan in Elections
Issue 1996P 2001L 2004P 2004L 2008P 2008L 2012PL
Independence/unification/cross- 
Strait affairs
32 7 26 25 27 9 22
Political or social reform/
stability
0 0 3 3 2 3 2
Wealth distribution /social 
welfare
0 1 3 6 0 6 6
Environmental protection 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
Economic prosperity 23 55 35 21 15 63 38
Social order and national 
security
32 7 7 19 10 10 2
Party or politician ability/
corruption
0 4 5 10 7 0 4
Others 3 13 3 4 10 1 5
Don’t know 9 12 16 9 28 8 20
Refuse to answer 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Sources: Data for 1996 are from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, and data for 
2001 and after are from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study Project.
Note: After the year, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the presidential election; “L” indicates 
that surveys were taken after the legislative election.
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are valence issues, in which there is near- universal agreement on the ends of 
policy (Fiorina 1981, 18). Since most partisan elites (and the public) take 
the same side on the valence issues, those issues have little potential to de-
velop into a long- term political cleavages.19
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate only the importance of position issues— 
specifically, the four focal issues of this chapter— in the perception of the 
public. Figure 5.6 presents the public’s perspective on those issues in the 
presidential elections, and figure 5.7 shows the situation for the legislative 
elections. Several points are noteworthy.
First, from the public’s perspective, the independence/unification issue 
has been the most important position issue across years both in the presiden-
tial and legislative elections. The proportion of respondents who consider 
this issue most important is much greater than the proportion for other is-
sues (figures 5.6 and 5.7). As previously discussed, politicians have manipu-
lated this issue most of the time. When the Taiwan independence issue was 
raised in the political arena, it was connected to Taiwan’s most important 
cleavages, that of ethnicity and Chinese/Taiwanese identity, so that it was 
easily perceived by voters and aroused the affections and disaffections of 
substantial portions of the Taiwan public. Also, the independence/unifica-
Fig. 5.6. The proportion of voters defining the most important position issue in 
the presidential elections. Source: Table 5.1. Note: Data is not available for 2000. 
On the horizontal axis, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the 
presidential election; “l” indicates that surveys were taken after the legislative 
election.
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tion issue is connected to relations with China, so that it is also related to 
national security and economic prosperity. This makes the independence/
unification issue even more important.
Second, the independence/unification issue is of more importance in the 
presidential elections than in the legislative elections. Presidential candidates’ 
election platforms target national voters, whereas legislative candidates tar-
get their own constituents. In order to attract voters, it is possible that issues 
involved in presidential elections tend to be national and important affairs, 
while issues involved in legislative elections are diverse— from national to 
local affairs. Even in the same year, the proportion of the respondents con-
sidering the independence/unification issue the most important was only 
9.0 percent in the legislative election held in January 2008; however, it was 
27.0 percent in the presidential election held in March of the same year 
(table 5.1).
Moreover, the importance of the independence/unification issue fluc-
tuates more in the legislative elections than in the presidential elections. 
More than 25.0 percent of the respondents perceived the issue as the most 
important position issue in almost all presidential elections. However, in 
the legislative elections, only 7.0 percent and 9.0 percent of the respondents 
Fig. 5.7. The proportion of voters defining the most important position issue 
in the legislative elections. Source: Table 5.1. Note: On the horizontal axis, 
“P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the presidential election; “l” 
indicates that surveys were taken after the legislative election.
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perceived it as the most important position issue in 2001 and 2008 whereas 
25.0 percent did in the 2004.20 In 2003, the TSU initiated the Campaign 
for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan and invited the former president, Lee 
Teng- hui, to be its spiritual leader. Later they sponsored the Call Taiwan 
Taiwan parade. Afraid of losing too many pro- independence voters, the 
DPP and Chen Shui- bian expressed their support for this campaign both 
explicitly and implicitly (New Taiwan Weekly News, September 12, 2003).21 
Chen Shui- bian also requested national enterprises to change “China” to 
“Taiwan” in their names. The independence/unification issue had occupied 
the spotlight in the 2004 legislative election. This further demonstrates that 
the public gets cues from the parties and politicians in order to shape its per-
spective on politics. As in the United States, Democrats mention prodemo-
cratic issues more, whereas Republicans uphold conservative values and is-
sues (RePass 1971, 395). Elites’ emphasizing or deemphasizing of a certain 
issue may affect the public’s perspective on the issue agenda (Chihibber and 
Torcal 1997, 31).
Last, issues other than independence/unification are not as important 
from the public’s perspective, but the importance differs across issues. More 
people consider the wealth distribution issue more salient in the legisla-
tive elections than in the presidential elections. Also, as the economic situ-
ation has declined, the economically disadvantaged strongly felt relatively 
exploited; thus, more people paid attention to the wealth distribution is-
sue. So from 2004, a number of respondents (6.0%) considered wealth dis-
tribution the most important problem facing Taiwan (figure 5.7). As for 
the political reform issue, few voters took it as the most important issue 
in either the presidential elections or legislative elections, although reform/
stability had been the top issue in the 1980s and early 1990s (Hsieh and 
Niou 1996b). The DPP elites promoted many reform programs, whereas 
the KMT stressed stability. Political stability occupied the top 10 advertise-
ments of the KMT during elections until the party turnover (Fell 2005, 26). 
However, the importance of the reform/stability issue faded after Taiwan’s 
transition to democracy.
The environmental protection issue has the least respondents who per-
ceive it as an important problem. Candidates’ campaign platforms empha-
sizing economic growth usually get more attention than those emphasiz-
ing environmental protection. Furthermore, the ruling party tends to stress 
economic growth rather than environmental protection. An example is that 
even though for a long time the DPP claimed to protect the environment, it 
compromised in favor of economic development when it was in power (Ho 
2005b). Thus, it is not surprising that relatively few politicians emphasize 
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the environmental protection issue. As a result, few respondents consider 
environmental protection to be an important problem compared to other 
issues.
Overall, partisan elites’ manipulation of the issues, such as developing 
an issue, shifting the issue position, and emphasizing one issue while deem-
phasizing another, has an impact on how Taiwan citizens perceive the issues.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined four issues: reform/stability, wealth distribution, 
environmental protection/economy, and independence/unification. We 
have shown how partisan elites frame and manipulate these issues to attain 
their political goals and how Taiwan voters respond. Research findings show 
that for all of the four issues, Taiwan voters are able to perceive the parties’ is-
sue positions, shape their own issue position, and make political judgments 
based on the issues. This shows that issue politics has gradually evolved in 
Taiwan politics, although the impacts across issues differ.
In the process of issue evolution in Taiwan, the Dang- wai and DPP elites 
played an important role. They strategically searched for issues that ben-
efited the party’s growth and strength, then clarified and manipulated the 
issues to mobilize the mass public. Having emerged in the authoritarian era, 
the DPP emphasized the political reform issues first. After accomplishing 
political reform, it moved to the issue of Taiwan independence. The DPP 
elites were successful in raising this issue, so that the party grew gradually in 
the 1980s and 1990s and won the presidency in 2000 and 2004. However, it 
lost the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, and it has not broken through 
the bottleneck of seat shares (40.0%) in legislative elections. One of the ma-
jor reasons is that the DPP cannot achieve a breakthrough on issue games.
Following Taiwan’s gradual democratization and political reform in the 
1980s and 1990s, it has become more difficult for the DPP to identify new 
and attractive reform issues. The DPP has tried raising several such issues af-
ter 2000, such as the return of the KMT assets obtained in the authoritarian 
era, revision of the 18 percent preferential interest rates for the pensions of 
retired public servants, the reform of the constitution, and the restructure of 
the legislature. The DPP has attained its goal on some issues, but it cannot 
take all of the credit because several parties were involved in the regulation- 
making process. Some reform issues, such as preferential treatment for re-
tired civil servants, are still controversial and might only help to consolidate 
the DPP’s original base of support but not broaden its voter base.
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Regarding the environmental protection/economy issue, the debate on 
whether to continue the construction of a fourth nuclear plant has stirred 
up mass attention recently. The disaster at the Fukushima nuclear plant in 
Japan has further stimulated the public’s concern about the safety of nuclear 
energy. If the KMT government had not been able to defuse the issue, the 
DPP could have taken advantage of it to attract the electorate. However, the 
KMT government decided to mothball the construction of the fourth nu-
clear power plant for fear of losing electoral support even though the option 
to use nuclear energy was kept open. In addition, as a result of the economic 
downturn since 2000, the Taiwan public is more concerned about economic 
prosperity, and the governing party has always considered economic growth 
as the top priority in its agenda. Without polarizing elites and voters, the 
environmental protection/economy issue has little chance of evolving into a 
salient political cleavage.
Thus, the independence/unification issue remains the most influential 
issue in Taiwan politics because all major parties have clear and polarized 
positions on it and it is connected to enduring social cleavages— ethnicity 
and Chinese/Taiwanese identity. As it was demonstrated in figure 5.4, the 
positions of the parties, in particular those of the KMT and the DPP, are ob-
viously separated more than those in figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. This situation 
provides partisan elites with opportunities to manipulate the issue in order 
to attract voters. The Taiwan public in turn responds to the elites, shapes 
its issue position, and perceives the importance of the issues accordingly. 
Among position issues, these types of interactions between partisan elites 
and the mass public is especially effective with the independence/unification 
issue. Moreover, this issue is relatively important also because Taiwan voters 
make political decisions based on it (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Fell 2005, 2012; 
Hsieh and Niou 1996a, 1996b; Shyu 1998; Sheng 2002, 2013; Sheng and 
Chen 2003). From 2000 to 2008, party positions on the independence/
unification issue became more polarized. The Pan- Green’s position on the 
issue dimension was moving toward a more pro- independence stance. In 
the meantime, the Pan- Blue’s position was becoming more pro- unification. 
In 2012, although both the KMT and the DPP were perceived as a little 
prone to being centrist (the KMT moved from 7.4 to 7.0 on the scale, while 
the DPP moved from 2.2 to 2.6), the difference between the two parties 
was still very large. The continuing polarization between the two parties has 
made the independence/unification issue more salient and has had decisive 
impacts on the political attitudes and behavior of Taiwan voters. It is quite 
possible that all parties will keep focusing most of their efforts on framing 
and manipulating this issue.
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Last, the wealth distribution issue in Taiwan has not become as salient as 
it has been in other advanced democracies even though the disparity between 
the rich and the poor has become more severe in recent years. Political par-
ties and candidates have frequently manipulated the issue of wealth inequal-
ity to gain electoral support from disadvantaged voters. Since they generally 
attempt to take credit for welfare programs, they tend to outbid each other. 
The differences between the positions of political parties on wealth distribu-
tion are thus small. Indeed, all major parties in Taiwan have little differences 
on this issue and have difficulty in distinguishing themselves from one an-
other. As a result, the wealth distribution issue has not been polarized to the 
extent of becoming a significant political cleavage.
Will this issue become an important political cleavage in the future? 
There are two possible scenarios. The first one is that the welfare distribu-
tion issue is absorbed into the dominant cleavage of independence/unifica-
tion and polarizes political elites and voters. There is evidence that elites of 
major parties took a ride on the independence/unification issue to evoke 
the public’s consciousness of wealth inequality in Taiwan. In 2008 and 
2012 elections, the KMT fielded the argument that Taiwan’s economic 
misfortune was related to cross- Strait tension and campaigned on expand-
ing economic relations with China, such as signing the Economic Coop-
eration Framework Agreement. Entrepreneurs of big businesses welcome 
this proposal and nearly unanimously endorsed the KMT presidential can-
didate, Ma Ying- jeou. In contrast, the DPP opposed the proposal and ad-
vertised ECFA’s negative effects with a dialect limerick popular among dis-
advantaged groups: “Female cannot find good husbands, male cannot find 
good jobs, and sons have to find a job in Heilongjiang.”22 Evidence shows 
that working class and self- employed citizens tend to oppose the ECFA, 
while business owners and people with managerial responsibilities gener-
ally support the accord (Lin and Hu 2011). It is also worth noting that 
Taiwan voters’ positions on cross- Strait economic exchange are reflected in 
their partisan identification. Supporters of the Pan- Blue Alliance generally 
consider the ECFA beneficial to Taiwan’s economy, while the Pan- Green 
identifiers tend to view the accord negatively. If this situation continues, 
the welfare distribution issue may be absorbed into the dominant cleavage 
of independence/unification in such a way that economically disadvan-
taged citizens are more pro- independence while the advantaged publics are 
more pro- unification. In such a case, class politics may emerge and wealth 
distribution may become more salient in Taiwan through the strength of 
identity issue. Independence and unification cleavage along with class con-
flicts may aggravate polarization in the Taiwan society.
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However, another scenario is also possible that may not contradict the 
first one. That is, the KMT will slow down its pace with China for fear 
of losing electoral support due to its contentious nature, while the DPP 
will be unwilling to sacrifice economic prosperity and will moderate its 
pro- independence position. The DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing- wen 
announced in the 2012 election that she would accept all cross- Strait agree-
ments signed between the KMT government and Beijing if she were elected. 
This shows that the DPP cannot stand against the wishes of big businesses 
when it is in power. In that case, the elites of both parties may stand close to 




a1: On the reform/stability issue
Looking at Taiwan’s overall development, some people believe that large scale 
reform is the most important thing, even if it means sacrificing some social sta-
bility. Other people believe that stability is the most important and that reform 
should not be allowed to affect social stability. On this card, the position that 
large- scale reform is the most important thing is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, 
and the position that social stability is most important is at 10. About where on 
this scale does your own view lie? As you understand it, about where on this scale 
does the position of the KMT lie? About where on this scale does the position of 
the DPP lie? About where on this scale does the position of the PFP lie? About 
where on this scale does the position of the TSU lie?
a2: On the wealth distribution issue
Regarding the question of social welfare, some people believe that the government 
should merely maintain the current system in order not to increase people’s taxes. 
Other people believe that the government should promote social welfare, even 
though it will lead to tax increases. On this card, the position that maintaining 
the current system is the most important thing is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, 
and the position that promoting social welfare is most important is at 10. About 
where on this scale does your own view lie? As you understand it, about where 
on this scale does the position of the KMT lie? About where on this scale does the 
position of the DPP lie? About where on this scale does the position of the PFP 
lie? About where on this scale does the position of the TSU lie?
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a3: On the environmental protection/economy issue
Regarding the question of economic development versus environmental protec-
tion, some people in society emphasize environmental protection while others 
emphasize economic development. On this card, the position that emphasizes 
environmental protection is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that 
emphasizes economic development is at 10. About where on this scale does your 
own view lie? As you understand it, about where on this scale does the position of 
the KMT lie? About where on this scale does the position of the DPP lie? About 
where on this scale does the position of the PFP lie? About where on this scale does 
the position of the TSU lie?
a4: On the independence/unification issue
In our society people often talk about the question of Taiwan independence from 
or unification with China. Some people say that Taiwan should declare inde-
pendence right away. Other people say that Taiwan and China should unify 
right away. Yet other people have opinions between these two positions. On this 
card, the position that Taiwan should immediately declare independence is at 0 
on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that Taiwan should immediately unify 
with the mainland is at 10. About where on this scale does your own view lie? 
As you understand it, about where on this scale does the position of the KMT lie? 
About where on this scale does the position of the DPP lie? About where on this 
scale does the position of the PFP lie? About where on this scale does the position 
of the TSU lie? The questionnaire wordings are identical in most years, except 
for 1996P and 2000P. However, the survey results of the two years with slightly 
different wordings did not deviate from common expectation much; thus, the 
authors kept them in the discussion.
a5: The most important problem facing Taiwan
During the presidential (legislative) election campaign, many different problems 
faced by our country were raised. What do you think is the most important politi-
cal problem facing Taiwan today? (Open- ended question)
Note: The wording of this question might be slightly different on cross sur-
veys, but the core element of the question is the same: that is, in the re-
spondent’s perspective, what is the most important political problem facing 
Taiwan today?
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APPENDIx 5.A2. Respondents’ Issue Positions and Their Perceptions about the Positions of Parties 
(1996– 2012)
Issue
Election Respondents KMT DPP NP PFP TSU
Reform/stability
1996P 7.1 6.9 3.9 5.6
1998L 7.2 6.6 4.0 5.2
2000P 7.2 7.0 4.4 5.6 5.9
2001L 7.2 6.8 3.6 5.7 6.1 4.8
2004L 7.3 6.8 3.9 6.1 3.7
2008P 7.0 6.1 4.7
Wealth distribution
2000P 5.6 4.8 6.5 5.2 5.4
2004L 6.3 5.6 6.0 5.5 5.2
2008P 5.9 5.6 5.4
2012PL 5.9 5.1 5.4
Environment/economy
1998L 5.3 7.3 5.0 4.9
2000P 5.2 7.2 5.2 5.0 5.4
2001L 6.1 7.2 5.6 5.6 6.3 5.8
2004L 5.7 7.1 5.6 6.4 5.4
2008P 5.9 6.8 5.4
Independence/unification
1996P 5.2 6.1 2.0 6.5
1998L 5.0 6.5 2.3 7.3
2000P 5.3 6.4 3.1 7.3 7.1
2001L 5.2 7.2 2.6 7.6 7.2 2.5
2004L 4.6 7.4 2.2 7.4 1.7
2008P 4.5 7.4 2.2
2012PL 4.5 7.0 2.6    
Source: Data for 1996– 2000 are from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 
and data for 2001– 12 are from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study Project.
Note: Entries are respondents’ means on a scale of 0 to 10. After the year, P” indicates that surveys 
were conducted after the presidential election; “L” indicates that surveys were taken after the legisla-
tive election.
Issues, Political Cleavages, and Party Competition in Taiwan  133
Notes
 1. The authors thank the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University 
for providing the data from the 1996, 1998, 2000 elections, and the Taiwan Election 
and Democratization Studies Project for providing data from the 2001 to 2012 elec-
tions. The coordinator of multiyear project TEDS is Professor Chi Huang (National 
Chengchi University). The authors are alone responsible for views expressed herein.
 2. The measurement of respondents’ positions on the reform/stability issue and 
their perceived positions of the parties are based on the questionnaire shown in a1 of 
the appendix 5.A1.
 3. Shih Ming- te, a former colleague of Chen, initiated the “Million Voices against 
Corruption, President Chen Must Go” campaign and appealed to Chen to resign 
from office. Shih and his followers, all in red shirts, sat outside the presidential office 
from September until the prosecutors charged Chen and his family with corruption; 
however, the court did not process the case against Chen in 2006. The reason is that 
the president has immunity from criminal accusations when he is president, according 
to the constitution.
 4. Liou Hsiao- Hsia, “Ma versus Hsieh: Comparison of Their Pork Barrels,” Unit-
ed Daily News, March 15, 2008, http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2007–08/storypage.
jsp?f_MAIN_ID=357&f_SUB_ID=2361&f_ART_ID=73230 (accessed May 8, 
2013; in Chinese).
 5. For more discussion on the ethnic cleavage, see chapter 3 of this book.
 6. Even in 2011, in all industries, 78.6 percent of employees worked in companies 
with fewer than 5 workers while 90.9 percent worked in companies with fewer than 
10 workers (Directorate- General of Budget 2012).
 7. Since the subcontractors, who usually had worked for the big outsourcing fac-
tories, still relied on contracts from the original factories, the owners of small factories 
APPENDIx 5.A3. Party Identifiers’ Issue Positions and Their Perceptions about the Positions of 









DPP (as perceived 
by DPP identi-
fiers)
1996P 5.7 6.3 3.7 2.3
1998L 6.0 6.7 3.8 2.5
2000P 5.9 6.5 4.3 3.2
2001L 5.9 6.9 4.2 2.8
2004L 6.0 7.0 3.5 2.2
2008P 5.8 6.7 2.9 2.0
2012PL 5.4 6.4 3.3 2.6
Source: Data for 1996– 2000 are from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 
and data for 2001– 12 are from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study Project.
Note: After the year, “P” indicates that surveys were conducted after the presidential election; “L” 
indicates that surveys were taken after the legislative election.
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did not consider themselves to be “capitalists” or even “bosses” (Hsieh 1989). Their 
relations with their employees, who usually had been their former colleagues from 
the big factories, were more like partnerships, not the confrontational relationships 
between capitalists and labor.
 8. A legislator from a business district once appealed to his electorate in the work-
ing class that he had “many well- achieved friends in business. They all used to work as 
apprentices or workers. They all claimed they have been in difficulty with their bosses 
when they were hired. However, they all opened their own business later with the 
assistance of their original bosses. So, workers do not always work for others; someday 
you will become employers” (Chang 1987, 21; in Chinese).
 9. The KMT leaders did not plan full- scale subsidies to the elderly from the begin-
ning. However, via hearings, media attention, and direct petition to President Lee 
Teng- hui and Premier Lien Chan some legislators from the agricultural districts, such 
as Chen Chih- ping, Lin His- shan, and Wong Chung- chun, appealed to the KMT 
leaders to support subsidies for elderly farmers (Sheng 2001, 90– 91).
 10. One of the reasons for parties to hold onto the independence/unification issue, 
rather than left- right ideology, may be the failure of the Taiwan public to distinguish 
between the left and the right. Chen (2003) found out that only half of Taiwan citi-
zens can identify their position along the left- right spectrum, a rather low rate com-
pared to citizens in most democracies. Hsiao, Cheng, and Achen also find that the 
Taiwan public misunderstands the meanings of “left” and “right” (see chapter 6).
 11. The KMT, PFP, and NP united and proposed to impeach the newly elected pres-
ident. BBC News, “Taiwan’s Suspension of NUKE4 Causes Political Crises,” Octo-
ber 30, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/chinese/news/newsid_998000/9987432.stm 
(accessed October 8, 2015).
 12. Green Party Taiwan, “Ma Ying- jeou Do Not Forget Your Promise of Carbon 
Tax on Earth Day,” December 18, 2009. http://www.greenparty.org.tw/index.php/
discuss/comment/233–2009–12–18–04–29–18 (accessed May 8, 2013; in Chinese).
 13. An earthquake and the following tsunami severely damaged the Fukushima 
nuclear plant. The radiation leak endangered the neighborhood, causing the Japanese 
government to order the evacuation of residents in the area. For months, people were 
suspicious of food and water from the area because of possible radioactive contamina-
tion. Even now, Fukushima residents still cannot return to their homes.
 14. Central News Agency, “Mothballed Nuclear Power Plant Can Be Activated Any-
time: President,” July 31, 2015. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201507030027.aspx 
(accessed October 9, 2015).
 15. The Four Noes and One Without pledge is essentially that as long as China does 
not have an intention to use military force against Taiwan, Chen Shui- bian would not 
declare independence, change the name of the nation, push for the inclusion of the 
so- called state- to- state description in the constitution, or promote a referendum on 
the issue of independence versus unification.
 16. The 1992 consensus refers to a memorandum of a meeting between the semiof-
ficial representatives of China and Taiwan in 1992. It stated that both sides recognized 
the principle of one China. More specifically, China and Taiwan belong to one China 
but the definition of one China is based on their own interpretation. However, the 
DPP denied the existence of 1992 consensus.
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 17. The Straits Exchange Foundation (the chairman, Chiang Pin- kung, represents 
Taiwan) and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (the chairman, 
Chen Yunlin, represents the PRC) are in charge of most communication and negotia-
tion on nonpolitical issues.
 18. To the contrary, a number of studies of Taiwan voters also have shown that 
individuals’ issue positions may affect their party preferences and party identification 
(Hsieh and Niou 1996a, 1996b; Hsieh 2005; Sheng and Chen 2003). We do not 
disagree with this argument and accept the possibility of the reciprocal relationship 
between issue position and party preference.
 19. For a discussion on various issues in Taiwan, readers may refer to the following 
chapters of this book: chapter 6 on economic issue, chapter 7 on cross- Strait relations, 
and chapter 9 on wealth distribution.
 20. In 2012, the presidential election and the legislative election were held together 
so that the proportion of the independence/unification issue rose.
 21. Tien Yu- bin, Hsu Gu- cheng, and Chang Kim- Guo, 2003, “Support for Rec-
tifying the Name of Taiwan, the Public Is the Evidence,” New Taiwan Weekly News, 
September 12, no. 390 (in Chinese).
 22. Heilongjiang is located in northeastern China and has frigid weather in the 
winter.
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Chapter 6
Economic Voting in Taiwan
Micro- and Macro- Level Analysis
Chia- hung Tsai
In chapter 5, Sheng and Liao find that the Taiwan voters consider economic 
prosperity as the most important problem facing the country, especially 
when Taiwan’s economy was in a downturn. It is, therefore, important to 
examine the Taiwan voter in this light. Economic voting theory posits that 
voters tend to cast their votes in elections based on their assessment of gov-
ernment performance in regard to the economy. That is, if voters perceive 
that the current government is doing a good job in handling the economy, 
they are likely to vote for the incumbent party (or candidate) in order to 
have it remain in office. But if voters are dissatisfied with their economic 
conditions, they may affect a party turnover by voting against the incum-
bent party (or candidate). The foregoing can be regarded as the basic ratio-
nale of economic voting at the micro level.
This chapter has found mixed evidence of economic voting in the 2008 
and 2012 Taiwan presidential elections. On the one hand, partisanship 
overshadows retrospective economic assessment, but on the other, pro-
spective economic evaluation is a major determinant of voting behavior. 
Our aggregate- level analysis, however, suggests that disposable income per 
capita (DIPC) explains the incumbent party’s vote shares. But the stan-
dard error on DIPC is larger than the .05 significance level. It is argued 
here that people tend to make their choices based on what the government 
will do in the near future, while macro economic conditions affect election 
outcomes.
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Economic Voting Theory
In the 1970s, Kramer (1971) argued that a party’s vote share represents the 
sum of three parts: party identification, past economic performance, and 
incumbent advantage. He found that changes in real personal income dur-
ing the election year explained more than half of the variation in the vote. 
Since then, political scientists have developed a great number of models 
explaining, or even predicting, electoral outcomes (Abramowitz 1996; Erik-
son 1989; Fair 1978; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Lewis- Beck and Rice 1992; 
Rosenstone 1983). Tufte (1978) provided an engaging analysis of the im-
pact of economic factors on congressional voting. His analysis shows that 
presidential popularity, along with yearly change in real income per capita, 
fit the election results from 1948 to 1976 very well. MacKuen, Erikson, 
and Stimson (1989) regressed presidential approval on political events and 
consumer sentiment and concluded that approval is a function of economic 
evaluation. Prior research on economic voting also implied that the presi-
dent is largely held accountable for the national economy; thus, voters who 
are not satisfied with the national economy will send a signal targeting the 
president’s performance (Erikson 1989).
Individual- level analysis of economic voting clarifies the mechanism by 
which the economic situation can affect political behavior. Key (1966) em-
phasized that voters look at the past records of the incumbent, and Downs 
(1957) argued that voters will base their preference on candidates’ past 
performance when considering candidates’ promises. Kinder and Kiewiet 
(1981) provided a theoretical foundation for pocketbook and sociotropic 
voting. They argued that personal finances may provide a shortcut to in-
formation but that sociotropic voting does not place higher informational 
demands on voters. They claimed that “[r]ather, voters must only develop 
rough evaluations of national economic conditions, and then credit or 
blame the incumbent party accordingly” (132). Feldman (1982) maintained 
that pocketbook voting occurs only among people who hold on to eco-
nomic individualism. Fiorina (1978), however, endorsed the retrospective 
voting theory that the vote for the incumbent president’s party is a func-
tion of individual personal income. Markus (1988) pooled survey data from 
the National Election Studies from 1956 to 1984 and found that both the 
aggregate- level economic indicators and personal finances are significant 
predictors of presidential voting choices. Nadeau and Lewis- Beck (2001) 
emphasized the influence of incumbency in the election: people choose ret-
rospective pocketbook voting when the incumbent president is running in 
the election.
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At the aggregate and individual levels, the logic of retrospective voting 
is straightforward: voters opt to support the incumbent who has improved 
economic conditions. The prospective voting theory instead assumes that 
people would choose the candidate who holds out a better prospect. Lanoue 
(1994) found that the effects of retrospective economic judgment are more 
consistent than prospective ones, whereas Lockerbie (1992) found that bet-
ter prospects are more important than backward judgments. One of the un-
derlying differences between the prospective and retrospective frameworks 
concerns the amount of information needed to make the forward or back-
ward judgment. Considering that the modern economic situation involves 
many aspects, including employment, housing, food prices, and so on, vot-
ers’ memory and understanding of past economic records may be challeng-
ing. Moreover, retrospective judgments can be subject to partisan framing: 
the incumbent may stimulate prosperity, but the opposition may paint it 
in dismal colors, for example, as causing less equality and greater inflation. 
Finally, the incumbent can hardly claim credit or be blamed for short- term 
economic fluctuations. Therefore, I assume that the reward model of eco-
nomic voting is less effective than the prospective framework.
The other dimension of economic voting studies is whether personal fi-
nances or the national economy has more influence on voting. Duch and 
Stevenson’s content analysis (2008) showed that citizens do indeed possess 
information regarding the macro economy. Gomez and Wilson (2006) 
found empirical evidence that sociotropic voting is common among less so-
phisticated people because they consider the national economy to be the 
president’s sole responsibility. Economic voting, therefore, does not require 
sophistication. Understanding national economic situations may not de-
mand too much information because voters can make a rough evaluation of 
the national economy.
Finally, there is the question about whether micro- or macro- level data 
analysis is superior regarding economic voting. The problem of endogene-
ity in cross- sectional data can be avoided with aggregate- level data analysis; 
however, aggregate data have fewer observations. Being aware of the trade- 
off, I analyze both types of data in this chapter.
The Case of Taiwan
It is not a coincidence that Taiwan voters embrace the value of economic 
growth, due to a shortage of natural resources. As in Japan and other East 
Asian countries, politics is geared to economic growth (Lumley 1976). When 
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the Kuomintang government moved from Nanjing to Taipei in 1949, its 
priority was land reform, and land reform, economic planning, and shrink-
ing the financial gap between the rich and the poor were the KMT’s primary 
accomplishments.1 In the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT government focused 
on economic growth (Chang 1965). According to Tien (1989, 26), the av-
erage GNP growth rate during the decade of 1953– 62 was 7.5 percent. In 
the next decade, the number increased to 10.8 percent. By 1991, exports 
accounted for 47.1 percent of GDP (Wu 1995, 59). Unfortunately, Taiwan’s 
economy has faltered since the 1990s. Not only did the growth of national 
income flatten, but disposable household income also declined. Labor short-
ages, inadequate infrastructure, and concerns over the environment slowed 
down the rate of growth. Although the KMT has been credited with eco-
nomic development, the issue of social inequality and a power struggle cost 
the KMT the 2000 presidential election.
Although the KMT lost the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, it 
called for improving cross- Strait relations, arguing that the future of Tai-
wan’s economy could hinge on economic cooperation with China. Tan and 
Ho in chapter 7 show the rapid increase in the amount of Taiwan’s invest-
ments in China after 2000. While more and more capital and technical 
expertise flows to China in exchange for cheap labor, land, and low environ-
mental regulation, the resulting closer tie between Taiwan and China indeed 
stimulated Taiwan’s economy, a result credited to the KMT even though it 
was not in power at the time. In contrast, the Democratic Progressive Party 
government discouraged the growing economic ties to the mainland, citing 
the concern for national security. The quest for economic growth shaped the 
2008 presidential election, and the KMT returned to power.
Scholars have found evidence of economic voting in Taiwan, but their 
findings are not conclusive. Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou (1998) supports prospec-
tive sociotropic voting in Taiwan’s first popular presidential election, but 
Sheng (2009) suggested that both prospective and retrospective economic 
perceptions were important in the 2008 presidential election. Hsiao (2013) 
also stressed the strength of prospective economic perception. Wu and Lin’s 
(2013) analysis showed no effect of economic evaluation but found that 
voter perception of cross- Strait relations is a powerful predictor. More im-
portant, Wu and Lin (2012) discussed the validity of retrospective and pro-
spective economic evaluations. Because the 2008 presidential election was 
held in March and the postelection survey is conducted in July and August 
due to the availability of student interviewers, they argued that responses 
to these questions might be endogenous to voting choice. They suggested 
that prospective economic views are more likely to predict voting behavior 
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if the election result is known before the survey is in the field. Their theory 
conforms to the findings of the American literature, yet they stop short of 
testing it with aggregate- level data.
In chapter 7, Tan and Ho find that the Taiwan voters’ evaluations of 
the national economy and their own personal economic situations are not 
independent from partisan identification and preference on the indepen-
dence/unification issue. More precisely, those who preferred unification or 
the status quo were more likely to evaluate the state of the economy posi-
tively, while pro- independence respondents had a more negative view. If the 
confounding effect of party support on economic evaluations indeed exists, 
it is hard to verify economic voting.
To confirm that economic outcome matters in mass political decisions, 
I will attempt to analyze both macro- and micro- level data. Since the Ma 
administration signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
with Beijing in 2010, which is expected to increase Taiwan’s trade with the 
Chinese mainland, I will focus on the public’s assessment of the national 
economy. Indeed, previous research has shown that the sociotropic consid-
eration, not pocketbook concerns, correlates with voting decisions (Kinder 
and Kiewiet 1979; Erikson 1989). Our hypotheses are thus:
1. Prospective economic evaluation is a significant predictor of voting 
behavior when partisan predisposition is controlled for.
2. The partial effect of retrospective economic evaluation on voting 
behavior is significant when partisan predisposition is controlled 
for.
3. The percentage change in disposable income per capita is associ-
ated with an incumbent’s vote share, all other things being equal.
Findings
Survey Data Analysis: The 2004, 2008, and 2012 Presidential Elections
The national postelection survey data conducted by Taiwan’s Election and 
Democratization Studies was chosen for this analysis. These three surveys 
use a stratified sampling frame that covers all of the cities and counties ex-
cept two surrounding islands, Kin- men and Mat- zu.
Each survey asks respondents’ retrospective economic evaluation: 
“Would you say that over the past year, the state of the economy of Taiwan 
has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” For the prospec-
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tive evaluation, the wording is “Would you say that in the forthcoming year, 
the state of the economy of Taiwan will get better, stay about the same, or get 
worse?” For both the retrospective and prospective economic evaluations, I 
code the response of “worse” as 1, “about the same” as 2, and “better” as 3.
To increase the predictive power of our economic voting models, I code 
self- identification as with either the Pan- Blue or Pan- Green camp. If respon-
dents identified themselves with either the KMT, the People First Party, or the 
New Party, they are categorized as in the Pan- Blue camp. If respondents iden-
tified with the DPP or the Taiwan Solidarity Union, they are considered Pan- 
Green supporters. More than 30 percent of respondents, however, responded 
that they identified with neither camp. Therefore, I created two dummy vari-
ables representing support for the Pan- Blue and Pan- Green camps. Table 6.1 
shows the wording of the questions and the coding schemes.
Economic Evaluations, Economic Records, and Incumbent’s Vote
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the distribution of retrospective and prospective 
evaluations of national economic conditions in three elections. In 2004, 
only one- third of respondents said that the economic situation had become 
TABlE 6.1. Individual- level Variables




Pan- Blue identification  
 
  
“Would you say that over the 
past year, the state of the 
economy of Taiwan has 
gotten better, stayed about 
the same, or gotten 
worse?”
“Would you say that in the 
forthcoming year, the state 
of the economy of Taiwan 
will get better, stay about 
the same, or get worse?”
“Of the following five politi-
cal parties, which  
party do you support the 
most?”
“Of the following five politi-
cal parties, which  
party do you support the 
most?”
“worse” = 1
“about the same” = 2
“better” = 3
“worse” = 1
“about the same” = 2
“better” = 3
DPP, TSU = 1
KMT, PFP, New Party = 1  
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worse than it had been one year before (table 6.2). But in 2008, the percent-
age had almost doubled. Although the KMT government tried to address 
the economic problems by building closer ties with China, in 2012 more 
than 40 percent of those polled said that the economy was worse than be-
fore. As for the prospective economic evaluation, the three elections have 
differing distributions. In 2004 and 2012, a plurality of the respondents 
said that economic conditions would be the same in the future. In 2008, 
however, the proportion of respondents who said that economic conditions 
would become worse is a little higher than that of people who said economic 
conditions would remain the same.
Before estimating the effects of national economic evaluation on vote 
choice, the bivariate relationship between economic evaluations and vote 
choice is assessed. Table 6.3 shows the strong association between retrospec-
tive evaluation and incumbent voting in 2004. About 70 percent of people 
who felt that the economic situation had improved voted for the incumbent 
party, the DPP. On the other hand, nearly 75 percent of those who that that 
economic times were bad supported the challenger.
Table 6.3 also shows that in 2008 approximately 65 percent of people 
answered that the economic situation had gotten worse, and half of them 
voted for the challenger, the KMT. People who said that the economy had 
TABlE 6.2. Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation of National Economy
  2004 2008 2012
Retrospective Worse 34.89 66.67 43.82
Same 38.51 30.27 38.58
Better 26.61 3.07 17.60
Prospective Worse 25.07 38.29 30.00
Same 47.58 36.85 48.24
 Better 27.35 24.87 21.76
Note: Column percentages are in cells.
TABlE 6.3. Retrospective Evaluation of National Economic Condition and Vote Choice, 2004– 2012
  Nonincumbent % Incumbent % Total
2004 Worse 251 70.51 105 29.49 356
Same 171 43.29 224 56.71 395
Better 82 25.55 239 74.45 321
2008 Worse 393 50.13 391 49.87 784
Same 309 83.29 62 16.71 371
Better 33 84.62 6 15.38 39
2012 Worse 322 64.40 178 35.60 500
Same 152 32.14 321 67.86 473
 Better 35 14.23 211 85.77 246
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stayed the same overwhelmingly supported the challenger. Fewer than 50 
percent of respondents considered that the economic situation was getting 
better and they clearly voted for the KMT. As for 2012, most respondents 
who thought that the economy had gotten worse voted for the challenger, 
but most respondents who answered ”stayed the same” and ”better” voted 
for the incumbent party. In other words, retrospective economic voting oc-
curred in 2012.
The first panel of table 6.4 shows that most people who said that the 
future economy would become worse voted for the challenger in 2004, and 
that 85 percent of people who thought that the economy would improve 
voted for the incumbent party. This result confirms the prospective eco-
nomic voting theory.
However, the second panel of table 6.4 suggests the reverse pattern in 
2008; more than 90 percent of people who felt that the economy would 
get better voted for the nonincumbent party, whereas more than 60 percent 
of the people who were pessimistic about the future economy voted for the 
incumbent. Wu and Lin’s (2012) theory applies here in that voters may use 
the election outcomes to justify their economic responses. In 2008, it is the 
winning challenger rather than the losing incumbent who benefits from a 
good economic prospect— a prospect judged after the election.
As for 2012, an election won by the incumbent, table 6.4 shows that 
more than 80 percent of people who were optimistic about the future econ-
omy voted for the incumbent in 2012 and that more than 60 percent who 
thought the opposite voted for the challenger. This result suggests that voter 
perceptions of the economic future have an impact on voting.
These contingency tables suggest that voting is conditional on both pro-
spective and retrospective concern about the national economy. To estimate 
the partial effect of retrospective and prospective economic evaluation in 
TABlE 6.4. Prospective Evaluation of National Economic Condition and Voting for the Incumbent, 
2004– 2012
  Nonincumbent % Incumbent % Total
2004 Worse 207 78.41 57 21.59 264
Same 249 50.30 246 49.70 495
Better 48 15.34 265 84.66 313
2008 Worse 156 34.14 301 65.86 457
Same 283 67.38 137 32.62 420
Better 296 93.38 21 6.62 317
2012 Worse 240  66.67 120 33.33 360
Same 233  40.59 341 59.41 574
 Better 36  12.63 249 87.37 285
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2004, 2008, and 2012, our economic voting model is set up as follows:
Pr(Y) = β0 + β1 × Retrospective evaluation + β2 × Prospective 
evaluation + β3 × Pan- Green + β4 × Pan- Blue + u
Where Y = 1 when voting for the incumbent party and 0 otherwise.
I ran three logistic regression models for each of the three years so that 
I could assess the consistency of the estimates. The outcome variable was 
whether voters chose the incumbent party or not. Notice that the DPP was 
the incumbent party in 2004 and 2008, and the KMT was running the gov-
ernment in 2012. Independent variables include evaluation of the economy 
and party identification. Retrospective and prospective evaluations of the 
national economy are estimated respectively and jointly for each election. 
Considering that the proportion of people who identified themselves as in-
dependents was constantly around 40 percent, I classified individual parti-
sanship as Pan- Green, Pan- Blue, and independents. Tan and Ho’s chapter 
also suggests that the partisans of both incumbent and opposition parties 
have different views on the economy. Therefore, two dummy variables, rep-
resenting Pan- Green and Pan- Blue, have been included in the models.
Table 6.5 partially confirms the hypotheses. Either retrospective or pro-
spective economic assessment alone would increase the probability of voting 
for the incumbent in 2004 and 2012 when both Pan- Green and Pan- Blue 
identification is controlled for. When both retrospective and prospective 
evaluations are included in the full models of 2004 and 2012, retrospec-
tive economic evaluation has no influence on voting behavior in 2004 and 
2012. Comparing the measure of model fit by AIC and BIC, I find that the 
retrospective voting model has a larger value (worse fit) than the prospective 
voting model and the full model in each year. The retrospective model also 
does poorly if goodness of fit is also measured by - 2×ln(likelihood), where 
again, the larger the value, the worse the model fits the data.
The signs of the coefficients for both retrospective and prospective evalua-
tions in the full model were negative in 2008. As in tables 6.3 and 6.4, people 
who felt that the economy would get better and people who felt that the econ-
omy had become worse voted for the nonincumbent party. It seems that the 
electorate deserted the DPP because of poor economic conditions in addition 
to the KMT’s economic promise, including the ”six- three- three” slogan.2
Our survey data analysis suggests that people tend to use the future eco-
nomic situation as the yardstick for voting. If the incumbent has failed to 
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his performance in office was good. Nevertheless, people may not track the 
incumbent’s past record if they find the economic prospect appealing.
Why do people tend to use their perceptions of future economic situa-
tion as the basis for voting? The first possible explanation is that people may 
link the current economic conditions with partisan squabbling. In 2004 and 
2008, the DPP cited the KMT’s obstructive legislature and China’s threat 
for their mediocre performance. In 2012, the KMT argued that they had in-
herited the economic problems caused by the DPP’s policy of “self- isolation” 
from China and the world. The second explanation is that the incumbent 
government has the resources to set up the agenda (Page and Shapiro 1992); 
the incumbent government may either stimulate the economy in the elec-
tion year or divert people’s attention from economic conditions to national 
security or inequality. For instance, the DPP proposed an unprecedented 
national referendum in the 2004 presidential election. In consequence, the 
economic record did not stand out as a clear- cut issue.3
If retrospective economic voting does not take place, how can the fu-
ture national economy drive voting behavior, especially in 2012? One of 
the possible explanations is that the Taiwan voters responded to the notion 
of “peace dividend” proposed by the Ma administration. Ma personally has 
repeatedly emphasized the benefits of closer ties with China, including more 
trade surpluses, faster integration with the East Asian economy, and stronger 
national security. The prospect of a better economy pictured by the Ma ad-
ministration thus may explain the prospective economic voting in Taiwan.
Across the nine models, an individual’s attachment to either the pan- 
Blue or pan- Green camp is a major predictor of incumbent voting. In 2004 
and 2008, people who identified themselves as Pan- Green supporters voted 
for the incumbent party, but Pan- Blue supporters did not do so. In contrast, 
Pan- Blue supporters tended to choose the KMT in 2012, but Pan- Green 
supporters voted the other way. While economic voting does occur, the par-
tisan variables are consistently much more powerful.
Although survey data analysis supports prospective sociotropic voting, 
it relies on voter perceptions and self- reporting. Aggregate- level studies of 
economic voting instead focus almost completely on the effect of macroeco-
nomic performance on elections. To predict an election outcome, there are 
a great number of economic indicators to choose from. Erikson (1989) fol-
lowed Hibbs’s (1987) and Tufte’s (1978) investigations of macroeconomic 
conditions and the presidential elections, arguing that the relative growth 
of per capita income change has largely determined the election outcomes. 
Tsai (2000) also found that real personal income per capita explains presi-
dential popularity well, in addition to political events and war. Therefore, 
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I calculated the percentage change of disposal income per capita from the 
previous year. In addition, I include the percentage change in the year before 
the election year.
Because there is a perfect correlation between the DIPC in 2002 and 
2003, the change in DIPC has no impact on the vote shares. Therefore, our 
analysis drops the 2004 presidential election. The DPP was the incumbent 
in 2008, so its vote share is regressed on Chen Shui- bian’s vote share in 2004. 
Likewise, Ma’s vote share in 2012 is regressed on his vote share in 2008 as he 
challenged the DPP’s ticket. Our aggregate- level economic voting model is:
Yt = γ0 + γ1 × (DIPC change) t- 1 +γ2 × (DIPC change) t- 2 +γ3 × 
(Incumbent’s vote share) t- 4 + u
The dependent variable is the raw percentage of votes won by the DPP 
and KMT in each city/county respectively; I divided the number of votes 
for each party by the number of valid votes. The first predictor variable is the 
percentage change in the DIPC from the previous year. Because the presi-
dential election is held in March, people judge the president’s performance 
by the change in their income during the year between the two years before 
the election to the year before it. For the 2008 election, the first percentage 
change in DIPC was determined as (DIPC2007 − DIPC2006)/DIPC2006, 
and for the 2012 election, as (DIPC2011 − DIPC2010)/DIPC2010.
To capture the possible influence from the economic situation two years 
prior to the two elections, I used (DIPC2006 − DIPC2005)/DIPC2005 
for the 2008 model, and for the 2012 model, (DIPC2010 − DIPC2009)/
DIPC2009. Finally, I included as a covariate the DPP or KMT vote shares 
in the city/county four years earlier.
The personal income data came from the Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) of the Executive Yuan.4 The vote- share 
data comes from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University 
(http://esc.nccu.edu.tw). It was jointly collected by the center and the Cen-
tral Election Committee.
Our data are from 23 cities and counties for the 2008 election and from 
20 for the 2012 election. That is because Taichung County, Tainan County, 
and Kaohsiung County were merged with Taichung City, Tainan City, and 
Kaohsiung City, respectively, in 2010. Fortunately, DGBAS provides the 
DIPC of the three counties as if they had been merged back to 2000. There-
fore, I am able to calculate the percentage change in the DIPC for those 
three metropolitan areas for the 2012 election model.
Before estimating the effects of personal income factors, I plotted the 
change in the vote from 2004 to 2008 against the percentage change in 
Economic Voting in Taiwan  151
DIPC from 2006 to 2007 for the DPP (fig. 6.1), and I constructed a similar 
scatter plot for the KMT in the 2012 election (fig. 6.2). The prediction line 
in figure 6.1 rises as the change in DIPC increases, and the R- squared is 
0.06. This plot implies that the DPP lost votes everywhere but they gained 
votes in the cities or counties where the average income increased. Figure 6.2 
shows a flat line, which suggests that the KMT lost votes even in the cities 
or counties where income per capita increased. Both plots suggest that the 
aggregate economic indicator may not be able to predict the variation in 
incumbent’s vote share very well.
Table 6.6 shows four models. The first model presents the effects of the 
DPP’s vote share in 2004 and percentage changes in DIPC from 2007 and 
2006 on the variation of DPP’s vote share. The second model drops the 
change in DIPC from 2006. The third model demonstrates the effects of 
Fig. 6.1. Percentage change in DIPC versus change in incumbent’s (DPP) vote 
share, 2008
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the KMT’s vote share in 2008 and percentage changes in the DIPC in 2011 
and 2010. Finally, the fourth model drops the second lagged DIPC variable.
The first column shows that a 1 percentage point increase in disposable 
income per capita in the preceding year produces about a 2 percentage point 
gain in Chen’s vote share in 2008. When the second lag variable is dropped, 
the coefficient increases to 3.76. As for the 2012 election, the third column 
shows that Ma’s vote share would increase by 2 percentage points with a one 
unit change of disposable income per capita. The fourth column displays a 
similar result as the two- year lag variable is dropped. Because the variation 
in disposable income per capita across 20 or 23 cities is small, the effect of 
change between one year before the election and the preceding year is not 
significant, but it is substantial. Bartels and Zaller (2001) similarly found 
Fig. 6.2. Percentage change in DIPC versus change in incumbent’s (KMT) vote 
share, 2012
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that the contribution of economic growth (GDP or real disposable income, 
RDI) to an incumbent’s vote share is about 2 percent. However, the rela-
tively large standard errors here limit our ability to tell exactly how an in-
cumbent’s vote share reflects the economic conditions in cities and counties.
To improve the standard errors, the 2008 and 2012 data are combined as 
a dataset with 43 observations. In addition to the coefficients on the lagged 
vote and on the change in DIPC, a dummy variable indicating the 2012 
election is estimated. Table 6.7 shows that the finding in table 6.6 still holds; 
the coefficient and its standard error of change in DIPC both shrink as the 
number of observations double. Therefore, the t- ratio remains small.
The conclusion is that the Taiwan voters continue to vote for the in-
cumbent regardless of their disposable income one or two years prior. This 
result seems to validate the effect of partisan identification shown in chapter 
5. Both incumbents’ vote shares in 2004 and in 2008 predict the outcome 
variables very well, which means that voters who voted for a party tended to 
vote for it again, regardless of which party was in office. The coefficient of 
the incumbent’s vote share in the second model is smaller than that in the 
third model, which suggests that some Pan- Blue voters switched to the PFP 
in 2012.
Survey data analysis implies that some people participated in “negative” 
retrospective voting in 2008: people who thought that the economy had 
TABlE 6.6. Models of the Incumbent Party’s Vote Share in 2008 and 2012
 2008 2008 2012 2012
(Intercept) −8.45*** −8.96*** −5.58*** −5.39***
(1.49) (1.36) (1.17) (1.15)
Chen’s vote share 1.00*** 1.00***
 in 2004 (0.03) (0.03)
Percentage change in 2.48 3.76
 DIPC from 2007 (3.60) (3.28)
Percentage change in −3.73
 DIPC from 2006 (4.19)
Ma’s vote share 0.97*** 0.97***
 in 2008 (0.02) (0.02)
Percentage change in 2.61 2.32
 DIPC from 2011 (2.62) (2.59)
Percentage change in −2.86
 DIPC from 2010   (3.15)  
R- squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Adj. R- squared 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
N 23 23 20 20
Note: ***p < 0.001, two- tailed test. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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become worse may have voted for the challenger (i.e., the KMT). Table 
6.6 and 6.7, however, show that there is a positive association between the 
DPP’s vote shares and income growth. The gap between the individual- and 
aggregate- level data analysis needs more examination.
Conclusion
In this paper, I examined evidence of economic voting in the 2004, 2008, 
and 2012 presidential elections. On the one hand, I found that partisanship 
is a better predictor of outcome than retrospective economic assessment. On 
the other, prospective economic evaluation is a major determinant of voting 
behavior when controlling for partisanship. Notice that in 2008, prospec-
tive evaluation of the economy may reflect people’s judgment on the newly 
elected government’s handling of the economy rather than a true preelection 
prospective judgment.
Our aggregate- level analysis suggests that economic conditions may not 
explain the incumbent party’s election results. Instead, only the previous 
election outcome is a good predictor. Our economic indicator, DIPC of one 
and two years, could involve measurement errors because some people hide 
portions of their real income, such as rent and stocks. More work is needed 
to devise a good macroeconomic voting model.
One of our findings is that the electorate does not punish incumbents 
for their performance in the first term. This is interesting because it implies 
TABlE 6.7. Model of Combined Incumbent Party’s Vote Share in 
2008 and 2012
 Incumbent’s vote share
(Intercept) −8.03***
(0.86)
2012 presidential election 1.78***
(0. 36)
Incumbent’s vote share 0.99***
 in the last election (0.02)
Percentage change in 2.10
 the previous year (2.14)
R- squared 0.99
Adj. R- squared 0.99
N 43
Note: ***p < 0.001, two- tailed test. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
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that the incumbent has the advantage. A possible cultural explanation is that 
people in Taiwan dislike sudden change. Instead, they tend to wait before 
throwing the incumbent out. Certainly, I need more election results to test 
this hypothesis.
To be sure, as both macro- and micro- level data analysis show, retrospec-
tive or prospective economic voting is shadowed by party identification and 
the underlying national identity. From the normative perspective, it may 
impede political accountability; politicians can play identity cards instead of 
handling the economy well. However, economic growth will remain one of 
the main sources of legitimacy. As a new generation arises, new parties are 
emerging, and independents are increasing (see chapter 4), socioeconomic 
voting may become as important as national identity.
Notes
 1. In Taiwan, economic development in the 1960s and 1970s had not widened 
income inequality as it had in other developing countries (Ferdinand 1996). By the 
1980s, Taiwan’s disparity between the rich and the poor was one of the lowest in the 
world (Roy 2003).
 2. “Six- three- three” means a 6% economic growth rate, under 3% unemployment 
rate, and raising income per capita to USD $30,000.
 3. In January 2004, President Chen initiated the defensive referendum under 
Article 17 of the Referendum Act. Because the DPP’s party platform states that “any 
change of Taiwan’s independence status quo should be decided via referendum,” the 
international community harshly rebuked DPP’s referendum proposal (Lin 2004). 
The Pan- Blue camp blasted the DPP for holding the referendum and presidential elec-
tion on the same day, asking voters to boycott the referendum. Tsai, Hsu, and Huang 
(2007) argued that the two political camps polarized on the referendum issue more 
than on the independence/unification issue.
 4. Regarding statistics by county or city, please look at this link http://statdb.dgbas.
gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/statfile9.asp. Dozens of indicators by city and by year can be 
assessed through this interactive web page. Unfortunately, it is only in Chinese. On the 
English version of the DGBAS’s website (http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5), there 
is no such web page.
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Chapter 7
Cross- Strait Relations and the Taiwan Voter
Alexander C. Tan and Karl Ho
The saying “politics stop at the water’s edge” probably is not applicable to 
the case of Taiwan because “high” international politics and “low” domestic 
politics converge at the island state. The most prominent of the factors is 
Taiwan’s relations with China, which seem to penetrate to the core of Tai-
wan’s domestic politics and especially its electoral politics. While elsewhere, 
electoral politics tend to be defined by the prominence of national or domes-
tic concerns, we learn from earlier chapters, chapter 3 in particular, that the 
China factor (as an external factor) affects Taiwan’s perception of its security, 
both political and economic, and influences citizens’ identity formation and 
political preferences. A complete picture requires us to examine the role of 
cross- Strait relations in defining voter identity.
We will begin by briefly examining Taiwan’s economic relations with 
China and suggesting that despite greater interaction, the perceptions of Tai-
wan voters have not significantly changed in favor of China. In fact, we sug-
gest that empirical evidence shows that Taiwan voters are ambivalent about 
the increasing cross- Strait economic interaction. In the following section, 
we examine how this ambivalence and vulnerability has politicized Taiwan 
society and how this politicization helps paint a picture of who the Taiwan 
voter is.
Cross- Strait Relations, the Economy, and Security
One of the features of Taiwan’s economy after 1990 has been increasing 
economic relations with China, which brought risks along with the profits. 
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The obvious benefit was the relatively benign impact of the 2008 global fi-
nancial crisis on the Taiwan economy as the growth in demand from China 
following the crisis alleviated the decline in orders from Europe and the 
United States. The increase in cross- Strait economic ties predates Taiwan’s 
inauguration of democracy, which began in the late 1980s. Although it 
was not officially sanctioned at the time, Taiwan companies and businesses 
had been trading and investing in China through third parties (mostly in 
Hong Kong). The surge in economic interactions was brought about by 
the convergence of several factors such as the relative political relaxation in 
Taiwan, but more noteworthy was the complementary change occurring in 
the industrial structures of the two economies, in which Taiwan’s industrial 
restructuring saw the manufacturing industries move to China. As these 
sunset (and generally more labor- intensive) factories migrated to China for 
production, they in fact established and created integrated production net-
works, further accelerating economic integration. How important is China 
to Taiwan’s economy? How integrated are the two economies? To answer 
these questions, two economic indicators are important— trade and invest-
ments. Figure 7.1 shows Taiwan’s exports and imports with China as a per-
centage of total exports and imports, while figure 7.2 shows the amount of 
Taiwan’s annual investments in China.
As figure 7.1 shows, exports to and imports from China have increased 
substantially in the last 20 years. Since the first handover of executive office 
from the Kuomintang to the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000, the an-
nual increase in the China trade as a proportion of total Taiwan trade has 
steeply increased. Beginning at 2.9 percent of total exports in 2000, China 
became a major trade partner of Taiwan in the span of a decade, and by 2013 
it accounted for 26.8 percent of Taiwan’s total exports. Although the import 
figures are significantly smaller, by 2010 imports from China accounted for 
about 15.8 percent of total Taiwan imports. Masked under these two sta-
tistics is the more important statistic— the huge trade surplus in favor of 
Taiwan. Since 1990, the trade surplus has favored Taiwan such that by 2013 
it amounted to about US$39 billion. To simply state that numerous Taiwan 
businesses and companies are profiting hugely from the China trade is an 
understatement.
As with the surge in trade with China, Taiwan’s investments in China 
have also increased rapidly. Figure 7.2 shows the amount of investment in 
China on an annual basis. Although these figures were approved officially, 
they were very likely underreported. What is unmistakable is the rapid in-
crease in the amount of Taiwan’s investments in China, which grew from 
US$2.6 billion in 2000 to more than US$14 billion in 2010 and US$9.2 
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billion in 2013. As mentioned earlier, the surge in investment is partly a 
consequence of Taiwan’s industrial restructuring, as labor- intensive indus-
tries looked to reduce their production costs, which increased due to rising 
business costs in Taiwan. However, as Taiwan businesses and the economy 
benefit from the China trade, the rapid increase of Taiwan investment in 
China has constantly raised the specter of industrial hollowing- out, whereby 
manufacturing industries move out of Taiwan en masse, leaving only admin-
istrative or design facilities.
Besides the perils of industrial migration, the increasing trade and invest-
ments in China also means that Taiwan businesses are exposed to risk with-
out any legal protection, because the two governments do not recognize each 
other or have any bilateral framework to address economic disputes. There 
is the fear within Taiwan that, beyond the China economic factor, Taiwan’s 
constrained international status is limiting Taiwan’s ability to be part of any 
burgeoning regional economic integration groups and thereby affecting Tai-
wan’s future economic performance. In this sense, the Ma administration’s 
push for the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
with China is perceived as a way to provide a legal framework for cross- Strait 
trade and investments, as well as to allow Taiwan to be included in future re-
Fig. 7.1. Taiwan’s trade with China. Source: Cross- Straits Economic Monthly 
Report, Mainland Affairs Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw (accessed April 19, 
2014).
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gional economic integration. The ECFA, in one sense, can be seen as simply 
a de jure recognition of what is a de facto burgeoning cross- Strait economic 
tie that has been going on for decades.
If we follow the neoliberal perspective in international relations that 
increasing economic interdependence and functional relations will lead to 
greater trust and to peaceful relations between interdependent states, it pro-
vides us with only an incomplete picture of Taiwan’s perception of cross- 
Strait ties, because the politics of the ECFA also signals Taiwan’s own inse-
curity and sense of vulnerability.
When asked to rate the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government’s 
attitude toward the Taiwan government and people, more than 40 percent 
of Taiwan respondents believe that the PRC government is unfriendly to the 
Taiwan people, and over half believe that China is unfriendly to the Taiwan 
government (except for a dip in 2011; see earlier chapter). The height of this 
hostility, from the Taiwan point of view, was greatest in the second- term 
campaign of independence- minded President Chen Shui- bian in 2004, 
where 79.4 percent of respondents believed that China is hostile to the Tai-
wan government. Juxtaposing the trade and investment statistics from 2000 
to 2010 with the perceived hostility data is quite revealing. Contrary to 
Fig. 7.2. Officially approved investments by Taiwan in China. Source: Cross- Straits 
Economic Monthly Report, Mainland Affairs Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw 
(accessed April 19, 2014).
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the expectations of neoliberal and interdependence theory at a time when 
trade and investments are trending upward, the Taiwan people’s perception 
of hostility has stayed stubbornly high and has not declined in any appre-
ciable way.
The growing economic integration between China and Taiwan creates a 
threat to Taipei, due to China’s sovereignty claims over the island, and makes 
Taiwan vulnerable, due to its increasing economic dependence on China. 
There are concerns within Taiwan society about whether this dynamic rep-
resents a risk or an opportunity for Taiwan. This vulnerability affects Taiwan 
citizen’s perceptions of national security, driving a wedge among the elites— 
which is also reflected among Taiwan voters— and directly shapes contend-
ing strategies of how to best handle cross- Strait relations. The contentious 
politics took center stage during the negotiations and eventual signing of the 
ECFA. There is a very clear political divide, which is reflected in the posi-
tions of the two major parties. The KMT believes that expanding these ties 
is important for Taiwan’s continued economic dynamism, while the DPP ar-
gues that increasing economic ties with China threatens national sovereignty 
and security (Gold 2009).
This heightened sense of vulnerability and the divided outlook on how 
best to approach the cross- Strait economic policy is also reflected by citizens’ 
views on the pace of cross- Strait interactions. At the height of President 
Chen’s administration, a fairly large group of respondents believed that the 
pace of cross- Strait interactions was too slow (see 2004 and 2006 in table 
7.1) with more than one in four stating so. By 2008, the Three Direct Links, 
which began in November 2008, and then the broader ECFA in June 2010 
triggered a significant swing to the “too fast” category, with more than one 
in three worried about the fast pace. This segmentation at the voter level 
is largely reflected in the divided discourse of party politicians, with the 
resultant political polarization at the elite and voter levels being duly noted 
by numerous political observers (Clark and Tan 2012b; Huang 2008; Liao 
and Yu 2008). It is fair, then, to infer that cross- Strait economic relations 
have become highly politicized (Clark and Tan 2012b), a point that we will 
return to in the following section.
Cross- Strait Economic Relations and the Voters
In the previous section, we pointed out the highly politicized nature of cross- 
Strait economic relations (specifically the policy- making process in Taiwan) 
resulting from the drastically contrasting visions of the proper strategy to 
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deal with cross- Strait ties. So how have cross- Strait economic relations be-
come highly politicized? How does the Taiwan voter reflect the politicization 
of cross- Strait economic policy making?
The contradictory claims to sovereignty of the PRC and the ROC had 
underlain the conflicting relationship between these two polities since the 
end of the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the PRC. Yet in the 
mid- 1980s and the mid- 1990s, a seeming détente existed between the two 
states until the missile crisis in 1995– 96, during Lee Teng- hui’s presidency. 
The détente broke down as a result of different and contradictory percep-
tions of territorial sovereignty despite the growing social and economic ties 
between the two countries. China calculated that growing ties would rein 
in separatism in Taiwan, while Taiwan’s democratization and growing eco-
nomic wealth stimulated the growth of a Taiwanese identity separate from 
China (Clark and Tan 2012a, 2012b). Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to 
TABlE 7.1. Views on the Pace of Cross- Straits Interactions, 2001– 2008
 Just right Too fast Too slow Don’t know N
Mar- 01 38.6 17.8 22.0 21.6 1,077
Jul- 01 35.5 17.3 20.3 26.8 1,100
Feb- 02 37.7 15.8 17.8 28.7 1,081
Apr- 02 36.5 13.1 17.5 32.9 1,091
Jul- 02 30.7 16.4 18.4 34.5 1,091
Dec- 02 29.6 15.4 19.6 35.5 1,076
May- 03 30.7 23.4 20.2 25.7 1,082
Aug- 03 30.6 20.5 19.5 29.4 1,149
Nov- 03 32.1 17.0 17.5 33.4 1,100
Apr- 04 39.9 15.1 20.2 24.7 1,083
Jul- 04 36.6 14.2 20.8 28.4 1,153
Dec- 04 35.8 19.1 25.2 19.9 1,067
May- 05 40.2 25.7 18.9 15.1 1,084
Aug- 05 34.1 25.1 25.0 15.7 1,096
Nov- 05 33.6 22.4 30.6 13.4 1,102
Apr- 06 30.6 19.9 34.5 15.0 1,088
Sep- 06 36.2 26.2 25.1 12.5 1,068
Dec- 06 35.6 19.6 29.6 15.2 1,073
Apr- 07 34.5 22.5 30.2 12.7 1,072
Aug- 07 36.1 21.0 28.7 14.2 1,095
Dec- 07 40.7 18.6 32.2 8.5 1,067
Mar- 08 40.8 18.9 35.2 5.1 1,068
Aug- 08 40.6 29.5 17.5 12.4 1,094
Oct- 08 38.6 30.1 20.5 10.8 1,081
Dec- 08 47.5 37.2 14.5 0.8 1,068
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ (accessed April 19, 
2014).
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state that Taiwan’s policies toward cross- Strait relations over the last two de-
cades constitute a game in which domestic and foreign policy are closely in-
tertwined as relations with China dominate the domestic political discourse 
and form the main political and social cleavage separating the two major 
parties— the KMT and DPP (Clark and Tan 2012a, 2012b).
In the last section, we noted that the growing economic linkages have not 
lessened the feeling of hostility to China and vulnerability among Taiwan 
citizens, as shown by public opinion surveys. In fact, as mentioned earlier, 
Taiwan’s growing wealth and its democratization have stimulated Taiwanese 
identity formation and consciousness despite the growing economic links 
with China over the last two decades.
Do these preferences color the Taiwan voters’ perception of cross- Strait 
economic relations and the benefits and costs that it entails? In other words, 
how politicized is the cross- Strait linkage, and how does it reflect who the 
Taiwan voter is? To answer these questions, let us look at how the evaluation 
of the economy, as well as the benefits of the ECFA, is affected by the prefer-
ence for independence or unification and by party identification.
Table 7.2 shows the distribution of how citizens evaluate the benefits of 
the ECFA based on their preferred position on the issue of independence/
unification. Ignoring the middle categories of “status quo and decide later” 
and “status quo forever,” it is evident from the statistics shown in the table 
that preferences on the issue of independence/unification are highly cor-
related with respondents’ evaluations of the benefits of the ECFA. Citizens 
TABlE 7.2. Evaluations of ECFA on the Economy by Independence/Unification Preference and Partisan 
Identification
 Worse Same Better N
Unify now 3.7% 44.4% 51.9% 1,569
Maintain status quo, unification later 6.3% 32.8% 60.9% 1,569
Maintain status quo and decide later 8.5% 41.1% 50.4% 1,569
Maintain status quo forever 12.8% 43.0% 44.2% 1,569
Maintain status quo, independence later 20.6% 55.2% 24.2% 1,569
Independence now 38.8% 53.1% 8.2% 1,569
Nonresponse 25.0% 61.1% 13.9% 1,569
Worse Same Better
Kuomintang 3.5% 27.4% 69.1% 1,570
Democratic Progressive Party 27.0% 58.1% 14.9% 1,570
New Party 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 1,570
People First Party 5.3% 42.1% 52.6% 1,570
Taiwan Solidarity Union 14.3% 78.6% 7.1% 1,570
Source: TEDS 2012, Election Study Center, National Cheng- chi University.
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who have a preference for unification are less likely to claim that the ECFA is 
bad for Taiwan, whereas citizens who prefer independence are more likely to 
point out the costs to Taiwan’s economy by evaluating the country as worse 
off as a result of the ECFA. It is not difficult to infer from these numbers that 
evaluation of the ECFA is very much influenced by the citizens’ views on the 
independence/unification issue rather than the objective criteria of whether 
the economy is actually growing or not.
Another way to view the politicization of Taiwan’s cross- Strait economic 
interaction is how different partisan identifiers evaluate the impact of the 
ECFA on the economy in general. Ignoring identifiers of the minor parties 
(regardless of whether they are Pan- Blue or Pan- Green), it is clear from the 
data in table 7.2 that the respondents’ identification with the KMT or the 
DPP colors their views of the impact of the ECFA on the state of Taiwan’s 
economy. About 85 percent of DPP supporters claim that the ECFA has 
made Taiwan’s economy worse or kept it the same as before, while more 
than 69 percent of KMT supporters give a positive evaluation to the ECFA. 
Yet again, it is not too huge a leap to infer that the voters’ evaluations of 
cross- Strait economic relations are more probably based on their partisan-
ship rather than on objective measures of general economic performance 
and health.
The impact of partisan identification and preference on the indepen-
dence/unification issue goes beyond just the evaluation of cross- Strait eco-
nomic relations as symbolized by the ECFA; it also permeates and colors the 
Taiwan voters’ evaluations of the state of the general economy as well as their 
evaluations of their own personal economic situations. Table 7.3 shows how 
different respondents divided along their independence/unification prefer-
ences evaluate the state of Taiwan’s general economy. These figures correlate 
well with the evidence presented in table 7.3 regarding the ECFA’s impact 
on Taiwan’s economy. In general, voters who preferred independence for 
TABlE 7.3. Evaluations of the Economy by Independence/Unification Preference
 Worse Same Better N
Unify now 41.4% 27.6% 31.0% 1,783
Maintain status quo, unification later 34.6% 42.6% 22.9% 1,783
Maintain status quo and decide later 37.8% 43.9% 18.2% 1,783
Maintain status quo forever 43.3% 37.0% 19.6% 1,783
Maintain status quo, independence later 51.5% 34.0% 14.6% 1,783
Independence now 69.9% 25.7% 4.4% 1,783
Nonresponse 47.4% 47.4% 5.1% 1,783
Source: TEDS 2012, Election Study Center, National Cheng- chi University.
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Taiwan were more likely to evaluate the state of the economy poorly, while 
unifiers and status quo respondents had a generally more positive view.
When approaching the voting booth, however, Taiwan voters take on the 
China factor in a more subtle manner. While the evaluations of the ECFA 
can be filtered through their stance for unification or independence in the 
future— hence, generating favorable or unfavorable views on the economic 
pact, respectively— a closer look at the data in table 7.4 reveals more about 
the intricacy of the electoral calculus. For those who rated the ECFA as ben-
eficial for personal economy, three- quarters, or a majority, of respondents 
reported voting for the pro- unification KMT candidates Ma Ying- jeou and 
Wu Den- yih. Of those who viewed the ECFA negatively, only slightly half 
chose the DPP candidates Tsai Ing- wen and Su Jia- chyuan. The deciding 
voter group comprised those who believed that the economy is not affected 
either way by the ECFA. In this group, the KMT solicited much stronger 
support (46.7% versus 30.5% for the DPP). Even when including those 
who refused to respond, the opposition DPP was clearly unable to mount 
enough support by opposing the agreement (see chapter 6 on more analyses 
of ECFA and economic voting in Taiwan).
The evaluation of economy and cross- Strait economic ties cannot be to-
tally separated from the preference regarding national status as well as from 
the partisan identification that points to the obvious politicization and po-
larization along this dimension. When using objective economic indicators, 
such as economic growth and trade statistics, the current statistics show that 
cross- Strait economic linkage is a boon for the Taiwan economy; for ex-
ample, the huge trade surplus in favor of Taiwan that translates to huge 
capital inflows for Taiwan companies and to increasing foreign exchange 
reserves for Taiwan. It is also evident that Taiwan businesses benefit from 
investments in China, because the increasing amount of investment can be 
TABlE 7.4. Evaluations of ECFA on the Personal Economy by Presidential Vote Decisions
 Worse Same Better N
TSAI Ing- wen and SU Jia- chyuan 50.8% 30.5% 5.4% 1,569
MA Ying- jeou and WU Den- yih 18.1% 46.7% 75.0% 1,569
James SOONG and LIN Ruey- shiung 4.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1,569
Nonresponse 2.3% 1.1% 0.0% 1,569
Refused to answer 11.9% 8.0% 5.4% 1,569
Nonvoter 13.0% 11.9% 12.5% 1,569
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
Source: TEDS 2012, Election Study Center, National Cheng- chi University.
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interpreted to mean that there is still profit to be made despite some stories 
of failed investments and corporate bankruptcies.
Is Taiwan’s economy more vulnerable and less secure as interaction with 
China increases? Since politics is an interplay of subjective and objective 
realities, the Taiwan voters’ responses to this question largely depend on the 
ideological and partisan lenses they wear— where the voter stands depends 
on where they sit regarding their partisan identification.
Some Concluding Thoughts
This chapter explores the complex dynamics behind the relationship be-
tween cross- Strait economic ties and elections in Taiwan. Specifically, we 
examine how the burgeoning cross- Strait economic transactions affect the 
perceptions of the Taiwan voters on how they perceive the vulnerability and 
security of Taiwan, as well as the perils and profits of this economic interac-
tion for Taiwan’s destiny (and for their own economic welfare).
When addressing the question whether foreign policy has only negligible 
impact on voting decisions, Aldrich and his associates emphasize the acces-
sibility of attitudes toward such policy and very importantly the distinct 
positions between parties and candidates (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 
1989; Aldrich et al. 2006). Indeed, Taiwan voters are clearly concerned with 
the cross- Strait relations (and relatedly the economic interactions) between 
the two sides. The attitude toward this important factor is readily accessible 
to voters not only in how they view their future but also how they choose 
their government. That subtle calculus is reflected in party identification 
and perceptions of the national economy. From the empirical evidence we 
present in this chapter, we demonstrate that the connections between the 
issues of economic development and fostering cross- Strait relations, and 
subsequently how the voters cast their ballots, are convoluted. With the 
status quo option available, for instance, voters evade directly factoring in 
the choice of unification or independence (at least not immediately) when 
choosing the government but instead are inclined to resort to a party that 
can negotiate a fine balance as far as dealing with the Chinese government 
is concerned. For the Taiwan voters, being economically and politically iso-
lated are clearly not good for the economy, yet getting too close to China 
could be inviting trouble. This view explains the shift in public opinion after 
the pro- unification KMT returned to power in 2008. Since then, more and 
more voters have come to believe that the pace of cross- Strait interactions 
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has been too fast and that the government should put a brake on unification 
(see chapter 3). This is quite an about- face compared to the DPP adminis-
tration in the 2000– 2008 period.
In the course of our exploration, the evidence (at least in the current 
and short term) points to the ambivalence and seeming bifurcation of the 
Taiwan voters with respect to their assessment of the current state of cross- 
Strait economic ties and the strategies to deal with continuing engagement 
with China. These views are most definitely colored by how the voters place 
themselves in the dominant political and social cleavages in Taiwan as ex-
pressed by partisan identification and ideological positions. Consequently, 
as Clark and Tan (2012a, 102) suggest, questions can be raised about the 
long- term stability of closer economic relations while the views on sover-
eignty remain incompatible, thereby creating the paradox that the existing 
stability in cross- Strait relations may well be a portent of future tensions and 
instability.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation of Presidential Candidates’ 
Personal Traits
Hung- chung Wang and Lu- huei Chen
In the study of political behavior, which factors affect an individual’s voting 
behavior attract the most scholarly attention, and political scientists have 
expended much effort searching for the answer. Using a sociopsychological 
approach, the authors of The American Voter proposed a model called the 
funnel of causality to explain American voters’ decision making. That model 
makes a distinction between the short- term factors— issue and candidate— 
and the long- term factor— party identification— on voting. The authors 
concluded that among all determinants, voters’ party identification plays 
the most important role in determining vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960).
Although Campbell and his colleagues also suggested the importance of 
candidate evaluation on the vote, they did not put much emphasis on it. The 
candidate, in their model, is treated as an idiosyncratic and short- term fac-
tor and is dominated by the more enduring factors of party identification 
and issue. Nevertheless, their model is criticized for giving little credit to the 
importance of the candidate, since the stability of party identification and its 
impact on election results have diminished. Scholars have argued that candi-
date evaluation needs to be viewed as more meaningful than had been thought 
(Miller and Shanks 1996; Niemi and Weisberg 2001; Wattenberg 1991).
In Taiwan, the candidate has played a very important role because mul-
tiparty politics did not emerge until the 1980s. In one- party politics, the 
electorate can choose only individual candidates from the same party, so one 
must focus on the candidate rather than on the party. And much research 
suggests that even after Taiwan switched its party system from a one- party 
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system to a multiparty system in the late 1980s, the candidate was still a crit-
ical factor in Taiwan’s elections and significantly affected electoral outcomes 
at both the central and local levels (Cheng, Chen, and Liu 2005; Hawang 
1996; Liang 1994; Shyu 1995; Yu 2003).
Nevertheless, that research did not systematically analyze the candidate 
factor to determine which factors influence the formation of people’s candi-
date evaluations, whether the candidate factor still plays an important role in 
people’s vote choice when party identification is also included in the analy-
sis, and whether party competition affects individuals’ political behavior. To 
correct this deficiency, in this chapter we will address these questions and 
attempt to provide answers.
We begin by reviewing how individuals form their candidate evaluation 
and introduce the criteria used for measuring candidates’ qualities. Then we 
explain the sources of the data and the measurement of candidate qualities 
employed in this research, and then look at Taiwan voters’ evaluations of 
the presidential candidates in the 1996, 2004, and 2012 elections. We then 
analyze the relationship between the people’s perception of candidates’ per-
sonal traits and their party identification, and whether candidate evaluation 
matters in vote choice.
The Formation of Candidate Evaluation and the  
Measurement of Candidates’ Personal Qualities
How do citizens form their candidate evaluations? This issue has attracted 
substantial scholarly attention and two information- processing models are 
widely employed to explain it. The first one is the online model, which is 
impression- driven and contends that an individual’s opinion is composed 
of evaluations formed as information is encountered. This opinion is then 
updated as new information arrives (Kim and Garrett 2012; Lodge, Mc-
Graw, and Stroh 1989; Zaller 1992). The second model is memory- based 
and maintains that individuals form their own opinion when a judgment is 
needed. Individuals then retrieve the relevant information from their long- 
term memory, forming a judgment based on what comes to mind (Kim and 
Garrett 2012; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Zaller 1992). Both models 
are considered valid, but there is no consensus on which model is more pow-
erful in explaining an individual’s evaluation formation. However, scholars 
generally agree that the assessment of candidates’ professional and personal 
qualities has a significant impact on voters’ final voting decision (Flanigan 
and Zingale 1998; Niemi and Weisberg 1993; Rahn et al. 1990).
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To be more precise, as suggested by Miller and Shanks, “evaluations of 
a candidate concerning a specific personal quality presumably represent the 
accumulation of many impressions, both positive and negative, of a candi-
date” (1996, 417). In other words, candidate evaluation is a collection of 
an individual’s perceptions of a candidate’s personal traits. This evaluation 
may be affected by various influential sources and general attributions de-
rived from individuals’ own partisanship. In addition, candidate trait may be 
more salient under certain conditions, such as in times of crisis like facing a 
terrorist threat (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).
Which personal traits are adopted by voters to evaluate a candidate? Pre-
vious studies of U.S. voters may offer some ideas on this issue for the case of 
Taiwan. The authors of The American Voter examined citizens’ evaluations of 
candidates in the 1952 and 1956 U.S. presidential elections based on three 
types of personal traits: record and experience, abilities, and personal char-
acteristics (Campbell et al. 1960). These measurements were also employed 
by Lewis- Beck et al. (2008) to test peoples’ perception of the candidates 
running in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. presidential elections. Kinder and his 
colleagues categorized respondents’ answers to the question about the best 
definition of an ideal president into two kinds of “abstract qualities.” The 
first quality is personality: citizens’ “judgments about what an ideal presi-
dent should and should not be like as a person.” The second kind is perfor-
mance: “what an ideal president should do or should avoid doing while in 
office” (1980, 317). Their research findings demonstrate that competence 
and trust are the most important qualities for an ideal president. Further-
more, the well- educated respondents considered that an ideal president is 
competent, and they expected a president to be an “exemplary manager,” 
whereas citizens with lower educational levels claimed that “likeability and 
personal morality” are the most important qualities that an ideal president 
should possess, and they expect a good president to be an “exemplary friend” 
(Kinder et al. 1980, 320).
Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk (1986) proposed five generic di-
mensions for candidate evaluation: competence, integrity, reliability, cha-
risma, and personal attributes. Their research suggests that these five di-
mensions influence individuals’ candidate evaluation, and among them, 
competence plays the largest role. In addition, Miller and Shanks (1996, 
420– 25) employed nine survey questions to investigate U.S. voters’ per-
ceptions of the two candidates, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, in 
the 1992 presidential election. These survey questions examined respon-
dents’ evaluations of the following candidate qualities: “cares about people 
like me,” “inspiring,” ”compassionate,” “gets things done,” “intelligent,” “a 
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leader,” “knowledgeable,” “honest,” and “moral.” However, according to 
their analysis of the election, Americans’ vote choice was not strongly de-
termined by their perception of the candidates’ personal traits. Evaluation 
of candidate qualities made only a small contribution to Clinton’s victory 
(Miller and Shanks 1996).
Although scholars may use different personal traits to measure citi-
zens’ candidate evaluation, we consider that the measurement proposed by 
Kinder et al. (1980) is a very reasonable one due to its generality. As noted 
earlier, Kinder et al. simply divided the candidates’ personal traits into two 
types: personality and performance. This abstract classification can include 
in the analysis personal traits used by other scholars and is easier for con-
ducting further research. Therefore, by following the measurement estab-
lished by Kinder et al., we used these two personal qualities— personality 
and performance— as the major dimensions with which to investigate the 
Taiwan public’s evaluation of candidates in the 1996, 2004, and 2012 
presidential elections.
Data and Measurement for Taiwan’s Presidential Candidates
As mentioned earlier, the candidate factor has, for a long time, been con-
sidered to be a crucial variable influencing Taiwan citizens’ voting behav-
ior. Compared to party identification and issue, systematic study of the 
candidate factor has been rare in Taiwan. Moreover, previous research on 
candidate factors focused on single elections (Cheng, Chen, and Liu 2005; 
Hawang 2005; Yu 2003). It does not offer us an overall picture of candidate 
evaluation in Taiwan. Nor does this literature suggest a pattern for how the 
island’s citizens evaluate their candidates. Because Taiwan citizens generally 
pay more attention to candidate traits in presidential elections, candidate- 
oriented voting tends to be more significant, a political phenomenon echo-
ing the observation of Tverdova (2011). Therefore, instead of using the 
results of a single election, we will focus on the candidates who ran for Tai-
wan’s presidency in 1996, 2004, and 2012, and especially on the winners of 
these three elections— Lee Teng- hui, Chen Shui- bian, and Ma Ying- jeou— 
observing the change and continuity in candidate evaluation after Taiwan’s 
democratization.1
To achieve this goal, we used data from surveys conducted for the three 
elections mentioned above.2 Nevertheless, we found that no survey ques-
tion dealing with candidate evaluation was employed consistently in public 
opinion polls in Taiwan, so making a comparative study via identical survey 
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questions was impracticable. As a consequence, we decided to adopt the 
measurement established by Kinder and his colleagues (1980) to investigate 
citizen perceptions of candidates’ personal traits. We simply divided a can-
didate’s traits into two groups— personal character and competence— and 
used them to determine how individuals form their candidate evaluation. 
Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that citizens’ candidate evalua-
tion is conditioned by their party identification (Baker, Lawrence, and Tavits 
2006; Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996), so we investigated the 
relationship between individuals’ perceptions of a candidate’s personal traits 
and their partisanship to see whether that was true in this case. Furthermore, 
we also examined whether this perception was significantly associated with 
people’s vote choice in the presidential elections. The survey questions em-
ployed from the 1996, 2004, and 2012 public opinion polls can be found 
in appendix 8.A1. We employed these survey questions to determine which 
candidate had an advantage in certain personal traits.
Candidate Evaluation in the 1996, 2004,  
and 2012 Presidential Elections
The 1996 presidential election represents a very important milestone in Tai-
wan’s process of democratization because it was the first direct election for 
the national leader. The leading candidate in this election was the incumbent 
president, Lee Teng- hui. He ran for president in 1996, after having held of-
fice for eight and a half years, and chose Lien Chan, who was the premier 
during that time, as his running mate.3 That Taiwan citizens could directly 
choose their chief executive came about because Lee had decided to adopt 
direct elections as the new electoral system for selecting the president.
Lee was born in Taiwan in 1923 and grew up while Taiwan was ruled 
by Japan (1895– 1945). He was educated in Japanese schools and was thus 
strongly influenced by Japanese culture. He then studied in the United 
States, receiving his master’s degree from Iowa State University in 1953 and 
his PhD from Cornell University in 1968, both in agricultural economics. 
While Lee was an economist with the Joint Commission on Rural Recon-
struction in 1971, he was recommended to President Chiang Ching- kuo 
for a position in the cabinet and became its youngest member at that time. 
He then achieved remarkable success in his political career, being appointed 
to several important positions, including mayor of Taipei City in 1978 and 
governor of Taiwan Province in 1981. Most important, President Chiang 
nominated Lee to be his vice president in 1984.
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Lee is a unique political figure. After Chiang died in January 1988, Lee 
succeeded him as president of Republic of China (Taiwan) and chairman of 
the ruling party, the Kuomintang. Undoubtedly, Lee was an excellent politi-
cal strategist. He was low- key while serving as the governor of Taiwan Prov-
ince and as Chiang’s vice president, but as president Lee displayed his skill at 
statecraft by gradually expelling his opponents— the nonmainstream faction 
of the KMT— from certain important positions in the central government, 
army, and ruling party, thus consolidating his power.
While Taiwan citizens possess various ethnic identities and have different 
partisan affiliation, as chapter 3 points out, they commonly have had a unique 
psychological connection with Lee. Members of the Minnan and Hakka 
groups liked and felt close to Lee because he was the first president who had 
been born in Taiwan. Mainlanders also supported him early in his term be-
cause he was promoted by Chiang. This unique psychological attachment was 
commonly known as the Lee Teng- hui Complex (Shyu 1995, 1998).
However, Lee’s promotion of Taiwanization provoked some segments 
of the KMT who believe that Taiwan should maintain a close relationship 
with China. Angered by Lee’s localization policy, these politicians left the 
KMT and formed the New Party. In order to confront this nonmainstream 
faction, Lee needed help from central government outsiders. He thus re-
cruited certain local politicians to fill the vacancies in the executive and 
legislative branches of the central government; however, many of these 
local politicians were corrupt. As a result, even though Lee was called the 
father of Taiwan democracy, he was criticized for spreading “black and 
gold” politics in Taiwan.
In 1996, Lee was the official nominee of the KMT. Failing to secure 
the support of the KMT, the former president of the Judicial Yuan, Lin 
Yang- kang,4 and the former president of the Control Yuan, Chen Lu- an, 
both decided to leave the party and run as independents in Taiwan’s first di-
rect presidential election. The Democratic Progressive Party, the first major 
opposition party in Taiwan, nominated Peng Ming- min, an exile who had 
been an opponent of the authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai- shek. Although 
Lee had to compete with these very well known and capable opponents, he 
defeated them by a huge margin.5 Indeed, Lee was the only presidential can-
didate in Taiwan’s democratic history who was able to garner electoral sup-
port from voters of different partisan affiliations and ethnic backgrounds. A 
survey shows that, in 1996 presidential election, Lee received 70.6 percent 
of the votes from members of the Minnan group and also won the majority 
support of the mainlander (51.2%) and the Hakka (79.4%) voters (Hsieh 
1995). While 94 percent of the KMT identifiers supported Lee, close to 30 
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percent of the DPP supporters also voted for him in Taiwan’s first demo-
cratic election.
How did the Taiwan public evaluate the candidates running for the presi-
dent in 1996? As shown in table 8.1, candidates’ personal character was mea-
sured on the basis of the respondents’ perceptions of the following: affinity 
with the people, leadership, integrity, trustworthiness, and understanding 
the needs of the people. The measures of competence were the candidates’ 
ability to deal with economic development, ethnic harmony, law and order, 
and peaceful development of cross- Strait relations. Respondents were asked 
to judge which candidate had the advantage over the other opponents with 
regard to these characteristics. Table 8.1 shows that then incumbent presi-
dent Lee received the most positive evaluation, both in terms of personal 
character and competence, than the other candidates. Specifically, 66.2 per-
cent of the respondents believed that Lee was the candidate who had the 
strongest leadership qualities. In addition, Lee also received higher ratings 
for trustworthiness, affinity with the people, and understanding the needs of 
the people. The only exception was the item of integrity because only 10.7 
percent of respondents felt that Lee had a better record than the other can-
didates. However, it is worth noting that most respondents (50.5%) thought 
there was no difference among candidates regarding their level of integrity.
Lee’s advantage was also demonstrated by respondents’ perception of can-
didates’ competence. Among the measurements of competence, 63.9 percent 
of respondents said Lee was the candidate who knew how to promote Tai-
TABlE 8.1. Candidate Evaluation in the 1996 Presidential Election
Personal Character Chen Lee Peng Lin ND* Total N
Affinity with the people 24.2% 40.6 3.7 8.2 23.2 100.0 1,396
Leadership 1.5% 66.2 6.8 3.1 22.4 100.0 1,396
Integrity 24.9% 10.7 9.6 4.3 50.5 100.0 1,396
Trustworthiness 10.9% 43.6 6.7 5.7 33.2 100.0 1,396
Understands the needs of  
the people
13.2% 35.5 9.0 5.3 36.9 100.0 1,396 
Competence Chen Lee Peng Lin ND Total N
Economic development 1.6% 63.9 3.9 3.3 27.4 100.0 1,396
Ethnic harmony 14.8% 39.6 5.7 6.8 33.2 100.0 1,396
Law and order 6.4% 41.4 4.8 10.9 36.5 100.0 1,396
Peaceful development in cross- 
Strait relations
7.4% 45.3 2.8| 8.0| 36.5 100.0 1,396 
Source: Hsieh 1995.
Notes: 1. Entries are row percentages. 2. ND = no difference. 3. Chen = Chen Lu- an; Lee = Le Teng- hui; 
Peng = Peng Ming- min; Lin = Lin Yang- kang.
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wan’s economic development. Moreover, Lee was also considered the candi-
date who could deal with peaceful development of cross- Strait relations, law 
and order, and ethnic harmony better than the other candidates. In short, 
among the candidates campaigning for the 1996 presidential election, Lee 
Teng- hui had a much higher positive evaluation than his opponents.
Taiwan’s first party turnover took place in 2000 after the DPP candi-
date, Chen Shui- bian, won the 2000 presidential election. Chen was born in 
1950 to a poor farming family in southern Taiwan. Although lacking family 
financial support during his youth, Chen did very well at school and entered 
the law school at National Taiwan University in 1970. He passed the bar 
examinations even before completing the law school program and became 
the youngest lawyer in Taiwan’s history. Chen had a very successful career 
as a lawyer, and his first connection with politics was defending the partici-
pants in the Formosa Incident in 1980.6 Afterward, he turned to politics 
professionally, winning a seat on the Taipei City Council in 1981 and then 
becoming a member of Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan, in 1989. 
His victory in the first mayoral election in the capital city, Taipei, in 1994 
was a critical achievement for Chen and the DPP because he was the first 
non- KMT mayor since 1972.
Chen was an extremely popular politician. He had the courage to do 
things that traditional politicians had not dared to do. For instance, he ap-
pointed young people as government officials and improved the administra-
tion of the Taipei city government. In addition, he was also the first politi-
cian to dress up as such characters as Superman and Santa Claus to show his 
affinity with the people on certain occasions. In short, Chen was a new type 
of politician and was regarded as the symbol of the opposition party, even 
though he was also criticized by his opponents for his bold actions.
Although Chen was a quite popular mayor and his job approval rating 
exceeded 70 percent in his first term, he was defeated by Ma Ying- jeou in 
the 1998 mayoral election. Chen then decided to run for president as the 
DPP candidate in the 2000 election, defeating Hsu Hsin- liang, the former 
DPP chairman, in the primary. Chen eventually took advantage of the split 
in the KMT in the 2000 election, becoming the first non- KMT president in 
history.7 Chen, however, garnered a low approval rating in his first term as a 
result of the economic downturn, the increasing tension between Taiwan and 
China, and the partisan antagonism between the Pan- Blue and the Pan- Green 
camps. Moreover, his opponents in the 2000 presidential election, Lien Chan 
and James Soong, who were leaders of the Pan- Blue Alliance, formed a formi-
dable alliance as running mates in the 2004 presidential election. As a result, 
it was a general belief that Chen would lose his reelection bid.
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However, a mysterious assassination attempt against Chen’s life occurred 
19 hours before the polls opened, giving him a needed boost, and Chen was 
reelected by a historically small margin of 0.2 percent of the total votes. Sup-
porter of the Pan- Blue Alliance suspected that the assassination attempt was 
faked by Chen’s followers in order to gain sympathy votes. Thus, Lien and 
Soong refused to concede. Instead, they challenged the electoral outcome 
in court.
To assess citizens’ candidate evaluation in the 2004 presidential election, 
five questions in the TEDS2004P survey were used: getting things done, 
integrity, sincerity and trustworthiness, understanding the needs of people, 
and affinity with the people. In addition, 10 traits served as measurements of 
candidate competence: ethnic harmony, political stability, economic devel-
opment, eliminating black and gold politics, Taiwan’s international status, 
democratic reform, law and order, peaceful development of cross- Strait rela-
tions, the unemployment problem, and education reform.
Table 8.2 shows how the Taiwan public evaluated the candidates running 
for president in 2004. The incumbent president, Chen, received more posi-
tive evaluations than Lien in terms of personal character except for sincerity 
and trustworthiness. Among these indicators, Chen had a significant advan-
TABlE 8.2. Candidate Evaluation in the 2004 Presidential Election
Personal Character Chen Lien ND* Total N
Gets things done 48.4% 11.3 40.3 100.0 1823
Integrity 23.6% 14.0 62.5 100.0 1823
Sincerity and trustworthiness 21.0% 23.3 55.7 100.0 1823
Understands the needs of people 31.4% 12.7 55.9 100.0 1823
Affinity with the people 46.9% 9.8 43.3 100.0 1823
Competence Chen Lien ND Total N
Ethnic harmony 21.2% 28.6 50.3 100.0 1823
Political stability 19.5% 25.5 55.0 100.0 1823
Economic development 13.2% 32.6 54.2 100.0 1823
Eliminate black and gold politics 41.3% 8.0 50.7 100.0 1823
Taiwan’s international status 20.3% 21.8 57.9 100.0 1823
Democratic reform 31.2% 11.3 5.2 100.0 1823
Law and order 17.9% 16.4 65.7 100.0 1823
Peaceful development in
cross- Strait relations
9.4% 39.5 51.1 100.0 1823
Unemployment problem 11.4% 25.4 63.2 100.0 1823
Education reform 9.8% 24.6 65.6 100.0 1823
Source: Hawang 2003.
Notes: 1. Entries are row percentages. 2. ND = no difference. 3. Chen = Chen Shui- bian; Lien = Lien 
Chan.
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tage over Lien for getting things done and for affinity with the people. The 
results are different when we look at respondents’ perceptions of Chen’s and 
Lien’s competence. Respondents tended to give Lien a more positive evalua-
tion than Chen, whose only advantages were in eliminating black and gold 
politics, democratic reform, and law and order. Among these measurements, 
respondents significantly agreed that compared with Chen, Lien was more 
likely to promote peaceful development of cross- Strait relations, since they 
knew that the DPP government had failed to maintain harmonious relations 
with mainland China.
The DPP’s eight- year dominance of the central government began with 
Chen Shui- bian’s victory in 2000 and ended with the election of Ma Ying- 
jeou in 2008. Ma was born in Hong Kong in 1950 and then moved to Tai-
wan. Both of his parents were officials of the KMT and public servants in the 
central government. Ma is a superstar of the Pan- Blue camp and has several 
advantages over most Taiwan politicians. First, Ma has had much experience 
as a civil servant. Immediately after receiving his SJD from Harvard Law 
School in 1981, Ma returned to Taiwan and served as deputy director of the 
First Bureau of the Presidential Office and as President Chiang Ching- kuo’s 
English interpreter. In 1988 Ma was appointed to the chair of the Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission, becoming the youngest cabinet 
member in the ROC government. He then was named to be deputy minis-
ter of the Mainland Affairs Council, the institute in charge of cross- Strait re-
lations, and minister of justice. In 1998, he was elected mayor of Taipei City 
in his first election, in which he defeated the incumbent, Chen Shui- bian, 
which was an indication of Ma’s popularity. Second, like John F. Kennedy, 
Ma is a good- looking man and also is an alumnus of Harvard University. His 
civility has won him the middle class’s support, particularly that of women. 
However, Ma was accused of being a spy for the KMT government while he 
was studying in the United States, a charge he firmly denied, and has also 
been criticized by opposition parties for his conservative political stance.
Although Ma was questioned for his status as a U.S. permanent resident 
during the campaign period, he easily defeated the DPP candidate, Frank 
Hsieh, in the 2008 presidential election. Ma’s landslide victory brought 
the KMT back to power.8 However, he faced the same problem that had 
plagued Chen Shui- bian in Chen’s first term: Taiwan’s economic downturn. 
Although cross- Strait relations became more peaceful after Ma took office, 
that achievement did not help his approval rating. In 2012, he was chal-
lenged by two opposition- party chairpersons, Tsai Ing- wen of the DPP and 
James Soong of the People First Party.
Table 8.3 shows the Taiwan public’s evaluation of candidates in the 2012 
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presidential election. In the TEDS2012 survey data, the measurements of 
a candidate’s personal character included the respondents’ perceptions of 
whether the candidate “understands the needs of people,” “ever made you 
feel angry,” “ever made you feel afraid,” and “ever made you feel hopeful.” 
As for candidate competence, we examined how respondents evaluated can-
didates’ capability, whether they are “able to protect Taiwan’s interests,” and 
whether they can “maintain cross- Strait peace.”
As data in table 8.3 shows, respondents are more likely to see Ma as a pol-
itician who knows citizens’ needs, acts in a way to not make citizens’ worry, 
and presents the country with a hopeful future. While similar assessments in 
these respects are also applied to Tsai, Ma had a significant advantage over 
Tsai in terms of perceived competence. In particular, about 60 percent of 
the respondents believed that Ma could better handle the issue related to 
cross- Strait relations.
Even though most citizens were not satisfied with his performance as 
the country’s president, Ma was able to defeat his opponents in the 2012 
presidential election, Tsai and Soong. If candidate evaluation does influence 
individuals’ vote choice, we may make the inference that Ma’s advantage in 
dealing with the relationship between Taiwan and China was the determin-
ing factor leading to his victory in 2012.9
Perceptions of Candidate Personal Traits  
versus Party Identification
After examining how Taiwan citizens evaluated the candidates running for 
the 1996, 2004, and 2012 presidential elections, we went further and inves-
TABlE 8.3. Candidate Evaluation in the 2012 Presidential Election
Personal Character  Ma Tsai ND* Total N
Understands the needs of people % 36.9 32.4 30.8 100.0 1,826
Not make you feel unhappy % 22.6 33.8 43.6 100.0 1,826
Not make you worry % 34.0 26.8 39.2 100.0 1,826
Makes you feel hopeful for the future % 16.9 26.3 56.8 100.0 1,826
Competence  Ma Tsai ND Total N
Capability % 40.4 31.5 28.0 100.0 1,826
Protect Taiwan’s interests % 40.7 31.2 28.1 100.0 1,826
Maintain cross- Strait peace % 59.4 13.2 27.4 100.0 1,826
Source: Chu 2011.
Notes: 1. Entries are row percentages. 2. ND = no difference. 3. Ma = Ma Ying- jeou; Tsai = Tsai Ing- wen.
Evaluation of Presidential Candidates’ Personal Traits  181
tigated the relationship between the perception of the candidates’ personal 
traits and respondents’ party identification since the latter is treated as the 
most crucial factor affecting people’s political behavior.
Petrocik (1996) proposed the theory of issue ownership, suggesting that 
each political party has its own advantages in handling certain issues. For 
example, the Republican Party is positively identified with issues associated 
with taxes, whereas the Democratic Party has a good reputation in dealing 
with issues related to social welfare. According to Petrocik, candidates focus 
their campaign efforts on these issues to win voter support, and voters will 
vote for the candidate if they think the party’s issues are important to them.
Based on Petrocik’s theory, Hayes (2005) then developed the theory of 
trait ownership to explain the origins of candidate trait perception, examining 
the connection between candidate traits, party issues, and strategic candidate 
behavior. Hayes pointed out that American voters tend to connect the issues 
owned by a political party with their evaluation of the candidates’ personal 
traits, suggesting that the evaluation of candidate’s personal trait is condi-
tioned by party label. For example, the Democrats tend to be regarded as 
more compassionate and empathetic than their counterparts, whereas GOP 
candidates are expected to be strong leaders with high moral standards. Thus, 
the winning strategy for a candidate is to trespass on his or her opponents’ 
trait territory (Hayes 2005). Although research shows that partisan identifiers 
tend to evaluate candidates of their own party more favorably (Campbell et 
al. 1960), Hayes’s study reminds us that some candidates may be viewed as 
superior or inferior in certain personal traits because of their party labels. In 
short, perceptions of candidate personal traits can be partisan.
Indeed, scholarly research has demonstrated that the theory of issue own-
ership can be equally applied to the case of Taiwan because major parties on 
the island have divergent positions on a number of important issues. For 
example, because the KMT and the DPP have opposite views on the issue 
of cross- Strait relations the KMT is generally perceived as a pro- unification 
party and the DPP a party for Taiwan independence (Hsieh and Niou 1996; 
Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). Similarly, the public tends to view the KMT as 
a pro- stability party and the DPP as a party associated with political reform 
(Hsieh and Niou 1996; Sheng 2007; and Wang 2012). In general, Taiwan 
citizens tend to view the KMT as superior in managing issues related to the 
economy, education, and cross- Strait relations. Alternatively, gender equal-
ity, social welfare, and governance at the local level are the winning issues 
for the DPP (Chang 2010). Interestingly, even though Taiwan citizens ex-
perienced economic hardship during Ma’s first term, they still consider the 
KMT as competent to manage Taiwan’s economy (Sheng 2013).
182  Taiwan Voter
Why do the KMT and the DPP own these particular issues? In the case 
of the economy, Taiwan enjoyed its longest economic boom when the KMT 
presidents, Chiang and Lee, held office, but the country suffered an eco-
nomic downturn when the DPP was in power. As a result, the public tends 
to think that the KMT is more competent to manage the national economy. 
On cross- Strait relations, the DPP views China as the main threat to Tai-
wan’s sovereignty and national security while Beijing leaders also strongly 
oppose the DPP’s pro- independence stance. Cross- Strait relations were tense 
as a result during the 2000– 2008 period when the DPP was in power. Be-
cause the KMT’s official position is for unification and the Ma adminis-
tration adopted a policy of rapprochement toward China, the relationship 
between Taipei and Beijing was peaceful during Ma’s presidency. As a result, 
the KMT is considered as more competent to handle Taiwan’s relationship 
with China. Regarding the reform issue, the KMT, as a long- term ruling 
party, has an extensive record of corruption. The DPP politicians, espe-
cially in their early stage of career as city mayors or county magistrates, were 
known for their rectitude and determination for reform. Hence, political 
reform is a DPP- owned issue.
Therefore, we would like to investigate whether the theory of trait 
ownership is also applicable in the case of Taiwan. We not only examine 
whether all respondents, no matter their party affiliations, agree that certain 
candidates are superior in some personal characteristics, but we also assess 
whether there is a direct link between the parties’ issue ownership and the 
Taiwan citizens’ perceptions of candidates’ personal traits.
As noted above, Lee Teng- hui overwhelmed his opponents in the 1996 
competition in all respondents’ evaluations of personal traits, both personal 
character and competence. Among these personal character evaluations, 
some of them are worthy of further analysis. Figure 8.1 illustrates how re-
spondents affiliated with different parties evaluated the candidates’ leader-
ship in 1996. Regardless of their party affiliation, all respondents thought 
that Lee had the strongest leadership compared to the other candidates. It is 
not a surprise that the KMT supporters (88.8%) endorsed their chairman’s 
leadership, but even non- KMT supporters acknowledged that Lee was su-
perior as a national leader: 49.0 percent of the DPP and 47.5 percent of the 
NP respondents had a positive view of Lee’s leadership. This result demon-
strates the advantage that the incumbent chief executive has.
Respondents’ perceptions of the 1996 presidential candidates’ capability 
in handling economic development are presented in figure 8.2. The pat-
tern is very similar to that for leadership. Lee’s capability in dealing with 
economic issues was also approved by respondents from different parties. A 
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majority of the DPP (54.8%) and the NP (50.0%) supporters also thought 
that Lee was the best candidate to handle the national economy, suggesting 
that the KMT candidate, Lee, had the advantage on this issue. Lee also had 
the advantage in regard to the issue of cross- Strait relations. According to 
figure 8.3, the majority of the Taiwan public agreed that Lee was more likely 
to manage the relationship between Taiwan and China well. Among all par-
tisans, the KMT and the DPP supporters and the independents reported 
that Lee would be better able to manage peaceful cross- Strait relations than 
his opponents. The NP partisans were the only exception: they claimed that 
Lin was the candidate who would be more competent in this respect. The 
only personal trait for which Lee did not have an advantage was integrity 
(figure 8.4). Chen won more endorsements among all citizens in integrity. 
In the Taiwan public’s mind, Lee was not the most incorruptible candidate. 
Furthermore, more KMT party members gave Chen credit for this personal 
trait instead of Lee (21.4% vs. 19.2%), showing that respondents seemed to 
have a strong impression that Lee was connected to black and gold politics 
while in office.
According to the above analysis, the 1996 presidential election displayed 
Lee’s dominant advantage in the Taiwan public’s perception of the candi-
dates’ personal traits. However, the 2004 election is another story. Only two 
candidates represented two party coalitions in the run for the presidency, 
and those two candidates had their own advantages with regard to personal 
traits, as we already mentioned above. As figure 8.5 shows, Chen had the 
advantage for the trait “getting things done.” Regardless of their party iden-
tification, respondents reported that Chen was more likely than Lien to get 
Fig. 8.1. Trait: leadership in 1996. Source: Hsieh 1995.
Fig. 8.2. Trait: Economic development in 1996. Source: Hsieh 1995.
Fig. 8.3. Trait: Peaceful development in cross- Strait relations in 1996. Source: Hsieh 
1995.
Fig. 8.4. Trait: Integrity in 1996. Source: Hsieh 1995.
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things done. Most important, the percentage of Pan- Blue supporters who 
thought that Chen was more likely to fulfill the president’s duty was higher 
than that of those who thought that Lien was (31.9% vs. 26.5%).
Differential public assessment of economic development is reflected in 
figure 8.6, which shows that the Pan- Blue and the Pan- Green supporters 
gave their candidates a more positive assessment on this issue (67.0% and 
31.6%). Independents gave Lien a higher rating than Chen (22.8% vs. 
7.2%). In other words, Lien was considered to be more capable of handling 
the issues associated with the national economy. Respondents may have 
formed this perception because Lien had been the premier of the Executive 
Yuan under Lee Teng- hui and had served as the country’s vice president. 
Lien’s term of office also coincided with the period during which Taiwan 
experienced a booming economy. As a result, Lien had the advantage on this 
issue. Figure 8.7 illustrates the respondents’ perception of the candidates’ 
ability to deal with cross- Strait relations, showing a pattern quite similar to 
that of figure 8.6. With the exception of the Pan- Green identifiers, the Tai-
wan public all agreed that Lien owned this trait. Actually, among the Pan- 
Green supporters, the proportion of those who endorsed Chen only slightly 
exceeded that who endorsed Lien (22.7% vs. 21.5%). Obviously, this issue 
was a weak point for Chen, and citizens did not believe he was capable of 
handling this issue.
The DPP candidate’s advantage shows up in matters of the elimination of 
black and gold politics and democratic reform. According to figures 8.8 and 
7.9, respondents generally thought that Chen was more capable than Lien 
in dealing with these two issues (41.3% vs. 8.0% in elimination of black 
and gold politics and 31.2% vs.11.3 % in democratic reform). Particularly 
among the Pan- Blue supporters, the proportion of those who endorsed 
Chen as being capable of eliminating black and gold politics is almost the 
Fig. 8.5. Trait: Get things done in 2004. Source: Hawang 2003.
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same as that of those who thought Lien was, suggesting that the KMT can-
didate’s weakness was associated with the issue of corruption. The KMT 
candidate’s predominance on the cross- Strait relations issue is also shown in 
figure 8.10. In addition to Ma winning all respondents’ endorsements, both 
the KMT partisans and independents agreed that he was more capable than 
Tsai of handling peaceful relations between Taiwan and China. Tsai did not 
have an advantage on this issue even among her supporters.
On the basis of the figures presented above, we find that party’s issue 
ownership is highly associated with voters’ perceptions of candidate per-
sonal traits. Respondents generally reported that the KMT candidates— 
Lee, Lien, and Ma— were more capable of dealing with the KMT- owned 
issues— economic development and cross- Strait relations— than their op-
ponents. On the other hand, DPP candidates have an advantage on the issue 
of reform, including democratic reform and elimination of black and gold 
politics. In short, our research findings suggest that on certain issues some 
Fig. 8.6. Trait: Economic development in 2004. Source: Hawang 2003.
Fig. 8.7. Trait: Peaceful development in cross- Strait relations in 2004. Source: 
Hawang 2003.
Fig. 8.8. Trait: Eliminate black and gold politics in 2004. Source: Hawang 2003.
Fig. 8.9. Trait: Democratic Reform in 2004. Source: Hawang (2003).
Fig. 8.10. Trait: Cross- Strait peace in 2012. Source: Chu 2011.
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candidates are superior to their opponents because of their party’s ownership 
of the issues.
Perceptions of Candidate Personal Traits vs. Vote Choice
Since the candidate factor is viewed as one of the three most critical factors 
affecting people’s voting behavior, we next focus on whether these percep-
tions of candidate personal traits have a significant impact on the Taiwan 
public’s vote choice. Tables 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 show the relationship between 
vote choices and citizens’ perceptions of a candidate’s capability of handling 
peaceful development of cross- Strait relations, which is the main political 
cleavage in Taiwan. Data in these tables suggest that the perception of can-
didates’ personal traits did not significantly correspond to vote choice in the 
1996, 2004, and 2012 presidential election. For example, among the DPP 
supporters in table 8.4, a majority (50.0%) of those who considered Lee to 
be the best one to handle the issue still voted for the DPP candidate, Peng. 
The vast majority of KMT identifiers, no matter which candidate won their 
endorsement, decided to support Lee in the 1996 election. The only excep-
tion was for partisan independents: they were the only group whose vote 
choice corresponded highly with their evaluations of a candidate’s capacity 
to handle issues related to cross- Strait relations. Respondents of the 2004 
and 2012 survey behaved in a similar way, as data in tables 8.5 and 8.6 show 
as the vast majority of KMT and DPP supporters made their electoral deci-
sions based on partisan affiliations. The results appear to show that party 
identification still played a more important role than candidate evaluation 
in affecting vote choice. In fact, the relationship between vote choice and 
such candidate traits as boosting economic development, eliminating black 
and gold politics, and promoting democratic reform are very similar. The 
empirical findings are not shown here due to space limitation.
Moreover, as tables 8.5 and 8.6 show, Pan- Green supporters are more 
likely to be split on the question of which candidate is most competent in 
dealing with cross- Strait relationships than Pan- Blue identifiers. This can be 
explained by the theory of issue ownership, which suggests that each politi-
cal party has advantages on certain issues. Since the KMT is perceived as 
being more competent to handle Taiwan’s economic development and rela-
tionship with China, it is not surprising that Pan- Green supporters are more 
divided in this regard. However, they still make their vote choices based 
on partisan affiliations even though they credit Pan- Blue candidates with a 
stronger ability to deal with cross- Strait relationships.
Overall, the empirical evidence from the 1996, 2004, and 2012 presi-
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dential elections allows us to draw the following conclusion: the effect of 
candidate evaluation on vote choice is not as significant as that of party iden-
tification. Taiwan citizens’ electoral decisions are mainly guided by partisan 
affiliation rather than by evaluation of candidate personal traits.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how the Taiwan public evaluates candidate quality. 
We focused on candidates running in the 1996, 2004, and 2012 presidential 
elections, investigating people’s perception of the candidates’ personal traits. 
TABlE 8.4. Perception of Peaceful Development in Cross- Strait Relations versus Vote Choice 
in 1996





Chen Lee Peng Lin Total
Chen 4 (20.0%) 15 (75.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (5.0) 20 (100.0)
Lee 3 (0.9) 311 (95.7) 3 (0.9) 8 (2.5) 325 
(100.0)
Peng 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0)
Lin 0 (0.0) 8 (80.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (20.0) 10 (100.0)




Chen Lee Peng Lin Total
Chen 3 (18.8) 5 (31.3) 8 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 16 (100.0)
Lee 2 (3.1) 26 (40.6) 32 (50.0) 4 (6.3) 64 (100.0)
Peng 0 (0.0) 2 (6.3) 30 (93.8) 0 (0.0) 32 (100.0)
Lin 0 (0.0) 3 (25.0) 8 (66.7) 1 (8.3) 12 (100.0)




Chen Lee Peng Lin Total
Chen 11 (40.7) 4 (14.8) 0 (0.0) 12 (44.4) 27 (100.0)
Lee 3 (18.8) 4 (25.0) 1 (6.3) 8 (50.0) 16 (100.0)
Peng 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Lin 3 (8.8) 1 (2.9) 0 (0.0) 30 (88.2) 34 (100.0)




Chen Lee Peng Lin Total
Chen 10 (43.5) 10 (43.5) 1 (4.3) 2 (8.7) 23 (100.0)
Lee 7 (7.4) 78 (82.1) 9 (9.5) 1 (1.1) 95 (100.0)
Peng 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0) 1 (100.0)
Lin 3 (18.8) 2 (12.5) 3 (18.8) 8 (50.0) 16 (100.0)
Source: Hsieh 1995.
Notes: 1. Chen = Chen Lu- an; Lee = Le Teng- hui; Peng = Peng Ming- min; Lin = Lin Yang- 
kang. 2. KMT = Kuomintang; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party; NP = New Party; IND = 
partisan independent.
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Following previous research, candidate personal traits were divided into two 
types: personal character and competence. Our empirical results reveal some 
interesting trends.
First, candidate evaluation appears to be highly associated with electoral 
outcome. Lee Teng- hui’s overwhelming advantage in citizens’ perceptions of 
candidate personal traits matches his landslide victory in the 1996 election. 
However, that overwhelming advantage was not reproduced by the candi-
dates running in the 2004 election. Neither Chen Shui- bian nor Lien Chan 
TABlE 8.5 Perception of Peaceful Development of Cross- Strait Relations versus Vote 
Choice in 2004





Chen 2 (28.6) 5 (71.4) 7 (100.0)
Lien 5 (1.4) 358 (98.6) 363 (100.0)





Chen 123 (99.2) 1 (0.8) 124 (100.0)
Lien 97 (94.2) 6 (5.8) 103 (100.0)





Chen 21 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 21 (100.0)
Lien 32 (34.8) 60 (65.2) 92 (100.0)
Source: Hawang 2003.
Notes: 1. Chen = Chen Shui- bian; Lien = Lien Chan. 2. IND = partisan independent.
TABlE 8.6. Perception of Cross- Strait Peace versus Vote Choice in 2012





Ma 591 (98.3) 10 (1.7) 601 (100.0)
Tsai 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 3 (100.0)





Ma 16 (10.1) 143 (89.9) 159 (100.0)
Tsai 2 (1.2) 168 (98.8) 170 (100.0)





Ma 100 (72.5) 38 (27.5) 138 (100.0)
Tsai 2 (7.7) 24 (92.3) 26 (100.0)
Source: Chu 2011.
Notes: 1. Ma = Ma Ying- jeou; Tsai = Tsai Ing- wen. 2. IND = partisan independent.
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was able to win respondents’ endorsements in all personal traits. Instead, as 
noted above, Chen had the advantage in personal character and Lien had the 
advantage in competence. The intense competition between Chen and Lien 
in citizens’ perceptions of candidate quality reflects the historically small 
winning margin in the 2004 presidential election.
Second, our research confirms that the theory of candidate trait owner-
ship is also applicable in Taiwan’s case. Although candidate evaluation is 
conditioned by party identification, in that people are more likely to give 
their own party’s candidate a higher evaluation, candidates representing 
different parties do own certain personal traits that are highly correlated 
with the political issues owned by their parties. In Taiwan, KMT candi-
dates, in respondents’ perceptions, are more likely to manage economic 
development and cross- Strait relations well, whereas DPP candidates are 
considered a better choice to deal with reform issues, such as elimination 
of black and gold politics.
However, our analysis shows that citizens’ vote choices do not necessarily 
match their evaluations of candidate personal traits. Supporters of the two 
major parties in general still vote for their party’s candidate even though 
they think that their party’s nominee does not have the advantage in certain 
personal traits. Party identification still plays a critical role in the Taiwan 
public’s vote choice. Partisan independents were the only group whose can-
didate evaluation matched their vote choice. This result does not mean that 
independents’ candidate evaluation single- handedly determine their elec-
toral decisions, which is arguably decided by many determinants.
In the funnel of causality model proposed by Michigan scholars, candi-
date, issue, and party identification are three major factors determining vote 
choice. We, in this chapter, begin with the analysis of how respondents eval-
uate their presidential candidates’ personal traits and then include political 
issues and party identification into our research. Our findings demonstrate 
that party identification, due to parties’ issue ownership, conditions how re-
spondents evaluate candidates. In short, the result confirms that party iden-
tification is the most important factor in Taiwan citizens’ voting behavior.
Do these results demonstrate that candidate evaluation has no impact 
on the Taiwan public’s voting decisions? In our opinion, it may be in-
appropriate to draw such a conclusion because here we have examined 
only the relationship between citizens’ evaluations of single candidate’s 
personal traits and vote choice, whereas citizens’ voting decisions may be 
determined by a comprehensive evaluation of candidate quality. Unfortu-
nately, the existing survey data do not allow us to investigate the effect of 
comprehensive candidate evaluation on vote choice. Furthermore, here we 
analyzed only individuals’ candidate evaluation in presidential elections. 
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The results may be different if we focus on the effect of candidate evalua-
tion at the local level.
Last but not least, we believe that candidate evaluation is valuable in 
analyzing the Taiwan citizens’ voting behavior, but data on this topic that 
is both more concise and accurate awaits further research. For example, at-
tempts can be made to investigate which type of candidate trait, among 
personal character and competence, is more likely to play the larger role in 
determining people’s vote choice. Moreover, the relationship between citi-
zens’ party identification and evaluation of candidate personal traits should 
also receive more attention from Taiwan scholars. Which candidate trait is 
more important than others? Is there an evaluation gap between the two 
major parties’ supporters? For instance, KMT supporters may place more 
weight on a candidate’s competence, whereas DPP partisans may consider 
personal character to be more important. There is still a need for more re-
search on this subject.




•	 Which candidate do you think has the most affinity with the people?
•	 Which candidate do you think has the strongest leadership?
•	 Which one is the most incorruptible?
•	 Which one is the most trustworthy?
•	 Which one has the best understanding of people’s needs?
Competence
•	 Which one is more likely to have the ability to promote economic 
development?
•	 Which one is more likely to have the ability to promote ethnic 
harmony?
•	 Which one is more likely to have the ability to improve law and 
order?
•	 Which one is more likely to have the ability to promote peaceful 
developments in cross- Strait relations?
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2004 Presidential Election
Personal Character
•	 First, let’s look at getting things done. How good is Chen Shui- 
bian (Lien Chan) at getting things done?
•	 Concerning incorruptness, how incorrupt do you think Chen 
Shui- bian (Lien Chan) is?
•	 Concerning sincerity and trustworthiness, how sincere and trust-
worthy do you think Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) is?
•	 Concerning understanding the needs of the people, how well do 
you think Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) understands the needs of 
the people?
•	 Concerning affinity with the people, how much do you think Chen 
Shui- bian (Lien Chan) has affinity with the people?
Competence
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to promote ethnic harmony?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to maintain political stability?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to promote economic development?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to eliminate black and gold politics (gangster 
and money politics)?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to raise Taiwan’s international status?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to promote democratic reforms?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to improve law and order?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to promote peaceful developments in cross- 
Strait relations?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to resolve the unemployment problem?
•	 Do you think the candidates on the Chen Shui- bian (Lien Chan) 
ticket have the ability to handle educational reform?
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2012 Presidential Election
Personal Character
•	 How would you rate Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James Soong) us-
ing a 0 to 10 scale, if 0 means that you think the candidate does not 
understand at all the needs of ordinary people and 10 means that 
a candidate completely understands the needs of ordinary people?
•	 Has Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James Soong), because of the 
kind of person she is or because of something she has done, ever 
made you feel unhappy?
•	 Has Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James Soong), because of the 
kind of person she is or because of something she has done, ever 
made you worry?
•	 Has Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James Soong), because of the 
kind of person she is or because of something she has done, ever 
made you feel hopeful for the future?
Competence
•	 I’d like to ask you to evaluate the capability of three presidential 
candidates, how would you rate Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James 
Soong) using a 0 to 10 scale?
•	 How would you rate Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James Soong) 
using a 0 to 10 scale, if 0 means candidates are completely incapable 
of protecting Taiwan’s interests, and 10 means that candidates are 
completely able to protect Taiwan’s interests?
•	 How would you rate Tsai Ing- wen (Ma Ying- jeou; James Soong) 
using a 0 to 10 scale, if 0 means candidates are completely incapable 
of maintaining cross- Strait peace, and 10 means that candidates are 
completely able to maintain cross- Strait peace?
Notes
 1. Regarding candidate evaluation, we focus here on people’s perception of two 
candidates’ personal traits: personal character and competence. However, no question 
was included in the 2000 and 2008 surveys that examined respondents’ evaluation of 
these two dimensions. Since the three waves of survey data we used already included 
all winners in the direct presidential elections, we decided not to include the 2000 and 
2008 data in our analysis.
 2. The first dataset analyzed in this chapter is from “An Interdisciplinary Study of 
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Voting Behavior in the 1996 Presidential Election.” That research project was con-
ducted by the Election Study Center, National Chenchi University, Taiwan, and the 
principal investigator was Professor John Fu- sheng Hsieh. The second dataset is from 
“Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2002– 2004 (III): The Presidential 
Election, 2004 (TEDS 2004P).” The principal investigator was Professor Shiow- duan 
Hawang for TEDS 2004P. The third dataset is from “Taiwan’s Election and Democra-
tization Study, 2009– 2012 (III): The Survey of the Presidential and Legislative Elec-
tions, 2012 (TEDS2012).” The principal investigator was Professor Yun- han Chu for 
TEDS 2012. The coordinator of the multiyear- project TEDS is Professor Chi Huang 
(National Chenchi University). More information is available on the TEDS website 
(http://www.tedsnet.org). These survey data provide information about the Taiwan 
citizens’ evaluation of presidential candidates.
 3. Before 1996, instead of being selected by direct election, presidents of the 
Republic of China were elected by the members of the National Assembly. Lee served 
as president in this way from 1990 to 1996. Lee originally considered that the selec-
tion of the national leader was the duty of the National Assembly, but he then changed 
his mind to promote direction elections for the presidency.
 4. Although Lin ran as an independent, he and his running mate, Hau Pei- tsun, 
the former premier, were strongly endorsed by the New Party in the 1996 presidential 
election. Hence, Chen, in fact, was the only candidate running for the election inde-
pendently.
 5. Lee won 54.0% of popular votes in the 1996 presidential elections; Peng, Lin, 
and Chen received 21.1%, 14.9%, and 10.0%, respectively.
 6. Formosa Magazine was a magazine created by certain anti- KMT individuals. 
On December 10, 1979, a prodemocracy demonstration led by members of Formosa 
Magazine took place in Kaohsiung and demanded democracy in Taiwan. However, the 
demonstration was prohibited by the KMT’s authoritarian regime and was suppressed 
by the police. The leaders of the demonstration were arrested and accused of treason. 
The Formosa Incident is regarded as a very important event in the history of Taiwan’s 
democratization because of its huge impact on Taiwan society.
 7. In the 2000 presidential election, Chen won 39.3% of popular vote. His oppo-
nents, Soong and Lien, received 36.8% and 23.1%, respectively.
 8. In the 2008 Taiwan presidential election, Ma won 58.4% of popular vote 
whereas Hsieh received only 41.6%. Corruption in the Chen administration and the 
economic recession were considered the main factors contributing to Ma’s landslide 
victory.
 9. Ma won 51.6% of popular vote, whereas Tsai and Soong received only 45.6% 
and 2.8%, respectively.
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Political Left and Right in Taiwan
Yi- ching Hsiao, Su- feng Cheng,  
and Christopher H. Achen
The left- right ideological dimension is an important conceptual tool for un-
derstanding most European democratic countries and their former colonies, 
such as those in North and South America. Party competition, the elector-
ate’s voting decisions, and governmental policy making can all be described 
in that framework (for example, Barnes 1971; Bartle 1998; Dalton 2008; 
Dalton and Tanaka 2007; Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993; Norris 2004, 
97– 125; Potrafke 2009).1 In its mathematical form, the “spatial model” of 
left- right voting has been a favorite of theorists since Hotelling (1929) and 
before. Of course, citizens in Western countries vary in how well they un-
derstand the dimension (Stokes 1962; Converse 1964; Converse and Pierce 
1986, 127– 29; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; Inglehart 1990; Lewis- Beck and 
Chlarson 2002). Nevertheless, political elites, scholars, and journalists make 
ready use of it to describe their national politics.
The ubiquity of “left” and “right” in the elite discourse of their countries 
has led some Western scholars to imagine that, in some form or another, 
those terms must be meaningful political concepts in virtually every country. 
Thus Sigelman and Yough (1978, 356) write that “party systems throughout 
the world can meaningfully be profiled in terms of polarization along the 
left- right continuum.” Similarly, Converse and Pierce (1986, 112) say, “This 
currency of ‘left,’ ‘center,’ and ‘right’ has of course been widely exported, and 
is a commonplace for politically sophisticated observers around the world.”
This same logic is embedded in the Comparative Study of Electoral Sys-
tems (CSES) international surveys, in which every participating country is 
required to ask the following question:2
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In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you 
place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 
means the right?
In Taiwan, however, left- right language is simply not used to describe 
the current party system— not by ordinary people, not by journalists, not by 
politicians, and not by Taiwan scholars. Asking them about it is like asking 
them about sharia law or dancing the flamenco— cultural concepts that are 
prominent elsewhere but not in Taiwan.
Since they lack the appropriate political context, how do Taiwan citizens 
answer the CSES question? What do they understand by political “left” and 
“right”? Scholars have occasionally remarked on anomalies in the use of left- 
right language in Taiwan (for example, Chen 2003), but no one has focused 
explicitly and in detail on how Taiwan citizens perceive “left” and “right” in 
politics. The purpose of this chapter is to do so. We begin by reviewing the 
use of left- right language in Western democracies. Then we proceed to the 
Taiwan case.
The Concept of a Left- Right Dimension
The political concepts of left and right originated during the French Revolu-
tion two centuries ago, when the more radical supporters of the Revolution 
sat on the left in the Estates General, with their ideological opponents on 
the right. Thus, from its beginnings the left- right distinction in the West 
reflected ideological divisions over tradition and hierarchy in society. “By left 
we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality— 
political, economic, or social; by right we shall mean supporting a tradi-
tional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward 
greater equality” (Lipset et al. 1954, 1135).
In the modern era, the left- right dimension has referred primarily to 
differences in the desired degree of government intervention in both society 
and economy.3 Thus Laver and Hunt (1992, 12) write that
the left pole has in general become associated with policies designed 
to bring about the redistribution of resources from those with more 
to those with less, and with the promotion of social rights that ap-
ply to groups of individuals taken as a whole even at the expense of 
individual members of those groups. The right pole has become as-
sociated with the promotion of individual rights, including the right 
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not to have personal resources expropriated for redistribution by the 
state, even at the expense of social inequality and of poverty among 
worse off social groups.
Scholars interested in social class issues in politics often adhere closely 
to the latter meaning. Thus Jansen, Evans, and De Graaf (2013, 54) say 
that “we construct a left- right party position based on economic and welfare 
policy issues,” and they explicitly set aside broader definitions proposed by 
other scholars.
More loosely, other historical cleavages typical of Western societies (Lip-
set and Rokkan 1967) have sometimes been subsumed under the left- right 
rubric when they happened to line up with the views of left and right politi-
cal parties. Thus debates over divorce laws, abortion, supranational integra-
tion, and many other issues are given “left” and “right” interpretations (Dal-
ton 2012; Zechmeister 2006; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). As Inglehart 
(1990, 292) argues, “The Left- Right image is an oversimplification, but an 
almost inevitable one, which in the long run tends to assimilate all impor-
tant issues.” Hence the left- right dimension is sometimes described as a kind 
of “super- issue,” especially in Europe.
Issues unrelated to governmental intervention in the market or in soci-
ety have no persistent left- right meaning, however. There is nothing left or 
right about disputes among ethnic, racial, or religious groups, for instance. 
Similarly, neither the left nor the right has a monopoly on forceful assertions 
of nationalism. Across Europe, conservative and socialist parties are found 
on both sides of the debate over ceding some national sovereignty to the 
European Union.
Particular leftist parties may adopt certain social views in a particular 
historical period, of course, as may rightist parties. However, history dem-
onstrates that the issue packages that seem so coherent and inevitable to 
partisans at the time have often varied dramatically in different times and 
places. In practice, major party platforms are strategic documents cobbled 
together to balance party factions and meet short- term electoral needs. They 
are not ideologically coherent statements of a political vision (see, for ex-
ample, Bawn et al. 2012).
Thus we expect that when left- right language is extended beyond its cen-
tral modern meaning, all sorts of jumbled statistical patterns will result. That 
is precisely what scholars have found (Fuchs and Klingemann 2009). Zech-
meister (2010) even finds some reversed signs for the correlation between 
economic views and left- right self- descriptions in Latin American surveys 
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because “left” and “right” are being used to mean something else in certain 
countries. “It is indeed a fact,” Zechmeister (2015, 199) writes, “that the 
political significance of the left- right semantics varies across countries, across 
time, and even across subgroups of a population.”
All these countries, however odd or broad the meaning they give to left 
and right, agree in one respect: in their party systems, “left” and “right” are 
meaningful political terms. The voters may understand them to a greater or 
lesser degree, but the words themselves are meaningful. What scholars have 
not discussed much at all, however, are countries in which those words are 
not used in electoral politics, so that the concepts “left” and “right” have no 
application to the party system. It is to such a case that we now turn.
Left and Right in Taiwan
Knowledgeable observers (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Rigger 2001, 39– 41) are 
agreed that for good historical reasons, conventional left- right issues do not 
consistently differentiate the two main Taiwan parties, the Kuomintang and 
the Democratic Progressive Party. According to Sheng and Liao’s longitu-
dinal study (see chapter 5 of this volume), the DPP has often been seen as 
somewhat more favorable to “environmental protection,” to “reform,” and 
to “social welfare programs,” leading some foreign observers to think of it as 
the left party. But in practice, across issues such as pensions and medical care 
programs, neither of the two parties has been consistently on the left or the 
right. Early in his term in office, DPP president Chen Shui- bian set aside 
many of his party’s social welfare promises in favor of promoting economic 
growth, a typical right- wing choice. As Fell (2012, 199) remarks, “As with 
environmental issues, welfare is not a core ideological issue for the party, 
thus could be sacrificed.”
Typically, the two main Taiwan parties are flexible, low intensity, and 
opportunistic on social welfare policies, differentiating themselves instead 
along national identity lines instead, as we have seen repeatedly in this book 
and as previous observers have noted (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Fell 2005b, 
chap. 4; Fell 2008, 69). Thus, elite politics in Taiwan is organized differently 
than in most Western countries, and the parties have little incentive to use 
left- right language in explaining themselves to voters.
Unsurprisingly, then, the left- right dimension does not predict voting in 
Taiwan. Norris (2004, 110– 11) utilized the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems dataset to explore citizens’ voting decisions in a variety of democra-
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cies and found that respondents’ left- right position was significantly corre-
lated with their voting decision— with the exception of Taiwan and Belarus. 
All this is quite different from most Western countries, where, in spite of 
considerable noise and misunderstanding by many in the population, on 
average the party placements make reasonable sense, and where individual 
citizens’ self- placements correlate at least fairly well with their voting deci-
sions (for example, on France, see Converse 1966 and Fleury and Lewis- 
Beck 1993; more generally, Norris 2004, 110– 11).
Left- right semantics do not predict the vote in Taiwan because, as we 
have seen, those words are not used in the political culture to describe party 
differences. Survey respondents are forced to guess their meaning. Thus, 
Chen (2003) found that only about half of Taiwan citizens were able to 
specify their position on a left- right dimension, a much higher failure rate 
than in most democracies. Moreover, even for those who did place them-
selves, Chen’s study of their unconventional responses led him to question 
whether respondents really understood what “left” and “right” meant. In 
the same way, Jou (2010, 373) encountered very low left- right cognition in 
his study of Taiwan citizens: fewer than 50% could place themselves on the 
scale. Taiwan’s left- right placement rate was the lowest among 35 countries 
in CSES cases studied by Russell Dalton, and the only country under 50 
percent (Dalton 2011, 107).
The evidence that Taiwan voters do not understand left and right lan-
guage is strengthened when one looks at center self- placements by voters— a 
5 on the 0– 10 point scale. As Converse and Pierce (1986, 128– 29) note, 
respondents who choose the midpoint are often poorly informed and simply 
trying to appear helpful to the interviewer: center placement “is an obvious 
selection for a person who is neutral, uncommitted, and even thoroughly 
indifferent to or ignorant about this generic axis of dispute.” (Similarly, see 
Lambert 1983 and Ogmundson 1979.) In two different studies, Jou (2010, 
373) found very high center placement in Taiwan— among the minority of 
voters who could place themselves at all, more than half chose the center po-
sition. Thus, altogether, more than three quarters of the Taiwan respondents 
chose either the neutral position or no position at all. The same finding 
appears in the 2012 TEDS survey: 78 percent of Taiwan respondents were 
either neutral or uncomprehending when asked the left- right question.4
All these Taiwan anomalies raise several questions. Is there any sense of the 
words “left” and “right,” conventional or not, that has meaning for the voters? 
What do ordinary Taiwan citizens mean when they are asked the meaning of 
those words? And how do they place the parties on that dimension?
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Taiwan Politics and the Cultural Connotations  
of “Left” and “Right”
As we have noted, a conventional left- right dimension seems to play little role 
in the vote choices of Taiwan’s voters. In this respect, the citizenry simply re-
flect the nature of Taiwan politics. The voters see real differences between the 
parties on the national identity issue, but few on secondary issues like social 
welfare (Chu and Lin 1996, 92– 95). As Sheng and Liao showed in chapter 
5, since the beginning of democratization in the 1980s, citizen preferences 
on such issues as Taiwan independence vs. reunification with China, envi-
ronmental protection vs. economic development, social welfare vs. low taxes, 
and reform vs. social stability have influenced party preferences and voting 
decisions to some degree (Hsieh, Niou, and Lin 1995; Sheng and Chen 2003; 
Tsai 2008; Wang 2001; Wang 2003). But the first of these— independence 
vs. reunification— is the most powerful issue, not only in locating the main 
two parties on the political spectrum, but also in determining voter choice. 
National identity concerns stemming from “the China factor” have been the 
main political cleavage to discriminate between the Pan- Blue camp and the 
Pan- Green camp (as chapter 4 reveals). However, national identity is not itself 
conventionally left- right in character, and those words are not used to describe 
the issue in Taiwan.5
Not only does left- right thinking fit Taiwan’s current elite and electoral 
politics poorly, but in recent history that language was actively employed 
to characterize something else— Taiwan’s foreign policy disagreements with 
mainland China. Before democratization in the late 1980s, the Kuomintang 
Party viewed the “leftist” Chinese Communist Party as the mortal enemy. 
With its monopoly on political communications, the KMT made every ef-
fort to suppress “left” views. Taiwan people were taught that the “left- side” 
was evil. Expressing sympathy for the left was a form of rebellion. The KMT 
emphasized that it was the “right” party. An element of negative evaluation 
still attaches to “left- side” political views in Taiwan.
These connotations of “left” and “right” are enhanced by the two Chi-
nese dialects most used in Taiwan, Taiwanese (spoken by a majority of citi-
zens) and Mandarin (the language of instruction in schools). Just as some 
respondents in English- speaking countries consider the political “right” to 
mean “correct” or “in the right,” so also in the Taiwanese dialect the same 
word “right” is used to mean both “the opposite of left” and also “correct” or 
“true.” “Left” in Taiwanese connotes “bad” in some way. The heritage from 
the authoritarian period enhances this identification.
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An equally consequential factor for left- right usage in Taiwan is that, 
apart from all political overtones, “left” in the Mandarin dialect connotes 
deviousness, unorthodoxy, or heresy.6 The inference extends even to left- 
handed people, who are often considered “alternative” or nonmainstream. 
In everyday Taiwan life, the right side when walking (or the right- hand seat 
when sitting) is reserved for elders, honored guests, or respected citizens.7 
The implication, then, is that one’s favorite political party should be placed 
on the right and the disliked party on the left.
Thus we expect that placing Taiwan’s parties on a conventional left- right 
scale will be difficult for ordinary citizens because that dimension is nearly ir-
relevant for party choice in Taiwan. When respondents are forced to place the 
parties or to define “left” and “right,” they will often fall back on other mean-
ings familiar from local culture, such as “Communist” vs. “anti- Communist,” 
“bad” vs. “good,” or “wrong” vs. “correct.” To assess these propositions, we use 
both cognitive interviews and public opinion surveys. The cognitive interview 
data come from a project called “A Study of Major Political Identification 
Concepts of the Taiwan Public.”8 In this project, which was carried out in 
2001, 50 respondents were asked to define the left- right dimension in politics, 
and then to place themselves and the major Taiwan political parties on the left- 
right spectrum. The interviewers gave no examples or cues of how this task was 
to be done. All the respondents had to define the concept and the positions 
according to their own understandings.9
We also employ opinion survey data collected by Taiwan’s Election and 
Democratization Study after the 2001 legislative election and the 2008 
presidential election (hereafter TEDS2001 and TEDS2008P). The sampling 
population is adult citizens in Taiwan. The number of successful interviews 
was 2,022 and 1,905, respectively. In TEDS, a 0– 10 scale was utilized for 
the respondents’ placement of themselves and the major parties, as well as 
for answers to issue questions.10
Citizens’ Perceptions of “Left” and “Right”
We begin with a discussion of the cognitive interviews to give a sense of what 
Taiwan respondents mean by “left” and “right.” In the end, all fifty respon-
dents managed some sort of definition, but the task was not easy for most 
of them. When asked to give a definition, 18 respondents (36%) began by 
asking what the question meant. Another five respondents (10%) said that 
the left- right dimension was politically irrelevant in Taiwan. For example 
(our translations):
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I don’t think the concept of left- right exists in Taiwan. (No. 01)
I just don’t get it . . . basically, I think the concept is meaningless in Tai-
wan. (No. 41)
Thus nearly half the respondents could not or did not use the left- right 
distinction in their thinking about Taiwan politics.
When pressed to a definition, respondents’ answers varied widely, and 
most did not fit the customary meaning of left- right in Western democra-
cies. We have attempted to catalog the respondents’ answers into six differ-
ent categories, with the “left” answer listed first: liberalism vs. conservatism 
(4%), doves vs. hawks (18%), Communism vs. democracy (18%), Taiwan 
independence vs. reunification with China (22%), bad vs. good (18%), and 
ruling party vs. opposition party (20%). Among the six different definitions, 
the first category clearly conforms to the definition of left- right in Western 
democracies, and the second might be generously interpreted to do so as 
well. But those two groups comprise fewer than 25 percent of the respon-
dents. The remaining four categories reflect confusions of various kinds.
To convey a sense of how the interviewees in the nonstandard categories 
express themselves, we give a sample of their responses. We begin with the 
third category of respondents, those who regard all democracies as “right.”
Communism vs. Democracy
Basically I think the left- wingers are closer to socialism, so socialists are 
counted as left. Closer to democracy and liberty are the right- wingers. 
From my point of view, in present- day Taiwan, no matter whether it’s 
DDP, KMT, PFP, or TSU [abbreviations of the Taiwan parties], they are 
basically on the democracy side, so all the Taiwanese parties belong to the 
right. (No. 13)
The left reminds me of the Communist Party. . . . the left was referred to as 
the Communist Party . . . The right is the more democratic party. (No.29)
I always think Communism vs. democracy. . . . It seems to me that the 
right side is democracy and the left side is communism. I don’t really get 
it. (No.42)
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The fourth category reflects the main political cleavage in Taiwan, the 
orientation toward China’s claim of ownership of Taiwan. As noted above, 
this policy dimension is not about economics or social class, but is rather a 
dispute between two versions of national identity. Thus it is not convention-
ally left- right.
Reunification vs. Independence
I don’t have the concept of the left- right. . . . it is made by [other] peo-
ple.  .  .  . The left in politics is [Taiwan] independence, and the right is 
unification [with China]. (No. 06)
Generally speaking, the definition of the extreme right is strongly sup-
porting unification, while the extreme left is strongly supporting indepen-
dence. This is how I see it. (No. 34)
Finally, the last two categories, nearly 40 percent of the interviewees, 
completely misunderstand left- right categories. The first group takes their 
cue from the connotation in Mandarin and Taiwanese of “left” as deviant 
or subpar.
Good vs. Bad
I feel the left seems to be negative . . . and the right is more positive. . . . I 
feel it is good vs. bad. . . . Because I think the left means heresy in our old 
saying, that unorthodox ways are “left ways” [in Chinese]. . . . If I use “the 
left” to describe something bad, then I think the opposite side of it should 
be something better. (No. 07)
Left- right in politics means who does things right. Those who do the right 
things are the rights, while those who do the wrong things are the lefts. 
(No. 31)
The last group of respondents associates “right” with the ruling party, 
regardless of its ideology.
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Ruling Party vs. Opposition Party
The left and the right? I think to say it in a simple way, it is the ruling 
party and the non- ruling party . . . I think the left is the non- ruling party 
and the right is the ruling party. (No. 33)
Ruling party is counted as the right, and generally speaking the left is the 
opposition party. (No.08)
Note that at the time of the interviews, the presidency was held by the 
pro- independence DPP. Categorizing them as “right,” as these respondents 
do, contradicts the categorization given by those respondents who focused 
on reunification vs. independence and thereby called the DPP “left.”
In summary, these cognitive interviews display the great range of in-
terpretation of left and right among Taiwan’s citizens. Only a few use 
European- derived interpretations to structure their dimensional thinking. 
Some impose idiosyncratic understandings. Many do not make use of the 
concept at all. Thus imposing Western left- right frameworks on Taiwan re-
spondents violates their understanding of the island’s politics and distorts 
the analysis of elections there.
Survey Evidence
These conclusions are strengthened when we turn to nationwide opinion 
survey data. We first explore how citizens locate themselves and the major 
parties on the left- right dimension and on a variety of policy issues, in-
cluding Taiwan independence vs. reunification with China, environmental 
protection vs. economic development, promoting social welfare vs. keeping 
taxes down, and large- scale reform vs. social stability. The latter three items 
are conventionally left- right in character, especially the social welfare ques-
tion, while the first issue concerns competing national identities and has no 
left- right ideological content, as we have discussed. In each case, the scale 
runs from 0– 10 (question wordings are given in the appendix). These issues 
were discussed by Sheng and Liao in chapter 5 to validate the importance 
of Taiwan’s principal political cleavage. Here our purpose is different: we ex-
plore the correlations between the left- right dimension and these four policy 
issue to verify that left- right is an inapplicable instrument for interpreting 
Taiwan politics. We begin with nonresponse rates.
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Figure 9.1 reveals that across a variety of issues, the nonresponse rate for 
the left- right question is by far the highest. In 2001 and in 2008, about half 
the citizens could not respond when asked where they placed themselves on 
the left- right dimension. By comparison, only about 10 percent failed to 
provide their own opinions on standard Taiwan political issues. Many citi-
zens give middle scores for their position on the ideological spectrum, prob-
ably because they are behaving cautiously in a task they did not fully under-
stand, as discussed earlier.11 Further investigation showed that, as expected, 
knowledgeable or highly partisan respondents were more often able to give 
an answer to the left- right question (as in Converse and Valen 1971, 131), 
while party preference made no difference. Nevertheless, even among those 
well- informed respondents who answered all five of the political knowledge 
questions or missed only one, almost 40 percent could not place themselves 
on a left- right scale in 2001. Failure rates were considerably higher among 
those with less understanding. Altogether, for half of all Taiwan citizens, 
there is no interpretation of left- right language that makes enough sense to 
allow them to place themselves on the scale, and, as we have already noted, 
the other half often manage the task only with idiosyncratic definitions of 
“left” and “right.”
The conclusion is much the same when we examine placement of the 
Fig. 9.1. Nonresponse rates for left- right self- placement and other issues. Data 
Sources: TEDS 2001 and TEDS 2008P.
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two principal political parties on the same 0– 10 scale. For each policy is-
sue, figure 9.2 shows the difference of the mean DPP placement from the 
mean KMT placement, with positive numbers indicating that the DPP is 
closer to the first option in each issue choice. For example, on the issue of 
independence vs. reunification, a positive difference means that the DPP is 
seen (correctly) as closer to the independence position. As figure 9.1 demon-
strated, some respondents could not place the parties on each issue. Hence 
the comparative placements in figure 9.2 are based solely on those respon-
dents who did so.
As in Sheng and Liao’s results in chapter 5, figure 9.2 shows that in both 
2001 and 2008 the DPP is considered closer than the KMT to the positions 
of “independence,” “environment,” and “reform,” with the party difference 
by far the largest on independence vs. reunification. Better informed and 
more partisan respondents perceived somewhat larger party differences (not 
Fig. 9.2. Difference in average respondent placement of DPP vs. KMT (1– 10 
scale), Data Sources: TEDS 2001 and TEDS 2008P
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shown but available from the authors on request). These findings are com-
pletely consistent with contemporary interpretations of party competition 
and elite political cleavages in Taiwan, as we noted above.
This optimistic view of the respondents is tempered by the one inconsis-
tency between 2001 and 2008, however, which occurs on the clearest and 
most conventional left- right issue, social welfare vs. keeping taxes down. In 
2001, the DPP was considered closer to “promoting social welfare” than 
the KMT, but this ordering was reversed in 2008. It may be that 2008 re-
spondents were simply expressing their more pessimistic view of the Chen 
Shui- bian administration after its eight years in office, during which he 
deemphasized social welfare, as we have seen. In any event, the instability 
and vanishingly small party differences on this issue reinforce the point that 
Western notions of “left” and “right” do not distinguish the two principal 
Taiwan parties.
A second and more striking anomaly is that the respondents give their 
favorite party a more rightward (higher) score and their disliked party a 
more leftward (lower) score. Figures 9.3 and 9.4 show this effect for 2001 
and 2008, respectively. The effect is visible in both figures, but is particularly 
dramatic in 2001. In that year, those respondents who liked the DPP (the 
proenvironment, “proreform” major party) moved its average placement so 
far to the right that it wound up to the right of the KMT. Here again is evi-
dence that many Taiwan citizens consider their favorite party as “right” and 
their disliked party as “left,” regardless of its actual policy views.
The argument that “left” and “right” do not have conventional meanings 
in Taiwan is further strengthened when left- right placement is correlated 
with issue positions on the four items mentioned above. If ”left- right” in 
Taiwan captured standard Western notions about the role of government 
in society, the correlations should be strong and positive with the three do-
mestic policy issues, particularly so for the social welfare vs. low taxes is-
sue, but small or zero with the independence- reunification question. How-
ever, figure 9.5 reveals that in both survey years, all the correlations are very 
small— none larger than 0.130. Worse yet, in both years, left- right position 
is slightly negatively correlated with attitudes toward social welfare, just the 
reverse of what is required for conventional ideological meaningfulness.12
Part of the explanation for the reversed correlation may lie in the survey 
measurements. In conducting the TEDS questionnaire, interviewers show 
the respondents cards with a 0– 10 scale. The “0” is located the left side, sig-
nifying “Taiwan independence,” “environmental protection,” “lower taxes,” 
and “large- scale reform.” On the other side, the “10” signifies “reunifica-
tion with China,” “economic development,” “promoting social welfare,” and 
Fig. 9.3. Placement of the parties on left- right by favorability toward the DPP 
(2001). Data Source: TEDS 2001.
Fig. 9.4. Placement of the parties on left- right by favorability toward the DPP 
(2008). Data Source: TEDS 2008P.
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“social stability.” (See figure 9.6) Thus, some respondents who did not un-
derstand the meaning of left- right may simply have regarded all the issue 
positions on the left side of the card as “left,” and all those on the right side 
as “right.” Since among all four issues, only the “social welfare” question has 
the “left” answer on the right- hand side of the card and the “right” answer 
on the left (the bold- faced answers in the list above), this may account for 
the weak (and slightly negative) correlation between it and the respondent’s 
left- right position. Once again, this suggests that the left- right dimension is 
little understood by Taiwan citizens and little related to their policy views.
Hard- core devotees of the conventional wisdom may yet have one final 
objection. “All right,” they may say, “the left- right orientation is weak in 
Taiwan. Previous scholars have found that it does not predict voting. But 
perhaps by 2012, after several decades of democratization, the result is dif-
ferent. Doesn’t everything in politics turn into left- right eventually?”
The answer, for the record, is no. As we have seen, a great many Taiwan 
respondents have to be discarded to assess the relationship of left- right po-
sition to the Pan- Blue vs. Pan- Green vote because they have no idea what 
the left- right question means. But even in that heavily truncated sample, 
no trace of causal importance appears. To give left- right orientation every 
chance, we did not load up the explanatory equations with many different 
noisy measures of related opinions, a tactic sure to reduce them all to statisti-
cal insignificance. Nor did we control for Michigan- style party identification 
questions, which have an overwhelmingly powerful impact in Taiwan (see 
Fig. 9.5. Correlation of citizens’ left- right position with issues. Data Sources: TEDS 
2001 and TEDS 2008P.
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Chapter 12). But even with all these biases in its favor, the left- right position 
failed to show much sign of explanatory life. With the scale set to a range of 
0– 1 and controlling only for dummy variables indicating the respondent’s 
party preference, the probit coefficient was just .1 and far from statistical 
significance. Taken at face value, that coefficient would imply at best a 3 
percentage point impact on a little more than half the sample (the remain-
ing group having zero impact because they do not recognize the terms “left” 
and “right”). But even a very modest effect of that size is far from reliable 
statistically.
Some indication of why the left- right variable fails is given by a close 
look at the party identifiers.13 Just 17 percent of KMT supporters placed 
themselves on the far right (a score of 10). But fully 14 percent of support-
ers of the more radical DPP respondents placed themselves there. Indeed, 
58 percent of the DPP sample placed themselves at one or another position 
on “the right” (scores 6– 10). More dramatically, there were just three sup-
porters of the strongly pro- independence TSU party in the sample, but they 
all placed themselves on the right. Overall, 77 percent of the sample placed 
themselves on the right.
As we have seen in Taiwan, “right” often means “correct.” No wonder, 
then, that the left- right variable adds almost nothing to explaining vote 
choices once partisanship is controlled. Once we know which parties the 
respondents belong to, knowing that most of them also consider themselves 
“correct” adds no new information.
Conclusion
Some readers of early versions of this chapter felt that our central point was 
already well known, since many scholars have shown that the meanings of 
Fig. 9.6. Content and direction on TEDS show card
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“left” and “right” differ across countries. Hence they felt that the Taiwan case 
brings nothing new. In the light of how the topic is treated in much previous 
literature, such a misconception is entirely understandable. But it misses our 
point entirely.
In the conventional view, the left- right dimension is a cultural near- 
universal. Whatever its meaning, every country should exhibit some form of 
left vs. right in politics. When a party system fails, scholars often blame the 
parties: too much clientelism, too little policy clarity, too little polarization, 
too little time for the voters to learn— all these are put forward as causes 
when left- right meanings are confused or impotent in voting decisions. (The 
European case is treated in van der Eijk et al. 2005, 177– 80 and Berglund 
et al. 2005, 116– 22; see Zechmeister 2015 for the Latin American coun-
terpart.) If these party failures were corrected, the argument goes, a strong 
left- right effect would make an appearance. In Europe and Latin America 
and some other parts of the world where that argument has been made, it is 
probably accurate. But to suppose without close study that it applies every-
where would be reminiscent of those American tourists in the 1950s who 
imagined that if only they spoke English slowly and loudly enough, anyone 
around the world could understand them.
Our point is rather that research using left- right concepts may go seri-
ously wrong if the left- right dimension essentially does not exist in some 
countries. For example, the idiosyncrasies of left- right language in Taiwan 
explain why Dalton and Tanaka (2007) measured low party polarization 
in Taiwan, a result that would surprise knowledgeable observers of Taiwan 
politics. As we have seen, in Taiwan a majority of citizens cannot place either 
themselves or the major parties on a left- right ideological spectrum. Even 
among those who can do so, many appear to be guessing or using idiosyn-
cratic definitions of “left” and “right.” As we have also seen, many Taiwan 
citizens identify their favorite party as “right” and consider the disliked party 
“left,” corresponding to the Taiwanese or Mandarin connotations of “left” as 
“bad,” “devious,” or “heretical.”
Now if many respondents favoring one major party put it on the right 
(“the right side”) and the other party on the left (“the bad side”), while 
many respondents favoring the other party do the reverse, the rights and 
lefts will tend to average out in the mean placement of each party. Average 
party placements will be pushed toward the center, making a highly polar-
ized party system appear convergent and consensual. But “low polarization” 
is simply mistaken. As we have seen repeatedly in this volume, cross- Strait 
relations help shape citizens’ national identity (chapter 3), determine peo-
ple’s party identification (chapter 4), set the core political cleavage for party 
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competition (chapter 5) and the party system (chapter 10), and thus are the 
critical factor for vote choice (chapters 7, 9, and 12). In particular, the issue 
of Taiwan independence has led to serious political conflicts and unusually 
bitter party divisions since Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, including fistfights on the floor of the national legislature.14 
Taiwan’s parties are not ideologically similar, and polarization is not low. But 
the CSES survey imposes left- right language on countries that do not use it, 
and scholars thereby may be led astray.
National identity issues are often poorly assimilated to left- right catego-
rizations. As Jou (2010, 371) insightfully phrased it, speaking of Taiwan, 
“One may  .  .  . hypothesize that an entrenched national identity cleavage 
leads to the paradoxical scenario of greater polarization accompanied by 
lower left- right identification.” It is precisely that sort of insight that is im-
possible to grasp unless one breaks out of the notion that some version of 
left- right applies everywhere.
The Taiwan voters’ difficulties in understanding left- right political con-
cepts are perfectly understandable. This volume’s theme is that party com-
petition in Taiwan is structured by the “China factor,” especially on the 
“independence vs. reunification with China” issue, but this is clearly not 
a conventional left- right dimension. Hence even at the political elite level, 
left- right distinctions are generally irrelevant and a poor guide to sorting out 
the parties. Little wonder that the voters do not use it.
This finding has important implications, not just for understanding 
Taiwan, but for the study of other countries around the globe. The chal-
lenge of comparative political research is the great diversity of political 
life and culture in different countries. As electoral research becomes more 
truly international, some Western concepts and frameworks will inevita-
bly come under challenge and be modified or set aside in many countries 
outside the West. We have argued that “left- right” is one such example— a 
framework to be used where it applies, but not elsewhere. Many countries, 
notably in Africa, have political systems primarily shaped by racial, eth-
nic, or linguistic divisions, not class conflict. Even in Western countries 
like Canada, with politics dominated by religious and linguistic divisions, 
voters struggle with the left- right concept, and some confuse “right” with 
“correct” (Ogmundson 1979, 800; Lambert 1983; Lambert et al. 1986). 
In Ireland, too, where divisions stemming from the Civil War have defined 
the party system for a century, the left- right concept has traditionally dif-
ferentiated the main parties rather poorly, leaving the voters confused by it 
as well (Sinnott 1995, 24– 33, 74– 78, 162; Marsh et al. 2008, 42).15 Left 
and right notions are rarely used in Africa either, apart from South Africa 
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(Jennifer Widner, personal communication). Taiwan provides an insight-
ful example of how much difference the absence of left- right language may 
make in all these countries.
The “China factor” is central to understanding Taiwan politics. The par-
ties and the voters divide over this question: How is Taiwan’s nationhood to 
be understood in light of China’s presence, its growing power, and its claims 
of sovereignty over Taiwan? It is that political dimension that shapes both 
Taiwan’s party system and the voters’ understanding of politics. Eurocentric 
notions of “left” and “right” simply do not apply.
To understand Taiwan, one must stop seeing it through a European lens. 
Conventional understandings of the importance of “left” and “right” in poli-
tics have no claim to universality. Many countries are well described in that 
way, but many others may not be, particularly in Asia and Africa. Here 
again, the study of Taiwan rewards the scholar with a deeper understanding 
of politics in many other places.
Appendix 9.A1.
Questionnaire Items and Operationalization of the Variables
Left- Right Ideology Question Wording:
In politics, sometimes people talk about the left and the right. This card lists 
eleven positions from the left (0) to the right (10). Which position do you 
occupy?
Taiwan Independence vs. Reunification with China Question Wording:
Sometimes people will talk about the question of Taiwan independence or 
reunification with China. Some people say that Taiwan should declare in-
dependence immediately. Other people say that Taiwan and China should 
unify immediately. Other people have opinions between these two posi-
tions. This card lists eleven positions from independence (0) to reunification 
(10). Which position do you occupy?
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Environmental Protection vs. Economic Development Question Wording:
Regarding the question of economic development versus environmental 
protection, some people in society emphasize environmental protection 
while others emphasize economic development. On this card, the position 
that emphasizes environmental protection is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, 
and the position that emphasizes economic development is at 10. About 
where on this scale does your own view lie?
Promoting Social Welfare vs. Lower Priority for Social Welfare/Increasing 
Tax Question Wordings:
TEDS2001 On the question of social welfare, some people believe that 
people should take care of themselves and the government should not get 
involved while other people believe that the government should actively pro-
mote social welfare and take care of all the people. This card lists eleven posi-
tions from individuals should take care of themselves and the government 
should not get involved (0) to the government should actively promote so-
cial welfare (10). Which position do you occupy?
TEDS2008P Regarding the question of social welfare, some people believe 
that the government should merely maintain the current system in order not 
to increase people’s taxes. Other people believe that the government should 
promote social welfare, even though it will lead to a tax increase. On this 
card, the position that maintaining the current system is the most important 
thing is at 0 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the position that promoting social 
welfare is most important is at 10. About where on this scale does your own 
view lie?
Large- Scale Reform vs. Social Stability Wording:
Looking at Taiwan’s overall development, some people believe that large- 
scale reform is the most important thing, even if it means sacrificing some 
social stability. Other people believe that stability is most important and 
that reform should not be allowed to affect social stability. On this card, the 
position that large- scale reform is the most important thing is at 0 on a scale 
from 0 to 10, and the position that social stability is most important is at 10. 
About where on this scale does your own view lie?
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Party Preference Question Wording:
Now we’d like to understand your opinions about each of the political par-
ties. If 0 means you dislike a party very much, and 10 means you like that 
party very much, what number would you give the KMT? The DPP?
Notes
 1. The cognitive interview data in this article come from a project entitled “A Study 
in Major Political Identification Concepts of the Taiwan Public” (NSC89– 2414- H- 
004– 022- SSS), whose principal investigator is Professor I- chou Liu of the Political 
Science Department of National Chengchi University. The survey data analyzed were 
collected by the Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies, 2001: The Legisla-
tive Election (TEDS2001) (NSC 90– 2420- H- 194– 001) and 2008: The Presidential 
Election (TEDS2008P) (NSC 96– 2420- H- 004– 017). The coordinator of the multi-
year project TEDS is Professor Chi Huang (National Chengchi University). Further 
information is available on the TEDS website (http://www.tedsnet.org). T. J. Cheng 
gave us helpful comments. We also thank Charles Witke for timely advice about Latin 
meanings. The authors appreciate the assistance of each of these institutions and indi-
viduals. However, the authors alone are responsible for the views expressed here.
 2. In the early years of the CSES, no exceptions were allowed. It is now possible to 
petition to be exempted if the question is meaningless in a particular country.
 3. More generally, perhaps, conservatism (the “right”) is the defense of the estab-
lished order. Historically, this meant a defense of hierarchy and a preference for the 
status quo rather than for the untried and risky proposals of reformers (Huntington 
1957; Beer 1966, chap. 9). By extension, “left” vs. “right” came to include divisions 
over change vs. custom, reason vs. tradition, and other issues raised by the revolution-
ary impulses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In practice, conservatives 
usually defended the interests of those who were successful and privileged within soci-
ety. In the modern era of widespread democratization, acceptance of capitalism, and 
rapid scientific innovation, however, aristocratic views of society and defenses of stasis 
are out of fashion. Contemporary success and privilege in the West derive primarily 
from economic achievement within the capitalist order, and government intervention 
is their greatest threat. Hence modern conservatism opposes additional government 
intervention. Thus, in its central meaning, today’s conservatism lacks the traditional 
emphasis on social hierarchy and reverence for the past, but it is nevertheless the legiti-
mate descendent of its ideological ancestors.
 4. Of course, some respondents may have had a legitimate thoughtful position at 
the midpoint of the scale. But as the next paragraph shows, many respondents at other 
scale positions were seriously confused. There is no simple escape from the central 
finding that the overwhelming majority of Taiwan respondents do not know what 
“left” and “right” mean in their politics, nor should they.
 5. Of course, an outside observer can call any issue “left- right.” Thus Fell (2005a, 
112) accurately remarks that “[some] analysts talk of a left and right in Taiwan.” How-
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ever, this occurs almost exclusively among foreign scholars doing comparative work 
across many countries, using cross- national datasets like the CSES that impose the 
same left- right survey question on every country. It is quite rare for Taiwan scholars 
themselves to mention the left- right as a description of contemporary politics on the 
island, except to criticize it (Chen 2003).
 6. English inherits a similar relationship from a now- dead language. In Latin, “dex-
ter” means the right side, from which English takes the word “dexterous,” meaning 
“skillful.” The Latin word for “left” is “sinister,” with overtones of bad omens from for-
tune tellers. The same word in English has come to mean “evil” or “portending evil.”
 7. One of us saw a Taiwan university official insist that a sign directing visitors to a 
set of university offices be placed on the right- hand wall, even though the offices were 
on the left side of the building. The reason given was that the right side was “greater.”
 8. The project is sponsored by National Science Council (Taiwan). The principal 
investigator is Professor I- chou Liu at the Political Science Department of National 
Chengchi University, who generously shared the data.
 9. These respondents were chosen to represent both genders and a variety of ages 
and occupations. Their demographic profiles are available from Su- feng Cheng.
 10. For the question wordings, see appendix 9.A1.
 11. Respondents were somewhat more responsive in 2008, raising the possibility 
that experience with democracy is improving comprehension. Of course, a compari-
son of two time points can be no more than suggestive. However, similar gains in the 
coherence of political attitudes over time have been noted in other new democracies 
(for example, Arian and Shamir 1983, 150).
 12. It is clear in figure 9.3 to figure 9.5 that Taiwan citizens locate party positions 
on the left- right scale mainly on the basis of their party preference, not the four tradi-
tional policy issues. This result also has been validated by a multivariable model, but 
the model cannot be included in the chapter due to space limitations. The model is 
available from Yi- ching Hsiao on request.
 13. Just under 61% of the sample placed themselves at a neutral 5 on the 0– 10 scale, yet 
another reminder of the weak understanding of this variable. Those respondents have been 
omitted in the percentage calculations that follow.
 14. Dalton and Tanaka (2007) recognize that the main axis of Taiwan politics is the 
independence- reunification issue, not the European versions of “left” and “right,” but 
they interpret their data as indicating only a little differentiation between the two main 
parties on the national identity issue.
 15. Both Canada and Ireland have a social democratic party, so that conventional 
left- right language plays some role in party politics. However, both parties typically 
receive only modest proportions of the vote, finishing well behind the two principal 
parties. Even in the special circumstances of 2011, the best year ever for both, they 
finished in second place, well behind the top party.
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Chapter 10
Electoral System Change and Its Effects on 
the Party System in Taiwan
Chi Huang
On June 7, 2005, the ad hoc National Assembly of Taiwan ratified a con-
stitutional amendment to change the electoral rules of the Legislative Yuan 
(the parliament) by halving the number of seats from 225 to 113, extend-
ing legislators’ terms of office from three years to four, and adopting the 
mixed- member majoritarian (MMM) system1 to replace the half- century- 
old single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system for legislative elections. The 
new mixed- member system in Taiwan consists of one tier of single- member 
districts (SMDs) of 73 seats and a party list tier of 34 seats. In addition, 
there are 6 seats reserved for highland and lowland aboriginals elected on the 
basis of the SNTV system (Huang 2007, 2008a).
This chapter examines the significant changes in the legislative electoral 
system in Taiwan and then evaluates their consequences to the political 
party system. Taiwan’s electoral reform in 2005 is of great interest in itself 
because it illustrates how the cleavages, institutions, parties, and voters 
interact to produce election outcomes, both expected and unexpected. But 
more important, it constitutes a critical case to reexamine the popular 
seat- maximization approach to electoral reform (Benoit 2007), since in 
Taiwan it was the ruling- party legislators’ own initiative to downsize the 
parliament, which ignited a raging controversy and then backfired. Curi-
ously enough, the leaders of the two archrival parties, the Nationalist Party 
(Kuomintang) and the Democratic Progressive Party, appeared as if they 
were silent partners pushing through the same new MMM rule, although 
at the same time each was seeking its own goals. Furthermore, Taiwan’s 
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case fills a gap in the literature concerning the “redistributive” type of elec-
toral reform (Renwick 2010) in new democracies and thus can be crucial 
for comparative studies of electoral engineering (Ahmed 2013; Colomer 
2004; Norris 2004; Sartori 1994).
The chapter begins with a review of the theoretical literature on the party 
system followed by an outline of a comprehensive multilevel framework 
linking cleavages with electoral systems, after which is a discussion of party 
politics under the SNTV system. I then apply the framework to trace the 
process of events and interactions between agents that led to the critical 
junctures of the passage of the electoral reform proposal in August 2004 and 
its final ratification in June 2005. Last is a discussion of the impact of the 
new MMM system on Taiwan’s party system at the national, district, and 
voter levels.
Theoretical Perspectives
There have been two main theories that explain the party system and voting 
behaviors in democracies: the cleavage structure and the electoral system. 
The former is represented by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who explained 
changes to party systems, electoral realignments, and political mobilizations 
in Western European countries through cleavages along the lines of groups, 
regions, farmers, workers, laborers, and entrepreneurs. The Lipset- Rokkan 
“freezing hypothesis” claims that these preexisting cleavage structures were 
then “frozen” in the 1920s into party alignments through voter mobiliza-
tion. That is, party systems basically stabilize only when they reflect the 
fundamental cleavages in societies. Once the party system is formed, it re-
inforces the cleavage system in order to perpetuate itself. The second school 
is represented by Duverger (1959), who believed it was the electoral sys-
tem that principally shaped the party system. For many scholars, Duverger’s 
“law” (that single- member districts favor a two- party system) and “hypoth-
esis” (that proportional representation leads to a multiparty system; Riker 
1982) still provide the foundation of how the electoral system affects the 
party system, while the relationship between district magnitude, M, and the 
effective number of parties has been extended into the “M + 1 rule,” that is, 
voters will concentrate their votes on the top M + 1 candidates (Cox 1997).
In spite of debates in the literature, these two theories are not necessarily 
contradictory. While cleavage theory focuses more on the macro- level origins 
of the party system, Duverger’s law focuses on the meso- level institutional 
structures. Indeed, later development of the literature witnesses greater ap-
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preciation of the interplay between social heterogeneity and electoral rules 
(Clark and Golder 2006; Cox 1997; Neto and Cox 1997; Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova 1994). In these interactive models, electoral systems set an up-
per limit to the number of parties and work like filters of social divisions. 
That is, within this upper limit, the more “permissive” an electoral system is 
(such as the proportional representation system), the easier it is for preexist-
ing cleavages to manifest as political parties. The more “restrictive” electoral 
systems (such as the SMD system), on the other hand, tend to constrain the 
number of parties.
A Synthesized Framework
The literature on electoral rules is indeed impressive, and the area is of-
ten revered as one of the most advanced in political science. But previous 
studies of Taiwan’s electoral reform only either examined legislative elec-
tions or looked at legislative and executive elections separately (e.g., Chang 
and Chang 2009). Yet legislative electoral systems, important as they are 
in translating votes into seats, do not operate in a vacuum. Their evolution 
and impact can be fully understood only when they are embedded within 
broader social and institutional contexts. Building upon the vast literature, 
Huang (2008a, 4– 5) developed a three- level analytical framework that in-
corporates the macro perspective of social cleavages, the meso perspective 
of institutional structures and electoral systems, and the micro perspective 
of voting behaviors. Following Powell’s (1982) insight that constitutional 
settings have a substantial impact on democratic performance, this general 
framework embeds the electoral systems within constitutional systems at the 
meso level. It assumes that political elites seek not only to maximize seats in 
the parliament but also to seize executive offices. It is the combination of the 
legislative electoral system and the constitutional setup that defines the pay-
offs of capturing executive offices and the degree of cross- district coordina-
tion required to win the executive offices. Hence “[t]o fully understand the 
effects of an electoral system, we must imbed it within the broader political 
contexts, especially the constitutional framework, of the country in ques-
tion” (Huang 2016, 302).
In presidential and semipresidential systems, for example, the president 
exercises the executive authority. The ultimate goal of most political parties 
and their leaders is undoubtedly to control both the executive and legisla-
tive branches in order to form a unified government, although the appeal of 
and the competition for the presidency is often a higher priority (Batto and 
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Cox 2016; Curini and Hino 2012). This implies that presidential contests 
often spill over to the legislative elections (Huang and Wang 2009, 2014). 
Although parliamentary elections after a presidential one may allow the 
president to consolidate his or her honeymoon (Samuels and Shugart 2010; 
Shugart and Carey 1992), our general framework also reveals the possibil-
ity that the parliament becomes a second battlefield for blocking govern-
ment policies or embarrassing the ruling party once a viable party loses the 
presidential contest, or both. In the latter case, the temporal proximity of 
presidential and legislative elections may well make campaigns appear to be 
never- ending tournaments that escalate the already- fierce competition and 
leave little room for party truces.
This synthesized framework, in contrast with the traditional legislature- 
centric perspective, broadens our theoretical landscape by taking into ac-
count the payoffs of holding executive office, the degree of coordination re-
quired to capture the executive office, and the sustainability of the executive 
office (term limit). Although Moser and Scheiner (2012) argue that strong 
presidentialism hinders party- system institutionalization, my framework 
does not exclude the possibility that the greater degree of national coordina-
tion required to win the executive offices may well motivate elites to form 
coalitions with or to join and stay in the major parties, or both (Hicken 
2009; Hicken and Stoll 2008). I argue that the joint effects of the presiden-
tial and legislative electoral systems, as well as the temporal proximity of the 
two elections, exert pressure on elites and parties to engage in cross- district 
coordination. Furthermore, social diversity is more than a background con-
dition waiting to be filtered by the electoral rules. I argue that deep- rooted 
sociopolitical cleavages can act as latent yet powerful forces structuring the 
speed and direction in which such coordination efforts move. Finally, the 
strategic actions of elites under these contexts shape the choice sets available 
to the electorate and its voting behavior at the micro level. Electoral conse-
quences, both expected and unexpected, in turn affect the persistence of and 
change in the party system, institutional structure, and eventually the socio-
political cleavages. The principal idea behind this comprehensive framework 
is simple: that is, social cleavage and constitutional structures are part and 
parcel of studying the evolution and effects of electoral systems.
Party Politics under the SNTV System in Taiwan
The evolution of the party system in Taiwan can be divided into three peri-
ods: the dominance of the single- party system under the KMT2 before the 
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late 1980s; the gradual emergence of small parties in the early 1990s that 
transitioned into a quite vigorous multiparty system after 2000 (Fell 2005); 
and the reversal of the latter system (as a result of changes to the electoral 
system) to a cleavage- based two- party system after 2008 (figure 10.1). In 
brief, competitive party politics emerged only after 1986, when opposition 
forces formed the DPP. The transition to full democracy was completed in 
the 1990s, when the national legislature was subject to regular reelection be-
ginning in 1992 followed by the first presidential election in 1996. The first 
power shift occurred when the long- time opposition party, the DPP, won 
the presidency in 2000 followed by reelection in 2004. However, the KMT 
has retained continuous control of Taiwan’s legislative branch, although the 
party went from a single- party majority to a majority in coalition and then 
back to a single- party majority. In the early part of the democratic era, the 
KMT retained a degree of dominance. After 2001, splinter parties forced 
the KMT into coalition arrangements, but the party returned to dominant 
status in the first postreform election of 2008 (see, for example, Stockton 
2010).
Taiwan has employed the simple plurality system for presidential elec-
tions since 1996 (table 10.2), but the legislative electoral system is somewhat 
more complicated. Before its 2005 electoral reform, Taiwan employed an 
SNTV system for its national legislature (table 10.1).3
In the 1998, 2001, and 2004 legislative elections, for example, there 
were a total of 225 seats. Of these, 168 representatives were elected from 
29 geographically defined multimember districts, and another 8 members 
were elected from 2 nationwide districts reserved for lowland and highland 
aborigines. The average district magnitude was 5.79 seats per district. Several 
districts had only 1 seat, while the largest district had 13 seats. In addition to 
the 176 SNTV seats, there were also 49 seats elected by closed proportional 
representation (PR) lists. The list designated for national party representa-
tives had 41 seats, whereas the list designated for overseas representatives 
had 8 seats. There was no separate party list ballot for the PR seats. Instead, 
all the votes for the party nominees running in the SNTV districts were 
summed to obtain each party’s national total. For all parties with at least 
5 percent of the national vote, these totals were used to apportion seats on 
the two lists using a largest remainders formula (Farrell 2011; Wang 2012).
Under the SNTV system, Taiwan has developed from a single- dominant- 
party system in the early 1990s to a period of multiparty politics after the 
2000 presidential election. Scholars have cited one- party dominance as the 
reason for the implementation of SNTV electoral rules. Under an SNTV 
system, political parties must coordinate their supporters’ votes within 
Fig. 10.1. Taiwan’s political party system, 1986– 2012. Source: Author. Note: 1. % in 
the parentheses denotes percentage of seats in the legislative Yuan; the broken 
line denotes an alliance, loosely defined as some form of cooperation between 
parties. For example, many NP candidates ran under the KMT’s umbrella in 
2001 and 2004, and the PFP agreed not to run its own party list in 2008 in 
exchange for KMT’s promise to nominate six former PFP legislators in six 
districts and also allowed the PFP to share four seats on the KMT’s party list. 
Although formally there was no NP legislator in 2008 and 2012, NP continues 
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constituencies in order to more evenly distribute votes across candidates. 
Without successful coordination, weaker candidates will get too few votes 
and stronger co- partisans will receive too many votes. If effective, intraparty 
coordination can result in political parties gaining an overrepresentation 
bonus. Governing parties have a tremendous advantage because they can 
use the resources of the state to overcome the coordination problems of 
nomination and division of votes (Cox 1997; Cox and Niou 1994; Cox 
and Rosenbluth 1993, 1996; Patterson and Stockton 2010; Rochon 1981). 
Meanwhile, small parties also face much smaller coordination problems 
since they often only nominate one candidate in any given district. With 
only one candidate, vote division is not a challenge (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 28). Besides, the vote share necessary to win a seat decreases as the 
number of seats increases. Since candidates can win with support from a 
small minority of voters, they can appeal to highly personalized and niche 
voters (Flanagan et al. 1991). Under an SNTV system, there is electoral 
space for small parties, either newly formed or splintered from the existing 
big parties when antagonistic intraparty struggle cannot be resolved.
Electoral Reform: Tangles of Two Archrivals
Taiwan has experienced numerous institutional challenges, such as frac-
tional politics, extremism, intraparty competition, money politics, party 
splintering, and an inefficient parliament, and many studies have attributed 
these disadvantages to the SNTV system (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox 
and Thies 1998; Richardson 1988; Wang 2012). Because of continual elec-
tion scandals, the call for legislative electoral reform has often enjoyed wide-
spread attention. However, it took the tension of stagnation and a stalemate 
caused by the divided government after the first power shift in 2000 to shake 
up the half- century- old SNTV system.
The hurdle of changing the legislative electoral system was unusually 
high in Taiwan when the DPP government took over power in 2000. The 
Legislative Yuan’s organization and election are specified in Article 4 of the 
Additional Articles of Constitution of the Republic of China. Changing the 
electoral system therefore requires amending the constitution, the procedure 
for which is also specified by the constitution. As of June 2000,4 a constitu-
tional amendment required two stages: a proposal passed by the Legislative 
Yuan and then ratification by the National Assembly.5 The proposal had to 
be initiated by at least one- fourth of the total seats of the Legislative Yuan 
and passed by at least three- fourths of the members present at a meeting at-
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tended by at least three- fourths of the total members of the Legislative Yuan. 
Once passed, the proposal had to be publicly announced for six months. 
Then 300 delegates had to be elected by proportional representation to the 
National Assembly to deliberate and vote on the Legislative Yuan proposal. 
Obviously, changing the legislative electoral rule was extremely difficult, not 
only because a constitutional amendment was called for but also because 
it took the incumbent Legislative Yuan, a beneficiary of the status quo, to 
initiate and pass the constitutional amendment proposal before sending it to 
the ad hoc National Assembly for ratification. Electoral engineering in Tai-
wan required Herculean efforts of both intra- and interparty coordination to 
achieve. Yet it did happen in 2005. Why?
Based on the comprehensive framework laid out previously, I argue 
that it was the introduction of popular presidential elections in 1996 
and the subsequent power shift in 2000 due to the KMT’s internal split 
that set the momentum of legislative electoral reform on track in order 
to “bring back order and end the parliamentary chaos.” The power of the 
president in Taiwan, under its “president- parliamentary” semipresidential 
system (Shugart and Carey 1992, 24), makes the presidency a big enough 
prize to motivate political elites to cooperate in the electoral process in 
order to win by a plurality. Before 2012, Taiwan also had peculiar stag-
gered electoral schedules for multiple political offices at different levels and 
branches of government (Huang and Lin 2013), as shown in figure 10.2. 
The temporal proximity of election schedules between the presidential and 
legislative elections in turn make the interparty competition for the for-
mer spill over into the latter like an endless election campaign.6 Anxious 
to appeal to the electorate, the major parties campaigned on a reformist 
platform and each advanced its image as the true champion of electoral 
reform. Repeated promises as part of the continuing election campaigns 
not only suppressed opposing intraparty views but elevated the clamor 
for reform to such a point that party leaders resorted to party discipline 
to get legislators to pass the constitutional amendment act. The following 
paragraphs chronologically trace the trajectory of Taiwan’s electoral reform 
so as to highlight the sequential interactions among cleavages, institutions, 
and agents that shaped reform politics in path- dependent ways.
In January 1994, the Japanese Diet passed electoral law reform bills that 
abolished the old SNTV system and adopted a new MMM system (Curtis 
1999; Reed and Thies 2001). The 1994 electoral reform in Japan and its 
initial implementation in the 1996 House of Representatives election sent a 
shock wave through neighboring Taiwan, where the SNTV system had been 
blamed for intraparty competition and factionalism, as well as for money 
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politics (see, for example, Cox 1996; Cox and Niou 1994). In late 1996, at 
the National Development Meeting summoned by President Lee Teng- hui 
of the KMT after his win in the March 1996 presidential election, a con-
sensus was reached to replace the SNTV system with a mixed- member sys-
tem. However, a proposed constitutional amendment about electoral reform 
failed in 1997 because the then- ruling KMT insisted on a Japanese- style 
MMM system, which favors big parties, while the then- opposition DPP 
and the New Party supported a more proportional, German- style mixed- 
member proportional system. Given that no consensus was reached on that 
point, the electoral reform proposal was dropped from the agenda. Instead, 
an amendment was ratified to increase the total number of seats in the Leg-
islative Yuan from 164 seats in 1995 to 225 seats in 1998 so as to accommo-
date members of the then to- be- abolished Taiwan Provincial Council who 
might run for the legislature. As a result, the average district magnitude 
increased from 4.52 to 5.79 seats per district, and only 40,000 votes were 
usually sufficient to elect a district candidate. This 37 percent jump in the 
number of seats did defuse some resistance to the streamlining of the Taiwan 
Provincial Government, yet it unexpectedly increased the electoral oppor-
tunities for small parties and seeded the next- round initiatives of slimming 
the Legislative Yuan.
Three years later, the DPP won the March 2000 presidential election, 
while the Pan- Blue parties maintained control of the majority of seats in the 
Legislative Yuan and dragged their feet over the new DPP administration. 
The first power shift plus the first divided national government ever experi-
enced in Taiwan intensified the fraught relationship between the executive 
and legislative branches and incited much mudslinging between the govern-
Fig. 10.2. Timing of Taiwan’s major national and local elections. Source: Huang and 
lin 2013. Notes: 1. Circles with dashed lines denote concurrent elections with 
the same set of ballots. 2. Dotted line in 2014 means special- city elections were 
held on the same day as other cities/counties but with a different set of ballots.
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ing DPP and the opposition KMT and its allies. The opposition Pan- Blue 
parties were often portrayed as the source of chaos in the parliament. Fre-
quent brawls that broke out on the floor further ruined the public’s image of 
the Legislative Yuan as a whole.
On November 24, 2000, a year before the 2001 legislative election, a 
DPP legislator placed a campaign advertisement in the newspapers calling 
for halving the number of legislative seats.7 This first call for such a reduc-
tion immediately caught the nation’s attention and became a campaign slo-
gan. It constituted a simple issue that could easily gain popular support and 
was difficult for opponents to disagree with in public. But it also motivated 
politicians to bundle their own political agenda with it. The effects went far 
beyond the December 2001 legislative election and extended to the March 
2004 presidential election and then to the December 2004 legislative elec-
tion. Among these three consecutive national elections within four years, 
the 2004 presidential election was the impetus for the final showdown on 
electoral reform. To a large extent, what happened in the May 2005 Na-
tional Assembly election and with the assembly’s ratification of the con-
stitutional amendment in June was not so much a critical election, as Fell 
(2010) argued, but only the consequence of the long, harsh four- year elec-
tion campaigns. The presidential hopefuls of the two major parties were 
betting that the new MMM electoral system would not only be favorable to 
their own party but also reduce the opportunities for the small parties. The 
two archrival parties, the DPP and the KMT, both dreamed of first winning 
the presidency and then a majority of seats and unwittingly appeared to act 
like silent partners in carrying out electoral reform.
In mid- April 2001, the DPP began openly advocating an MMM system, 
a reversal of the position it had held since 1997, when it was in opposition. 
In late October 2001, President Chen Shui- bian pledged that if the DPP 
became the largest party in the Legislative Yuan, he would advance bold and 
decisive parliamentary reforms, including replacing the SNTV system with 
an MMM system and downsizing the legislature. This was the first time 
that electoral system reform had been explicitly linked with the popular 
issue of assembly size. In mid- November, the KMT responded with a five- 
point parliamentary reform proposal that also included an MMM system 
and a reduction in the number of legislative seats. In late November 2001, 
President Chen Shui- bian accused the KMT and the NP of not supporting 
seat reduction and reiterated his pledge to reduce the total number of seats 
to 150 and replace the SNTV system with an MMM system, and, in ad-
dition, to synchronize legislators’ three- year term with the president’s four- 
year term. For fear of being labeled antireform, the KMT and NP responded 
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that they had wholeheartedly supported the seat- reduction proposal from 
the very beginning. Under pressure from public opinion, the party caucuses 
promised to work on these proposals after the 2001 legislative election. The 
December 2001 election was a debacle for the KMT, whose seats decreased 
from 54.7 percent to only 30.2 percent. Meanwhile, the ruling DPP sub-
stantially increased its seats from 31.7 percent to 38.7 percent and became 
the largest party in the legislature. The election results definitely boosted the 
morale of the DPP.
Not long after the new legislature convened in 2002, the Taiwan Solidar-
ity Union, which was formed months before the 2001 election and was con-
sidered to be an ally of the DPP, took the lead in proposing a constitutional 
amendment to reduce the assembly size by half. Other parties responded by 
proposing various versions of that proposal. In reality, however, the reform 
was unpopular with the rank- and- file legislators in both major parties, since 
they understandably were not happy about half of their seats in the legisla-
ture being eliminated. The two major parties paid lip service to the proposal, 
but the constitutional amendment committee did not even convene. The 
atmosphere began to change, however, after the KMT and the People First 
Party leaders, Lien Chan and James Soong, teamed up as running mates for 
the 2004 presidential election. While the KMT and PFP were still squab-
bling about their common platform, especially the PFP’s objection to the 
MMM system, the Government Renovation Committee of the Presidential 
Office announced in early May a parliamentary reform plan that reiterated 
President Chen Shui- bian’s campaign promises of the previous year. Soon 
the DPP party caucus and the DPP Standing Committee reached agreement 
on the reform plan and pledged to complete the constitutional amendment 
and put it into effect for the December 2004 legislative election. In June 
2003, the KMT- PFP party caucuses dared the DPP to reduce the seats ac-
tually by half, that is, to 113 seats instead of 150, but they still criticized 
the MMM proposal as a campaign gimmick. In October, the KMT- PFP 
caucuses even began talking about reducing the number of seats to 100 but 
remained vague about whether they supported an MMM or mixed- member 
proportional system.
The tone of “reform bidding” turned acrimonious as the presidential 
election drew near. On November 13, Premier You Xi- Kun opened another 
battlefront by proposing to formulate a completely new Taiwan constitu-
tion via public referendum. This move touched upon the fundamental issue 
of Taiwan independence versus future unification with China (see Huang 
2005, 2006). Caught by surprise and again worried about being labeled 
antireform by the DPP, the KMT chair, Lien Chan, countered by advocat-
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ing a new Republic of China constitution. Lien, cajoled by the acquies-
cence of the PFP, vowed a sweeping reform based on 10 principles, the fifth 
principle of which concerned parliamentary reform: the MMM system; seat 
reduction to 100, 113, or 150; and synchronized terms. The content of 
this principle was suspiciously similar to the DPP’s earlier proposal. Mean-
while, the KMT- PFP caucuses took the lead in late November to initiate a 
constitutional amendment based on Lien’s pledge but with an explicit seat 
number of 113. While this initiative was still collecting the signatures of 
legislators, on December 30 the DPP’s Central Standing Committee also re-
duced its original 150- seat proposal to 113 seats, partly at the strong urging 
of the DPP’s former chair Lin Yi- Xiong. The two arch rivals now engaged 
in strange tangles.
On February 25, 2004, the Constitutional Amendment Committee 
of the Legislative Yuan convened and on March 10 passed a draft of the 
amendment proposal. It seemed that the major parties intended to rush 
the process, and they sent the bill to the floor right before the March 20 
presidential election. Yet on March 15 the party caucus of the Nonpartisan 
Solidarity Union, a long- time opponent of the MMM system, motioned to 
send the bill for cross- party consultation, which would take four months 
according to the legislative procedure rule. This motion blocked the bill one 
step short of reaching the floor.
After winning reelection in 2004 by a thin margin, President Chen Shui- 
bian vigorously pushed for electoral reform. In his inauguration speech on 
May 20, he vowed to fulfill his campaign promises by completing the consti-
tutional renovation by the end of his second term in 2008. As before, electoral 
reform was unpopular with most rank- and- file legislators. Not surprisingly, 
the TSU and NPSU continued to oppose the MMM system. But even the 
KMT- PFP alliance began to weaken after losing the presidential election. The 
KMT chair, Lien Chan, again worried about public support in the upcom-
ing December 2004 legislative election, threw his support behind the reform. 
Some PFP legislators, however, began to voice their objections to the MMM 
system for fear of a bleak future. The PFP chair, James Soong, who was also 
worried about being accused of breaking campaign promises, persuaded the 
PFP legislators to support the electoral reform bill so as to maintain a prore-
form image for the December legislative election. The pressure of the upcom-
ing election was so great that eventually not only the DPP and the KMT- PFP 
caucuses went along with their party leaders but the TSU and NPSU legisla-
tors all voted unanimously, though reluctantly, on August 23, 2004, to send 
the constitutional amendment proposal to the National Assembly for ratifica-
tion. The December 2004 legislative election outcome turned out to be a great 
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As the election ended and campaign pressure subsided, political reality 
took over. In late March 2005, the PFP announced a change of position on 
the constitutional amendment bill that it had voted for the previous August. 
The TSU and NPSU soon followed suit. The election for the 300 National 
Assembly delegates held on May 14, 2005, was the only election in Taiwan 
based solely on the party list system. The record- low turnout rate of merely 
23.4 percent signified not just the confusion about the PR rule but also the 
public’s unfamiliarity with the debates on electoral rules (Huang, Wang, and 
Lin 2012, 2013; Huang and Yu 2011). The DPP earned 42.5 percent of 
the votes and the KMT garnered 38.9 percent. Not surprisingly, the smaller 
parties, including the TSU, PFP, NP, and NPSU, all opposed the bill, fear-
ing a bleak future. But the minor parties did not have the clout to block the 
amendments since the two major parties, the DPP and the KMT, combined 
accounted for 244 (81.3%) of the 300 seats and exerted strict party disci-
pline over their members. Eventually, the ad hoc National Assembly ratified 
the amendment in June 2005 with a vote of 249 for and 48 against with 
staunch support from the two big parties, which expected gains from form-
ing a unified government under the new electoral rules.
The new MMM electoral system, specified by the new Article 4 of the 
amended Additional Articles of the ROC Constitution, has two tiers with 
a total of 113 seats. The tiers are not linked, so seats are determined inde-
pendently in each tier. The nominal tier includes 73 seats (64.6%), which 
are elected by plurality in SMDs, and 6 seats (5.3%) are in two national 
SNTV districts for lowland and highland aboriginals. The remaining 34 
seats (30.1%) comprise a single national list tier and are apportioned by a 
largest remainder rule. Note that the nominal tier seats far outnumber the 
list tier seats. Giving such heavy weight to the nominal tier is disadvanta-
geous to smaller parties, since smaller parties often find winning a plurality 
in an SMD to be a daunting challenge and rely heavily on seats from the 
list tier for survival. With fewer list tier seats available, smaller parties find 
it harder to survive. Even worse, to win any of these seats, parties must 
win at least 5 percent of the national list tier vote. This 5 percent legal 
threshold also discriminates against smaller parties, since, without a legal 
threshold, parties winning at least 2.14 percent of the valid vote would be 
able to win a seat.8
Taiwan’s electoral reform has important implications. Literature on elec-
toral reform usually considers the costs and benefits to legislators. As might 
be expected, legislators, especially from small parties, were generally against 
reform. However, the critical players were actually the national party leaders/
presidential contenders who effectively sold out their legislators in order to 
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play to public opinion in hopes of advancing their own careers. We cannot 
understand the electoral reform without reference to the semipresidential 
system. Additionally, these key presidential contenders represented the two 
camps of the identity cleavage. That is, the identity cleavage was hidden at 
the very root of Taiwan’s electoral reform.
Effects of Electoral System Change on the Party System
Preludes to the Postreform Legislative Election
Most studies evaluating the impact of the new MMM system in Taiwan fo-
cus on the January 2008 legislative election (Hsieh 2009; Jou 2009; O’Neill 
2013; Shyu 2011; Stockton 2010). My comprehensive framework clearly 
points out that the new electoral system directly affects politicians’ strategic 
entry and exit decisions as well as the formation and dissolution of intra-
party and interparty coalitions. Interactions among political elites, in turn, 
determine the voters’ choice sets on ballots in elections.
Indeed, the impact of the MMM system had been felt almost immedi-
ately after the ratification of the constitutional amendment. The effects were 
particularly acute for legislators of small parties. They were squeezed from 
both ends: by a 50 percent decrease in total seats, as well as by a plurality 
rule in the newly drawn SMDs. Small- party incumbents intending to run 
for reelection were fighting an uphill battle. But of course this had been part 
of the plan of the two big parties pushing for the MMM system. As a result, 
the first and immediate impact of MMM on the party system manifested 
itself among the political elites, including large- scale party switching dur-
ing 2006 and 2007 as well as interparty negotiations inside the Pan- Blue 
and Pan- Green camps. In the two years after the 2005 electoral reform, as 
many as 22 incumbent PFP legislators switched to the KMT while 5 TSU 
legislators switched to the DPP. Therefore, party realignment started long 
before the first postreform legislative election held in January 2008. More 
important, the multiparty system began to converge toward a two- party sys-
tem split along the preexisting fundamental cleavage, that is, independence 
versus unification.
However, interparty coordination proves to be not as easy as party 
switching on the part of individuals. Two years before the 2008 legislative 
election, the KMT reached out to and eventually negotiated successfully 
with the PFP to nominate six former PFP legislators in six districts and 
also allowed the PFP to share four seats on the KMT’s party list. The 
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KMT also made way to NPSU candidates in three SMDs, and promised 
not to nominate a candidate in the first district in Pingtung so as to al-
low an independent candidate, also affiliated with the NPSU, to compete 
against the DPP candidate. Apparently, the then- opposition KMT, after 
losing the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, was anxious to form a 
Pan- Blue coalition aimed at the presidential election in March 2008 and 
thus was more willing to make compromises with its allies. In contrast to 
the coordination in the Pan- Blue camp, the DPP and the TSU squabbled 
with each other and eventually failed to reach any substantive agreement. 
The DPP seemed to believe that the TSU would simply back down and 
follow its lead. Yet the TSU eventually fielded 13 candidates in districts to 
fight its battle for survival. The effects of such differences in the interparty 
coordination within each camp were further magnified by the new elec-
toral system, since the mechanical effect of the SMD tier favors the party 
capturing the majority of popular votes.
Effects at the National Level
As discussed in the previous section, the reform of the legislative electoral 
system was initiated by the then- ruling DPP to win an absolute majority in 
the Legislative Yuan and gain full control of both the executive and legisla-
tive branch. However, the lame- duck president, Chen, was unable to reach 
an agreement with the TSU. Even worse, a series of scandals involving the 
president and his family broke out in 2006 and tarnished the clean image 
of the DPP. As a result, the outcome of the 2008 legislative election starkly 
demonstrated the new MMM system’s disproportionality effect on the los-
ing party. Actually, the DPP received 38.2 percent of total district votes but 
only 13 (16.5%) out of 79 SMD/SNTV seats. For the PR ballot, the DPP 
received 36.9 percent of the total votes and 14 (41.2%) of 34 party seats. On 
the other hand, the KMT garnered 53.5 percent of the total district votes 
and 61 (77.2%) out of the 79 SMD/SNTV seats, as well as 51.2 percent 
of the total at- large votes and 20 (58.8%) out of the 34 party seats (Huang 
and Hsiao 2009). If we count the 3 seats won by the NPSU, the Pan- Blue, 
indeed, secured an overwhelming victory over the DPP in the 2008 legisla-
tive election, which also paved the way for the landslide victory of the KMT 
presidential candidate, Ma Yin- jeou, in March 2008. In 2008, 12 parties 
filed lists on the PR ballot, but only the two big parties, the KMT and the 
DPP, surpassed the 5 percent threshold. Although the two small parties, the 
NP and TSU, did receive 4 percent and 3.5 percent for the PR votes, respec-
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tively, neither of them managed to reach the 5 percent threshold required for 
parties to be allocated PR seats.
The presidential and legislative elections became synchronized on Janu-
ary 14, 2012, when Taiwan held its first- ever concurrent presidential and 
legislative elections. The elections also served as a test of the tenacity of 
the new two- party system under Taiwan’s MMM rules embedded within 
the semipresidential system. The PFP chair, James Soong, lamenting being 
cheated by the KMT, ran as an independent presidential candidate and also 
nominated 10 legislative- district candidates in order to file the party list.9 
The TSU, on the other hand, ran on the party list only, without nominat-
ing any district candidates. So each party essentially ran on its own in 2012, 
with the exception of a tacit alliance between the KMT and NPSU. In this 
three- way presidential race, the incumbent president, Ma Ying- jeou of the 
KMT, defeated his main challenger, Tsai Ing- wen of the DPP, by a substan-
tial margin. The third candidate, James Soong, received only 2.8 percent of 
the popular vote (Huang and Wang 2014). Meanwhile, the two major po-
litical parties took the lion’s share in the legislative election (table 10.3). The 
ruling KMT received 48.2 percent of the total district votes and 48 (60.8%) 
SMD/SNTV seats, as well as 44.6 percent of the total party list votes and 16 
(47.1%) party seats. The DPP, on the other hand, performed much better 
than it did in 2008 by garnering 43.8 percent of the total district votes and 
27 (34.2%) SMD/SNTV seats. For the PR ballot, the DPP received 34.6 
percent of the total votes and 13 (38.2%) party seats. Three PFP candidates 
were elected: one through the aboriginal SNTV district and two through 
the list tier with 5.5 percent PR votes. The TSU also won three seats from its 
9.0 percent list votes. Besides PFP and TSU, none of other seven parties that 
filed lists got as much as 2.9 percent. Notably, the outcome of the 2012 elec-
tion indicated the consolidation of the two- party system without coalitions.
The last four columns of table 10.1 present the Laakso- Taagepera effec-
tive number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) and the effective number of 
electoral parties (ENEP) in moving from an SNTV to an MMM system 
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). According to 
Duverger’s law, the number of parties in SMDs would shift toward two, due 
to mechanical effects and strategic voting owing to psychological effects. 
But Duverger’s hypothesis predicts that multiple parties remain in the PR 
tier of the system because voters have stronger incentives to vote sincerely. 
Figure 10.3 clearly indicates that there was an immediate sharp drop in the 
ENPP from 3.08 to 1.47, which is almost one- party dominance in parlia-
ment. With a much stronger performance by the DPP, and after the PFP 
split from the Pan- Blue coalition and ran its own candidates in the 2012 
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legislative election, the ENPP rose to 1.97, which is much closer to 2.00. 
ENEP indexes are not directly comparable between single- ballot SNTV and 
two- ballot MMM systems. Still it is not difficult to see that the growing 
trend of ENEP under SNTV was interrupted after the change of electoral 
system. Furthermore, as Duverger’s law and hypothesis expect, the ENEP 
in the SMD tier hovers around 2.30 while its PR counterpart is slightly 
higher. Actually, the ENEP in the PR tier rose from 2.49 in 2008 to 3.03 
in 2012 because both the PFP and TSU’s party votes exceed the 5 percent 
legal threshold.
Effects at the District Level
The national- level indexes were further checked and tested at the district 
level. It can be shown that the changes at the district level are also congru-
ent with the electoral- system theories. Specifically, I exploit the SF ratio (the 
ratio of the second to the first loser’s vote total) patterns over time and across 
two tiers. Cox (1997, 85) used the SF ratio to test the M + 1 rule, a general-
ization of Duverger’s law. The M + 1 rule holds that, at the district level, the 
effective number of candidates will decline toward the district magnitude 
(M) plus one. SF ratios demonstrate the extent to which the number of 
votes cast for less competitive candidates trail behind M + 1. Cox reasoned 
Fig. 10.3. Effective numbers of parliamentary parties and presidential candidates. 
Source: Huang 2013.
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that in Duvergerian equilibria, when strategic voting by voters occurs, the 
(M + 2)th candidate will be deserted and thus the SF ratio will be near zero. 
In non- Duvergerian equilibria, however, the first and second losers receive 
nearly the same number of votes, and thus the SF ratio will be near one. 
When M is small, such as in SMDs, where M = 1, strategic voting is more 
likely to occur in closely contested districts. As M grows larger, such as in an 
SNTV system with multiple seats in each district, strategic voting becomes 
more difficult due to the lack of clear information for voters. In other words, 
we should expect a greater number of districts concentrated at the lower 
end (closer to zero) in the nominal tier under an MMM system than in an 
SNTV system. If we plot the histogram of SF ratios of all the districts, the 
M + 1 rule predicts a right- skewed distribution with most districts having 
near- zero values concentrated on the left side and only a small number of 
exceptions on the right.
The SF ratios of Taiwan’s seven legislative elections at the district level 
were computed and then classified into 10 intervals, as shown in figures 
10.4 and 10.5. An examination of these figures reveals a dramatic reversal 
of district distributions after the electoral system switched from SNTV (fig-
ure 10.4) to MMM (figure 10.5). During the SNTV period from 1992 to 
2004, many of the multimember districts fell at the higher end of SF ratio 
(i.e., closer to 1.00). In the last two legislative elections of 2008 and 2012 
under MMM, however, most single- member districts’ SF ratios indeed had 
values close to 0.00 and thus concentrated at the lower end. This means that 
two- party competition has become the norm at the district as well as at the 
national level.
Effects at the Voter Level
As mentioned earlier, Duverger (1959, 205) asserted that single- member 
district plurality would tend to generate two- party competition, and he also 
proposed that PR systems would encourage multiparty competition. Besides 
the mechanical factor of SMD that leads to the underrepresentation of the 
weaker parties, the psychological factor that supporters of the third party 
tend to “transfer their voter to the less evil of its two adversaries” (Duverger 
1959, 226) also causes strategic voting. A mixed- member electoral system 
is characterized by the hybrid of both SMD and PR tiers. If identifiers with 
small parties indeed vote strategically on the SMD ballot and sincerely on 
the PR ballot, this ticket- splitting pattern becomes a micro- level evidence of 
electoral system effects.
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There is an abundant extant literature on voting choices and ticket- 
splitting under the MMM system at the voter level based on survey data, 
especially the TEDS 2008L and TEDS 2012- T surveys (Huang 2008b; 
Huang and Chou 2013; Huang and Hsiao 2009; Huang and Lin 2009; 
Huang, Wang and Kuo 2008; Wang, Lin and Hsiao 2016). It emphasizes 
that partisan voting is dominant for either of the two major party identi-
fiers on both SMD and PR ballots. Yet certain supporters of the smaller 
Fig. 10.4. SF ratio of Taiwan’s legislative Yuan elections, 1992– 2004. Source: Huang 
2013.
Fig. 10.5. SF ratio of Taiwan’s legislative Yuan elections, 2008– 2012. Source: Huang 
2013.
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parties indeed tend to vote strategically for the major party candidates of 
their own “color” camp, but vote sincerely for their most preferred party 
on the PR ballot. Besides partisanship, ethnic identity and attitude toward 
Taiwan independence vs. unification with China remain important explana-
tory variables of voting choices. For example, compared to those who iden-
tify themselves as Taiwanese, those who identify themselves as Chinese or 
as both Taiwanese/Chinese are more likely to vote for KMT candidates in 
districts and vote for the Pan- Blue camp on the party ballot.
In spite of the tendency of strategic voting from minor parties’ support-
ers, however, the MMM electoral system still squeezes smaller parties from 
two ends. That is, PR portion in Taiwan accounts for only 30.1 percent of 
the total 113 seats plus its relatively high 5 percent legal threshold causes 
the MMM electoral system to exert heavy pressure on small parties and thus 
push down the number of parties. Meanwhile, the force of gravity of the 
SMD portion in Taiwan’s MMM electoral system tends to favor any major 
party that can garner near 50 percent vote share in legislative elections.
Conclusions
This chapter has employed a comprehensive framework with which to study 
the evolution and effects of electoral systems embedded within social and 
institutional contexts. It has examined the change in legislative electoral sys-
tem in Taiwan and evaluated its consequences on political party systems 
from the perspective of this broad framework. It is interesting to note that 
after switching from an SNTV system to an MMM in 1994, Japan expe-
rienced only a gradual evolution from a multiparty to a two- party system, 
taking five House of Representatives election cycles, whereas the party sys-
tem in Taiwan changed immediately and dramatically in the first postreform 
election (Huang 2011; Huang, Kuo, and Stockton 2016). Taiwan’s fast con-
vergence toward two- party competition can be partly attributed to institu-
tional factors. That is, the powerful presidency of Taiwan’s semipresidential 
system motivates party leaders to synchronize the legislative electoral system 
to make it easier to form a unified government.
However, institutions alone do not explain the direction in which mul-
tiple parties converge. This chapter argued that the fundamental cleavage in 
Taiwan, that is, independence versus unification, has played a hidden yet 
significant role in three ways. First, it directed the centripetal force of the 
plurality system of presidential election toward the two camps. Although the 
old SNTV system left room for splinter parties within camps, the cleavage 
246  Taiwan Voter
motivated elites to push for a new electoral system that was more compatible 
with the enduring social division. Second, it accelerated the speed of conver-
gence toward the two- party system along the borderline of the preexisting 
cleavage by skipping time- consuming trial and error in coalition permuta-
tions. Last, but certainly not least, it crystallized a relatively stable two- party 
competition with regular power shifts under the semipresidential system.
Notes
 1. In Chinese, the new MMM rule is literally called “single- member district, two- 
ballot system.” This chapter adopts the classification and terminologies of two sub-
types of mixed- member systems used by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001, 13– 14). In 
the MMM systems, there is no link between nominal and list tiers in the allocation of 
seats to parties. The plurality formula used in the nominal tier can lead to significant 
disproportionality, and the list tier merely mitigates rather than erases this dispropor-
tionality. In contrast, the mixed- member proportional systems prioritize the list tier, 
that is, the second ballot, and each party’s total seat share is proportional to the list tier 
vote share.
 2. The KMT, which was founded on the mainland, was the ruling party of the 
Republic of China on the mainland. It moved to Taiwan in 1949 after losing the civil 
war with the Chinese Communist Party.
 3. As explained below, the prereform system was technically a mixed system since it 
had a nominal tier, with voters choosing specific candidates in the SNTV tier, as well 
as a list tier (see Farrell 2011). However, for the purpose of clarity, this chapter will 
refer to the prereform system as an SNTV system. In an SNTV system, each district 
has one or more seats and each voter can cast only one ballot for one specific candi-
date. There is no provision for preference rankings, so if a voter supports a candidate 
who does not win, the vote cannot be transferred to a second- favorite candidate.
 4. Before 2000, the constitution could be amended by the National Assembly 
alone upon the proposal of one- fifth of the total delegates and by a resolution of three- 
fourths of the delegates present at a meeting having a quorum of two- thirds of the 
entire Assembly. The KMT government took advantage of its overwhelming majority 
in the National Assembly to pass six constitutional amendments during the 1990s.
 5. The second stage was changed into a national referendum when the 2005 con-
stitutional amendment abolished the National Assembly.
 6. Both the learning effect of the 2000 presidential election and the centripetal 
effect of the plurality rule pushed the effective number of presidential candidates 
toward two in the ensuing presidential elections, as shown in figure 10.3. This down-
ward trend may well affect the effective number of parties in legislative elections.
 7. The DPP legislator Zhang Xue- shun used a sensational approach, pointing to 
the majority KMT as the “source of chaos and disorder” in the Legislative Yuan and 
argued that halving the seats would bring back order. See Commercial Times, Novem-
ber 24, 2000.
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 8. According to Lijphart (1997, 74), given the district magnitude M, the effective 
threshold is 0.75/(M + 1).
 9. Article 24 of the Election and Recall Act provides that unless a party has attained 
2.0% and more of the total valid votes in the recent presidential election or has won 
at least 2.0% of the votes in the previous three legislative elections or has five seats or 
more in the Legislative Yuan, it has to nominate at least 10 candidates in SMDs or 
indigenous districts in order to qualify for a party list.
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Chapter 11
Political Participation in Taiwan
Chung- li Wu with Tzu- Ping Liu
Political participation by ordinary citizens is the essence of democracy. Verba 
and Nie (1972, 3– 4) stress that political participation is at the heart of dem-
ocratic theory and has “a particularly crucial relationship to all other social 
and political goals.” Dahl (1971, 1) also posits a strong link between the two: 
“A key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” 
To this end, a democracy must provide its citizens with equal opportunities 
to formulate preferences, to signify those preferences, and to have their pref-
erences influence the formation of the government. Therefore, higher levels 
of participation by citizens in political activities can be viewed as a norm that 
supports a democratic political regime.
Political participation comes in many forms, including contacting pub-
lic officials, participating in political demonstrations, and many others. To 
an ordinary citizen, however, voting is the commonest, simplest, and least 
costly form of participation in electoral politics, although it has profound 
implications for the political system. Under a system of voluntary suffrage, 
voter turnout not only indicates how much interest the electorate has in the 
election but it also reveals the electorate’s degree of psychological attachment 
to political affairs (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46– 47; Rosenstone and Hansen 
2003, 245– 48). Likewise, voting is the key mechanism for responsiveness in 
democratic society. Citizens cast ballots to choose among candidates from 
competing political parties, and their choices are important in the selection 
of political leaders and public policies. The desire for office certainly makes 
political elites modify or even totally change policies to meet the expecta-
tions of voters (Almond and Powell 1988, 49; Nie and Verba 1975, 9– 10).
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Thus electoral participation in general, and voter turnout in particular, 
are important elements in the maintenance of democracy. Both have been 
widely studied in Western countries; however, they have received compara-
tively little attention elsewhere. This chapter explores political participation 
in Taiwan since the early 1990s, with a particular focus on electoral partici-
pation and voter turnout from 2001 through 2012. Our main purpose is, 
first, to describe trends in voter turnout since democratization, and second, 
to analyze the personal attributes of Taiwan citizens that have led them to 
become involved in politics over the past decade.
Voter turnout in Taiwan has been relatively high compared to other de-
mocracies, with an average of about 70 percent; however, it has declined 
substantially since 2000. To understand this pattern, we will use individual- 
level survey data to explore the question of who votes in Taiwan, comparing 
people of different ages and ethnicities. We will also examine party iden-
tification and political knowledge to learn their effects on the decision to 
vote. Finally, we will discuss how each of these demographic and cognitive 
factors influences other forms of political participation. The survey data used 
originate from the multiyear Taiwan Election and Democratization Study 
conducted by the National Chengchi University Election Study Center.1
The Framework of This Chapter
The term political participation encompasses many different activities. This 
chapter adopts Rosenstone and Hansen’s (2003, 4– 5) definition, so our re-
search is focused on voting, persuading others, campaigning, giving money, 
contacting others, attending meetings or rallies, and signing petitions. To 
explain these activities, we focus first on two sociodemographic variables— 
age and ethnicity.
Demographic factors are important for understanding political partici-
pation because individuals’ social backgrounds are central to the develop-
ment of their political attitudes and behaviors. It is a generally accepted 
proposition that age is a predictive variable where political attitudes and 
participation are concerned. According to the life- cycle effects theory, politi-
cal information and experience rise steadily with age, a phenomenon con-
firmed by previous empirical studies in the United States (Campbell et al. 
1960, 485– 87; Conway 2000, 19– 24; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 114– 16). 
Political participation increases through a person’s thirties, forties, and fif-
ties, and is at its height in Taiwan when individuals are in their late fifties 
and early sixties. Participation among those older than sixty- five declines 
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primarily because these people are in poorer health and are less physically 
mobile. Thus a person’s ability to participate in political activities will be 
closely related to age.
Among the socioeconomic variables used to explain political partici-
pation, race/ethnicity is probably the most thoroughly researched factor 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Tate 1991; Verba and Nie 1972). Ethnicity 
has been a critical issue in Taiwan’s political life, especially in relation to the 
ethnic differences between Minnan and mainlanders (Wang 1994, 1998).2 
In the light of Taiwan’s unique historical background and sociopolitical en-
vironment, ethnicity and its related issues (e.g., ethnic consciousness, na-
tional identity, and disputes over unification with or independence from 
the mainland) may all be regarded as social cleavages.3 Mainlanders have 
political attitudes and voting behavior that are distinct from those of other 
ethnic groups, mainly Minnan and Hakka (Hsiau 2000; Hughes 1997; Wu 
2008; Wu and Hsiao 2006).
In addition to individual characteristics, we consider the effects of cog-
nitive variables as well. Previous studies have demonstrated that these sub-
jective psychological determinants could be more important than the so-
ciodemographic factors noted above. Party identification, which refers to 
how closely a person identifies with one of the major political parties, is in 
theory closely related to political involvement (Abramson, Aldrich, and Ro-
hde 1995, 72– 75; Campbell et al. 1960, 121– 23; Miller and Shanks 1996, 
154– 56). It is a key part of an individual’s belief system and is characterized 
by long- term stability. Previous studies have demonstrated that party identi-
fiers have a greater degree of political interest than those without any party 
preference (Conway 2000, 52– 55; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 54). In Taiwan, 
many voters think of themselves as Pan- Blue supporters, others consider 
themselves Pan- Green.4 The rest— with the exception of the few who iden-
tify with a minor party— are labeled independents.
Research has shown that independents tend to be less concerned about 
politics, have less political information, are less interested in political activi-
ties, and tend to vote less often. Partisans, in contrast, are more involved 
and informed and more likely to register and vote, to talk about politics, to 
evaluate the outcomes of elections, to discuss candidates’ campaign prom-
ises, to try to influence others, to engage in campaign activities, and so on 
(Wu and Hsu 2003; Wu and Huang 2007). Partisans are also treated as the 
object of mobilization efforts by political parties, so they tend to participate 
more actively in the political process.
Intimately connected with ethnicity and party identification is the issue 
of national identity, or what is sometimes termed “ethnic consciousness,” 
which is widely regarded as an important issue that attracts the most atten-
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tion in Taiwan’s politics, and is also considered to be a key variable in re-
search on political behavior (Fell 2005; Hsiau 2000; Hsieh 2005; Wachman 
1994). National identity comprises individuals’ attitudes and beliefs toward 
their own nationality— Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chi-
nese. Over the decades when Taiwan was ruled by a Kuomintang- controlled, 
mainlander- dominated authoritarian regime, a China- centered political ide-
ology was the mainstream value. However, since the beginning of the de-
mocratization process in the mid- 1980s, a Taiwan- centered consciousness 
has gradually risen to prominence. This is confirmed by there being a greater 
number of respondents who identified themselves as “Taiwanese only” com-
pared to those who chose “Chinese only.”
It is necessary to explain that although ethnicity and national identity 
should be closely related, the former is an objective characteristic, while the 
latter is based on a subjective psychological sense of belonging. Regarding 
the direction of political participation, it is hypothesized that an individual 
having a more intense ideological identification (i.e., those who identified 
themselves as “Taiwanese only” and “Chinese only”) is predisposed to par-
ticipate in politics more actively.
In addition to party identification and national identity, political knowl-
edge is another subjective cognitive factor related to political participation. 
In theory, participation is strongly linked to information about government 
and politics. The available empirical evidence on this point indicates that 
individuals who have more information about what the government is doing 
tend to be more active politically (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 62– 104; 
Stone and Schaffner 1988, 204– 5). Actually, there is a positive- feedback 
relationship between participation and information: as individual citizens 
gain more political information, they participate more, thereby acquiring 
more experience and skills, thus further increasing their political knowledge. 
Previous studies on Taiwan politics have confirmed that a person’s political 
knowledge is directly related to sociopolitical involvement (Liao 2006; Tsai 
2001; Yang 2003). In the data collected for this chapter, political knowledge 
is self- reported by the respondents in surveys. In other words, it reflects the 
respondents’ confidence about their own level of political knowledge, which 
may contain some degree of bias.
The Historical Trend in Voter Turnout in Taiwan
In 1949 the KMT government retreated to Taiwan after the civil war in 
mainland China. From the early 1950s through the mid- 1980s, the KMT 
regime, in view of its comprehensive domination over the government’s rul-
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ing apparatus, bore the characteristics of an authoritarian one- party state 
with elements of totalitarianism (Tien 1989; Winckler 1984). The control 
seized by the KMT was comparable to that of the ruling party in a Leninist- 
style state, with two exceptions. Those exceptions were the existence of pri-
vate ownership and, more significantly, the institutionalization of local elec-
tions (Cheng 1989, 477– 78).
The first local elections for executive posts were held in two stages in 
1950 and 1951. Over the next five decades, voting was gradually expanded 
from local to national elections. From 1950 to 1968, electoral competition 
was limited to the chief executives and representative bodies at the city, sub-
county, and county levels and to the provincial assembly. In these elections, 
no organized political opposition was permitted to compete with the gov-
erning KMT. In 1969, the authorities initiated limited electoral competition 
for supplementary representative seats at the national level. With the lifting 
of martial law and the end of the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression 
of Communist Rebellion, all members of the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan were subject to direct election in 1991 and 1992. The most 
important development was the first popular presidential election, which 
took place in 1996. At present, all representative bodies and major execu-
tive officials— except the premier, who is appointed by the president— are 
elected by popular vote.
After the lifting of martial law in 1987, voting participation in Taiwan’s 
national elections, at an average of approximately 70 percent, was relatively 
high in comparison with that of other democratic countries. Nevertheless, 
Taiwan’s aggregate- level turnout rate for presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions has exhibited a downward trend similar to that in many developed 
countries (Powell 1986). Generally speaking, the rates of voter turnout in 
presidential elections are somewhat higher than those in parliamentary elec-
tions, as shown in table 11.1. For presidential races, turnout increased from 
76 percent in 1996 to 83 percent in 2000, and then slipped to 80 percent in 
2004, 76 percent in 2008, and 74 percent in 2012.
The turnout rates for legislative elections exhibit an obviously declin-
ing trend. The turnout in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections was about 72 
percent, which was high compared to the elections that followed. In 1995, 
1998, and 2001, the average was approximately 67 percent. The level of 
voter turnout then plunged to 59 percent in the 2004 year- end legislative 
election. Save for 2012, which was the first occasion upon which a presi-
dential election coincided with a legislative vote, and when, as might be ex-
pected, there was a higher turnout rate (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; 
Nikolenyi 2010), the turnout rate for legislative elections has consistently 
Political Participation in Taiwan  257
decreased, reaching its lowest point in 2008 at about 58 percent. Overall, 
Taiwan’s voter turnout has declined for both presidential and legislative elec-
tions at the aggregate level. This drop in citizen engagement raises worri-
some questions for the health of Taiwan’s democracy to which we will return 
at the end of this chapter.
Explaining Voter Turnout in Taiwan
To understand who votes in Taiwan, we examine the TEDS multiyear 
survey data mentioned above. These data allow us to trace the pattern of 
changes in the turnout rate in recent elections. In each election year, the sur-
vey data constitute a nationally representative, multistage probability sample 
of adults living throughout Taiwan.5
The respondents were asked whether they had cast ballots, but in Taiwan, 
as in other countries, people sometimes report that they voted when in fact 
they did not.6 The actual turnout of individual citizens is known to the 
Taiwan Election Commission, but their records are secret. Unlike in some 
other democracies, researchers are not given access to these records, even on 
a confidential basis. Thus turnout reports in Taiwan cannot be “validated,” 
that is, checked against official records. The result is that turnout in Taiwan 
as reported in surveys is higher than the official records, as may be seen in 
TABlE 11.1. Voter Turnout in Taiwan’s National Elections, 1989– 2012
Year Type of election
Turnout  
(%)
1989 Supplementary representatives of the Legislative Yuan 75.2
1991 2nd session representatives of the National Assembly 68.3
1992 2nd session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 72.0
1995 3rd session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 67.7
1996 9th presidential election 76.0
3rd session representatives of the National Assembly 76.2
1998 4th session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 68.1
2000 10th presidential election 82.7
2001 5th session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 66.2
2004 March 11th presidential election 80.3
2004 December 6th session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 59.2
2008 January 7th session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 58.5
2008 March 12th presidential election 76.3
2012 January 13th presidential election 74.4
2012 January  8th session representatives of the Legislative Yuan 74.7
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, http://www.esc.nccu.edu.tw/.
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the charts below.7 Thus surveys are not very good at estimating absolute lev-
els of turnout. Fortunately, however, turnout comparisons across groups are 
less affected by this problem, and that is our focus in this chapter. In order 
to provide clearer ideas, we present the results in figures (11.1– 11.5) and 
tables (11.2– 11.6).
Figure 11.1 shows the differences in voter turnout rates by age group. The 
first thing to note is that the reported turnout rate in presidential elections 
is higher than that in legislative elections, which is as expected. Moreover, in 
both types of elections, the turnout rate increases with age. However, with 
the exception of voters in their fifties and older, the reported turnout rate has 
gradually decreased with time. Thus the problem of declining interest in vot-
ing is concentrated among younger voters. Their turnout has declined faster 
than the average seen in figure 1. This raises special concerns for Taiwan’s 
democratic health as Taiwan’s older and more reliable voters inevitably reach 
the age at which they can no longer participate actively.
Ethnicity has long been a politically sensitive issue in Taiwan, especially 
the cleavage between the majority Taiwanese and the minority mainland-
ers (Moody 1992; Wachman 1994). Mainlanders are often thought to par-
ticipate more. Contrary to expectations, however, the results in figure 11.2 
reveal that mainlanders do not have a significantly higher turnout rate than 
Minnan and Hakka. Thus subethnic differences in Taiwan have very little 
impact on turnout. As we will see, however, differences reappear when we 
look at electoral participation more broadly.
Next, we explore the relationship between an individual’s party identifi-
cation and turnout rate, as displayed in figure 11.3. Party identification, in 
theory, is closely related to political involvement. As expected, an individual 
with a preference for a specific political party, either a Pan- Blue or a Pan- 
Green supporter, is more likely to vote in both presidential and legislative 
elections. The differences are typically not large (5 to 10 percentage points), 
but they have existed in all elections after the 2001 Legislative Yuan contest.
Contrary to expectations, the results in figure 11.4 indicate that there is 
no specific relationship between voter turnout and national identity. Indi-
viduals who have a clear national identity (either Taiwanese only or Chinese 
only) have relatively high turnout rates; however, the differences are weak 
and insignificant. More specifically, those who identify themselves as Chi-
nese are more likely to vote. Overall, the findings are consistent with the 
results displayed in figures 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4— that individuals who have 
a distinct idea of their ethnicity, party affiliation, and national identity are 
more likely to vote, although these variables merely exert conditional effects 
on voting participation.
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Also as hypothesized, the turnout rate in presidential elections increases 
with the level of (self- reported) political knowledge (see figure 11.5). The 
turnout rate for individuals with a low level of political knowledge is around 
84– 86 percent. The rate for those with either a moderate or high level of po-
litical knowledge is generally higher than 90 percent. However, in the elec-
tions to the Legislative Yuan, the relationship between turnout and knowl-
edge is more erratic. Not until the 2008 election does a legislative election 
exhibit the expected pattern, with more knowledgeable individuals voting at 
a higher rate. It may be that the parties formerly mobilized voters differently 
in the two kinds of elections but no longer do so; this is a topic that deserves 
further investigation.
In summary, an individual’s age (up to 65), party identification, national 
identity, and level of political knowledge are all positively correlated with 
turnout rates, just as they are in most democracies. Essentially, the more 
experienced and more engaged citizens are more likely to vote, as one would 
expect. However, we did not find strong differences between Taiwan’s sub-
ethnic groups.
Fig. 11.1.  Voter turnout by age group. Note: From left to right in each year, bars 
represent voters in one of five age groups: 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s and above. 
Numbers on the bars represent the percentage turnout for each age group. l: 
legislative; P: presidential.
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Explaining Other Kinds of Political Participation in Taiwan
Voter turnout is just one aspect of democratic participation. Citizens may 
influence their representatives in many different ways, and all of those path-
ways matter for democratic responsiveness. Thus we now proceed to exam-
ine other types of participation, using the same explanatory factors we used 
to study voter turnout. Due to the different types of participation being 
recorded in our multiyear datasets, we divided respondents into two groups, 
participants and nonparticipants, for analytical convenience. Participants 
are defined as those who took part in at least one form of political activity in 
the surveyed time period, while nonparticipants are those who indicated an 
abstention from all such activities.8
Differences in electoral participation by age group, by an individual’s 
ethnicity, by party identification, national identity, and by level of political 
knowledge are displayed in figures 11.6– 11.10.
Age, ethnicity, party identification, national identity, and political 
knowledge are all more or less positively correlated with the level of an indi-
vidual’s electoral participation, as was the case with turnout rates. However, 
Fig. 11.2.  Voter turnout by ethnicity. Note: From left to right in each year, bars 
represent Hakka, Minnan, and Mainlanders. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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all these explanatory factors make a bigger difference to electoral participa-
tion broadly defined than they do to turnout. Age matters more; mainland-
ers participate more, at least in recent elections; and partisanship, political 
knowledge, and national identity matter much more significantly than they 
did for turnout. Thus substantial inequality in political participation persists 
in Taiwan, with older, more engaged mainlanders participating more.
If this trend of inequality in participation continues, it will have a nega-
tive impact on the future development of democracy in Taiwan. If younger 
people drop out of the politically active population, the nation’s political 
agenda will be dominated by the interests of older, possibly more conserva-
tive, voters in the future. Economically, this might result in more govern-
ment resources spent on welfare programs geared toward the elderly as well 
as protection of inefficient traditional industries at the expense of financing 
future- oriented policies, such as improving education and providing incen-
tives for starting new businesses. Politically, it might cause young people 
to become disillusioned with the democratic establishment, pushing them 
toward ever more radical methods of promoting their own interests. The 
Fig. 11.3.  Voter turnout by party identification. Note: From left to right in each 
year, bars represent Pan- Blue identifiers, Pan- Green identifiers, and independents. 
l: legislative; P: presidential.
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recent Sunflower Student Movement is an illustration of youth’s lack of con-
fidence in a political system led by an older generation with apparently little 
concern for the needs of the young.
Conclusion
This chapter covers the development of voter turnout and electoral partici-
pation in Taiwan. Both voting and participation in electoral activities are es-
sential elements in the formation and maintenance of democracy. Elections, 
especially, are the most important way of promoting political participation 
among ordinary citizens. Through elections, citizens select political lead-
ers and shape public affairs, while the government uses them to guaran-
tee its legitimacy (Jackman 1987, 405– 6). According to Lipset (1981, 27), 
“democracy is a complex society . . . which supplies regular constitutional 
Fig. 11.4. Voter turnout by national identity. Note: From left to right in each 
year, bars represent voters who identify themselves as: Taiwanese only, both 
Taiwanese and Chinese, and Chinese only. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism 
which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major 
decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.” In a democ-
racy, political participation affects the distribution of social values, and one 
way of judging its effectiveness is to see who plays an active role in the politi-
cal process, and how much they participate in it.
Despite the importance of political participation to democracy, we find 
that empirical research on this topic has been limited primarily to Western 
countries, and that systematic analysis of electoral participation in devel-
oping democracies such as Taiwan remains scarce. Research into the level 
of political participation among Taiwan citizens is therefore likely to have 
implications for government authorities and civic groups, as they seek to sta-
Fig. 11.5. Voter turnout by self- assessed political knowledge. Note: From left 
to right in each year, bars represent low, moderate, and high levels of political 
knowledge. Because different survey questions on political knowledge were 
used, varying scoring scales were adopted. For data from TEDS 2001, TEDS 
2004l, TEDS 2004P, and TEDS 2008l, we recoded political knowledge by level: 
low (score 0– 1), moderate (2– 3), and high (score 4– 5); for data from TEDS 
2008P, scoring was recoded to low (score 0– 1), moderate (score 2), and high 
(score 3); for data from TEDS 2012, scoring was recoded to low (score 0– 2), 
moderate (score 3– 4), and high (score 5– 7). l: legislative; P: presidential.
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bilize and strengthen the island’s fledgling democratic institutions. The need 
to deduce what drives political participation in Taiwan is even more pressing 
due to a significant downward trend in turnout for both presidential and 
legislative elections in recent years.
We end this chapter as we began it, by highlighting that political par-
ticipation can be affected by sociodemographic characteristics and subjec-
tive cognition, as well as people’s personal attitudes and life experiences. 
Political socialization is a continuing process. Reviewing the similarities and 
differences displayed above, we note in particular that voters in their fifties 
and sixties, those who identify with a particular party, those who perceive 
themselves to be Chinese, those who have high levels of political knowledge, 
and those who are mainlanders are more likely to vote and engage in politi-
cal activities. This more engaged group can be seen as the established higher 
social class within Taiwan society. They tend to be an economically well off 
sector whose interests are at least in part opposed to those of younger voters.
In this sense, social and economic factors are fundamental to political 
participation. The findings of this chapter confirm the proposition that the 
Fig. 11.6. Electoral participation by age group. Note: From left to right in each 
year, bars represent the percentage of voters in one of five age groups: 20s, 30s, 
40s, 50s, and 60s and above. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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higher a person’s social status, the more likely they are to be an active par-
ticipant in political life. People in the upper and middle classes tend to be 
more interested and involved in public affairs than lower class individuals. 
The unequal distribution of political participation may have the effect of 
driving Taiwan toward an “elite regime” in which the established upper class 
will be able to use its financial resources and political knowledge to dictate 
the policy agendas of elected politicians, gradually creating an environment 
more favorable to corporate and business interests at the expense of labor. 
Such a development would not only further strengthen the dichotomy be-
tween the young and the old but also create an insurmountable gap in power 
between the urban and the rural populations, the rich and the poor, as well 
as between the politically connected and unconnected members of the pub-
lic. Socioeconomic disparity between groups and regions would be accom-
panied by political unfairness, and the democratic system would no longer 
guarantee an equal voice for all voters as it was originally meant to do.
The potentially divisive nature of unequal political participation means 
that it is necessary for Taiwan to reengage those groups of voters who are un-
Fig. 11.7. Electoral participation by ethnicity. Note: From left to right in each year, 
bars represent Hakka, Minnan, and Mainlanders. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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derrepresented in the electorate. To be fundamentally and sustainably effec-
tive, this process of reengagement must emphasize cooperation between the 
higher levels of society and the grassroots. On the one hand, populist civic 
groups must be established to educate people about the long- term harm 
caused by political indifference. These groups should not only be encour-
aged but also financed, if necessary, by the government. On the other hand, 
the government must be tolerant of dissent. Negotiations with the Sun-
flower Student Movement and even partial incorporation of their platform 
into official policy, for instance, may trigger renewed interest among those 
young people who have become disillusioned with politics.
What is most important, however, is the need to continue monitoring 
the levels of political participation by different groups, as has been done in 
the research presented in this chapter. The ability to identify which groups 
have become estranged from the mainstream political establishment allows 
measures to be taken to rectify this state of affairs before the drifting away 
of certain voters creates systemic problems for policymakers and for Taiwan 
society.
Fig. 11.8. Electoral participation by party identification. Note: From left to right 
in each year, bars represent Pan- Blue identifiers, Pan- Green identifiers, and 
independents. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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Appendix 11.A1. Survey Questions and Coding of Variables
Voter Turnout. “Did you vote for the Legislative Yuan Election?” (1 = yes; 2 
= no) (TEDS 2001L) (TEDS 2004L) (TEDS 2008L)
 “In this presidential election many people went to vote, while others, 
for various reasons, did not go to vote. Did you vote?” (1 = yes; 2 = no) 
(TEDS 2004P) (TEDS 2008P) (TEDS 2012)
Electoral Participation. “Respondents’ total amount of political activities 
listed below: did volunteer campaign work for either a candidate or a 
party; attended an election- related gathering or banquet; joined a candi-
date’s support organization; reminded friends to watch candidate debates 
or campaign; persuaded others to vote for a particular candidate or party; 
gave money to a political party or candidate; purchased a candidate’s 
souvenirs; attended a candidate’s rally) (1 = none; 2 = at least one of them) 
(TEDS 2001L) (TEDS 2004P) (TEDS 2004L) (TEDS 2008P) (TEDS 
2012)
Fig. 11.9. Electoral participation by national identity. Note: From left to right in 
each year, bars represent voters who identify themselves as: Taiwanese only, both 
Taiwanese and Chinese, and Chinese only. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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Age. Respondent’s age measured in years. (1 = 20 to 29; 2 = 30 to 29; 3 = 40 to 
49; 4 = 50 to 59; 5 = above 60)
Ethnicity. Ethnic background of respondent’s father. (1 = Hakka; 2 = Min-
nan; 3 = Mainlander; aborigines coded as missing)
Party identification. “Among the main political parties in our country, 
including the KMT, DPP, PFP, NP, and TSU, do you think of yourself 
as leaning toward any particular party?” “Which party is that?”(1 = Pan- 
Blue supporter [KMT, NP, and PFP]; 2 = Pan- Green supporter [DPP and 
TSU])
National identity. “In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There 
are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you consider 
yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both?” (1 = Taiwanese; 2 = both; 3 = 
Chinese)
Political knowledge. Respondents’ total amount of correct answers to the 
following questions: “Who is the current Vice President of our coun-
try?”; “Who is the President of the PRC?”; “Who is the current President 
Fig. 11.10. Electoral participation by self- assessed political knowledge. Note: From 
left to right in each year, bars represent low, moderate, and high level of political 
knowledge. l: legislative; P: presidential.
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of the United States?”; “How many years are a legislator’s term?”; and, 
“Which institution has the power to interpret the Constitution?” (1 = 
low [total correct answers are 0– 1]; 2 = moderate [total correct answers are 
2– 3]; 3 = high [total correct answers are 4– 5]) (TEDS 2001L)
 “Who is the President of the PRC?”; “Who is the current President of 
the United States?”; “How many years are a legislator’s term?”; “Which 
institution has the power to interpret the Constitution?”; and, “Who is 
the current Vice President of our country?” (1 = low [total correct answers 
are 0– 1]; 2 = moderate [total correct answers are 2– 3]; 3 = high [total cor-
rect answers are 4– 5]) (TEDS 2004P)
 “Who is the current Vice President of our country?”; “Who is the Presi-
dent of the PRC?”; “Who is the current President of the United States?”; 
“How many years are a legislator’s term?”; and, “Which institution has 
the power to interpret the Constitution?” (1 = low [total correct answers 
are 0– 1]; 2 = moderate [total correct answers are 2– 3]; 3 = high [total cor-
rect answers are 4– 5]) (TEDS 2004L)
 “Who is the current President of the United States?”; “Who is the current 
premier of our country?”; “Which institution has the power to interpret 
the Constitution?” (1 = low [total correct answers are 0– 1]; 2 = moderate 
[total correct answers are 2]; 3 = high [total correct answers are 3]) (TEDS 
2008P)
 “Who is the current Vice President of our country?”; “Who is the current 
President of the United States?”; “Who is the President of the PRC?”; 
“Which institution has the power to interpret the Constitution?”; and, 
“How many years are a legislator’s term?” (1 = low [total correct answers 
are 0– 1]; 2 = moderate [total correct answers are 2– 3]; 3 = high [total cor-
rect answers are 4– 5]) (TEDS 2008L)
 “Who is the current President of the United States?”; “Who is the current 
premier of our country?”; “Which institution has the power to interpret 
the Constitution?”; “Which of these persons was the finance minister 
before the recent election?”; “What was the current unemployment 
rate in Taiwan as of the end of last year”; “Which party came in second 
in seats in the Legislative Yuan?”; and, “Who is the current Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, Kurt Waldheim, Ban Ki- 
moon, or Boutros- Ghali?” (1 = low [total correct answers are 0– 2]; 2 = 
moderate [total correct answers are 3– 4]; 3 = high [total correct answers 
are 5– 7]) (TEDS 2012)
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Notes
 1. Data analyzed in this chapter were collected as part of the research project enti-
tled “Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2012: Presidential and Legislative 
Elections” (TEDS 2012) (NSC 100– 2420- H002– 030). The coordinator of the mul-
tiyear TEDS project is Chi Huang of the Department of Political Science at National 
Chengchi University. The principal investigator is Professor Yun- han Chu of the Insti-
tute of Political Science at Academia Sinica. More information is on the TEDS website 
(http://www.tedsnet.org). The following were responsible for distributing the date: 
the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University; the Department 
of Political Science, Soochow University; the Graduate Institute of Political Science, 
National Sun Yat- Sen University; the Department of Political Science and Graduate 
Institute of Political Economy, National Cheng Kung University; the Department of 
Political Science, Tunghai University; and the Election Study Center, National Cheng-
chi University. The authors appreciate the assistance of the institutes and individuals 
aforementioned in providing data. This research is partially supported by National 
Chengchi University’s Top University Project. The views expressed in this chapter are 
those of the authors alone.
 2. For a discussion of ethnic and subethnic differences in Taiwan, see chapter 1.
 3. Although Minnan and mainlanders have different attitudes and characteris-
tics, in reality politics is the main factor generating the ethnic consciousness of both 
groups. See chapters 1 and 3.
 4. As a reminder for readers, the Taiwan party system is generally divided into the 
Pan- Blue camp, which espouses eventual political unification with China, and the 
Pan- Green camp, which consists of supporters of Taiwan independence. The major 
parties of the Pan- Blue camp are the Kuomintang, the People First Party, and the New 
Party, while the Pan- Green parties are the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union, and the Green Party.
 5. The TEDS data are weighted by gender, age, and education to achieve national 
representativeness. The population statistics are based on census data reported in the 
official documents, Taiwan- Fukien Demographic Statistics, Republic of China, released 
by the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China.
 6. The topic of vote misreporting is important both theoretically and practically 
(Wu 2006, 224). Research on both electoral turnout and vote choice depends heavily 
on self- reported behavior, but it is generally found that a number of respondents do 
not accurately report their electoral behavior. One cause of errors in survey research 
is that more respondents claim to have voted in postelection interviews than have 
actually cast ballots. A possible consequence is that misreporting does indeed produce 
some misleading conclusions, since much of the scholarly work tests models of elec-
toral behavior based on survey measurements containing a relatively large amount of 
error.
 7. In figure 11.2, for example, all but the small, youngest group reported turnout 
rates exceeding 80% for the 2001 Legislative Yuan election, but as figure 11.1 shows, 
the actual turnout rate in that election was only 67%.
 8. The 13 electoral activities in the TEDS are as follows: read the official elec-
tion notice; read candidates’ leaflets, newsletter, or newspaper ads; watched candidate 
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debates or campaign speeches on TV; did volunteer campaign work for either a candi-
date or a party; attended an election- related gathering or banquet; joined a candidate’s 
support organization; reminded friends to watch candidate debates or campaign; per-
suaded others to vote for a particular candidate or party; gave money to a political 
party or candidate; purchased a candidate’s souvenirs; invited to participate in a candi-
date’s rally; attended a candidate’s rally; and visited a candidate’s website.
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The Power of Identity in Taiwan
Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang
Most countries are politically divided along lines that reflect their inter-
nal cleavages. Those cleavages may be religious, linguistic, ethnic/racial, 
regional, or class- based. Most countries contain several politically relevant 
divisions. In multiparty systems, particularly those with proportional repre-
sentation and a low threshold for gaining parliamentary seats, some minor 
cleavages (farmers, small ethnic or linguistic minorities) may have their own 
party in the legislature. Larger parties usually represent coalitions. In two- 
party systems, both parties are large, and in consequence each party will 
represent a broad combination of groups. Large parties frequently reflect 
many entirely distinct and unrelated cleavages in the society, sometimes in 
ways that make common sense, and sometimes not. In the United States, for 
example, liquor distributors and conservative evangelical Christians, once 
bitter enemies in the Prohibition era, now find themselves side by side in the 
Republican Party.
Thus, in most countries the major parties embody many different identi-
ties. The voters, too, are often a jumble of identities, some more strongly felt 
than others, but all of them subject to activation and mobilization under 
the right circumstances. Studying the role of social identities in politics is 
typically quite difficult. Different voters will identify with a particular party 
for very different reasons. Many voters themselves will have more than one 
identity that drives them toward a particular party, and perhaps some other 
identities that are in conflict with that party.
As the parties adopt new positions, some voters will feel conflicted. Most 
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will stay with their partisanship, simply living with the tensions or tuning 
them out. Others will move toward political independence, perhaps even-
tually switching to another party with which, again, they are in imperfect 
agreement. But the result is that at any given time, there is no simple rela-
tionship between identity, partisanship, and issue positions. All three are 
tangled up in not wholly consistent ways.
In consequence, the study of how identities relate to partisanship and 
political attitudes is very complex in most countries. A small proportion of 
voters, often discriminated- against minorities, may have one main identity 
driving their political stances. But for most voters, too many things are af-
fecting too many other things. Voters have too many identities. Even when 
identities are the main factor driving party choices and issue positions, the 
catch- all nature of the parties and the complexity of the voters’ own political 
lives create a vortex of causal arrows, making it extremely difficult to discern 
why the voters are thinking and choosing as they do. Any attractive theoreti-
cal account comes up against mixed empirical support and plausible coun-
terarguments. Put another way, most countries are not very good places to 
study how social identities connect to political identities, issue preferences, 
and vote choices.
Taiwan, however, is a happy exception, as this book has demonstrated. 
Social cleavages are few. Apart from a tiny minority, Taiwan voters do not 
differ racially. The great majority adhere to a low- intensity, syncretist reli-
gious tradition with a mixture of Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian elements, 
which has never been a source of political divisions. In the absence of an 
exploitative industrial revolution and without the associated development of 
strong employee unions, social class has not been central to Taiwan politics. 
(Compare the heavy emphasis on class in treatments of European politics— a 
recent example is Evans and De Graaf 2013.) In Taiwan, the principal divi-
sion is linguistic and ethnic— whether the language one speaks at home is 
Mandarin, Hakka, Hokkien (Fujianese), or one of the aboriginal languages. 
In turn, this cleavage relates to the historical time of arrival on Taiwan from 
elsewhere, and the associated history and culture of each group.
As we discussed in chapter 1, events of the past 70 years have reinforced 
those linguistic and cultural divisions and made them politically salient. 
Other divisions are much weaker. That means that Taiwan has just one cen-
tral cleavage— a gift to scholars trying to understand how identity operates 
in politics. Of course, as we have seen, that cleavage has evolved. Once tied 
more strictly to ethnicity, with a Mandarin- speaking ruling elite enforcing 
their culture on everyone else, the issue is now more closely related to differ-
ing conceptions of national identity.
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Ethnicity still matters: only a minority of mainlanders identify as strictly 
Taiwanese, and extremely few Minnan identify as purely Chinese. But with 
a more open society, intermarriage, and the passage of time, the categories 
have blurred. Some Hakka and aboriginal citizens, with their own historical 
grievances against the Minnan, feel free to line up politically with mainland-
ers, for example. What matters less and less are the divisions of the 1950s. 
What matters more and more, regardless of ethnicity, is where one stands 
on the status of Taiwan. Is China the ancestral homeland of which Taiwan 
is an integral part, even if currently administered separately? Or is China a 
different country from Taiwan, home to a fundamentally different people? 
Debates of this kind are familiar from the history of many countries.1
In this book, we have addressed the question of how Taiwan voters make 
their decisions when they go to the polls. We have found that the central 
political cleavage and its associated social and political identities are central 
to voters’ thinking. Candidates’ personal traits, the domestic issues of the 
day, cross- Strait relations, and Taiwan’s institutional arrangements all play 
a modest role as well. But what shapes politics on the island much more 
than anything else is “the China factor,” the central dispute over Taiwan’s 
national identity. Over and over again in this book, we have found that it 
dominates voters’ decisions. And because left- right language is used to de-
scribe that division by almost no one in Taiwan, the conventional Western 
view that “left” and “right” apply everywhere in one form or another among 
knowledgeable citizens simply collapses when applied to Taiwan, as chapter 
9 showed.
Because the two main parties are perceived to take opposite sides on the 
fundamental cleavage, partisanship embodies the same electoral division. 
Thus, whether the national identity issue directly shapes some policy dispute, 
or whether partisanship structures it instead, the result is the same: the dis-
pute will be molded by the underlying cleavage over Taiwan’s national identity. 
Nothing else matters to the same degree, and certainly not the conventional 
left- right dimension that gives form to politics in most Western countries.
Repeatedly, therefore, the analyses in the various chapters have identified 
partisan identification as the most important factor in Taiwan voters’ elec-
toral calculus.2 That is, the island citizens’ self- declared partisan affiliations 
with the Pan- Blue Alliance and the Pan- Green Alliance exert the most sig-
nificant effects on how and why they support specific candidates. As figure 
12.1 shows, partisanship has an extremely powerful effect in Taiwan. 3 In the 
2012 presidential election, knowing the voter’s partisanship was tantamount 
to knowing how he or she voted in the vast majority of the cases. Only in-
dependents fell toward the middle: everyone else was polarized. In contem-
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porary Taiwan, there simply is not much about the vote left to explain once 
partisanship is accounted for.
The finding that partisan identification plays an important role in un-
derstanding citizens’ political behavior in democratic polities is not new, 
of course. More than half a century ago, the authors of The American Voter 
convincingly demonstrated “the role of enduring partisan commitments 
in shaping attitudes toward political objects” (Campbell et al. 1960, 135). 
They concluded that “the strength and direction of party identification are 
facts of central importance in accounting for attitude and behavior” (121).
What Taiwan voters add to this familiar story is that their partisan iden-
tifications largely embody the single most important political cleavage on 
the island— Taiwan’s future relationship with China, generally characterized 
as the issue of unification vs. independence. Because this key political cleav-
age is also intertwined with the island citizens’ psychological attachment to 
China (or detachment from it), partisan identification mirrors Taiwan vot-
ers’ conception of Taiwan’s national identity. The Pan- Green Alliance sees 
Taiwan’s de jure independence and its permanent separation from China as 
the ultimate objective, whereas the Pan- Blue Alliance does not preclude the 
island’s eventual unification as a possible outcome.
In the public’s view, the Pan- Green Alliance is pro- independence while 
Fig. 12.1. Pan- Blue vote in 2012 Taiwan presidential election
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the Pan- Blue Alliance is pro- unification. As these are two diametrically 
different positions, the Taiwan voters’ decision to adopt a partisan iden-
tification is easier than in many other countries— the choice is clear and 
unmistakable. Cross- Strait relations and Taiwanese/Chinese identity have 
always been key campaign issues in presidential elections. All other issues 
are secondary, as Sheng and Liao’s chapter demonstrates. Subjects related to 
Taiwan’s relationship with China have been main instruments employed by 
the two political alliances to energize their supporters. Also, because Taiwan’s 
party structure reflects the key political cleavage in the society, all other is-
sues, even essentially administrative policy issues such as absentee voting or 
the adoption of an English translation system, can be formulated as aspects 
of the main cleavage and debated in partisan terms, as we saw in chapter 1. 
Of course, the impact of partisanship varies across countries, as hundreds of 
studies have shown. (The case of Latin America, for example, is discussed 
in Lupu 2015.) The clarity of choice and the polarization provided by the 
party system are often thought to enhance the development of partisanship. 
(The European case is treated in Berglund et al. 2005 and van der Eijk, 
Schmitt, and Binder 2005, 177– 80; see Zechmeister 2015 for the Latin 
American counterpart.) Both clarity and polarization apply to Taiwan, and 
the strength of partisanship there confirms the usual comparative logic of 
how citizens become partisans. These Taiwan findings handsomely coincide 
both with Western studies and with Bartels’s conclusion in the American po-
litical setting that partisanship is “a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens’ 
perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world” (Bartels 2002, 138).
Thus, partisan identification plays a central role in the Taiwan voter’s 
electoral calculus, as it does elsewhere. Yet other countries’ voters often give 
weight to the character of the candidates and the state of economy in making 
their vote choices. Is that true in Taiwan? The chapter by Wang and Chen 
(chapter 8) clearly shows that the notion of candidate issue ownership is ap-
plicable in Taiwan. That is, voters’ perceptions of candidate traits are closely 
connected with party labels. In general, the Pan- Blue candidates, or more 
precisely the KMT candidates, are perceived as more capable of handling 
issues related to economic development and cross- Strait relations, whereas 
the Pan- Green, or the DPP, candidates are associated with eliminating cor-
ruption and initiating political reforms. Yet the perception of personal traits 
does not provide substantial advantages or disadvantages to candidates dur-
ing elections. Citizens’ electoral decisions continue to be conditioned by 
their partisan affiliations.
As Lewis- Beck (1988) and Paldam (1991) demonstrated, and as many 
subsequent studies have confirmed, the strength of economic voting varies 
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dramatically from one country to the next. Powell and Whitten (1993) and 
Anderson (2007) each argued that context matters: if clarity of responsibility 
is unclear, for example, or if no credible alternative government exists, eco-
nomic voting may diminish or disappear. (Gelineau and Singer 2015 review 
the literature and discuss the Latin American case.) In the case of Taiwan’s 
essentially two- party system, the president’s responsibility is clear and the op-
position is credible. Economic voting should occur. Indeed, the Taiwan pub-
lic’s assessment of the economy does appear to have an effect on their voting 
decisions. However, Taiwan voters appear to be rather tolerant of incumbents’ 
past economic performance. Rather than punishing sitting presidents for a 
bad economy, they apparently have a tendency to reward candidates that offer 
a promising economic future. That is, prospective economic voting is more 
prevalent in Taiwan than retrospective voting, as both the postelection survey 
data and the aggregate cross- county economic evidence suggest. Nevertheless, 
as Tsai concludes in chapter 8, Taiwan voters’ “partisanship is a better predic-
tor” of electoral outcomes than their assessment of the state of the economy.
Comparative Strength of the Factors Influencing Vote Choice
In this book, we have reviewed a variety of factors that influence vote 
choice— ethnicity, national identity, issues, and economic evaluations— 
and we have compared each with partisanship. Repeatedly, we have found 
that partisanship was the controlling factor, with an impact much stronger 
than any of the other single forces at work. However, we have not yet as-
sessed these competing factors jointly. We have seen only that partisanship 
is dominant, but not which of the remaining influences on the vote are also 
somewhat consequential. It is to that task that we now turn.
We begin by using all available explanatory variables to account for the 
presidential vote in 2012. The small vote (2.8%) for James Soong is grouped 
with that for Ma Ying- jeou to form the Pan- Blue vote; the vote for Tsai 
Ing- wen is the Pan- Green vote. Logit analysis is employed to model this 
dichotomous variable. In addition to party identification, the explanatory 
variables include the three principal ethnicities (with Hakka as the excluded 
category), and the three types of national identification (“Taiwanese,” “Chi-
nese,” and “Dual”), with “Dual” (i.e., “both Chinese and Taiwanese”) as 
the excluded identity. We also create a category (“No ethnic identity”) for 
the small but distinctive group who replied “other,” “don’t know,” or who 
refused to answer the question. This group is more senior (a large majority 
older than 49) and less educated (a majority with junior high school or less). 
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More than 70 percent have no partisanship, but they often retain the one- 
party KMT voting loyalties of their youth.
Other variables included were measures of opinion on unification/inde-
pendence, on social welfare expenditures, and on the cross- Strait economic 
agreement (ECFA). Economic evaluations were also included— first, the 
county- level change in disposable income per capita, and then also the re-
spondent’s prospective and retrospective evaluations of the national econ-
omy. (See chapter 6 for the definitions of these variables.) Preliminary ex-
ploration of the data indicated that the only category of occupation with a 
possible substantial effect on vote choice was being a postsecondary student. 
Similarly, having a junior high school education or less was the only pos-
sibly influential category of education. Dummy variables for each were in-
cluded in the explanatory model, along with two variables for demographic 
factors— gender and age. All variables were scaled to 0– 1 for easy compari-
son.4
The first column of table 12.1 displays the result of this initial explor-
atory model.5 Partisanship is by far the most powerful factor, as expected. 
The other variables generally take on their expected sign, although not all 
are statistically significant. Retrospective evaluations in particular fail to be 
influential, just as one would expect from the results in chapter 8. Age is 
also neither powerful nor significant, and in most alternate specifications 
it looked even less influential than it does here. And of course, that is to be 
expected, especially because the age distribution of ethnicities and identities 
does not differ in Taiwan: there are young and old in all groups.
The second column of table 12.1 therefore drops retrospections and age, 
and reestimates the model. As expected, very little changes. Thus, if retro-
spections or age somehow have small effects, we can be comfortable that 
their exclusion is not distorting the impact of other factors.
The issue that arises next concerns the prospective evaluations. The TEDS 
survey is conducted after the election. Thus, when voters are asked whether 
“the state of the economy of Taiwan will get better, stay about the same, 
or get worse,” they already know who won the election. We have known 
since The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960, 397– 400) that economic 
outlooks are powerfully influenced by partisanship: winners are optimis-
tic, losers are pessimistic. Thus, as chapter 8 discussed, some scholars have 
expressed the concern that the TEDS prospective economic evaluations ap-
pear influential only because they are caused by the dependent variable, and 
not because they have genuine explanatory power on their own. Thus, the 
impact of prospective evaluations may be substantially inflated in column 2. 
There is no way to know for certain with the data available.
TABlE 12.1: The Pan- Blue Presidential Vote in 2012























































































































Pseudo- R2 .67 .67 .64 .64
N 1,190 1,203 1,393 1,393
Note: * significant at .10. ** significant at .05. *** significant at .01. Dependent variable 
is 1 if the respondent voted for pan- Blue (Ma or Soong); 0 if for DPP (Tsai). Logit parameter 
estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).
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To allow for this possibility, column 3 of table 12.1 drops prospective 
evaluations from the statistical model. Partisanship remains as powerful as 
ever, as do most of the other variables, but the impact of social welfare at-
titudes drops, and the estimated effects of changes in county disposable in-
come and postsecondary education are cut in half. None of the latter three 
coefficients is large and none is even close to statistical significance: they may 
have a modest effect, but there is not enough evidence to support keeping 
them as explanatory factors.6
Column 4 of table 12.1 then drops these three variables with unprovable 
effects. The remaining coefficients change little, letting us assess the ethnicity 
and national identification effects. Column 4 shows that being a mainlander 
has an important positive impact on voting pan- blue, as expected, but be-
ing Minnan has only a small and statistically insignificant effect. That is, 
the Minnan are not distinguishable from the excluded category (Hakka). 
And second, being a Taiwanese identifier has a substantial and significant 
negative effect on voting pan- Blue, again as expected, but the other cat-
egories of ethnic identity (“Chinese” and none) have small and statistically 
insignificant effects; that is, they are indistinguishable from the excluded 
category (“dual identity”). Thus, within the limits of the available data, there 
are actually just two dichotomies where ethnicity and national identification 
are concerned: mainlanders vs. everyone else, and “Taiwanese” identification 
vs. everything else.7
Table 12.2 uses these two dichotomies to replace the more elaborate cod-
ing of table 12.1. All the other remaining variables are retained, generating 
our final, preferred model. Every variable is now comfortably statistically 
significant and most coefficients are quite large. Partisanship retains its over-
whelming effect, and apart from the demographic factors of being female or 
having little education, all the other explanatory factors are closely related to 
the central political cleavage on the island. Being a mainlander and identify-
ing as “Taiwanese” make a difference even after partisanship is controlled, as 
do opinions on unification/independence and on the cross- Strait economic 
agreement, ECFA.
Thus again we find that partisanship, ethnicity, national identity, and the 
main political dimension are more tightly linked in Taiwan than elsewhere. 
Ethnicity is fixed, but the other three can be chosen. We find that they are 
causally joined with each other, so that for most politically knowledgeable 
Taiwan citizens, conceptions of national identity, partisan identification, 
and position on issues related to China are strongly connected. Other politi-
cal issues tend to be swept up into this complex of interrelationships: the 
clarity of that relationship on the island suggests strongly that politics else-
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where works the same way, even if the researcher cannot otherwise penetrate 
the murkiness of most countries’ multiple identities, issues, and parties. In 
that sense, the bright clarity of Taiwan’s political life helps us see into the 
shrouded complexity of other countries’ polities. That is what we have tried 
to help the reader accomplish in this volume.
A New Cleavage?
Recent political developments in Taiwan have led some scholars to speculate 
that “class politics based on wealth gap has become a new driving force of 
Taiwan’s party politics” (Wu 2014, 1). That is, the dominant political cleav-
age has shifted away from the unification- independence issue to the widen-
ing gap of economic distribution. Indeed, beginning in the early 2000s, 
Taiwan’s economy experienced a gradual slowdown, economic inequality 
worsened, and the rate of unemployment rose as well.




















Note: * significant at .10. ** significant at .05. 
*** significant at .01. Dependent variable is 1 if the 
respondent voted for Pan- Blue (Ma or Soong); 0 if for 
DPP (Tsai). Logit parameter estimates (with standard 
errors in parentheses).
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As a remedy for Taiwan’s economic misfortunes, leaders of the Pan- Blue 
Alliance see the Chinese mainland as an economic opportunity, and they 
argue that an economic liberalization policy is the means to the island’s eco-
nomic revival. Access to China’s vast market, however, is contingent on an 
improved cross- Strait political relationship. Thus, after taking office in 2008 
the Ma administration of the KMT implemented a policy of rapproche-
ment toward Beijing. As was explained in chapter 1, cross- Strait tension at-
tenuated after a series of accords were signed between the two governments, 
including the landmark trade deal known as the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement. Unfortunately, the expansion of cross- Strait eco-
nomic exchanges did not improve Taiwan economic fortunes in the short 
term, and the island’s unemployment rate and economic inequality contin-
ued to worsen. Leaders of the Pan- Green Alliance therefore criticized Ma’s 
liberalization policy as only allowing the import of cheap Chinese goods, 
thereby hurting the island’s own industries, widening the gap between haves 
and have- nots, and worsening the job prospects of the younger generation. 
Pan- Green leaders also argued that Ma’s rapprochement policy of advanc-
ing cross- Strait relationship on the basis of the “1992 Consensus”— or “one 
China with different interpretations”— is tantamount to surrendering Tai-
wan’s sovereignty to the Beijing government.8 These concerns were a promi-
nent feature of the 2012 presidential election, and they constituted the un-
derlying appeal of the 2014 protest known as the Sunflower Movement, led 
by a group of young people.9
But do the recent economic concerns and the disputes over ECFA herald 
the arrival of a new central dimension in Taiwan political life (Wu 2014)? Or 
is ECFA just another issue being swept up into the usual partisan cleavage? 
We have argued throughout this book that on Taiwan, issues are primarily 
consequences of partisanship and national identity, not causes. Disagree-
ments over ECFA certainly involve differences over trade liberalization vs. 
autarky, and thus they might represent purely economic disagreements— a 
new dimension, perhaps even a partisan realignment. But ECFA also re-
quires closer integration with China, and that aspect of the policy might be 
dominant in people’s thinking in the way that we have seen repeatedly in 
this volume.
Fortunately, the 2012 TEDS survey permits a test of these alternate ex-
planations. The survey contains a question about conventional left- right at-
titudes, which we have called the “social welfare” issue:
Regarding the question of social welfare, some people believe that 
the government should merely maintain the current system in order 
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not to increase people’s tax. Other people believe that the govern-
ment should promote social welfare, even though it will lead to a tax 
increase.
As Wu (2014, 16) notes, this question is not directly about redistribu-
tion. However, it is certainly related to it: maintaining the status quo is 
precisely the means to avoid tax increases of all kinds, including those for 
reducing inequality through redistribution. Laissez- faire domestic attitudes 
should predict laissez- faire international trade policy attitudes, at least to 
some degree, if a new economic dimension is really emerging. Thus, if ar-
guments about ECFA are truly economic arguments, answers to this social 
welfare question will inevitably be related to attitudes toward ECFA. On the 
other hand, if ECFA is just another aspect of the main cleavage, then parti-
sanship and attitudes toward unification/independence should be far better 
predictors of what people think about ECFA.
Table 12.3 shows the result of an ordered logit analysis of ECFA opinions 
on partisanship, unification/independence, and the social welfare question. 
As the table shows, the first two factors are powerful and statistically signifi-
cant predictors of ECFA attitudes. The coefficient on the social welfare item, 
on the other hand, is not only small and highly statistically insignificant, but 














Note: * significant at .10. ** significant at .05. 
*** significant at .01. Dependent variable is 1 if the 
respondent believes that ECFA will make his family 
better off; 0 if worse off, and .5 if the same or not sure. 
Ordered logit parameter estimates (with standard er-
rors in parentheses).
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it actually has the wrong sign. Net of partisanship and unification attitudes, 
laissez- faire attitudes toward social goals have zero effect on what people 
think about the laissez- faire policies embodied in ECFA. The obvious con-
clusion is that in the voters’ minds, ECFA was about China, not about eco-
nomics. Like postal voting, ECFA is yet another policy pulled into the main 
Taiwan cleavage. Indeed, a survey conducted after the Sunflower Movement 
confirms the above observation (Yen, Kay, and Chen 2015). Their results 
indicate that the perceived economic interests of Taiwan citizens do affect 
their positions on trade policies, but that Taiwanese nationalism and security 
concerns play a more paramount role in their positions.
If Taiwan’s democracy survives its external threats long enough, then 
some day, undoubtedly, Taiwan’s internal political divisions will represent 
something other than disputes over national identity. That day may arrive 
quickly, or it may not. But as of 2012, the date of the most recent presiden-
tial survey data available, such additional considerations had at best only a 
small impact on the presidential election. We find no credible evidence that 
the beginnings of a new dimension had emerged in voters’ minds.
Looking to the Future
Now if partisanship in Taiwan is strong and other issues matter relatively 
little, how stable is Taiwan voters’ electoral behavior? What are the implica-
tions of our findings for Taiwan’s future elections? Taiwan’s party system 
has consolidated into what is effectively a two- party system, as chapter 10 
explains. The resulting stability corroborates Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) 
“freezing hypothesis”: a party system reflecting key political cleavages in the 
society is expected to be fairly stable. In fact, a 2012 TEDS panel study rein-
terviewed the 2008 respondents, finding that among those who voted KMT 
in the 2008 presidential election, 89 percent voted for the KMT again in 
2012. The corresponding number for the DPP was precisely the same— 89 
percent. These stability rates are similar to those in other two- party democ-
racies, such as the United States, and they indicate that Taiwan’s democracy 
is consolidating its party system and the loyalty of partisans. Whether this 
stability is due to American- style psychological identification with the par-
ties or to the steady force of other attitudes and identities makes no differ-
ence for our purposes.
The analysis in chapter 2 has shown that the Pan- Blue Alliance has en-
joyed on average a 5– 10 percentage point electoral advantage at the national 
level since 2000, and yet the DPP has won three of the six presidential 
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elections since democratization. How is that possible? First of all, as past 
experience has shown, the Pan- Blue Alliance is notoriously susceptible to 
internal division. As was discussed in chapter 2, the KMT was severely di-
vided in the 1996, 2000, and 2012 presidential elections. When a number 
of party members failed to secure the party nomination for the presidency, 
they ran as independents or became party switchers. Indeed, it was Pan- Blue 
candidates, Soong and Lien, who divided nearly 60 percent of the electoral 
support and thereby delivered the victory to the DPP- affiliated Chen in the 
2000 presidential election, who won the election with only 39.3 percent of 
the votes. Even in the absence of Pan- Blue divisions, a properly engineered 
campaign strategy by the Pan- Green Alliance may secure a win, especially 
when economic prospects look weak under Pan- Blue control.
Furthermore, even if Taiwan voters’ electoral behavior is largely deter-
mined by their partisan affiliations, the vision for the country that a can-
didate presents continues to play an important role in citizens’ electoral 
calculus. As chapter 3 shows, the majority of the island citizens consider 
Taiwan an independent state separate from China, but they are risk- averse 
and pragmatic on cross- Strait relations. The majority of them are not willing 
to sacrifice their hard- won democratic way of life and economic prosperity 
for such radical political changes as declaring de jure independence or uni-
fication. Precisely because the island’s future relation with China is the key 
political cleavage of the society, any presidential hopeful will need to present 
a realistic and workable vision to the electorate or suffer the consequence of 
losing the election.
The 2012 presidential election best illustrates this logic.10 Indeed, ob-
servers generally believe that the loss of Tsai Ing- wen, the DPP nominee, 
in Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election was related to her ambiguous stand 
on cross- Strait policy. Tsai’s campaign strategy was to deemphasize cross- 
Strait issues, a strong suit for the KMT but a major DPP weakness, and to 
focus more on social issues such as economic growth and inequality. While 
Ma’s policy had a proven record of engaging China and had been praised by 
Washington, Tsai’s “Taiwan Consensus” was necessarily short on specifics 
due to the internal politics of the DPP. On the one hand, the DPP needed 
to court the backing of its core supporters, who were generally in favor of 
Taiwan’s de jure independence from China. On the other hand, the DPP 
also needed to win the support of moderate partisan identifiers from both 
alliances who did not support unification but wanted to avoid inflammatory 
rhetoric and policies that could lead to cross- Strait tension. Tsai was thus 
trapped in the dilemma of needing to mobilize the party’s core supporters by 
appealing to their political identity, while not alienating the more moderate 
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centrists. The ambiguity and lack of specificity provided the KMT with am-
munition for an attack. It also raised uncertainty about cross- Strait relations 
should she win the election, with a potential to destabilize Taiwan’s uneasy 
but carefully managed relationship with the mainland. Ultimately, the elec-
tion came down to a choice between “1992 Consensus/stability” vs. “Tai-
wan Consensus/potential instability,” which was a manifestation of Taiwan’s 
key political cleavage. The incumbent Ma was a vulnerable candidate with 
many weaknesses, but he managed to win a second term.
Interestingly, during the 2016 presidential election held on the island, 
the cross- Strait relationship appeared to be a mute issue. If the China fac-
tor heats up Taiwan’s dominant political cleavage, as we have argued, why 
were there no sparks thrown off during the campaign? In our view, this is 
due to a divided KMT and a moderate stance adopted by the DPP presi-
dential nominee, Tsai Ing- wen. As we noted earlier, the Pan- Blue Alliance 
is notoriously susceptible to internal division. The 2016 election was no 
exception. Immediately after Hung Hsiu- chu became the party’s presiden-
tial nominee, many KMT elites and local leaders contemplated replacing 
her with someone else (Peng and Chin 2015). They eventually succeeded, 
making Eric Chu the KMT nominee. James Soong, formerly of the KMT, 
also ran as the candidate of the PFP. Meanwhile, realizing that cross- Strait 
policy is her Achilles’ heel, Tsai moderated her stance by claiming that she 
would maintain the cross- Strait status quo if elected. Although Tsai’s vague 
China policy presented the KMT with an opportunity for attack, as it did 
in the 2012 election, the divided KMT could not launch an effective of-
fensive against Tsai’s stance on cross- Strait relations (Lowther 2015). The 
unpopularity of the Ma administration and the relatively stagnant economy 
probably also helped Tsai. In the end, she won easily. Thus the China factor 
may have played a less explicit role in the 2016 campaign than in past years. 
But does that mean that the traditional Taiwan political cleavage will be any 
less influential in voters’ decisions or in the near term?
As the old Danish proverb has it (sometimes attributed to the Danish 
physicist Niels Bohr or to the American baseball player Yogi Berra), “Pre-
diction is very difficult, especially about the future.” We know no reliable 
fortune teller who could tell us how Taiwan’s politics and international sta-
tus will evolve. For the medium term, however, we see no prospect that a 
de facto independent Taiwan will develop another cleavage to replace the 
powerful role of “the China factor.” China is too near, too antagonistic, and 
too strong. Each of the two parties may trim, modify, and deemphasize, but 
inevitably one will represent faster progress toward independence and the 
other will want to go slow, engage with China, and avoid irreversible decla-
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rations that would likely lead to war. Those differences, tied to deep social 
cleavages, will not evaporate any time soon.
Chinese- American relations may have much to do with the outcome that 
prevails. Taiwan is a small country, and its fate is not entirely in its hands. 
But so long as it persists as a democracy, it can talk about the future it wants 
for itself, and it can use elections to put alternate teams in place, teams that 
differ on the right national identity for the island country. As we have shown 
in this book, that is what politics in Taiwan is fundamentally about.
There are many lessons to be taken from the study of Taiwan, and we 
conclude with just one that seems to us the most important. Taiwan illus-
trates in great detail the power of identity in politics. In every country that 
we know, the choice of partisanship is not primarily about issues; it is about 
identity. Election campaigns are not centrally about proper positioning in 
some ideological space; they are primarily about mobilizing identity groups. 
Candidate personalities and the state of the economy matter at the margin, 
but the major effects shaping democratic elections are determined well in 
advance by the balance of partisanship in the electorate. And that balance is 
determined by the complex, interconnected histories of the relevant identity 
groups and their resulting affinities and antagonisms.
Yet there is dispute about these claims among scholars. Some believe that 
an understanding of politics has to begin from preferences, and that pref-
erences are about self- interest, often material self- interest and social class. 
Indeed, in most countries, it can be hard to tell the difference between self- 
interest and identity explanations in the welter of competing identities and 
interests. But Taiwan is a place where one can see those forces in undiluted 
form and without the multiple cleavages and countervailing effects present 
in larger countries. Because identity effects are not being obscured in the 
cross- section by equally large and opposite identity effects, as they often 
are elsewhere, Taiwan lets us see just how strong those identity effects are. 
And the answer from Taiwan is: very strong indeed. Just as the Galapagos 
Islands showed Darwin how evolution worked everywhere, but in a clear 
and indisputable way, so also the island of Taiwan demonstrates in a clear 
and indisputable way that identities are where to start in thinking about 
electoral politics.
In turn, that suggests that the first questions to ask about another coun-
try’s party system are not: What are the main political issues? Or: How are 
the parties positioned from left to right? Both questions may matter for 
governmental policy but have little resonance in the public mind. For the 
average citizen, perceptions of issues and ideologies are primarily derivative 
rather than causal, as this book has repeatedly shown and as other scholars 
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have demonstrated for other countries (Campbell et al. 1960, chaps. 6, 7; 
Lenz 2012; Achen and Bartels 2016, chaps. 9, 10).
Thus an implication of this book is that the key questions for under-
standing voting are not issues and party positions, as so many comparative 
studies assume. Instead, scholars should ask: What are the principal identity 
groups? And how are they connected to the political parties? Those are ques-
tions that need to be posed everywhere. But we hope that we have convinced 
the reader that nowhere is their value and power more obvious scientifically 
than in Taiwan. For that reason, the study of Taiwan, valuable for its own 
sake, is even more valuable for what it has to teach us about how elections 
should be understood around the world.
Notes
 1. Citizens of Britain and the United States may recall a similar dispute from the 
1770s.
 2. In Taiwan’s TEDS survey, party identification is measured in the usual interna-
tional manner, as “leaning to” a political party. That language is quite different from 
the original American survey item, and it also differs from the wordings in use in some 
other democracies. Question wording matters substantially where party identification 
is concerned (for example, Sinnott 1998), and a better understanding of what wording 
is best for Taiwan now that the party system has consolidated is an important topic for 
future research. For our purposes, however, it makes no difference whether Taiwan’s 
partisanship is a meaningful psychological identity or simply a habituated behavioral 
partisanship. The point is that, either way, it organizes attitudes and votes.
 3. Throughout this chapter, partisanship is coded on a seven- point scale, ranging 
from “very strongly” lean to the DPP to “very strongly” lean to the KMT. The middle 
category represents those who do not lean to either party.
 4. The opinion items and the prospective and retrospective economic evaluations 
all have three response categories, and they are coded 0, .5, and 1, with upper values 
indicating more pan- Blue/proincumbent attitudes. Age is coded so that age 20 = 0 
and age 100 = 1. Percentage disposable income changes are divided by 20, so that 
they range approximately from - .5 to +.5. All other explanatory factors are dummy 
variables coded either 0 or 1. We have not included candidate traits because the list of 
such factors is very long, and because chapter 8 demonstrated that such evaluations 
are driven primarily by partisanship. We also excluded left- right orientation because, 
as chapter 9 showed, that variable is meaningless in Taiwan, and thus the variable was 
dropped from the 2012 TEDS presidential study. Previous work on the 2008 presi-
dential election showed that left- right positions had only a small, statistically insignifi-
cant effect on the vote (Hsiao and Lin, 2013).
 5. We found repeatedly that the survey weights made no meaningful difference, 
and so we have chosen to present unweighted results throughout this chapter.
 6. The county- level disposable income figures are quite variable from one year to 
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the next, especially for the smaller counties, which are difficult to survey adequately 
in every country. Thus the available measures may represent actual disposable income 
changes with substantial error. In addition, there have been too few presidential elec-
tions to run regressions with national- level data. Our provisional conclusion in this 
book is that retrospective economic voting is not very consequential in Taiwan, but the 
topic cries out for additional research.
 7. We also tested the coefficients for Chinese identity and no identity to see wheth-
er they were jointly significant. However, the Wald test in each of the four columns 
of table 12.1 was very far from statistical significance, meaning that deleting both 
variables was justified.
 8. The “1992 Consensus” maintains that the notion of “one China” should serve 
as the basis for cross- Strait interactions. However, the two governments had different 
interpretations of what “one China” was. This is the tacit understanding presumably 
reached by Beijing and Taipei in November 1992. See Su and Cheng (2002).
 9. The “Sunflower Movement” was a protest against a proposed cross- Strait trade- 
in- service agreement. It lasted more than 20 days between March 18 and April 10, 
2014, during which time student demonstrators occupied the Legislative Yuan and 
damaged the main government buildings of the Executive Yuan. The movement 
reflects the public’s concern about Taiwan’s increasingly close economic ties with Chi-
na. It also led to a massive demonstration against the Ma administration’s cross- Strait 
policies in front of the presidential office on March 30 (J. R. 2014).
 10. For further discussion of the 2012 presidential election, see Romberg (2011) 
and Paal (2012).
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